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1. Introduction
1. Introduction
Two questions were the backbone for writing this dissertation. The first asks: ‘What
is risk and how is risk perceived in society?’ or as I frame it ‘What is the sound of
risk?’ The second question takes a step in a concrete direction. The second question
furthermore is pointing towards a specific aim. Hence, the second question is: ‘How
can a deeper understanding of nuclear risk perception help to create a peaceful and
sustainable world for future generations?’ In my dissertation I am not able to answer
the second question and in truth, I have been challenged to answer the fist one. I have
also redefined my questions so they are more precise and can be answered with scientific
knowledge and methods. I use all my knowledge, proficiency, respect, and boldness to
answer the questions.
In the title I describe risk as a sound. A sound is an impulse that resonates within a
given space, like a signal that transmits and changes information (Kasperson et al., 1988).
I chose the word sound because it indicates the multifaceted nature of a risk. Something
resonates within a given social space and creates a sound that can be perceived and
interpreted as a risk. Depending on the impulse, the space, and the receiver the sound
of risk is differently perceived within this space. The perception of risk is embedded
within a social space and by passing on information the perception of risk is able to
change that space from within. A sound is an invitation, an object of change. Sounds
are deeply intertwined and cannot be separated from one another – and so are the
perceptions of risk. Using the analogy of sound with the concept of risk, I want to invite
others to keep thinking of the idea of risk. Somebody can use my work to get inspired
and to continue research on this topic.
On an abstract level, I imagine the sound of risk as an invitation to play together; to
add new information and above all to listen to each other. In my work, as in my music,
I am opening a space for exchanges of ideas. Silence also is a sound resonating in the
space of ignorance. A sound can open that silent spaces within our societies allowing to
start dialogues and social changes. My hope is that the awareness of nuclear risks keeps
a dialogue alive that is constantly working on solutions to improve how social beings live
together peacefully today and for future generations.
On a concrete level, pragmatism and curiosity motivated me to want to develop a
deeper understanding of nuclear risk perception. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear acci-
dent on March 11, 2011 was a shock for me. I was surprised how little expertise exists
among experts and authorities in terms of solutions and protection for affected com-
munities in the area. I was also astounded to see how the accident created a social
dynamic in distant places, such as in Germany, that forced political authorities to in-
stantly react to tame nuclear fears. I might have forgotten about this accident had I not
been curious about statistical methods, specifically for causal analysis. This interest led
to the discovery of a unique situation in the data structure of the International Social
Survey Programme (ISSP) and its Environmental Module III (ISSP, 2012), which was
1
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the data set I was working with in 2012 analyzing environmental concern. Nuclear acci-
dents happen randomly. Such an unexpected event becomes a cut point that divides the
data structure in a pre- and post-Fuksushima sample. The survey was collected in 2010
and 2011. Therefore, the data in the ISSP made it possible to compare respondents’
attitudes towards nuclear power before and after the Fukushima accident. I had data,
statistical skills, people to advise me, and I wanted to know how the Fukushima Dai-
ichi accident changed individuals perception of nuclear power. However, the question
remained: what exactly is nuclear risk perception? Holding this question, I started to
write my dissertation.
To understand the concept of risk, especially of nuclear, I decided to observe this
phenomenon from various perspectives. To do so I step by step chose what literature
to include in my dissertation. The order of chapters and topics reflects this approach.
Often the chapters are based on one mayor literature source and I let the authors speak
in their own voice, presenting their ideas and understandings of risk and risk perception.
I also have given some chapters more weight than others. Therefore the weight of
perspectives and ideas in my dissertation follows not a well balanced way but sometimes
is following one source or perspective in more detail and depth. I wanted to present
existing information, expressed and explained by excellent scholars, in a new order to
hopefully find new ways of seeing the problem. I would like to inspire other scholars,
individuals – including myself – to work on future solutions of how to solve the risk of
nuclear energy.
The purpose of my work is to broaden the present view, rather than to explain the
existence of risk and risk perception, and the causal mechanisms that create a risk
perception. If my work helps to understand causal mechanisms in more detail and
supports or rejects existing hypotheses and assumptions, than this is a side product of a
more severe question: How to create a world that is free of nuclear threat in the future?
This is my underlying intention and goal. The combination of all involved perspectives
can maybe reveal the answer for solutions.
As I mentioned previously, my aim is to complement and expand upon the existing
work on risk research in social sciences. Excellent people have reflected upon problem
from a wide range of perspectives, collaborated internationally, shared and documented
their ideas. Take for instance the book: ‘The Risk Society Revisited : Social Theory
and Governance’ by Eugene A. Rosa, Ortwin Renn, and Aaron M. McCright (Rosa
et al., 2014). Another example is Ortwin Renn’s book ‘Risk Governance: Coping with
Uncertainty in a Complex World’ (Renn, 2008). Both book explain the concept of risk
from a sociological perspective in a depth I am not able to do. Therefore, my theoretical
work will emphasize certain aspects through such authors and their ideas to learn about
existing views, and to challenge existing perspectives on (nuclear) risk. This will be
followed by my personal empirical analysis on nuclear risk perception.
This dissertation is divided in three parts. The first part, ‘The sound of risk,’ will
develop an understanding of what risk is and how it is perceived by humans. The second
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and main part of my dissertation, ‘Towards a deeper understanding of nuclear risk per-
ception,’ provides information about existing scientific approaches, in order to explain
differences in individual’s perception of nuclear risk. In three empirical analyses, I test
theoretical claims and hypotheses on nuclear risk perception in a cross-national com-
parison, while taking into consideration potential effects due to the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear accident. The final third part, ‘The art of change,’ is included in the dissertation
to provide information and to inspire of how to govern risk such as nuclear risk in the
future. This work is by no means complete, and clearly, not free of ignorance and error
and. There is certainly more work to do, but this is a start.
The following is a summarize of each chapter, including my main sources and authors
I have worked with.
1.1. The sound of risk
In Section 2, the concept of risk is introduced and discussed. My first attempt to
understand the concept of risk is rimmed within two possible boundaries: a positivistic
perspective on the one hand and a constructivist perspective on the other (Rosa, 1998;
Rosa et al., 2014). From a positivistic point of view, risks are an ontological reality, an
existing entity independent of human’s perception. From a constructivist point of view,
the epistemological approach, risks are not an independent entity but are socially created
when entering the social space. Through communication, risks take on a social meaning.
Here I refer primarily to literature from Eugene Rosa (1998) and Rosa and colleagues
(2014). Rosa develops an approach that combines the epistemological as well as the
ontological perspective, into one framework, called the “hierarchical epistemology and
realist ontology (HERO)” concept (Rosa et al., 2014, 27-32). All knowledge claims about
risks are based within these two boundaries of factual knowledge on the one hand and
mere interpretation based on non-knowledge on the other. I turn to Karl Popper (1982)
and Paul Feyerabend (1993) to argue that, assuming the world is based on knowledge and
realism, allowing an epistemological perspective only to be an exception, would result
in a manifestation of one dominant perspective that does not allow for a “pluralistic
methodology” (Feyerabend, 1993, 21), which is the possibility on entering an unknown
space to create an open space where future solutions can take shape. I argue in favor
of a pluralistic methodology and a sense for openness in scientific reasoning. In a world
of high uncertainty and low empirical knowledge, tautological reasoning, as well as the
acceptance of an infinite regress can be useful sources to form new perspectives on social
realities.
In the second part of this chapter (Section 2.4), I summarize different definitions of
risk and conclude that risk is a normative concept. My thoughts are based on literature
by Terje Aven and Ortwin Renn who define risk as: “uncertainty about and severity
of the events and consequences (or outcomes) of an activity with respect to something
that humans value” (Aven and Renn, 2009, 6). I then define the prototype of a ‘risk
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entrepreneur’ using Knight’s idea of uncertainty, an unmeasurable entity that cannot be
controlled by social behavior. A risk entrepreneur is aware of the nature of uncertainty
however is able to inwardly restructure knowledge and non-knowledge of risks within
social contexts, such as social institutions. A risk entrepreneur reformulates the commu-
nicative processes around how risks are perceived and how future solutions are planned
and decided.
Holding an awareness of the vastness of communicative processes, I define risk as:
‘uncertainty about and severity of the events and consequences (or out- comes) of an
activity with respect to something that humans value. The interpretation of uncer-
tainty and severity is a communicative social process and as such open.’ Charles Perrow
(1999) remarks that risks and risk communications are embedded within social power
structures. To define the ‘sound of risk‘ I have included also the existing power struc-
tures in my concept and define risk as: ‘uncertainty about and severity of the events and
consequences (or outcomes) of an activity with respect to something that humans value.
The interpretation of uncertainty and severity is a communicative social process and
as such open. The openness depends on the social power structure. The social power
structure as such depends on previous decision making processes under uncertainty.’
The first part’s second chapter, Section 3, narrows the scope of reflection and points
towards the technologically and socially created risk of nuclear technology. I reflect
on potential consequences that the existence of nuclear technology, especially nuclear
weapons, can have for human life now and in the future. The existence of nuclear
technology, its knowledge as well as the ability to build nuclear weapons, created a
social reality in which a “nuclear Holocaust” (Jasanoff, 2006, 30) of human life on earth
is possible. In this chapter I refer to Antony Giddens’ book ‘The Consequences of
Modernity’ (1990) and work by Sheila Jasanoff (2006). The aim of this chapter is to
mention a utopian reality wherein it is possible to govern risks peacefully, justly, and
humbly by creating new social institutions and resilient communities. Through these
descriptions of possibilities like a “nuclear winter” (Giddens, 1990, 28) I want to span
the scope of reflection from the case in which the risk of nuclear technology is able to
destroy social life almost entirely, to a possibility wherein the existence and awareness
of nuclear risk can create a new social reality which is fully prepared to solve and govern
existing, as well as, new naturally and socially induced risks. The choice is ours.
In this first part, I aim to introduce the reader to the concept of risk, allowing to
address risk as socially constructed as well as empirically grounded. The fear of a mas-
sive nuclear catastrophe creates a new space of uncertainty. This space of uncertainty
is realistic as well as utopian, grounding reflections of how to govern risks. The sound
of risk, the combination of human’s realistic as well as utopian thoughts, is constantly
changing. Figure 1 depicts the above summarized thoughts and emphasizes by its circu-
lar arrangement that the evaluation of risk is a self-enforcing and self-reflecting process.
From my point of view there is no prevalence of one perspective. For example, the idea
of a nuclear winter allows Giddens to speak about an utopian society (Giddens, 1990).
On the other hand, from my understanding, social utopias led to the real scenario of
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Figure 1: Summarizing the sound of risk: a multidimensional concept
world wars, as well as, to the dream of an endless, cheap, and clean source of energy in
the post World War II era. I will get back to these thoughts in the introduction of the
first empirical chapter (Section 6) referring to Dwight D. Eisenhower’s address ‘Atoms
for Peace’ (Eisenhower, 1953)1 in 1953. From each perspective the concept of risk, the
‘sound of risk’ is real and justified, creating a space of uncertainty, the birthplace for
new social realities.
1Document available at http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/all_about_ike/speeches/atoms_
for_peace.pdf (accessed October 15, 2015).
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1.2. Towards a deeper understanding of nuclear risk perception
The second part, ‘Towards a Deeper Understanding of Nuclear Risk Perception’ shares
explanations of how individuals derive their assessments and judgments of risks. Risk
perception is introduced as a multidimensional concept with different facets, depending
on how individuals evaluate hazards (Rohrmann and Renn, 2000). Especially in a cross-
national comparative context, empirical risk perception research in social sciences varies
depending on the risks under evaluation, the complexity of the design, and the sample
size and quality of the data structure. This part contains a theoretical and an empirical
part. The main theoretical chapter, Section 4.2, describes different approaches how risks
are evaluated by individuals. The concept of heuristics is introduced to refer to a basic
and intuitive approach. A risk’s qualitative aspects are taken into consideration when
evaluating a risk from the psychometric perspective. Research using the psychometric
approach (cf. Slovic, 2000a) observed that risks, perceived as dreadful and unfamiliar,
are judged as severe risks. Further important qualitative aspects of individual’s risk
judgment are: if a risk is taken voluntarily, if someone is involuntarily exposed to a risk,
or if individuals or institutions are responsible for a risk. This chapter also discusses a
risk’s potential to spread in an uncontrollable way across social boundaries (Section 4.2.3
and Section 4.2.8). Risks with a high dread potential, such as nuclear power, can, in
a case of an accident, affect individual or institutional actors at distant places and in-
stitutional or economic sectors that are not directly linked with that technology. In
such a case, institutional or individual actors act as social amplification stations of risk
(Kasperson et al., 1988). An important content in this theoretical chapter is to em-
phasize emotional aspects that influence individual’s risk perception (Slovic et al., 2004;
Loewenstein et al., 2001). Emotions seem to be an important component influencing
how information related to risks is evaluated. Emotions area an important element in
intuitively judging a risk activating affectively laden images. I argue that emotions are
necessary to overcome socially constructed and institutionalized ignorance structures,
designed to control uncertainty (Smithson, 2008).
The second part’s second theoretical chapter, Section 5, systematically describes how
certain individual factors are related with risk perception, specifically nuclear risk per-
ception. This chapter provides the theoretical, empirical evidence, and analytical foun-
dation for my personal empirical analysis on nuclear risk perception. The content is
related to Renn and Rohrmann’s integrative framework on empirical risk perception
research (Renn and Rohrmann, 2000b, compare Section 5.6). Three questions have
motivated my analyses: (1) How are values and socio-demographic factors shaping indi-
vidual’s perceptions?; (2) How are these factors contributing to form extreme differences
on nuclear risk perception within a society?; (3) How do these differences differ between
societies? For the first question, I have included an explanation of how values and
value cluster – such as post-materialistic values – are able to influence risk perception.
Even though the concept of cultural prototypes (Section 5.2.2) is not unequivocally to
operationalize with the data I use I have included this approach because it allows to
reflect why, due to matters of social organization, individuals approach to assess a risk
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can widely differ within and between societies. An important aspect to include is an
individual’s trust in social institutions, Section 5.2.3. Many modern and technological
risks are not experienced directly, but are indirectly managed, controlled, and regulated
by state authorities and institutionalized actors.
Section 5.3, describes socio-demographic factors and their relationships, aims to grasp
a deeper understanding of how individual socio-demographic factors influence differences
in nuclear risk perception. My first point of interest is the observed gender gap in nuclear
risk perception: women express consistently higher levels of nuclear risk perception in
empirical risk research. With this topic, I first consider factors such as occupational
status and/or level of education as possible unobserved factors influencing the gender
effect on nuclear risk perception, Section 5.3.1. Then I take a step further to reflect
upon the relationship of role models, self-identity and risk perception, Section 5.3.2.
Further socio-demographic aspects I consider to explain in this section are differences
between younger and older individuals and how social status, political ideology, as well
as locations are related to risk perception.
The following chapter summarize studies that compare risk perception cross nation-
ally, Section 5.4. I then provide national and cross-national studies that analyze how a
nuclear accident, such as the accident of Three Mile Island (1979), Chernobyl (1986),
and Fukushima (2011) is affecting nuclear risk perception, Section 5.5. It can be shown
that nuclear risk perception is a varying social phenomenon within any society however
homogeneously distributed across societies. The studies show that the social context,
such as the existing political system or the role of medias, is considered to be an influ-
ential factor that influences how individuals within a society react to a nuclear accident.
The short term effect of a nuclear accident lead to substantial changes in individual’s
risk perception even in distant places. In the long run the level of nuclear risk perception
adjusts back to pre-accident levels.
Before introducing the three empirical chapters, I summarize in Figure 2, the social
components I have examined and place into relation which reflect the concept of risk
perception. The core elements I am focusing on in my research are displayed in the ver-
tical aligned factors ranging from ‘heuristics’ to ‘social-demographic’ factors that shape
risk perception. In my research I do not distinguish between a hierarchical or sequential
structure of this mentioned components (compare for example Loewenstein et al., 2001;
Visschers and Siegrist, 2013). The elements that are horizontally ordered are steps in a
risk evaluation process indicating that information processing, risk communication, and
respective actions take place within a given social power structure. The arrows point in
both directions to indicate that the process that forms individual risk perceptions and
institutions to govern risks is a self-referential process mutually influencing each other.
The source of risk, at the very left side, can be evaluated and perceived by humans if
social processes have created an awareness and defined something as a risk.
In the following three empirical chapters, I focus on the vertical block in Figure 2
and test how individual factors are related to nuclear risk perception. In these chap-
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ters I have also taken into consideration how risks are evaluated within a historically
grown political power structure, which influences the evaluation process as well as how
individuals are able to exchange and communicate information within a community and
develop strategies to govern the risk. The three chapters are structured as separate
scientific research questions and follow the structure of a scientific journal publication.
All three empirical chapters use the ISSP 2010 as data source.
The first empirical chapter, Section 6, analyzes how socio-demographic factors and
values are related to nuclear risk perception (compare Section 5). The analyses are
performed separately for five selected countries: United States, Great Britain, France,
Germany, and Japan. I use data from the ISSP 2010 conducted before the Fukushima
Daiichi accident. The results show (compare Table 4) that quite similar effects are
observable in all five countries: women, as well as people who have a left political ori-
entation, express higher levels of nuclear risk perception. Older people and people with
higher income express lower levels of risk concern. A positive correspondence between
women and levels of education is observable in the U.S. and in France, indicating that
the observed negative effect of education in this countries is driven mostly by very well
educated male respondents. The development of nuclear technology and the anti-nuclear
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movement is summarized from a historical perspective in each country. The results allow
to hypothesize that individual’s nuclear risk perception indirectly influences the develop-
ment of a country’s nuclear project, if the political system allows civil society players to
influence the political decision making processes. High levels of nuclear risk perception
are a common phenomenon within all five countries – at least 39% of all respondents
perceive nuclear power plants as ‘very dangerous’ (compare Table 3). Furthermore, these
results suggest that similar socio-demographic factors drive nuclear risk perception. Yet,
national politics are differently affected by civil-society’s actors, leading for example to
a phase out of nuclear power in Germany and a continuity of the nuclear programme in
France or Japan. Hence, it can be assumed, even though I cannot prove this statisti-
cally, that the social context in which citizen’s judgment of nuclear power is expressed,
directly influences how nuclear risk perception shapes social change.
The second empirical chapter, Section 7, analyses the direct effect of the Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear accident on individual’s nuclear risk perception. I assume that the ac-
cident on March 11, 2011 naturally divides respondents into a control and a treatment
group.2 The underlying assumption is that the accident narrows the observed gap of
nuclear risk perception because people are unequally updating their views. The results
show that social groups, such as men or older people, who prior to the accident expressed
lower levels of nuclear risk concern, changed their views much more than individuals of
similar groups who prior to the accident perceived nuclear power plants as dangerous.
Heuristics, as well as emotional aspects (compare Section 4), can be used to explain
the observed short term changes within the sample groups. Since individuals are social
amplification stations, the results allow me to presume that sudden changes in nuclear
risk perception, even if only for a short time, can put pressure on policy makers. In
conclusion, I assume that after an accident people who are holding both, emotionally
positive as well as negative images of nuclear power, start to question their positive im-
ages. As a result, the gap between people with lower and higher nuclear risk perception,
on average, shrinks and shifts towards higher levels of nuclear concern – at least for a
short period of time.
In the third empirical chapter3, Section 8, I compare the concept of environmental
concern and nuclear risk perception. The assumption is that nuclear risk perception is
a specific aspect of the broader concept of environmental concern. Furthermore, that
socio-demographic factors as well as individual values correlate differently with both
environmental indicators. In fact, people with higher socio-economic status express
higher levels of environmental concern along with lower levels of nuclear risk perception.
In contrast women, compared to men, as well as people who hold post-materialistic
values, show higher levels of risk perception as well as environmental concern. The results
reveal that after the Fukushima Daiichi accident, respondents in the ISSP 2010 express
2 This chapter is a co-authored work with Dr. Rudolf Farys (University of Bern) who implemented
the statistical analysis and Dr. Thomas Häussler (University of Bern), who helped to structure the
idea.
3 This chapter is a translation of an already published German version (compare Vogl, 2014.)
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higher levels of nuclear risk perception whereas, on average, environmental concern is
not affected by the accident. For me, the question of whether nuclear risk perception
is a specific aspect of environmental concern or if the concept of risk perception is a
separate field within environmental sociology remains open.
I close the second part of my dissertation with a summary to explain that the theo-
retical concepts can be supported by my empirical findings. These are useful concepts
even though an encompassing theoretical framework in environmental sociology is miss-
ing. Renn and Rohrmann’s framework (2000b) is a useful approach to systematically
analyze the multi-facetted nature of nuclear risk perception. The observed effects seem
to be quite homogeneous across different societies. The effects differ compared to envi-
ronmental indicators such as the indicator of environmental concern. Risk perception
increases in case of the Fukushima Daiichi accident indicating a more evenly distributed
awareness of nuclear risks among all citizens after a major nuclear accident.
1.3. The art of change
The final part of the dissertation, titled ‘The Art of Change’ has two chapters. In
Section 9 strategies and concepts are introduced that offer the possibility of design-
ing institutional structures able to govern risks based on a dialogical communication
processes (Rosa et al., 2014). These concepts are a paradigmatic shift in decision mak-
ing processes, questioning the predominant command-and-control strategy following an
adaptive procedure to manage risks (Kasperson, 2013). The adaptive concept is designed
first to accept each basic rationale and position’s before developing possible solutions
to govern risks. Involving different positions, is a necessary step to derive the best so-
lution in the decision making process. Deliberative democratic participation combined
with scientific analytical knowledge allows us to learn from experience and to pursue an
adaptive management strategy based on the best available knowledge. Effective commu-
nication among all participants is undoubtedly becoming a key element towards building
trust, the foundation to bridge different positions and the point of departure to adopt
someone else’s perspective. Effective communication also keeps everyone actors included
and involved in the decision making process, even with conflicting positions. The mutual
acceptance of the decision making process strengthens a community’s ability to develop
strategies to govern risk able to affect the community (Jasanoff, 2006).
The final chapter, Section 10, summarizes the key findings and points to the limita-
tions of my dissertation. I am also asking the fundamental question: What lies beyond
risk perception? The key findings are that nuclear risk perception is a common social
phenomenon observed in all countries and as I conclude a global phenomenon. However,
nuclear risk perception differs within a population due to different evaluation strategies,
of which many are intuitively derived and based on emotions, challenging the assumption
that risks are evaluated based on objective criteria, such as probabilities and number
of fatalities. In the final chapter, I also ask if individual’s nuclear risk perception bears
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information and could be a powerful force that can be used to transform society. I use
Ulrich Beck’s reflection on a “cosmopolitan moment” (Beck, 2014, 88) to argue that nu-
clear risk perception does carry transformational power which can evoke awareness to
create social institutions able to govern risks for future generations. I further argue that
the awareness of global risks, threatening the existence of humanity, opens the space for
deeper reflection which can connect individuals and social groups to values able to bridge
the gap of enmity. Nuclear risk perception is neither an irrational feeling nor a product
of rational ignorance: it is a social phenomenon indicating that social influencers have
done well in the past and could do better to govern nuclear risks in the future.
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Part I.
The sound of risk
2. Critical self-assessment in the philosophy of
science
In the very first part of the dissertation I set out on the quest to answer the question:
What is reality? To find answers to this question, I have focused on different approaches
on how knowledge about reality is created? This quest – independent on how satisfying
the answers turn out to be – has lead me to the more specific question of whether or not
risks are real. The overall goal of this section is to provide a framework that enables the
reader to understand different knowledge claims in the context of risk evaluation pro-
cesses and, hence, is able to further improve decision making processes in risk assessment
processes.
This section is inspired by and relies on thoughts of Eugene Rosa (2014, 14-32, see also
Rosa, 1998), whose work on the meta-theoretical foundation of risk is – in my opinion –
of great depth and critical ingenuity. He, as well as his work with colleagues, illuminates
the boundaries of existing knowledge in various disciplines, providing a framework that
categorizes as well as possible the spheres of human approaches towards our world.
Rosa shapes the senses to identify different meta-theoretical perspectives and scientific
paradigms in different schools of thoughts. In line with his approach I wish to follow his
credo “to develop a cumulative understanding of risk”(Rosa, 1998, 16).
My argument for risk governance and future decision makers will be to create processes
that shape the awareness of different knowledge claims within society. Any individual
knowledge claim depends on the social context and the processes that shape individual’s
perception of the world. Independent of any social process, knowledge claims, I argue, are
a-priori equally valid and, hence, a-priori equally an object of skepticism, vigilance, and
scrutiny. An a-priori equally distributed ignorance seems to me to be an effective solution
to start to learn and to listen to each other. Scientific reasoning has been influenced
to a great deal by proving or rejecting knowledge claims using different methodological
approaches, such as logical reasoning or empirical proves. What if the idea of learning
from each other becomes more important than proving other’s knowledge as wrong? The
question then becomes: what can I learn about my reality by listening and understanding
different knowledge claims. Creating fragility about a world and social processes in the
world, we only barely understand or agree upon. I feel that the foundation of learning is
based on the idea of identifying spaces of ignorance through allowing our own knowledge
to be open to criticism. Solving complex problems in an uncertain world requires an
understanding of the world beyond limited individual knowledge.
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You could ask: To what degree is there an understanding of an outside world? Is
there a world independent of our understanding? Does reality exist? There are two ba-
sic perspectives in the philosophy of science. One could say that these two perspectives
represent two poles of knowledge claims about the world. The one pole is the ontol-
ogist or positivist school of thoughts whose most sedulous adherents believe only in a
reality and truth that is independent of human perception and that can be explained,
even though not perfectly. The other pole represents fearless devotees of epistemology,
forming the school of thoughts of constructivism or phenomenology. In the most ex-
treme interpretation, people believe that knowledge of an external physical world does
not exist, but is constructed through experience. Knowledge, such as generalized laws,
hence, is only a re-interpretation of individual experience. In the following sections I
will discuss both approaches in more detail and reflect to what degree the concept of
‘risk’ can be embedded in either school of thoughts.
2.1. Positivistic paradigm – an ontological approach
The positivist paradigm is the most prominent approach to risk analysis (Rosa, 1998,
19). In its pure form it is in line with the scientific principles of: “consistency in internal
logic, empirical support, and predictability of outcome under like conditions” (Rosa,
1998, 20). The aim of such an approach is to compare different hazards and make
them accountable, and, at the end, insurable. This approach defines risk in a singular
definition: risk = probability × consequences. The approach relies on both abstract
and clearly defined concepts and theories, such as the axioms of probability theory or
the axioms of the rational actor approach. These concepts provide clear criteria which
allow for empirical testing. Technical risk analysis is based on the concept of realism.
The advantage or the beauty of this approach is that risk analysis takes place in a
protected space of knowledge, “within a coherent and organized framework” of a shared
“semantic content”: a common language of logic, mathematical precision, and mutual
agreed criteria of empirical evidence (Rosa, 1998, 20). In its essence, the scientific logic
of this paradigm is based on the assumption that the world and the real truth can be
known, and that there are criteria that prove to what degree the truth can be studied
with empirical evidence and statistical testing. If there is empirical evidence found,
through various methods of observation, over a long period of time, the assumptions of
the positivistic paradigm can be met, and the outside world can be tested and defined
as external reality.
Rosa et al. (2014, 17-39) provide the example of gravity to support the realist view
of a world independent of human observation. And still, the authors state that our
understanding of the world will never be exactly as the world is, therefore always an
approximation – a world of no perfect isomorphism.4 Leaving even the infinitely small
4 That argument allows in return to claim that socially constructed knowledge claims are never perfect
but always subjective hypotheses and therefore fallible.
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space for subjective interpretation on an existing external reality leads always to knowl-
edge claims that are socially constructed – “[s]ocial construction can not be avoided”
(Rosa et al., 2014, 17). However, there is also a world out there that is almost free of
interpretation because brute facts have been observed by different social entities over
a long period of time: the facts are ostensible and repeatable. Gravity is such an ex-
ample of “pan-cultural recognition” (Rosa et al., 2014, 19). There is an intersubjective
agreement of independent observers of a repeatable fact that always lead to the same
result. “Such intersubjective agreement about this constraint, widely dispersed across
history and collective experience, suggests that this physical feature of the world is send-
ing compellingly similar signals to percipient observers – wherever or whenever they are.
Moreover, it implies that the source of these signals is outside our own phenomenological
context of interpretation” (Rosa et al., 2014, 19).
I want to point out that Rosa and colleagues use, from my point of view, a universal
and neutral language to describe their view of an ontological or positivistic realism. They
base their approach to prove that there is an outside world on the idea of N. Katherine
Hayles (Hayles, 1995). Hayles argues that realism can be illustrated by observing limi-
tations or constraints. That constraints are not to be influenced or changed by enabling
human agency i.e. the intension of not wanting things to happen: the pencil will drop
due to gravity, again and again. Humans learn that any physical feature is sending
signals. Signals seem to be some sort of information that vary in their form. If they
are strong, they can be interpreted as conditions of the world, independent of human
activity and there are clear cases that meet the criteria of being “mind-independent”
(Boghossian, 2006)5, an indicator of an outside reality. Which also means that some
signals are not clearly identified and, hence, an object of interpretation.
The shortcomings of the above mentioned positivistic paradigm have their origin in
the semantic condition of a scientific and technical understanding of the world. Phys-
ical facts or signals that do not meet the criteria are not testable and, hence, exclude
themselves from scientific reasoning and therefore from an accepted outside reality. An
outside reality, in that sense, only exists if the signal meets the methods that are able
to transform the signals into the common shared scientific languages, practices, and
paradigms. The realism paradigm over-simplifies outside signals into a scientific reality
to be treated as a “neutral product of science” (Rosa, 1998, 20). The narrow technical
view of positivistic science provokes critique. In the case of risk identification and risk
assessment, the reduction of risk into a neutral object excludes information that is for
example based on values or normative judgement. The critique is that ignoring socially
relevant factors leads to an ontological-bias. Risk in the positivistic tradition of scientific
reasoning then is perceived as a pure ontological object independent of its context and
epistemological meaning. Rosa (1998, 21) also remarks critically that if a risk’s rational
scientific solution is at the same time promoted as the ultimate and best solution for
social reality, it does not take into consideration ethical constraints – a pitfall of natu-
ralistic fallacy claiming that the scientific point of view is also the ethical best point of
5 Cited in (Rosa et al., 2014, 17).
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view. It is possible therefore that the technically best solution is not the socially most
accepted solution.
2.2. Constructivist paradigm – an epistemological approach
Rosa et al. (2014, 15) argue that human knowledge claims always are to some degree
socially shaped and an interpretation of an external reality. The authors conclude that
“there can never be a perfect isomorphism between the world and its states and our
understanding of it” (Rosa et al., 2014, 15). Scientific reasoning is never free of inter-
pretation – the breath of uncertainty and the doubt of a misguided interpretation loom
when expressing claims about the world. According to Lakatos (1999, 24), any belief has
its equal right to exist next to other beliefs and interpretations. Therefore, on the other
side of the demarcation line facing the “school [of] militant positivism” (Lakatos and
Feyerabend, 1999, 24) are the schools of thoughts that are based on skepticism, cultural
relativism, or rooted in the phenomenological tradition. From a meta-theoretical point
of view, scientific knowledge and any perception of reality or theory claiming truth, is
socially constructed and part of a belief system.
Comparing the constructivist paradigm with the positivistic paradigm, Rosa (1998,
21) points out that in the constructivist tradition the world outside is a constant process
of interpreting and negotiating past actions and its possible meanings. The process of
perceiving and negotiating knowledge is equivalent to the world outside, manifesting the
reality at a specific time and space. Hence, “[f]or the most devoted social constructivists
there is no separation between reality and our perception of reality” (Rosa, 1998, 21).
From this point of view, objective reality is a cultural phenomenon, becoming real if it
enters the collective consciousness or awareness of cultures and social systems, by getting
a social meaning through communicative processes. Risk in this sense is not an external
object, rather a social negotiation. Risks are not perceived as a constant outside object,
but are continuously reshaped and defined by the ongoing negotiations between all in-
volved social actors: “Physical risks thus have to be recognized as embedded within and
shaped by social relations and the continual negotiation of our social entities” (Wynne,
1992a).6 The nature of socially constructed risks is constantly changing, therefore, in a
world of social interaction, risks are never a constant physical phenomenon.
The constructivist paradigm is not free of critique. Rosa et al. (2014, 16) mention
three points of critique that are relevant in the case of risk analysis. The first point of
logical critique is the tautological nature of the paradigm: “if all knowledge is socially
constructed saying that the risk is a social construction is a tautology.” Tautologies are
statements that are true by definitions, free of falsification and, hence, not needed to be
tested by empirical evidence. The constant true-nature of a tautology and its immunity
of external falsification imputes information from outside world or external information
6 Cited in (Rosa, 1998, 21)
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only minor weight. From an empirical social scientist’s point of view, any scientific
statement needs some empirical evidence and any theory needs to be constructed that
it can be falsified by empirical evidence (Popper, 1959). Rosa and colleagues criticize
that because of the tautologic logic, there is no separation between constructivism, the
perception of knowledge, and realism, empirical foundation of knowledge. In the end all
merged into one: everything is constructed – even the construction of the constructed
knowledge.
The second critique points in the same direction and criticizes the lack of sense for a
need of empirical evidence. Any constructivist approach allows the possibility of neglect-
ing an outside reality in favor of an a-priori knowledge claim. An extreme constructivist
claim of reality is that since every knowledge claim is to some degree subjective, any
approach to reality is as valid and as good as any other. This implies that in the end,
any knowledge claim is a process of collective judgement. This equally distributed un-
derstanding of any a-priori knowledge at any time and any space does not leave much
flexibility to define a criteria to chose between alternative knowledge claims about re-
ality – say risks – leaving a gloom of indifference and apathy. Rosa (1998, 23; see also
Rosa et al., 2014, 14) also remarks that if any argument is as good as any other, any
combination of arguments can then be used to come up with any claim or interpretation
about the world. That instrument of equal yet not testable arguments can then be used
to create arguments in favor or against any existing opinion. The political consequence
is that knowledge claims can be misused as an instrument to maintain or gain political
power. Hence, the most powerful systems or social entities can use their power to claim
and define any state of reality over any other, without worrying about or taking into
consideration the consequences: “[This view] allows the powerful and unscrupulous to
adopt just about any terminology – risk or otherwise – to impose their will on others
with impunity” (Rosa et al., 2014, 14). The problem is, that any logical argument be-
comes immune to any other argument or critique if the argument is that there is no
criterion to accepted any hierarchy of knowledge claims. That logic, if and only if it
is used in the extreme numbed or starchy way, also stops any social process to create
consensus among different views and does not permit for communicative process as a
means to come to a solution about risks in our world.
The third critique of the constructivist paradigm is the logical construct of an infinite
regress. If the social reality, such as a risk, is socially constructed and our understanding
and knowledge claims about that reality is also socially constructed, then any assumption
about reality is a construct, including the reality itself. In this case there is no outside or
independent information to learn or update our understanding of the state of the world:
“Our understanding of, for example, plane crashes must come, if not from something
independently real, from other social constructions. [...] This reasoning sends us into an
infinite regress, leading us to the absurd land of ad infinitum” (Rosa et al., 2014, 16).
To overcome the problem of equally valued knowledge claims in a world of different
empirical evidence and despite the given evidence still socially constructed knowledge
claims, Rosa et al. (2014, 23-32) develop an approach they call ‘hierarchical epistemol-
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ogy’. This approach considers that any knowledge is socially constructed and even with
the best methods, humans cannot generate perfect knowledge and, hence, are not able
to gain an absolutely true understanding of the world. From this point of view, the
world is real but the knowledge about the world is an approximation based on empirical
evidence. The author’s suggestion of how to perceive the level of empirical evidence
about any claims about social reality, such as risks, is to construct a continuous space
which can combine both, the epistemological approximation as a hierarchical continuum
within an ontological world. They call this approach “hierarchical epistemology and real-
ist ontology (HERO). Epistemological hierarchicalism does not deny the fallibility of all
knowledge claims. It denies that all knowledge claims are equally fallible” (Rosa et al.,
2014, 29). The continuum constitutes itself on the amount of mutual collective agree-
ment or disagreement about a set of knowledge claims. In its extreme states of knowledge
claims, there is on the one hand pure facts while on the other a pure interpretation.
The hierarchical distinction of the HERO approach is given by the quality of empir-
ical evidence. The quality is defined by two criterions: ostensibility and repeatability.
Ostensibility represents the degree to which an event can be identified by different in-
dividuals; for example, I can describe an object by actually observing it. Repeatability
comprises all that events that can be identified in a defined space over multiple time
points. The better the quality of identification – the stronger the signal an object sends
– the higher the agreement on a social reality, and, hence, the closer to place an event
near the realism end of the scale. The purer an object can be identified in its unique
shape, the closer it becomes to an ideal type of an external fact. This are moments when
the foggy dew of uncertainty shows its humility and does not cover up our knowledge of
reality and its interconnectedness.
The above mentioned continuum of the HERO concept should be interpreted as a
space of overlapping categories rather than a linear scale of elaborated and multi-facetted
differences. Rosa (1998, 35-37) separates the space of all knowledge claims into three
broader categories: a) grounded realism, b) synthetic realism, and c) social construction.
Grounded realism represents the knowledge claims with high levels of empirical evidence,
such as high ostensibility and high repeatability. There is low uncertainty involved and
at the same time high information density about possible outcome stakes are available,
i.e. high predictability. At the other end of the “realism-constructivism continuum”7
is the space of social construction. This category contains all of the knowledge claims
about the outside world that have a high level of uncertainty and predictability of pos-
sible outcomes, a space in which no information about exact consequences exists. As
an example for the latter category, Rosa mentions systemic risks such as global climate
change or consequences of nuclear waste disposal. As an example of grounded realism,
the author refers to insurable risks like car accidents or common injuries. Synthetic
realism as the middle category on the realism-constructivism continuum, contains the
7 The author calls it continuum yet indicating that it is more of a meta-theoretical approach and in
fact more research needs to prove how much of the scale can be really interpreted as a continuum,
rather than a space of different categories.
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knowledge claims about real brute facts, that need to be interpreted due to different
claims regarding consequences and ethics. As example, the author mentions the dosage
of ionizing radiation people are exposed to. Based on the criteria of ostensibility and
repeatability, knowledge claims can be specified and categorized. At the same time the
HERO-concept is based on the common criteria of positivistic sciences: intersubjective
agreement, predictability, and the quantification in a functional form; hence, “the fun-
damental demands of positivistic science” (Rosa, 1998, 36). Integrating the realistic
perspective allows for the possibility of ignoring that school of thoughts if the criteria
of brute fact science are not met: “Indeed, [the HERO-concept] insists on the inclusion
of a wide range of alternative orientations under conditions of low ostensibility and low
repeatability” (Rosa, 1998, 36).
scienti￿c explanation; developed, as they are, on the basis of evidenceultimately perceiv-
able to the human senses – empirical evidence.35
In essence, the ostensibility criterion asks the question: ‘Do you see what I see?’36 If
the answer is ‘yes’ we have inter-subjective agreement. The greater the agreement, the
higher the placement of this knowledge claim in our hierarchy. If, on the other hand,
the answer is ‘no’ the repeatability criterion responds: ‘Just wait and you will have
another opportunity to observe what I see.’ To the extent the subject observation is
truly ostensible, the repeatability criterion almost assures inter-subjective agreement at
some point.37 Should particular evidence fail these criteria support for the epistemo-
logical realism also fails. Under such conditions we need to look away from
epistemological realism and toward constructivism and related perspectives as a way of
understanding. The O&R principle is straightforwardly applicable to risks, providing a
basis for judging their placement on the realism – constructivism continuum.
Post-normal risk 35
35 Archer (1987) develops a sophisticated argument along these lines, while extending the reasoning to include the
importance of language translations.
36 Needless to say, the ‘seeing’ may be with the naked eye or be aided by instrumentation.
37 The expectation of widespread intersubjective agreement about risk is not merely an unrealistic hope, as the accu-
mulating empirical evidence shows. Cross-cultural studies of risk perceptions comparing Americans to Hungarians
(Englander et al., 1986), to Norwegians (Teigen et al., 1988), to the French (Karpowicz-Lazreg and Mullet, 1993),
to Poles (Goszczynska et al., 1991), to Hong Kongese (Keown, 1989) and to Japanese (Kleinhesselink and Rosa,
1991) show a continuity in the structure of the cognitive maps between cultures, even as the contents of those maps
vary.
Fig. 3. The realism–constructivism continuum of knowledge claims about risk. Note: Because the
diagram compresses four variables – ostensibility, repeatability, uncertainty and outcome stakes
– into two dimensions, the orientation of the axes is high to low, rather than the typical orien-
tation.
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Figure 3: Information matrix in terms of epistemological hierarchicalism.
2.3. Criticizing ideal risks – a plea for openness
I personally think Rosa’s approach of hierarchical epistemology and the realism-to-
constructivism continuum can be misleading and is biased towards the ideal state of
predictability. The ideal of predictability is based on the assumption that the true re-
lationship between objects of his world can b d rived by more information and better
models. I argue that social problems are complex social realities with low ostensibility
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and low repeatability; i.e. much less is known about the predictability and the causal
relationship between social actions. From my point of view, and this is my critique on
the bias towards a positivistic school of thoughts: the starting point should be that the
state of the world is of high uncertainty and little is known about the consequences of
uncertain outcomes. Hence, social constructivism is the predominant state of the social
world and grounded realism the exception. In that space of uncertainty or risk we can
observe areas that are of higher information density indicating higher inter-subjective
agreement, such as the area of grounded realism in Figure 3. From my perspective even
the world of grounded realism is still nested in the world of social constructivism, so
there is no guarantee that any knowledge claim, no matter how much inter-subjective
agreement exist, is free of uncertainty. More importantly the perspective of a grounded
realism starts with the high preposition that all uncertainty can be explained – meaning
that there is no uncertainty or openness in this world, pointing towards a deterministic
world.
At this point I would like to address Rosa’s critique on constructivism as explained
above. I think his point of view is correct, however presents a limited view of reality,
emphasizing the potential to explain social reality rather than emphasizing the complex-
ity of social reality. He is doing right in providing a meta-theoretical approach, but it is
still an approach, a guideline, not an explanation for social knowledge. Risks are com-
plex social phenomenon. Any social understanding of any risk profits from its openness
to alternative explanations, social perspectives, multiple views, and different narratives.
Here, I would like to express some preliminary thoughts, while still deeply respecting the
elaborated concepts presented by Rosa (1998) and Rosa et al. (2014). To support my
ideas I want to refer to the work of Karl Popper (Popper, 1982), Imre Lakatos (Lakatos
and Feyerabend, 1999) and Paul Feyerabend (Feyerabend, 1993).8
2.3.1. The open universe
In his lecture on on scientific methods, Imre Lakatos discusses in detail the demarcation
problem, the question of what exactly distinguishes science from pseudoscience, meaning-
ful science from science that is not meaningful, and intellectual honesty from intellectual
dishonesty (Lakatos and Feyerabend, 1999, 20). Lakatos mentions Karl Poppers who
describes the practices of intellectual dishonesty as the use of a theory that does not
contain a condition under which it can be falsified: “According to Popper, intellectual
dishonesty means putting forward a theory without specifying the experimental condi-
tions under which it could be given up” (Lakatos and Feyerabend, 1999, 26). Lakatos,
mentions Paul Feyerabend who argues that Popper’s falsifiability criteria is not strong
8 My critique can be criticized for its lack of logical argumentation. I think that logic forces to think
in dualism, and dualism leaves not much space for creativity. What if there is a space between A
and non-A? A space that consists of both and is more than both, because there is always some
non-A in A and some A in non-A, that is not the intersection. Creativity, I believe, is only possible
if there is an open space between any dualistic perception of reality.
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enough, that it is merely “empty rhetoric to frighten school children”, to use Lakatos’s
words. Hence, for Feyerabend there is no real criteria, but an honest view of oneself:
“Feyerabend’s only piece of advice is to remain faithful to yourself – to do your own
thing and not let yourself be judged” (Lakatos and Feyerabend, 1999, 26). According to
Lakatos, the falsification criteria is a weak criteria and can be circumvented by ad-hoc
modifications and adjustments. The strongest scientific criteria on the quest to explain
reality remains still someone’s own judgement – a reality of modes of discourses.
After the introduction of Popper and Feyerabend by Lakatos, I want to let Popper, the
teacher and Feyerabend, his student express their opinions about the world and different
perceptions of reality. In his book ‘The Open Universe’ (Popper, 1982) Popper describes
the world as a reality consisting of World 1, World 2, and World 3 objects. World 1 is
the world of physical objects like trees, stones, human or animal bodies. World 2 is a
world of psychological state, such as emotions, subconscious and conscious experiences,
the states of the human mind, and the mind of other beings like animals. World 3 is
a world of abstract things like theories, assertions, prepositions, arguments, whether
they are complete or incomplete. World 3’s nature is not inconsistent with itself even if
all problems that have been thought or have not been thought of so far are part of it,
because it is not a theory or an argument: World 3 is “[...] a class of things, a universe
of discourse” (Popper, 1982, 115). It is a world that is from its very nature open, neither
right nor wrong, a world of problems and their possible answers.
Following that argument of an open World 3 of discourse, for Popper the universe
is open. The open universe is neither a deterministic pure causal world with infinite
knowledge, nor is the open universe a probabilistic world with mere chance as the initial
factor of change. The universe, in the sense of Popper, contains both and beside its
deterministic and probabilistic poles, it is open: “Our universe is partly causal, partly
probabilistic, and partly open: it is emergent” (Popper, 1982, 130). Popper emphasizes
the importance of not ignoring the openness of World 3, the source of human creativity
and of our mind’s freedom, and the emergent space of future problems and solutions:
“No good reason have been offered so far against the openness of our universe, or against
the fact that radically new things are constantly emerging from it; and no good reasons
have been offered so far that shed doubt upon human freedom and creativity, a creativity
which is restricted as well as inspired by the inner structure of World 3” (Popper, 1982,
130). Nevertheless, World 3 could not exist without the ability to express thoughts
and to use the beauty of the human mind, of human creativity, human reasoning and
freedom. Openness allows every human being to learn, change and to transform society
based on rational criticism, rather than the strength of the most powerful entities.
Popper asks whether objects are real or if there is a hierarchy of reality between the
different Worlds he describes. For Popper all objects of World 1, World 2, and World
3 are equally real, arguing that there is interconnectedness between all elements in the
universe: “The proposition of the truth of which I wish to defend and which seems
to me to go a little beyond common sense is that not only are the physical World 1,
psychological World 2 real, but so also is the abstract World 3; real in exactly that sense
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in which the physical World 1 of rocks and trees is real: the objects of World 2 and of
World 3 can kick each other, as well as the physical objects of World 1; and they can
also be kicked back” (Popper, 1982, 123). By ‘kicking back’ Popper refers to a definition
by Alfred Landé (Popper, 1982, 100-101, 116-117)9 that something is real or exists if
can be kicked and in principle can kick back – if the objects of a universe interact with
each other. The openness for Popper is not a question of reality or existence of objects,
emotions, or ideas it is the interaction with all those elements that can be in principal real
and therefore can influence the future. Language and creativity are important elements
of the openness of the mind and of human freedom.
Popper also puts forward the idea of a critical rationalism and the idea that humanity
can develop independently of natural selection and natural boundaries because the mind
is an independent system with its own language: “[man] has produced a new world of
civilization, of learning, of non-genetic growth: of growth that is not transmitted by
the genetic code; of growth that is not so much on natural selection as on selection
based upon rational criticism” (Popper, 1982, 123). But what is the practice of ‘rational
criticism’ – what kind of presupposition does Popper assume if he speaks of this element
in our mind? Is it a language of comparison between assumption and facts, of arguments,
of plausibility, a process that guides us closer to reality and scientific truth? I will leave
this question open to what Paul Feyerabend would answer.
Paul Feyerabend perceives knowledge and truth as something real and an element
that exists in the world. In its very nature, knowledge is the combination of a universe
of different viewpoints. In his opinion, there is no singular theory or the best way to
get closer to reality or truth. What allows us to get closer to the ideal of explaining
reality is the combination and the plurality of methodologies that define the universe of
knowledge. Progress in human knowledge was not made by improving the best theory
that existed, it was made, as Feyerabend emphasized, by contrasting: “Also, some of
the most important formal properties of a theory are found by contrast, and not by
analysis. A scientist who wishes to maximize the empirical content of the views he holds
and who wants to understand them as clearly as he possibly can must therefore introduce
other views; that is, he must adopt a pluralistic methodology”(Feyerabend, 1993, 21).
And there exists more than just pluralistic ideas. The openness of our knowledge is the
source of our creativity allowing for pluralistic views and giving space for unknown facts
and its corresponding questions and possible answers. Knowledge is a social entity and
in its nature is not driven by a converging mechanism that gravitates towards the truth.
Knowledge is a space of alternative viewpoints that are interlinked between each other
by language and methodology: “Knowledge so conceived is not a series of self-consistent
theories that converges towards an ideal view; it is not a gradual approach to the truth.
It is rather an ever increasing ocean of mutually incompatible alternatives, each single
theory, each fairy-tale, each myth that is part of the collection forcing the others into
greater articulation and all of them contributing, via this process of competition, to the
9 Popper refers to Landé’s work: Foundation of Quantum Theory, 1955 pp.3 ff., or From Dualism to
Unity in Quantum Physics, 1960, pp.3-8.
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development of our consciousness. Nothing is ever settled, no view can ever be omitted
from a comprehensive account.” (Feyerabend, 1993, 21).
How can one combine the ideals of scientific truth, the ideal of a critical and rational
testing of theory and observations, with the idea of pluralistic ideas and methodologies?
How can a scientist be a strict critic and yet hold an open mind to defend new approaches
against pressure within her or his community or even within its own perception of truth
and scientific dignity? For Feyerabend, the scientific human is no longer a role within a
fixed context of knowledge-frames, he or she has become to be the bearer of knowledge,
the keeper of the balance between different viewpoints. By being the other, by intro-
ducing and keeping the voice up for “counterinductive theories” and always pointing to
the evidence that there is no theoretical approach that is able to solve the “discrepancy
between theory and fact” (Feyerabend, 1993, 21). Feyerabend presents an ideal scientist
as the gardener of openness rather than the defender of settled theories: “The task of
the scientist, however, is no longer ‘to search for the truth’, or ‘to praise god’, or ‘to
systematize observations’, or ‘to improve predictions’. These are but side effects of an
activity to which his attention is now mainly directed and which is ‘to make the weaker
case the stronger ’ as the sophists said, and thereby to sustain the motion of the whole”
(Feyerabend, 1993, 21).
Feyerabend encourages us to constantly look for alternative approaches for existing
theoretical explanations of reality. Even the best and most common viewpoint needs
to be challenged by counterintuitive approaches for it might give us the answer we are
looking for to solve complex social problems. According to Feyerabend, a critical mind
is trained to question by creating an awareness of underlying theoretical assumptions,
of predetermined procedures, and hidden or habitual structures that might obscure the
association between a-priori knowledge, observations, and association or conclusion –
there might be something missing: “Usually we are not aware of [the assumptions] and we
recognize their effects only when we encounter an entirely different cosmology: prejudices
are found by contrast not by analysis.”(Feyerabend, 1993, 22). A scientist in this sense
is not only trying to improve the explanations and the knowledge we have about the
existing outside world, she or he is also revealing the underlying presuppositions or
patterns that form that knowledge, challenging not only the view on the world but also
his or her view on him or her observing the world: “We cannot discover [the truth]
from the inside. We need an external standard of criticism, we need a set of alternative
assumptions or, as these assumptions will be quite general, constituting, as it were,
an entire alternative world, we need a dream-world in order to discover the features of
the real world we think we inhabit (and which may actually be just another dream-
world)” (Feyerabend, 1993, 22). The ability to create an external world inside oneself,
a distanced space of observations, is what Feyerabend calls a “dream-world”. But the
dream-world is not a world separated from processes surrounding a scientist. It is more
to be understood as an invitation to think counterinductively, and to find arguments
that support any counterinductive approach. It is a way to demonstrate that there
are rational arguments that support different approaches and that it is likely that a
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best rational argument cannot be derived. Later I will use Feyerabends argument to
demonstrate that an irrational approach like defending tautologies or infinite regress
can be helpful to get a better feeling of how risks are perceived and constructed in a
social context. At this point, I only want to be inspired by Feyerabend and his idea of an
“undercover agent”, who is dedicated to knowledge and humanity, but still sceptical about
the social rationals behind any scientific authority: “An anarchist is like an undercover
agent who plays the game of Reason in order to undercut the authority of Reason (Truth,
Honesty, Justice, and so on)” (Feyerabend, 1993, 23).
It is more than just mere scientific goodwill that motivates Feyerabend’s thoughts. In
his heart, he is a humanitarian, and believes as does Popper in humans and in human
history. As a result pluralism is not only important for scientific methodology, but
also for the “humanitarian outlook” (Feyerabend, 1993, 38). Creativity and freedom of
thoughts is the access point for World 3, the space for “freedom of artistic creation”
(Feyerabend, 1993, 38).
An open space of creativity is not an unwanted element in human minds that should
be controlled by any educational systems, rather the essential feature to finding solutions
and to make changes in the world. The predominant ideal of a dualist worldview with
the forced split between art and science needs be let go of in order to combine both
elements imagination and reality: “Progressive educators have always tried to develop
the individuality of their pupils and to bring to fruition the particular, and sometimes
quite unique, talents and beliefs of a child. Such and education, however, has very often
seemed to be a futile exercise in day-dreaming. For is it not necessary to prepare the
young for life as it actually is? Does this not mean that they must learn one particular
set of views to the exclusion of everything else? And, if a trace of their imagination is
still to remain, will it not find its proper application in the arts or in a thin domain of
dreams that has but little to do with the world we live in? Will this procedure not finally
lead to a split between a hated reality and welcome fantasies, science and arts, careful
description and unrestrained self-expression? The argument for proliferation shows that
this need not happen” (Feyerabend, 1993, 38). Feyerabend defends the reflection of
subjective perceptions and objective facts and laws. For him a sense of the whole universe
of thoughts and knowledge, in combination with the individual experiences, ideas and
beliefs, forms change and prevents any human attempts to manifest ideologies10, and its
effects on the real world: “A scientist who is interested in maximal empirical content,
and who wants to understand as many aspects of his theory as possible, will adopt a
pluralistic methodology, he will compare theories with other theories rather than with
‘experience’, ‘data’, or ‘facts’, and he will try to improve rather than discard the views
10 I include also and additional critical remark by Feyerabend because it shows, that any given viewpoint
or believe can be changed by real world entities. It is an individual decision, not always in favor
of pure knowledge, that make people believe: “And we realize that proliferation may have to be
enforced by non-scientific agencies whose power is sufficient to overcome the most powerful scientific
institutions. Examples are the Church, the State, a political party, public discontent, or money: the
best single entity to get a modern scientist away from what his ‘scientific conscience’ tells him to
pursue is still the dollar (or, more recently, the Swiss franc).” (Feyerabend, 1993, 37)
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that appear to lose in the competition” (Feyerabend, 1993, 33).
Feyerabend is also not only interested in the common view of our knowledge, but
compares the historical perspectives and practices of the scientific system. From the
historical view point, for him, the system seems to get closer and less connected. The
improvements are happening within disciplines, but not in the whole universe of human
knowledge. Again, he pleads for a shared practice of multiple entities or players to create
and to improve knowledge: “Considering the argument in the text [for proliferation and
alternative views to progress in knowledge], it is clear that the increasing separation of
the history, the philosophy of science and of science itself is a disadvantage and should
be terminated in the interest of all these three disciplines. Otherwise we shall get tons
of minute, precise, but utterly barren results” (Feyerabend, 1993, 34, footnote 2).
So far Feyerabend is the defender of a pluralist methodology. He seems to be inter-
ested more in results and not so much in the approaches leading to results: the result
demonstrates the improvement of knowledge, the openness of the system and the cre-
ativity to change human perception of the world. He says a pre-considered world of
fixed ideas or fixed perceptions on how theories, methodologies and scientific rational-
ities should be used will not guide towards more humanity, on the contrary it will be
biased and influenced by strong social forces: “Therefore, the first step in our criticism
of customary concepts and customary reactions is to step outside the circle and either to
invent a new conceptual system, for example a new theory, that clashes with the most
carefully established observational results and confounds the most plausible theoretical
principles, or to import such a system from outside science, from religion, from mythol-
ogy, from the ideas of incompetents, or the ramblings of madmen. This step is, again,
counterinductive. Counterinduction is both a fact – science could not exist without it
– and a legitimate and much needed move in the game of science” (Feyerabend, 1993,
52-53).
2.3.2. Tautologies – sources of creativity
Rosa and colleagues (2014, 16) use a logical argument to argue against a mere con-
structivist perception of risks. Risks in their sense are not socially constructed. They
argue that if risk is a social construction and everything is socially constructed, than a
social construction is a social construction. That is a tautology. In a tautological expla-
nation, statements about the world are not based on empirical evidence anymore and
the scientific criteria of falsification is not possible anymore. Tautological explanations
of the world, hence, are something to be rejected within the scientific context, because
they cannot be tested. I want to argue that tautologies are not per se the dark side of
scientific reasoning. Even if they do not address themselves to the empirical evidence,
they might open a space of reflection precisely because they cannot be tested. The
tautological space of reflection opens the opportunity to perceive a risk from different
angles and different layers of consideration such as different time points, cultural views,
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and different power structures within a society. Different states in the world do exist
and they send information, but it is not clear how they will be perceived by an observer
or a receiving system. For instance, I can observe a car accident; I can be shocked if I
am the driver; I can be entertained if I am a random person next by who likes accidents;
I can be concerned or feel needed if I want to help; I can be happy that I earn money if
I am the car repair service or the manager of a hospital. Risks can be understood as a
normative concept. The human life can be understood as normative concept. Allowing
for social constructions creates a space for creativity and openness that is a necessary
and important element to understand complex social phenomena. A tautologic view on
the world offers the freedom to question methodologies and its historical foundations.
Carefully used it is a tool to get an understanding of the content and the background of
a perspective to create human freedom, and not to blindly use methodologies to solve
problems. Foremost tautologies stop feeding a hungry human-ego by wanting of stop-
ping to ask questions only wanting to know the solution. All what humans know are
different approaches for solutions, the final solution remains hidden.
The authors criticize the constructivist perception of reality. There is no continuous
scale of how much a social fact is real or constructed if there is no reference point that
is based in reality: “Framing the issue in this way [like a tautology and that risks are
socially constructed] precludes any continuum since, by assuming the realism pole away,
both poles have been fused into one” (Rosa et al., 2014, 16). My counterargument is
that if we think of risks from a tautological perspective, with no defined poles does not
necessarily mean that there are no poles at all. All that exist is a-priori a uniform space
of equally possible situations. From my point of view, the no-difference assumption of
a uniform distribution does not minimize the space of reality, but expands the space
of reality. Risks in this space have a-priori the same chance to be perceived as risks
as risks that are not perceived as risks. The tautologic space creates the dimensions of
openness – going beyond uncertainty. Both poles have not “been fused into one” (Rosa
et al., 2014, 16) as the authors claims, but by fusing they expand and create a new
level or dimension of reflection. The a-priori equally densely distributed risk spaces can
be influenced by different social expectations forming a changed social reality. Society
and its ability to create, observe, and validate empirical and mystical evidence can form
clusters of higher or lower density through a communicative process. After a certain
threshold level of communicative density this social realities can be perceived as risks.11
This abstract view is useful to distance oneself from pre shaped and unknown expecta-
tions, expecting ‘nothing’ as prior state of observation. Imagine yourself for one moment
in that space: a space of equal color and equally dense pressure. All movements feel the
same, equally balanced noises, movements, and other sensations. Any expectation need
or belief now can change that space: I want to go to work, I want to eat, I don’t want
to feel cold, I want to fight, I want to love, I want to learn, I want to grow, I have to be
11 It is also possible – in this tautological space – to include another level of abstraction – such as
not-perceivable natural powers – that might influence socially constructed expectations. This is
only an ad hoc thought, an idea to keep alive for the future.
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obedient, I must be quiet, I can play a musical instrument, I can talk, I can read, I can
analyze datasets. And this is only me. In that space it does not matter, because there
is only me. Imagine that many of these spaces come together and form a society with
all of these expectations merge together and forming clusters of expectations. People
who want to go to work, who want to eat, who want to talk, who can analyze datasets.
That can lead to very dense clusters and to conflicts – or to social realities that could be
perceived as risk for social entities. Now the space is not uniform with the same color
and equally balanced sensations over time. The space is constantly changing because
of expectations (I want, I can, I must) or because something else is entering that space
with its expectations (I want, I can, I must). These expectations form realities and
produce realities that can be perceived as risks. That does not necessarily mean to be
the case given the – of course utopian – a-priori equally dense and balanced space of no
expectations.
The idea of different clusters of density in an utopian uniform space enables us to
perceive obvious risks like a car accident still as embedded in a socially constructed
reality; still as something that can be non-existent in a different world of expectations.
Even if we improve any technical issues to avoid car accidents, the idea of mobility
is still a socially constructed feature and an observable object. To avoid car accidents,
humans would have to change the idea of mobility. Human behavior and human decisions
are embedded in social environments. Therefore risks are a-priori tautologic – they are
embedded in a social environment and only exist because of socially created expectations.
The tautological space keeps a naive view on risks or social reality allowing for open-
ness. It prevents risks from being minimized or improved on, such as trying to minimize
the already low probability of nuclear accidents or improve the precision of already very
precise nuclear weapons. The naive view does not neglect the openness of social reality
and keeps the levels of uncertainty high – not allowing to be explained by scientific
statements, empirical evidence, existing school of thoughts, and dominant social power
structures.
If we observe a phenomenon in the social reality, we should keep in mind that there
is not much knowledge available in terms of causal relationships and predictable power
that explains how human attitudes and human behavior is created and interacting. We
do not know much about that world we are living in and the interplay of powers. This
is expressed incisively by Barrow’s figure of the “degree of uncertainty” (Barrow, 1998,
67-68) (see Figure 4).
The vertical axis describes the degree of uncertainty to predict a phenomenon math-
ematically or with formal models. The horizontal axis describes the complexity of a
phenomenon. We see that in the technical world of chemical reactions and applied sci-
ences, there is a well defined balance of existing information and complexity so that
there is a good understanding of what processes are happening and how they can be
explained. In this case, there is a good understanding of the laws that cause the pro-
cesses and there is enough understanding to explain the outcomes that are related to
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68 BACK TO THE FUTURE
Complexity of phenomena
Fig. 3.2 A schematic representation of the degree of uncertainty that exists in the underlying
mathematical equations describing various phenomena relative to the intrinsic complexity of
the phenomena, after David Ruelle.
We can draw a dotted curve through the diagram shown in Fig. 3.2 which, in
some sense, divides the subjects where we have a very good understanding of
what is going on (and why) from those where we do not. Notice that it is
possible to know the laws governing what you are studying, as in the study of
highly turbulent liquids, and yet be in poor shape when it comes to explaining
what is seen.
Selective and absolute limits
Hiding between all the ordinary numbers was an infinity of transcendental numbers
whose presence you would never have guessed until you looked deeply
into mathematics
CARL SAGAN18
When considering the limits that might exist to the future development of our
knowledge about the physical world, in all its aspects, we need to distinguish
some different breeds of limit. Suppose that all that could be known was laid out
in a line of boxes stretching out in front of us. The line might be unending or it
might have an end. Let us suppose it to be unending. Then there could be an
'absolute' limit upon our knowledge of the world in the sense that only a finite
(Source: Barrow, 1998, 68)
Figure 4: Degree of uncertai ty
the processes. With higher complexity, higher interplay, it becomes difficult to explain
what can be observ d, the results s e s to be chaotic and uncertain, even if the laws are
well known, such as n the case of h ghly turbule t l quids. For social world phenomena,
the degree of complexity and the degree of uncertainty are very high; the combination
of objects is complex and the underlying processes hard to explain in formal models;
there are many explanatory factors, and less is known about the basic underlying causal
processes that create changes. Hence, in the world of science, there are spaces where it
is possible to predict an outcome. This ideal world of pr diction is rather the world of
technology and applied science than the world of social human interaction.
To support my argument for the social embeddedness of any real or constructed risk, I
ask the reader to include Rosa et al.’s graphical explanation of the realism-constructivism
continuum (compare Figure 3) in the upper right ‘high-complexity high-uncertainty’ area
of Barrow’s graph. As it becomes obvious, risks are still embedded in the social world.
By becoming aware of the dimensions of knowledge it is obvious that it is possible to
improve the existing knowledge, in the classical sense of predictable power and causal
consequences. Science can construct situations that are independent of the social world.
I call this, experimental knowledge gained in artificial environments which is also per-
ceived as knowledge, even if its external validity cannot be proven. Risks are then also
to be understood as the consequences of experimental knowledge put into social reality.
The combination of qualities of knowledge, scientifically constructed and socially expe-
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rienced knowledge, can lead to new conflicts about reality. Asking for new solutions to
solve that problems. Knowledge creates new expectations.
That lack of knowledge and the limits we all face in collecting sufficient amounts of
information or knowledge are actually a constant motivation force for the debate on
risks within a social world. The reality is a reality of ignorance, change, uncertainty,
ambiguity, complexity, and guessing combined with the mystical world of expectation,
explanation, falsification, knowledge, perfection, truth, stability and lying – just to re-
member Feyerabend’s critical or (almost polemic) remark on the “scientific conscience”
and the ability to manipulate scientific knowledge using strong human powers, such as
money or prestige (Feyerabend, 1993, 37). Allowing for a tautological explanation of risk
prevents a critical mind of being washed away by the human powers with their sirens
like alluring sound of truth any human being is embedded in its Odyssey of wisdom.
2.3.3. Skeptical arguments lost in arbitrariness
The second critique on constructivism was the critique that any skeptical argument can
outnumber empirical evidence. Consequently without an external reality, there would be
no criteria to chose among alternative approaches, opinions, and solutions (Rosa et al.,
2014, 16). That view is plausible, but again a more constructivist approach an a-priori
uniform distribution of reality, can be more helpful in finding solutions and tracing the
root of real problems. The constructivist view helps to envision the real consequences of
the interplay of social realities that can be harmful for the entire system. My argument
against hierarchy of evidence and arguments is that risks are perceived and judged by
social entities, so solutions for risks are also developed by social entities. In many ques-
tions and dealing with complex risks like war conflicts, complex technological systems
such as nuclear power, or new biotechnological developments such as genetically mod-
ified organisms (GMOs), there are to some part ethical questions based on normative
arguments. Focusing mainly on the predominant and available empirical evidence ne-
glects the normative questions and the ethical component of human life on earth. Life
on earth is an empirical evidence, but how those who have a life on earth are living
their lives on earth is in many ways an ethical question. Empirical evidence can help to
find solutions, but in the end what will lead to changes is common agreement, based on
respect and the willingness for mutual solutions between living entities on this planet.
Given a normative social framework, it is questionable if the best argument in case of risk
assessment processes is the argument based on the strongest empirical evidence. Social
risks should be judged with empirical as well as with normative evidence – a skeptical
argument helps to support the latter.
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2.3.4. Infinite regress
Thirdly, I refer to the critique of the infinite regress. If our knowledge is socially con-
structed and not based on reality, the social construction of knowledge is also socially
constructed: “This reasoning sends us into an infinite regress, leading us to the absurd
land of ad infinitum” (Rosa et al., 2014, 16). In its pure sense this argument is of course
true. I want to invite the reader to leave the true and logical world for a moment and to
take a step into this mystical “absurd land” Rosa and colleagues are mentioning. Maybe
this land is not as absurd as we might first assume if we allow to disregard the logical
world of scientific theory.
If risks are a social phenomenon, allowing for an infinite regress can be useful to trace
back the phenomenon to the historically grown roots of the risk, such as social attitudes
and behavior, technological invention, and the political decision making process. The
question then is not based on the judgement whether risks are socially constructed or
not, leading again to the infinite regress. Rather the question could be: how much of our
understanding of a risk is socially constructed and is not constituted within the world
of brute facts. I am suggesting a pseudo-constructivist view raising my voice not for
an infinite regress, but for a limited infinite regress. A limited infinite regress can be
perceived as a method of reasoning about a perceived reality, asking for the given and
social reason that lead to the present reality. This allows a-priori to open the space of
discourse for multiple interpretations. The limits are reached if the discourse entered
the fields of absurdity and could not find out again, ending in frustration. As long as
the social discourse is lead by the willingness to create a solution, as long as there is
some evidence that either reasons are plausible, the debate is still based on a socially
perceived reality and is not ending in an infinite regress.
The constructivist view helps us to free humans from ignorance and to create awareness
of the unlimited limits. The problem is not how to make the world safer, but to learn
when it is safe enough. To do so, we need to see the limits of our behavior and of
our perceptions. Reality does not say stop, nor do scientific knowledge system say it is
enough. Humans need to construct a stop, define its own boundaries and accept them
as reality. The need for nuclear power is a social construct, creating its own reality. I
see this as a brute fact.
I also want to warn of a naive understanding or an unwary use of empirical evidence or
brute facts, such as for example “sickened or dead bodies” in nuclear accidents or plane
crashes (Rosa et al., 2014, 16). The authors argue that risks are not socially constructed
because there is an external reality that make us understand better of the circumstances
that created a risk, such as an accident: “If a risk is socially constructed – say, the risk
of airplane crash – then our understanding of that risk is a social construction. There
is the risk that the plane may crash because we collectively think that it will” (Rosa
et al., 2014, 16). Say for example, we talk about the risk of a beginning of a war instead
of an airplane crash, then the last sentence would be: There is the risk that the war
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will break out because we collectively think that it will. This is realistic. There is no
machine or external factor that start a war; war stems from but human decisions and
expectations. Pushing my argument in favor of an infinite regress again, say the war
is already happening and within this war there is an airplane crash, then the sentence
would become a different meaning: There is the risk that the plane may crash because
we collectively thought that it will. This statement is realistic. We collectively think
that war will happen and plane crashes are an accepted consequence of a war. The
airplane did not construct the reality of a war, within it can possibly crash. Humans
created that real scenario, the new real world of the brut fact of an airplane crash.
Any brute fact is a real fact and creates social expectations. As a result, there is an
interplay of brute facts and the social construction of expectations. The brute fact that
airplanes exist may have the power to create the expectation for wars in human minds.
What happens if there is an airplane, but no war? What happens if the airplane will
never reveals its dangerous beauty, never crashes and never drop bombs? Who created
that airplane? Who is cleaning and taking care of it? Whose dangerous tool has it
become? What expectations does the existence of an airplane create? What makes
an object that consists of natural materials like steal or glass, chemical substances like
rubber or electronic valuable to be an object to be used to kill people? When does such
an object create a possible risk?
Referring to the use of objects in a social world, the philosopher John Searle argues
that agents assign functions to objects. The objects consist of natural features, but the
natural features do not assign the function itself, this depends on agent’s purpose: “The
agents exploit the natural features of the object to achieve their purpose. [...] [The
functions] only exist relative to observers or agents who assign the function” (Searle,
1998, 121). Searle concludes that functions are never observer-independent even within
a given framework of causal relations. These assignment of functions to causal relations
is always happening within a social context, a presupposed “teleology”, as he describes
the social context: “We can summarize the general point by saying that all functions
are observer-relative. Functions are never observer-independent. Causation is observer-
independent; what function adds to causation is normativity or teleology. More precisely,
the attribution of function to causal relations situates the causal relations within a
presupposed teleology” (Searle, 1998, 121). In the case of nuclear power, the causal
relationship is nuclear fission, the assignment of that causal relation is to use it, for
example, as a weapon or as a power resource. For the teleology of war it is a weapon
for the teleology of modernity it is a power source. In both contexts, it is also both: an
resource to produce weapons or a power source in weapon-systems like submarines. In
the context of national states nuclear power can also function as a weapon to demonstrate
a certain level of development of a country and to show its strength and independence
to other countries.
Risks, I conclude, should be perceived as objects of a social context – risk are not
observer-independent. That allows an observer to perceive a risk as a tautological object
embedded in a world of infinite regress. A risk is perceived as a risk independent of its
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empirical evidence.
2.4. Defining risk
2.4.1. A first attempt to define risk
A state that is of no uncertainty, predetermined, or completely independent of human
activity is a state without risk. Uncertainty in this sense is defined as an “indeterminacy
between cause and effect” (Rosa et al., 2014, 21). Therefore, states of the world that are
uncertain, possible, and not predetermined can be described as states of risk. Rosa et
al. (2014, 21) define risk as:
“Risk is a situation or an event where something of human value (including humans
themselves) is at stake and where the outcome is uncertain.”
This definition contains three elements. First, reality is a state of possibilities and
possible outcomes. It is not constructed as a predetermined entity. Second, reality does
not follow a known mechanism or law, but there is uncertainty, uncertainty about the
possible outcomes and the causal relations. There is a likelihood about the underlying
mechanism of human activity but there is never certainty – leaving a space of non-
knowledge. Third, if the outcome is affecting something of human value, then this is
a situation that is not independent of the human world and we can talk about a risk.
Possible and uncertain mechanisms, and the outcome that exist in this world and are
not affecting humans, are not perceived as risks, according to this definition.
This definition is also based on the realist or ontological perception of the world: risk
are real even though they always contain a subjective or epistemological element, since
human’s perception, cognitive ability, and knowledge are limited: “[...] risk will appear
less like an objective state of the world than like a social construction” (Rosa et al.,
2014, 21).
2.4.2. Personal critique on the definition of risk
To contrast this realistic few with a constructed view, I want to create possible solutions
were the mechanisms of risk do not function in the expected way, but still meet the
criteria of the definition.
a) Consider the world as system of space and time in which nothing exists. A system
with nothing in it, where nothing can change anymore and everything is of equal shape.
b) Consider the world as system of space and time in which nothing of human value
exists. No matter what mechanisms are driving the possible changes. Does this world
exist in the world we are living in? It is an ethical questions to perceive this part as
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‘not of human value’ if we want to answer the question with ‘yes’ or ‘it depends’. If
we assume that there is a non human world (worldnon−human) independent of human
perception and human influences there should also be a human world (worldhuman),
dependent on human perception and of human value. Is it possible for humans to access
a worldwhere nothing of human value exists? In the aggregate of all human entities
taken together there are no elements that are not of human value. For each individual
human entity it is also possible that something is not of human value.
What is of human value depends on individual perception. What is perceived as
valuable can change over time and depends on the ‘something’ that is in the scope of
perception of each individual. This ‘something’ is also a changing entity over time in
human history. There are elements of ‘something’ that have been constant throughout
time, and some elements are have changed, emerged, or fizzled out over time. Risk only
exist in this world if humans value ‘something’. Since every human is valuing ‘something’
differently, on the individual level, there are different shapes or densities of what is at
stake. The sound of risk emerges because, on the aggregated level, there are different
densities of risk, depending on what humans value and perceive as ‘something’ to lose
or valuable to keep or expect to gain.
After reflecting the ‘something’ part and the ‘of value’ part of the definition, the
physical part of the definition, I want to challenge the stochastic part of the definition –
the ‘uncertainty’ element. The stochastic element basically means it is possible, but the
given probability is unclear. It is unclear to what extend ‘something’ will be affected
by uncertainty, and how that affects the ‘of value’ element. Perception of uncertainty
depends on how individuals cope with randomness in the world, limited knowledge about
causal mechanisms, and the openness of social life.
Risk in any world of human entities only exist if there is a possibility of change of
‘something’, a space of uncertain elements and of human value. A space that is free
of determination and free of mere probability. If there is mere determinism, everything
follows a clear causal structure and the density of risk is zero, because there is no
possibility to change the mechanism, complete silence. Equally zero density of risk
exists if everything is probabilistic with known probabilities, constant tones in a constant
rhythm. It is a world of changes where is nothing lose or to gain, because there is no
memory of the past and no expectation for the future.12
12 Here is an experiment. I want to create an artificial situation in which the world can be perceived
as a continuum of time in which changes happen slower than the perception of those changes – a
continuum of infinitely small sequences (as the definition of a line as a sum of points). Imagine a
world with uncertainty, but without perceived risks. Each sequence happens independently of the
previous one but the reaction to these changes in the materialistic world happen without a lack of
time. The reactions of the stochastic world and the materialistic world happen unanimous. It is
like a balanced dance of reaction. In this case the mechanisms of risk lose their power and there is
no perceived risk-density in the world but real change takes place. If the time between two states
of the world lengthen, if the present moment becomes a longer period than the past and present
decades, centuries, and millennium, the social entities will change to a social entity that contains
the element of time. The elements of ‘something’, of ‘value’, and of ‘uncertainty’ would also become
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In my opinion the above given definition of risk neglects that in the end, risk, no
matter what epistemological degree the evidence has, depends on its interpretation of
situations or events. The interpretation is an open and communicative process between
different social actors. Here is my first updated definition:
Updated definition (1):
Risk is an interpretation of a situation or an event, whereby something of human value
(including humans themselves) is at stake and where the outcome is uncertain. The
interpretation of risk itself is a communicative process and as such open.
To support my argument of risk as an interpretation of reality, I will try to show
the logical structure leading to the definition. I am assuming that reality is a density
of information. The density is based on experienced past experiences and on future
expectations. As a result, reality is an interpretation of an ontological reality. Risk
is therefore is a density of information of something estimated as having value. This
estimation and evaluation process is happening within a space of uncertainty. Here is
an ad-hoc formal definition of the above mentioned definition:
Risk is a density of different elements: R = X(Y )× P (U), with
R = risk, X = something, Y = value, P = at stake (to a degree), U = uncertainty.
The formula can be read as: ‘something’ X has a certain ‘value’ Y . That ‘something’
of ‘value’ is ‘at stake’ (to a degree) P , but that ‘at stake’ is uncertain (to a degree)
U . Risk R is a combination of two elements: an materialistic element X(Y ) and a
stochastic element P (U). The epistemological reading of the concept of risk depends
on the combination rule, that rule or interpretation depends on different worldviews.
From a presupposition of an uncertain world, a stochastic worldview, the definition can
be interpreted as R = U [P (X(Y ))]. This interpretation of risk can be read as: ‘in
an uncertain world, something of value is at stake’. We suppose there is an uncertain
world and in this world something can change. Each something has a value. From a
presupposition of a materialistic worldview the same elements of the definition of risk
can be interpreted as R = X[Y (P (U))]. The reading of that interpretation is ‘in a
world something is of value, that something is at stake with an uncertain outcome’. We
suppose there is a world of something of value and that this something of value can
change due to uncertainty.
Both mentioned interpretations of risk are basically similar. I argue that if all el-
more clear because they would not change as quickly, they might be constant, they would not be
touched by any short-term changes. For example, suppose humanity did not survive in the future.
This would only mean that for humans the idea of life is no longer important. That might be a risk
for the non human world, if humanity had been something of value for that world. The element of
time is important when exploring this experimental view. Consider the possibility of a social entity
that has no expectation in the future or the future has not any value. As if time itself had no value.
Same with the past, no value. Or imagine the past having value, but not the future or vice versa.
How does a different perceptions and value of time influence risk perception? How does it create
tensions and densities of aggression in the social world? This is an open question.
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ements X, Y , P , and U are the same, depending on the presupposed worldview the
perception of risk R differs. From my point of view the starting point of the risk in-
terpretation is the perception of the state of the world. In the stochastic interpretation
(R = U [P (X(Y ))]), the uncertain world is given or predetermined and this world is
at risk because of the existing ‘somethings’ that are of value. In the materialistic in-
terpretation (R = X[Y (P (U))]), the ‘somethings’ are given and are at risk because of
inherent uncertainty in the world. In the stochastic worldview, risks can be changed if
the materialistic element, the value of the ‘something’, changes its interpretation. In the
materialistic worldview risk can be changed if the stochastic element of uncertainty is
changing. The different worldviews, I argue, can lead to different social reactions and
interpretations of what is perceived as a risk.
My argument for different risk densities based on different point of views relies on the
assumption that in the stochastic worldview any low-probability assumption does not
change the assumption of uncontrollable uncertainty. In other words, a risk remains high
even if the understanding of the change of ‘something’ is on a higher level. Whereas in the
materialistic worldview, uncertainty decreases and risk diminishes if the understanding
about ‘something’ and its value increases. For instance, if an old nuclear power plant,
with given accident probability, is replaced with a new nuclear power plant, with a lower
accident probability, the risk of a nuclear accident will be less and the uncertainty of
the risk shrinks. In an stochastic worldview, the change of probability does not affect
the risk density because one nuclear power plant has been replaced by an newer one.
The fact that the newer one has a different accident probability does not change the
truth that there is still a nuclear power plant and still a risk of an accident. What
constitutes a risk is the inherent uncertainty that cannot be reduced by reducing the
accident probability.
Risk is a social perception or an interpretation, a density of information-units, a
system of information-units. The evaluation of the ‘somethings’ and the valuation of
‘uncertainty’ are core elements in balancing a risk system. Balancing risks is a commu-
nicative process that is of constant change. If risk cannot be changed, because some
parameters X, Y , P , U are not changeable, we are in a risk-trap. Say for example food
is on shortage and cannot be substituted a risk emerges till the missing food will be
substituted. In case of ‘mind-food’, such as ideologies or paradigms or places of origin, a
substitution is not so easy. In such case X cannot be changed easily. The ‘other’ X will
always be a huge risk, or not even a risk, but an element that is not part of the human
reality. What if the valuation of X changes within a given social reality, say because of
a changing population structure, caused by migration or a higher life-expectancy? Such
shifts could lead to a self-enforcing process that increases the risk of conflict within the
given risk-system. This dynamics of self-enforcing risk mechanisms are missing in Rosa
et al’ definition.
The element of time is also missing in Rosa et al’ definition. Time-horizon, focus on
past experiences or future expectations can influence risk perception of any social organ-
ism. The reaction time for change within a social system also needs to be considered.
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If changes in X and reaction in Y happen simultaneously, such as an adjusted value
orientation as a result of a change in the social structure, the risk-density should be
the same. Too slow or too fast reactions change the existing risk-density and lead to
irritations.
Since risk is not based on ontological realism but on epistemological or ‘subjective’
interpretation, the elements of risk perception set the dimension for risk interpretation
and of how to perceive risk, and to use it as a tool for social change. I summarize my
thoughts: the world is a world of possible outcomes with uncertain probabilities and
consequences for humans. Humans have different interpretations of reality. This opens
the space for a communicative process. This can push or influence people to go to war
or become peaceful. Existing risk densities in the human world are a chance for social
change.
2.4.3. Improving the definition of risk
In the next part I am going to further discuss the definition of risk, based on the concept
Rosa et al. (2014, 21) present. This part is a critique on technical risk concepts that
ignore the complex nature of uncertainty in their risk evaluations. The discussion will
move further to a concept that has the potential to address both ideas: on one hand the
idea of quantification of uncertainty with qualitative or quantitative methods, and on
the other, the idea of a still unknown world with risks as an interpretation of the world.
This concept focuses on the quantification of uncertainty as an approach to create states
of knowledge, that are able to compare the knowledge about any risks, independently of
their impact on something of human value. In this part I will mostly refer to the work of
Terje Aven and his collaborative work with Ortwin Renn (Aven and Renn, 2009; Aven,
2008, 2010, 2012a; Aven et al., 2014). At the end I will add commend based on Frank
H. Knight’s thoughts on uncertainty (Knight, 1921).
According to Aven and Renn (2009), the existing definitions of risk can be classified
into two groups. The first group is built upon technical terms combining two elements:
a frequency analysis and an analysis of the consequences: risk = probability × conse-
quences.13 For the frequency analysis, there is usually the measure is a probability, a
number between 0 and 1, indicating the chance of the occurrence of a consequence. For
the consequence analysis certain terms are used to express an often undesirable outcome:
losses, disutility, adverse outcomes, or adverse effects. Technically the combination of
probability and consequences are often expressed as expected value or expected utility.14
13 A typical definition of that concept of risk is: “Risk is the combination of probability of an event
and its consequences” (Aven and Renn, 2009, 1).
14 The expected value is expressed as the mean value x¯ of a number of outcomes (x1, ..., xn) and their
probabilities (p1, ..., pn): x¯ =
∑
xipi. The utility function does not imply a linear relationship
for the expected value but assigns a specific utility function (U(·)) to the outcome component:
u¯ =
∑
U(xi)pi (compare: Machina, 1987, 122).
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In contrast the second group of risk concepts is represented by the definition men-
tioned already above: “Risk is a situation or an event where something of human value
(including humans themselves) is at stake and where the outcome is uncertain” (Rosa
et al., 2014, 21; see also Aven and Renn, 2009, 1). This class of definitions is character-
ized by first a component that explicitly emphasizes the uncertain nature of the world
and second a component that expresses an evaluation of the outcome.
Aven and Renn (2009) criticize both definitions and and suggest a definition that is
more precise on how uncertainty is part of our knowledge system of the world. For these
authors, uncertainty is an individual, knowledge based dimension, not independent of an
assessor. They suggest a definition that contains following properties (Aven and Renn,
2009, 10):
1. accommodate both undesirable and desirable outcomes,
2. address uncertainties instead of probabilities and expected values,
3. is not restricted to specific consequences and quantities.
A definition of risk should contain these elements and at the same time generates
enough information that a risk judgement based on the best available knowledge, qual-
itative and quantitative, can be guaranteed.
Technical definitions are based on probabilistic quantities and the multiplication of
probabilities and consequences to derive expected values as a result of risk analysis. The
technical definition misses that uncertainties can exist without being able to be expressed
in terms of probabilities. This limited definition reduces the knowledge dimension of
risk to only be expressed in terms of probabilities. Aven (2008) criticizes this narrow
approach arguing that probabilities are only a vague measure of a risk. Uncertainties
in estimation process of the true value remain, moreover estimates can be based on
a selective information process: “The arbitrariness in the numbers produced could be
significant, due to the uncertainties in the estimates or as a result of the uncertainty
assessments being strongly dependent on the assessor” (Aven, 2008, 769). He remarks
the inadequate awareness, which could be called ignorance, of the uncertainty of our
knowledge of the chances and consequences of certain activities, situations or events
that are perceived as risk. His argument is about the adequate interpretation of the
knowledge structure, that is not appropriately pictured by probabilities, often giving the
wrong impression of a very precise way to express risks: “[R]isk cannot be adequately
described and evaluated simply by reference to summarizing probabilities and expected
values” (Aven, 2008, 774) he argues.
It is usually the case that the scope of interpretation – the arbitrariness – is quite large,
Aven continues. The urge to provide pure probabilities instead of crude entities requires a
high willingness to simplify the world and to refer to strong assumptions. Simplification
happens in data structure as well as on the methodological processes, leading to a bias in
how to weight information or how to incorporate or ignore important factors. It seems
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that exact quantification is also resource demanding: “In addition, risk quantification is
very resource demanding. We need to ask whether the resources are used in the best
way” (Aven, 2008, 775). Given the limited resources of time and money to adequately
express a precise risk picture, based on all available information and potential factors,
a pure number like a probability or any risk indicator can hide the lack of knowledge or
unknown or unwanted information behind the nimbus of precision and objectivity.
To bridge the gap between the need for a quantification or, if that is not possible
due to the nature of the risk, a framework able to compare between different risks
Aven and Renn (Aven, 2008, 775) proposed two modifications for defining risks. The
first modification is to recognize that probabilities can be interpreted and expressed as
subjective measures and degrees of beliefs of an assessor, and therefore are not related to
the idea of an estimate of a true probability. The second modification is furthermore to
emphasis the aspect of uncertainty, indicating that the interpretation of the uncertainty
of a risk is a subjective judgement, based on the best available information.
The definition based on uncertainty and not on probability takes into consideration
that in many cases, even with the best available information, there is still uncertainty
about the occurrence and the consequences of a risk that is not be able to be explained.
The definition does not preliminary lead to a normative judgement about whether this
risk leads to desirable or undesirable outcomes. More so, it provides the necessary
information for a judgement: “As stated earlier, the expression of uncertainty does not
imply a judgement on risk acceptability or tolerability but it is the precondition that such
a judgement can be made on the basis of evidence and qualified assessments rather than
pure intuition or personal experience” (Aven and Renn, 2009, 7). For these authors, it
is important to provide a framework that distinguishes between risk assessment, a value
free approach based on knowledge, and the judgement of acceptability.
The definition Aven and Renn suggest, as a modification of Rosa’s definition (compare
Rosa, 1998; Rosa et al., 2014) is: “Risk refers to uncertainty about and severity of the
events and consequences (or outcomes) of an activity with respect to something that
humans value” (Aven and Renn, 2009, 6).
In this definition risk is not an ontological object that exists but risk is based on the
knowledge of its occurrence – it is an epistemological component. Uncertainty is also
not to be seen in relation to an outcome, but uncertainty is related to the knowledge and
perception of an event and its consequences. The definition defines two steps to evaluate
risk: firstly, the uncertainty about an event and the consequences needs to be quantified;
secondly the uncertainty needs to be evaluated in relation to the severity of an event and
its consequences. The severity of an event can be evaluated by quantitative measures
like money, risk indicators counting numbers of fatalities or environmental indicators,
and any measure that measures the intensity or the extension as a consequence of an
event, that is influencing something of human value.
The authors emphasize that their concept is based on the concept of uncertainty and
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not on probabilities. However, they still claim to have a comparable measure of uncer-
tainty. Uncertainty, independent of its measure, is a construct of human imagination
and not independent of an assessor’s view. It is a useful concept because the choice of
the measure for uncertainty or likelihood is not arbitrary, but the criteria is still based
on comparability. This creates openness to acknowledge different degrees of uncertainty
like known uncertainties – “we know what we do not know” – and ignorance or non-
knowledge, also called unknown uncertainties – “we do not know what we do not know”
(Aven and Renn, 2009, 9).
In this sense even precise measures like probabilities, likelihoods, or expected values
are not perceived as given states of an objective world. All measures express an observer’s
degree of belief, and depend on the observer’s perspective. In the subjective or Bayesian
case (compare e.g., Gill, 2008; de Finetti, 2008) probabilities are subjective measures
of uncertainty, based on the available information and beliefs that exist. Subjective
probabilities are still an estimate, containing different levels of uncertainty. In this
case there is no true objective state of the world, like in the classical interpretation of a
probability as an estimate of an unknown, but fixed and true value of a world independent
of an observer’s interpretation: “A probability is interpreted in the classical statistical
sense as the relative frequency of times the events occur if the situation analyzed were
hypothetically “repeated” an infinite number of times. The underlying probability is
unknown, and is estimated in the risk analysis” (Aven, 2008, 768).
A risk approach that includes risk dimensions like unknown uncertainty and state
of knowledge or competence goes, beyond the standard evaluation of expected values.
An appropriate outcome analysis is not easy to obtain, especially if there is no assess-
ment culture to identify consequences that are far beyond the expected outcomes. As
a first approach, a risk picture could include more critical or reflexive aspects like large
uncertainties that are related to the observed phenomena, or views from experts that
are challenging the given interpretations and conclusions. Aven suggests including more
elements into risk assessment to critically evaluate risk. His formal notion is (2008,
774): (I, C, I∗, C∗, U, P,K). I is the initiating event of risk like a hazard, C depicts
the unknown consequences of that event, I∗ and C∗ are the corresponding estimates or
predictions of the events and the consequences. The uncertainty component is U and P
the assigned probabilities. Additional knowledge or background information about the
model assumptions or suppositions are included in K. That wide framework opens up
the space to ask critical questions about knowledge, uncertainties, and potential gaps
that might lead to a false estimate of potential consequences C. The aim is to iden-
tify uncertainties and different views that might lead to consequences C that have not
been taken into consideration by deriving an expected consequence E[C]: “This system
reflects features such as the current knowledge and understanding about the underly-
ing phenomena and the systems being studied, the complexity of technology, the level
of predictability, the experts’ competence, and the vulnerability of the system” (Aven,
2008, 774).
The openness to identify unexpected consequences in the real world is related to the
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openness in an expert’s mind to identify the limits of someone’s own knowledge. One
way is to question the quantification mechanisms that try to identify information and
create comparable results. Frank H. Knight (1921) provides a framework for how to
compare different levels of knowledge, expressed in probabilities that helps to accept the
limits of any estimate.
2.4.4. The risk entrepreneur – opening the unknown space
In his book ‘Risk, Uncertainty and Profit’ Frank H. Knight (1921) distinguishes between
three types of uncertainty. The first two types are measurable types of uncertainty he
calls risk. The distributions of outcome are known, either through calculation that is
based on a-priori knowledge or on empirical data. The third type is a more complex type
of uncertainty because it is not quantifiable. In the third case, the distribution of the
outcome is not known because there is no information. Knight states that the world of
knowledge is a quite static system, not the changing and unknown world that is around
us: “It is a world of change in which we live, and a world of uncertainty” (Knight, 1921,
199).
The openness of the world is not reflected in what he observes in the world of scientific
knowledge or in the world of true probabilities, since the aim of expert’s expertise and
knowledge is predictability and, hence, a static world: “We have, then, our dogma which
is the presupposition of knowledge, in this form; that the world is made up of things,
which, under the same circumstances, always behave in the same way” (Knight, 1921,
204). The complexity of the world depends on the things we choose to deal with and the
given circumstances that influence the action of that things. The combined knowledge
of both things and circumstances then forms the knowledge of expected consequences.
Knight criticizes the accepted assumption of repeatability that things always behave in
the same way when the circumstances are kept constant.
Knight furthermore questions whether the concept of a thing is logically correct be-
cause in an interconnected world, that thing is again a foundation for circumstances
that influences other things; moreover, circumstances influencing that thing in the first
beginning are itself composed of things. Any experience of objects in the world does
not match the assumption of repeatability: “The assumption that under the same cir-
cumstances the same things behave in the same ways thus raises the single question of
how far and in what sense the universe is really made up of such “things” which preserve
an unvarying identity (mode of behavior)” (Knight, 1921, 205). He further challenges
the scientific paradigm that even varying structures consist itself of underlying complex
things that, if they are known, are itself unvarying and “ultimate” (Knight, 1921, 205).
This is not what he thinks the world is made up of. The dogma of knowing cannot be
based on the assumption of a closed universe in space and time. Knowledge is based on
the assumption of a world that is in constant change and knowledge is only a temporary
state: “[W]orkable knowledge of the world requires much more than the assumption that
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the world is made up of units which maintain an unvarying identity in time” (Knight,
1921, 205).
Knight challenges the assumption of a true probability, constant over time and given
by the underlying structure of the composition of the things in the world. For him there
are two types of probabilities. The first type or true probability are a-priori probability,
which can be calculated from given knowledge and chances can be computed based
on general principles about the underlying data generating process, such as a lottery
in an experiment or rolling a perfect dice. The second type of probability is called
statistical probability. This type is not based on given knowledge, but must be calculated
inductively from a large group of cases, estimating the true parameter. In this case, the
chances can only be calculated using empirical information. The empirical information
can be classified and tabulated in groups of sufficient homogeneity: homogeneity being
an important feature of empirical information is necessary to form relative frequencies.
The uncertainty component in Knight’s concept of knowledge becomes important in
situations which are not homogeneous and too unique to be comparable, hence, there
is no information that can be used a-priori or empirically derived to value a judgement.
In this case “[t]he conception of an objectively measurable probability or chance is sim-
ply inapplicable” (Knight, 1921, 231). To speak of an objectively correct judgement
expressed by a number, like a probability, is in his sense “meaningless and fatally mis-
leading” (Knight, 1921, 231). True uncertainty in the very strict sense is uncertainty
that cannot be measured and cannot be empirically grouped or controlled and by no
mean can be eliminated by social activity or socially organized behavior.
The uncertain nature of the world is an opportunity for social players to become an
entrepreneur and to change the world in a certain direction: “It is this true uncertainty
which by preventing the theoretically perfect outworking of the tendencies of competition
gives the characteristic form of “enterprise” to economic organization as a whole and
accounts for the peculiar income of the entrepreneur” (Knight, 1921, 232). Knight
emphasizes the role of an entrepreneur as a person who starts a business idea and who
profits from the potential that is inherent to the uncertain space.
At this point I want to emphasize the individualistic aspect of Knight’s approach,
confirming the social dimension of uncertainty as a characteristic in the world of business
creation and profit seeking. An ‘entrepreneur’ in his sense of the word, is someone who
accepts uncertainty as a social fact, senses it and tries to create social structures to
integrate that uncertainty into society. Sensing and entering the open spaces in society
is also a space and chance for transformation, change and creation of new knowledge
about the world and its features: “It is a world of change in which we live in, and a world
of uncertainty. We live only by knowing something about the future; while the problem
of life, or of conduct at least, arise from the fact that we know so little” (Knight, 1921,
199). To accept the limits of knowledge in the first part is a prerequisite to building social
institutions. Organizing social mechanisms that provide an exchange of knowledge and
lead to decision making processes by mutual exchange and the willingness for consent,
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is an important aspect of a free society in a world with limited knowledge and changing
uncertain factors: “No one denies that “man is a social animal”; and in fact society makes
men far more than man make society, meaning by deliberate thinking and action. Yet
I believe that individualism must be the political philosophy of intelligent and morally
serious men. The choice lies between allowing people to fix the general form and terms
of association by mutual consent, and having all conduct ordered by some authority,
ultimately one based on a claim to a prescriptive right to power” (Knight, 1921, xlix).
I would like to include one thought Knight provides, reflecting a society and business
world that can be helpful in the light of risk assessment processes. Knight mentions the
entrepreneur, accepting and judging uncertainty to create new markets. He also speaks
of the morality of free individuals, acting responsibly for their community or society,
willing and able to transform and change previous ideas of social life, based on mutual
consent. He provides an answer for why uncertainty has formed any form of social
association and why uncertainty will always be the driving factor of new institutions,
based on previous and given knowledge. From his point of view, uncertainty can be
transformed in an objective form of knowledge, like probabilities, when the world is
categorized in groups and these groups can form their own social entities. In this case,
uncertainty was transformed in certainty, as the example of regulation processes show.
“As we have repeatedly pointed out, an uncertainty which can by any method be reduced
to an objective, quantitatively determinate probability, can be reduced to complete
certainty by grouping cases. The business world has evolved several organization devices
for effectuating this consolidation, with the result that when the technique of business
organization is fairly developed, measurable uncertainties do not introduce into business
any uncertainty whatsoever” (Knight, 1921, 231-232). If these organizations are able to
control uncertainty, this is a useful practice of reducing uncertainty. The problem, in my
point of view, arrises when social institutions, designed to control uncertainty, are not
able to deal with uncertainty, because the nature of the ‘thing’ or ‘something’ cannot
be controlled by human knowledge or human behavior. For example, if a thing is not
able to distinguish between right and left it is not possible to establish a norm telling
the thing to drive on the right or left side of a road.
I think that today’s risk ‘entrepreneur’, to borrow Knight’s terminology, is aware of
the nature of uncertainty and feels moral responsibility. Within an open and uncertain
universe, the gravity of uncertainty is pulling risk entrepreneurs towards the centers
of institutionalized risk control. The entrepreneur, furthermore, is able to differentiate
between all forms of certainty and uncertainty, transforming centers of risk into respon-
sible institutions of risk-awareness, guided by the laws of uncertainty and ignorance.
What are the laws of uncertainty in the sense of risk assessment? I would argue that
it is the awareness of openness in any social process that is constantly challenging own
perceptions or previously formed perceptions. An institutionalized open space of uncer-
tainty takes into account that there never is such a thing as certainty. The space a risk
entrepreneur creates is an institutionalized space of anarchy, creating a willingness to
learn more about a risk. Aven (2008, 774) mentions an approach developed by Klinke
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and Renn (Klinke and Renn, 2002) that goes beyond standard interpretations of risk
consequences based on monetary unities or human lives, taking into account social conse-
quences and changes, that are beyond social accountability: “Examples of such features
are temporal extension, delay effects, irreversibility and aspects of the consequences that
could cause social mobilisation, i.e. violation of individual, social or cultural interests
and values generating social conflicts and psychological reactions by individuals and
groups who feel aﬄicted by the consequences” (Aven, 2008, 774).
2.4.5. Risks as a semi-normative concept
Aven and Renn (2009) try to define a risk concept that provides a fine balance between
risks based on uncertainties, going beyond the limits of probabilities judgement, all the
while providing a concept based on empirical evidence and on personal opinion. It
is a fine line of trying to bridge the gap between measurable concepts or objectified
knowledge, and perceived individual knowledge. Risk from their point of view is the
combination of all dimensions of risk: “A low degree of uncertainty does not necessarily
mean a low risk, or a high degree of uncertainty does not necessarily mean a high level of
risk. As risk is defined as the two-dimensional combination of uncertainties and severity
of consequences, any judgement about the level of risk needs to consider both dimensions
simultaneously” (Aven and Renn, 2009, 8). The authors emphasize that their definition
of risk does not contain an a-priori normative judgement about a state of the world. It is
conceptualized to assess undesired and desired outcomes and is not restricted to certain
quantities or consequences, such as cost benefit measures or numbers of fatalities. Their
concept widens the narrow scope of number obsessed idealists, yet holds back those
voices claiming that risk is a mere interpretation of the world: “Our proposed definition
provides a conceptually consistent and practically compatible concept of risk without
falling into the extreme of total subjectivism and relativism but also not pretending that
risk is a measurable object similar to other physical entities” (Aven and Renn, 2009, 8).
The concept is open for an epistemological interpretation of risk, risk is what we
perceive as risk – it is not a state of the world, but it still asks for a quantification or
qualification judgement to assess uncertainty. Aven and Renn define risk as: “Risk refers
to uncertainty about and severity of the events and consequences (or outcomes) of an
activity with respect to something that humans value” (Aven and Renn, 2009, 6).
I want to update this definition and define uncertainty more precisely as an social
process of communication that is as such open for interpretation and depends on many
social factors. Uncertainty as well as risk is also an epistemological element – a construct.
Updated definition (2):
Risk refers to uncertainty about and severity of the events and consequences (or out-
comes) of an activity with respect to something that humans value. The interpretation
of uncertainty and severity is a communicative social process and as such open.
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I raise my concern because I wonder how this concept will perform in an environment
of social power structures with high expectations and controversy opinions, financial
incentives, hierarchies, and social interests?
2.4.6. Risk perception and power
After a first definition of risk perception I wish to include less technical views of risks.
For Terje Aven and Ortwin Renn “risk perception is based on personal beliefs, affects
and experiences irrespective of their validity [...] [R]isk perception does not only cover
perceived seriousness of risk but also acceptability of risk” (Aven and Renn, 2009, 6).
Risk perception from that point of view includes a judgement about the state of the
world. I refer to Sheila Jassanoff (1999) when pointing towards the political and cultural
values that shape the sound of risk. The sound of risk is an ambiguous, vague, and
unstandardized concept, varying across cultures and boundaries. It is concept assuming
the openness of thoughts and asking for new anarchical methods. A birthplace for
new perspectives, paradigms, and solutions. My aim is to show different approaches of
evaluating risk and to understand different views about the past, current and future risk-
state of the world. All of this information pulled together may offer hints of what needs
to be taken into consideration to successfully govern global environmental problems. For
a peaceful and sustainable world, as a source of life for future generations.
Risk assessment is an institutionalized social process designed to solve problems. Each
process is nested within a given knowledge systems and a political power structures. Both
aspects – knowledge and power – are worth considering when discussing a concept of
risk.
Excursus: The sand castle
I argue that human reasoning is not a brute fact rather a complex social process. There
is a different sound for any topic we talk. In fact, we can question the sound of our
language that leads to making decisions. To change the existing constraints, we could
add another dimension of social sound that might lead to a new type of space for decision
making. One way to add a new sound element would be to distance and question who
we are, the way we think and the way we talk. We could experiment with being silent
and listening to other voices, perhaps in new ways.
In this excursus I want to borrow Charles Perrow’s voice to let him speak about his
concerns (Perrow, 1999, 2006, 2007). Picture Charles Perrow’s childhood voice in an
imaginary situation, when he is playing by himself in a sandbox outside his house. One
day, while he is playing, an adult passes and stops to watch him trying to sculpture a
complex top on his sandcastle. The adult offers to help and says ‘use a bit of water that
helps to form better sand’. Little Charles does so and it works. The next day, the man
comes back again, this time with an oven to heat up sand. He suggests to the child:
‘We use heat to melt sand and build glass. That way you can form anything you want
and build the nicest sandcastles in the whole neighborhood.’ Little Charles helps him
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to collect sand from his sandbox and watches how the adult melts sand to make glass.
At the end of the day, he has a wonderful sandcastle now made of glass. The man is
happy and walks away feeling satisfied with himself. The following day, the man is back
again and together they create a second castle. This time little Charles cuts himself on
a sharp edge of the castle, his finger bleeding. The adult calms him with a candy and
stops the bleeding with a band-aid. Now Charles has two sand transformed glass-castles
in his sandbox. Some of his sand is gone, but they look so wonderful and are great to
play with, and are an endless source of fun. He watches them carefully while playing
with other children. The man does not return and, after a few weeks, Charles forgets
about him. The wound, healed leaves a little scar on his finger. Every evening when he
goes to bed he prays that the next day will be as good as the day he had today. Every
time he folds his hand to pray, he sees the scar.
Over time, he starts to worry about something happening to the glass-castles. What if
it breaks, leaving many sharp edges? I could cut myself. He calms his fear by counting
all days he has been playing in the sandbox with his glass-castles, without anything
unusual happening. Happy with his answer, he sleeps deeply. The next evening, while
praying, he sees the scar and asks himself what would happen if the castle broke into tiny
bits of pieces? He calms himself by reasoning, even if it does breaks apart, by carefully
cleaning the sand of all sharp pieces, he will not get hurt. Happy with his answer he
falls asleep. The next evening he asks himself about the cleaning, what if I cannot find
all pieces and some are left in the sandbox? Even if I am cleaning carefully, even more
carefully that when I clean the kitchen, the way Mom asks me to do? He calms himself
by realizing that the sandbox is big enough that he could play in only one half of the
sandbox. This time he does not go back to sleep, but asks himself what if the other
glass-castle in the second half of the sandbox also breaks and what if I cannot clean that
part? Then he remembers that a neighbor’s friend also has a sandbox and that he could
ask his parents to build a new sandbox as a present for him. Satisfied with his answers,
he goes back to sleep.
Little Charles forgets the scar for a while and nothing happens. He plays in his
sandbox, watching nature; he likes to watch birds and he dreams of flying like a bird.
He imagines how he would take his glass-castles up in the air and take them anywhere
he wanted to. In the evening, while praying he imagines birds flying with glass-castles
above him and he sees himself as one of the birds. Then he sees the scar and this reminds
him of the sharpness of glass. He asks himself, what if there are big birds flying with
big glass-castles above me and what if they drop them on my house? How can I go to
my sandbox to play with my glass-castles in the sandbox, what if there are tiny sharp
pieces of glass everywhere? I would cut myself again and again and I could not walk or
play anymore. It takes little Charles a while to calm down, by constantly counting the
days nothing has happened in the past. The next day, while playing in his sandbox he
has mixed feelings when being near the glass-castles, but he cannot get rid of them. He
feels afraid of a giant bird that might take them up in the air, drop them somewhere,
and harm him or other people. He does not what to do. After a while, he wonders what
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if the sandbox is the only place he can go to, or what if the world is a sandbox and he
cannot go to another sandbox to play in. This evening, while praying he thinks that
he doesn’t want the glass-castles anymore. He doesn’t wont them to break to hurt him.
He doesn’t want them to be dropped somewhere hurting someone else. Little Charles
Perrow grew up and he became a professor at Yale University. That is how the excursus
ends.
The intention of Charles Perrow’s work seems to be a constant questioning of existing
views of realty. Perrow is pointing into directions that might not previously been taken
into consideration. For him, experts use methods to come to conclusions. Today’s
methods are based on accountability and empirical facts. Experts are professionals
trained to use their methods and feed them with created empirical evidence. Empirical
evidence such as “toting up the deaths” is created to match the methods (Perrow, 1999,
322).
Perrow’s thoughts are circulating around technologies that are like the giant flying
glass-castles that could break in the future creating catastrophic damages to humanity.
He criticizes people who only look back saying that nothing has happened so far, because
these people claim, that according to the methods used and the existing data, these
technologies are safe: “A working definition of an expert is a person who can solve a
problem faster or better than others, but who runs a higher risk than others of posing
the wrong problem. By virtue of his or her expert methods, the problem is redefined
to suit the methods. Because you can count, and because we have data on deaths,
the choice is defined as a problem of toting up known figures. I define the problem as
one of potential consequences, not observed ones” (Perrow, 1999, 322-323). By pointing
his finger, maybe the one with the little scar, above our heads in the sky, Perrow is
envisaging a potential situation that does not yet exist, an unpredictable consequence of
today’s practices and methods. He also emphasizes not ignoring potential threats or risks
that are easily forgotten because they have not yet happened, and my only occur once.
Such is the threat of a potential nuclear war: “Your concern with power lawnmowers or
automobiles, where we have good accident statistics, may save more people from injury
and death, than my concern with nuclear war, which happened only once and has very
low chances of happening again” (Perrow, 1999, 323).
For me, the nuclear holocaust is an important element to be aware of because this is
a realistic and plausible end to humanity. A social reality that happens only once, the
impossibility, the black swan of empirical evidence (Aven, 2013; Taleb, 2010). Nuclear
war is entirely human made and created by existing worldviews, knowledge, and human
technology. It could be stopped or started through human decisions. Not a collective
decision. For Charles Perrow, the debate about risk and how to deal best with risks is
not a matter of the existing risk culture in society, but a matter of the existing power
structure within that society (Perrow, 2006).
Questioning the way risks are defined and assessed in society is also a way to question
the existing power structures. Giving voice to critics who question the power structure in
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society could also be a chance to reduce the vulnerability of the social system the risks are
created in. Giving voice opens the space for different opinions, independent of how they
are embedded in the given power structure in society. The debate about risk can help
to open those dense power structures to form a new space of more interconnectedness
and more ways to exchange and discuss in society: “The way we have formatted the
discussion of risk in our popular culture and academic literature also tends to avoid the
issue of power. Everything is connected in our world, we say, and that is true. But the
most important thing about the connectedness is often overlooked: most of it involves
dependencies rather than interdependencies” (Perrow, 2006, 53). If the social system is
more interdependent no dominant structure could be formed and kept stable because
“[i]nterdependency means reciprocity, mutual affect and mutual adjustments. It also
means choice, which is achieved through redundancies, where, for example, a firm has
many suppliers to choose from and many customers to sell to” (Perrow, 2006, 53).
The elements to discuss from Perrow’s point of view are then to question the given and
previous power structures that created a risk, to discuss the relation between dependen-
cies and interdependencies within a society which then will lead to the question of who
was involved in the decision making process and what kind of options did exist to choose
from. Analyzing the catastrophic consequences of nuclear technology, Perrow comes to
the conclusion of abandoning nuclear power and nuclear weapons (Perrow, 1999, 347).
The option to abandon existing technologies is, from my point of view, an important
aspect in governing risks, that has not yet been effectively realized in human history.
The term risk, then takes on a different meaning. Risk then defines social practices and
social spaces that are too dangerous to human life. A risk for humanity, not only, as the
above discussed definition by Rosa et al. (2014) claims, ‘something of human value’. In
this sense I am questioning the definition of risk again. The interpretation of uncertainty
and severity is based on the existing social power structure of decision making. Risk
decisions are also made to maintain the existing social power structure – a structure
that as such is created by past decision making processes in an uncertain world.
Updated definition (3):
Risk refers to uncertainty about and severity of the events and consequences (or out-
comes) of an activity with respect to something that humans value. The interpretation
of uncertainty and severity is a communicative social process and as such open. The
openness depends on the social power structure. The social power structure as such
depends on previous decision making processes under uncertainty.
According to this definition, risks are socially constructed and can be reversed by
social processes. How humans deal with their risk is an open process based on human
decisions. Risks as such are part of an infinite social regress, not to be stopped and not
to be avoided, all the while, not able to be fully explained by a model or a social theory.
Risk is open by nature. Not because of its objective nature but because of its social
interpretation. Therefore humans cannot control risk, but can learn to change them.
This open space surrounding risks is, in my opinion, the ‘sound of risk’. A sound that
46
3. Risk as a consequence of modernity
can transform society because it has the power to influence decision making processes
within the existing power structure.
3. Risk as a consequence of modernity
3.1. Anthony Giddens’ modernity
For the following chapter of my dissertation it does not matter if risks are real or if they
are socially constructed, nor if they even exist. What matters is that there are ‘things’
out there in the world that have consequences. Some consequences are maybe not
desired by the next generation of humans on earth. The next generation does not only
inherit our knowledge, it also inherits our ‘things’, along with the actual and potential
consequences of that knowledge and that things. An obvious question is: What are
potential consequences for future generations and what are the things that lead to that
consequences? To focus on the main topic of my work a following question then is: How
is this question related to nuclear technology? My answer is: that thing what we want
to catch by thoughts and word is called ‘nuclear totalitarianism.’ It is that a technology
can lead to a Holocaust15, a mass extermination of social life at certain areas of this
planet, including the entire planet itself. And it is not that technological systems are
wanting to do that. But technological systems are part of human life and humans have
the potential or want it to happen.
The question therefore is: How to make humans not to want a thing, such as the
nuclear Holocaust, to happen? This discussion, from a scientific point of discussion, will
not lead to a conclusive end. The aim is to focus on the consequences and not to make
them happen in the future; not even trying to answer the question what the true nature
of risk really is. Not today’s consequences but consequences for future generations. And
consequences not for the next generation, but for future future generations. Generations
that have a different social order, different boundaries, different abilities than we have
today. Generations that will bear the consequences of today’s decision making processes.
From a future observer’s perspective, it does not matter who is today’s risk taker
and risk bearer, nor what is the risk assessment methods that exists today are. Future
generations will find methods to deal with today’s consequences. What we can do today
is to start to play ‘future generation’. We could skip some parts of history and make
the nuclear Holocaust not happen. A dissertation in the future then would also not be
written to discuss risk and its consequences to improve existing risk assessment methods.
The dissertation then would be the story of why the Holocaust did not happen and why
humans are able to use knowledge and to understand the consequences of knowledge. It
15 Middle English : from Old French holocauste, via late Latin from Greek holokauston, from holos
‘whole’ + kaustos ‘burned’.
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would be a story why war will never happen again. Why war was abandoned from human
reality, not a technology which was abandoned, but a human practice that became no
longer relevant to human reality.16
3.1.1. Risk and danger
Anthony Giddens is a philosopher who tries to encompass the above mentioned dimen-
sions of peace, no totalitarianism or nuclear Holocaust, in a world of risk. He uses the
term of risk but is not focussing on the term of risk, basically leaving the term risk its
openness.
Think of an ice age, the ice age of human created risk to be more precise. Today’s
world is covered within a thick ice shield. The ice shield of modernity, of the 20th century,
the century of totalitarianism and world wars. There are two human made risks which
have created this ice age: the language of war and the knowledge to use the tools of war.
The mental constructions of ‘enemy’ has produced a mental ice shield in human minds.
It has also produced the tools of war to attack an enemy, sealing the mental ice shield
with an technological shield of weaponry of mass destruction. The mental ice shield
has created territories that can be delineated as enemy territories. Assigning unknown
humans as risk. Anthony Giddens (1990) calls the ice age ‘modernity’. The ice shield
he calls the idea of an ‘nuclear Holocaust’. What could melt the ice is what he calls an
‘ethic of planetary care’ or ‘Utopia’.
Giddens sees a direct connection between the logic of modernity and the logic of
totalitarianism. From his point of view, “[t]otalitarianism and modernity are not just
contingently, but inherently, connected” (Giddens, 1990, 172). The idea of superior
national ideologies combined with national knowledge has led to an unchained race in
technological domination and hegemony. Nuclear power is the outstanding example of
the logic of dominance through technological knowledge. Scientific knowledge in this case
is a weapon, used to create real physical weapons to harm other people. The combination
of science and weaponry technology, as Giddens points out, will therefore again and again
produce technologies that are as much of a threat as nuclear power (Giddens, 1990, 172-
173). Risks in this sense are not mere factors to analyze and to measure, risks have a
history and a story to tell. To control risks, one needs to understand the forces that
created the risks. To solve risks, there is no one-dimensional technological solution, but
only a complex social solution.
Risk in the sense of Giddens’ notion is a term that evolved with the meaning of
chance. Chance and risk emerged into modern thinking when traditional and religious
knowledge claims about the world were put into question: “[t]he concept of risk replaces
16 I deeply hope that in the future everybody will be able to write a dissertation or a masterpiece,
not a dissertation anymore as we understand today. A dissertation based on the language of peace,
justice, and sustainability and not on the language of war, ignorance, and success.
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that of fortuna”, as Giddens states (1990, 34). Risk in this sense can be perceived as
a symbol of a paradigmatic shift into a new area. Where ‘fortuna’ represents the old
religious point of view of a given reality by a divineness; risk represents the perception
of determination and contingency of the new area of modernity. The concept of risk is
also a symbol for trust in modern thinking, new forms of social institutions, and social
systems. It is also part of a general awareness that human activity is the source of
new social and technological processes. And these activities are based on human moral
beliefs, the knowledge of natural causes, and an open character of the world. Risk opens
the scope for new chances independent of given moral and mental concepts within a
deterministic religious cosmology (Giddens, 1990, 34).
Unlike the definitions of risk discussed in previous chapters, Giddens distinguishes
between risk and danger, even if he mentions that it is a fine difference (Giddens, 1990,
34). Danger is a state of the world that is a threat to a desired outcome. Danger can be
out of the scope of human awareness. Risks, in contrast, are within human awareness.
Taking calculated risks and choosing an action includes an awareness of alternative
actions and its expected outcomes and potential threats to that outcomes. Human
reasoning is not free of ignorance and the open character, the contingency, of the outside
world leaves space for unaware and threatening moments that can affect desired human
action. Humans, in this case, are not aware of the danger. For Giddens human life is still
based on the awareness or unawareness of danger – not of risk. The concepts of trust
and risk are used to control the dangerous nature of life: “[r]isk and trust intertwine,
trust normally serving to reduce or minimize the dangers to which particular types of
activity are subject.” He continues to also mention the context in which risks and trust
environments are embedded. “What is seen as “acceptable” risk – the minimising of
danger – varies in different contexts, but is usually central in sustaining trust”, Giddens
explains (1990, 35). Risk in this notion can be interpreted as a social construct, creating
and sustaining trust, depending on the context and the awareness of danger.
Modernity is characterized by the emergence of new social institutions and a new
dynamic within that social institutions. The essential core element is the nation-state
as new social institutions and expert systems like scientific knowledge as driver of rapid
technological and ideological change within and across the new social institutions.
The dynamic of the new institutions (Giddens, 1990, 6) lead to an institutionalized,
organized environment of changes. According to Giddens the main driver has been tech-
nological change. The pace and scope of institutionalized changes developed into dimen-
sions of near or global reach. Modern institutions, like the nation-state, have an intrinsic
nature and are able to combine and organize social life more efficient. Capitalism, as
Giddens explains, the accumulation of capital within competitive marked environments
and industrialism as a mechanism of nature transformation in human build environments
created also new environments of institutionalized risks, or unintended consequences of
modernity. According to Giddens modernity developed its dynamic nature because of a
transformation of time and space from local time-space units or communities into larger
social system of same time-space orientation. The invention of a mechanical clock and a
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uniform calendar helped to create new spaces of social life. The local place lost its local
time and rhythm, the new space got its new time, or as Giddens points out “empty” time
dimensions (Giddens, 1990, 17). Social institutions could use that time to define time
zones such as the social space of a working day. In the same way new “empty” spaces
emerged (Giddens, 1990, 19), independent of the local environment, allowing them to
transform, such as new market places or parts of the world to explore. The local space
got transformed by social activities and decisions distant from them.
Further increased relation to social others, distant from given local space, is also a
mechanism in modernity, leading to new institutions and new social systems. “The
advent of modernity increasingly tears space away from place by fostering relations
between “absent” others, locationally distant from any given situation of face-to-face in-
teraction” (Giddens, 1990, 18). The “lifting out” of social interactions and relations from
local environments to an “indefinite” or almost undefined space is termed by Giddens as
“disembedding” (Giddens, 1990, 21). Giddens explains: “The image evoked by disem-
bedding is better able to capture the shifting alignments of time and space which are
of elementary importance for social change in general and for the nature of modernity
in particular” (Giddens, 1990, 22). Disembedded social time and space systems create a
new openness of the world, an openness to abstract knowledge, mental spaces, point of
views, new ideas, as well as an openness to organize social life.
The disembedding of social systems formed new social forms of interaction and ex-
pertise, called expert systems, individuals mutually rely on: “By expert systems I mean
systems of technical accomplishment of professional expertise that organise large areas
of the material and social environments in which we live today” (Giddens, 1990, 27).
According to Giddens, expert systems are spaces of social knowledge and organization
beyond individual control that create the whole social system. Individuals accept their
lack of knowledge of the world and trust the professional expertise of expert systems,
like car and airplane transportation, construction of buildings, finance technology, energy
supply or health institutions and medical doctors. Expert systems, such as scientific dis-
ciplines, define universal mechanisms and codes independent of the local context. In that
sense expert systems become universal and independent systems with own time-space
dimensions, but also depend on the acceptance or trust of those absent of the knowl-
edge or information. Giddens concludes: “An expert system disembeds in the same
way as symbolic tokens, by providing “guarantees” of expectations across distanciated
time-space. This “stretching” of social systems is achieved via the impersonal nature of
tests applied to evaluate technical knowledge and by public critique (upon which the
production of technical knowledge is based), used to control its form” (Giddens, 1990,
28).
Aside from the separation of time and space on one hand and the disembedding of
social systems on the other, the “reflexive ordering and reordering of social relations”
(Giddens, 1990, 17) explains the dynamism of modernity. The ordering of social rela-
tions is mostly related to an constant change of knowledge and updating of information
within the social systems that results in reordering of interactions in social, political,
50
3. Risk as a consequence of modernity
or economical relations. The constant transformation and dynamic also identifies the
own limits of institutions and expert systems, creating new paradox or new pressure on
knowledge, action, and social organization, especially if these organizations rely on trust
of individual people. Confidence and faith are still important elements for building trust
in expert systems: “An element of Simmel’s “weak inductive knowledge” is no doubt
very often present in the confidence which lay actors sustain in expert systems. There is
a pragmatic element in “faith,” based upon the experience that such systems generally
work as they are supposed to do. In addition there are often regulatory agencies over
and above professional associations designed to protect the consumers of expert systems
– bodies which licence machines, keep a watch over the standard aircraft manufacturer,
and so forth” (Giddens, 1990, 29).
Risks in Giddens description of modernity arise as the risks show their global reach
and their high consequences. Modernity itself became a character of a “runaway” world
because in the reflexive world of time space “distanciation” no individual is able to be
taken into responsibility or is able to provide a solution to help (Giddens, 1990, 131).
The main characteristic of modern risks is the fact that, beside best human action and
knowledge, there is no solution to eliminate the possibility of potential failures – the
danger still exists. In the case of great systemic risk like a nuclear war, an accident or
global climate change “... fortuna tends to return” (Giddens, 1990, 111), humans have
no answer but to turn again towards faith.
Giddens identifies seven characteristics of modern risks and presents a risk profile of
modernity (Giddens, 1990, 124-125):
1. “Globalisation of risk in the sense of intensity : for example nuclear war can
threaten the survival of humanity.
2. Globalisation of risk in the sense of expanding number of contingent events which
affect everyone or at least large numbers of people on the planet: for example,
changes of the global division of labour.
3. Risk stemming from the created environment, or socialised nature: the infusion of
human knowledge into the material environment.
4. The development of institutionalized risk environment affecting the life-chances of
millions: for example, investment markets.
5. Awareness of risk as risk : the “knowledge gaps” in risks cannot be converted into
“certainties” by religious or magical knowledge.
6. The well-distributed awareness of risk : many of the dangers we face collectively
are known to wide publics.
7. Awareness of the limitations of expertise: no expert system can be wholly expert
in terms of the consequences of the adoption of expert principles.”
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Giddens’ risk profile can be separated into two sections. The first part of the profile
(characteristics 1 – 4) describe the scope and intensity of potential risks, like nuclear
war and the collapse of investment markets. He claims that humans created and in-
stitutionalized risk environments that are of global dimension in terms of interaction,
like changes in the global division of labor, or in terms of threat potential for humanity,
such as elimination of humanity in case of a nuclear war. The second part of the profile
(characteristics 5 – 7) describe the social awareness or perception of today’s risks. Risks
in that sense are knowledge gaps that are known or scientifically proofed and known
to the wide public. Giddens not only emphasizes laypeople’s awareness, but points out
that the expert systems as such are aware of their lack of knowledge and the potential
knowledge gaps or uncertainties. In this sense it becomes obvious why Giddens speaks of
risks as “manufactured uncertainties,” created by human activities and decisions (Rosa
et al., 2014, 86; see also Giddens, 2002, 26). Personally, a more suitable term is what
Giddens (1990, 35) calls “environments of risks,” because it indicates the social and the
spacial dimension of modern risks. It also indicates that the awareness of risks creates
new social systems: “Risk is not just a matter of individual action. There are “environ-
ments of risk” that collectively affect large masses of individuals – in some instances,
potentially everyone on the face of the earth, as in the case of the risk of ecological
disasters or nuclear war” (Giddens, 1990, 35).
The idea of a nuclear war, as an example for an environment of risk, also wipes out
the idea of real security: “We may define “security” as a situation in which a specific set
of dangers is counteracted or minimised. The experience of security usually rests upon
a balance of trust and acceptable risk. In both its factual and its experiential sense,
security may refer to large aggregates or collectivities of people – up to and including
global security – or to individuals” (Giddens, 1990, 35-36). Security is socially created,
based on the level of trust and the related awareness or accepted risks within a system.
Security requires dangers and means or actions to minimize the detected dangers. In
the context of intrinsic modern institutions, like the nation-state the need for security
can also produce new risks and conflicts. The distant other can become the enemy.
According to Giddens, ontological security is an emotional, an unconscious phenomenon
of humans “being-in-the-world” (Giddens, 1990, 92). In this context he refers to basic
trust as the main bearer of an balanced emotional state, as the source of security. If an
individual or a society is lacking a sense of trust, not security, then dread is the dominant
feeling and rising its voice to demand security: “If basic trust is not developed or its
inherent ambivalence not contained, the outcome is persistent existential anxiety. In its
most profound sense, the antithesis of trust is thus a state of mind which could best be
summed up as existential angst or dread ” (Giddens, 1990, 100).
3.1.2. A nuclear winter
After introducing Giddens’ ideas of risk, danger, expert systems, modern institutions,
time and space, as well as trust and security, I want to return to the risk of totalitarianism
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as a consequence of modernity.
The twentieth-century history has proven, that the beauties of modernity like tech-
nological development, scientific knowledge, free markets, and nation-states based on
democratic constitutions have been more of an illusion than the emergence of the new
creativity and liberty. The “dark sides” (Giddens, 1990, 9) of modernity, as Giddens crit-
ically remarks, are manifested in the military power and the industrialization of war, as
well as the surveillance and social supervision of citizens. The idea of a nation-state, as
an institution of security created a new environment of risk, which has become known as
totalitarianism: “In the wake of the rise of fascism, the Holocaust, Stalinism, and other
episodes of twentieth-century history, we can see that totalitarian possibilities are con-
tained within the institutional parameters of modernity rather than being foreclosed by
them. Totalitarianism is distinct from traditional despotism, but is all the more fright-
ening as a result. Totalitarian rule connects political, military, and ideological power in
more concentrated form than was ever possible before the emergence of modern nation-
states” (Giddens, 1990, 8). He explains that prior to World War I a bureaucratic social
organization, based on the Weberian idea of rationalization of human activities, within
a military regime of power could connect with the innovative forces of industrialism to
create new visions and realities of mass destruction and ideological domination. The
ideas of two blocks on the planet and its nuclear arm race as resent result of global war-
fare in human history make Giddens come to a pessimistic conclusion about the state
of the world: “The world we live today is a fraught and dangerous one” (Giddens, 1990,
10).
I want to expand further on Giddens thoughts on the nuclear danger. For Giddens, the
danger of the modern world lies in the destructive potential of its military institutions,
including the scenario of a nuclear conflict: “We live today in a global military order in
which, as a result of the industrialisation of war, the scale of the destructive power of
the weaponry now diffused across the world is massively greater than has ever existed
before. The possibility of nuclear conflict poses dangers no previous generations have
had to face” (Giddens, 1990, 10). War in that sense cannot be perceived as a solution to
solve risks anymore, because the potential threat of a global nuclear war does remain.
Unlike other risks the nuclear winter or nuclear Holocaust – as Giddens calls a global
nuclear war and its consequences for humanity – is a hypothetical scenario, created
and implemented by human institutions. The means for that scenario are produced
and designed by organized human knowledge; it is a desired scenario, an ideological
and materialistic manifestation of the industrialization of war. Any real nuclear winter
would not be survived or could not be assessed by any institutions or social systems
that build the bombs: “[...] the risks of a nuclear war as such, are controversial in terms
of any assessment that might be made of strict probabilities. We can never be sure
that deterrence “works,” short of the actual occurrence of a nuclear combat – which
shows that it does not; the hypothesis of a nuclear winter will remain just that unless its
actual occurrence makes any such considerations subsequently, since both are important
in relation to the experience and perception of risk” (Giddens, 1990, 28). The ideology
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of modernity with its runaway dynamic created socially organized knowledge structures
and ideologies that are able to eliminate humanity.
The runaway dynamic of modernity created an awareness of risks and dangers, as
Giddens claims. Pre-modern perception of danger perceived threats as an external effect
of nature. The new knowledge structures and institutionalizing of responsibility and
the expectation to control threats created a new awareness of external threats, such as
ecological threats. Potential dangers are known and transformed into risks by knowledge:
“Ecological threats are the outcome of socially organized knowledge, mediated by the
impact of industrialism upon the material environment” (Giddens, 1990, 10). I would go
even further and replace the term ‘ecological’ and ‘material’ with ‘social’ and ‘human’
to emphasize that the human environment with the waste source of wisdom, emotions
and creativity, set into an environment of organized knowledge dynamics and dynamics
of industrialization, can create social threats. Social threats can pass the extreme ends
or boundaries of its own social space. This process is creating, for example, a nuclear
war for humanity as a new environment of risk.
The world has become a world of “potential global catastrophes” (Giddens, 1990, 25)
with risk, such as nuclear accidents, that have low-probabilities and high-consequences.
Giddens clearly points out that existing human knowledge, such as the knowledge to
build a nuclear bomb, cannot be eliminated and completely controlled in the future.
Thus risks can only be minimized, never controlled: “Low-probability high consequence
risks will not disappear in a modern world, although in an optimal scenario they could
be minimised. Thus, were it to be the case that all existing nuclear weapons were done
away with, no other weapons of comparable destructive force were invented, and no com-
parably catastrophic disturbances of socialised nature were to loom, a profile of global
danger would still exist. For if it is accepted that the eradication of established technical
knowledge could not be achieved, nuclear weaponry could be reconstructed at any point”
(Giddens, 1990, 133). The most obvious point is that since the combination of science
and military power has created weapons of high threat potential, future generations can
invent new technologies as deadly or as catastrophic as nuclear power (Giddens, 1990,
172). I argue that new utopian spaces for human reasoning and action need to be created
to form a global human risk perception, with the awareness of the deadly potential of
human creativity and reasoning. In a world with no empty spots anymore, there is a
need for a new “empty space” (Giddens, 1990, 19).
3.1.3. Unreal threats and empty spaces
The catastrophic potential of modernity’s dangers creates a new perception beyond
technical assessments and organized knowledge systems. In its core, the threat of a
nuclear war is not perceived as real for it is beyond accountability. It also creates a
permanent sense of uncertainty for human life, questioning modern institutions and
believe systems like the idea of rational control of human life. Giddens states: “The
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greater the danger, measured not in terms of probability of occurrence but in terms of
its generalised threat to human life, the more thoroughly counterfactual it is. The risks
involved are necessarily “unreal,” because we could only have clear demonstration of them
if events occurred that are too terrible to contemplate. Relatively small-scale events, such
as the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki or the accidents at Three
Mile Island and Chernobyl, give us some sense of what could happen” (Giddens, 1990,
134). Modern threats create their own new belief systems and ideologies, I hypothesize.
A possible indicator for a threat for humanity could be a measure of risk perception of
a high risk technology, such as nuclear power.
The idea of perception and awareness, beyond rational reasoning and standardized
procedures of risk assessment, can be the starting point of new forms of risk assessment
and social learning. The question of the uncontrollability and the catastrophic potential
of human created threats could guide human reasoning to a new empty space, creating
new forms of communication to analyze and discuss social life in the future. Giddens’
words guide towards a procedure of risk assessment that includes the enormous threat
potential of modern risks: “The baseline for analysis hast to be the inevitability of living
with dangers which are remote from the control not only of individuals, but also of large
organisations, including states; and which are of high intensity and life-threatening for
millions of human beings and potentially for the whole of humanity” (Giddens, 1990,
134).
The empty space, as mentioned above, is a questioning of the idea of expertise, as
Giddens clearly points out, by criticizing expert’s role in risk management. The fact
that risk assessment does not cover the whole problem due to technical, social, and
human factors, the dynamic of technological development does create a catastrophic
potential with unintended consequences of technological progress: “More damaging than
the lay discovery of this kind of concealment is the circumstance where the full extend
of a particular set of dangers and the risks associated with them is not realised by the
experts. For in this case what is in question is not only the limits of, or the gaps in, expert
knowledge, but an inadequacy which compromises the very idea of expertise” (Giddens,
1990, 134). I would argue that expert systems within certain social risk environments
are not free of losing the moral understanding of respectful awareness of knowledge. By
respectful awareness of knowledge, I mean the awareness of the boundaries of knowledge
and the open spaces of uncertainty that remain unnoticed.
According to Giddens, the limits of expertise and its uncertainties are closely related
to the limits of institutions as such. Designed as closed systems, social institutions
should be able to provide a space and a normative concept, such as laws and rules, for
certain social activities. The institutionalized social space should be able to monitor,
control, and sanction actors and their activities and, hence, control its own created
risks. Modern institutions with their imperfect and disembedding mechanisms are not
able to control risks entirely. Especially if the institutionalized mechanisms follow the
idea to “outguess others in order to maximise economic returns” (Giddens, 1990, 128),
such as in the case of technological competition, scientific knowledge markets, arms
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race, business, and in financial markets. Giddens also brings up that risks, designed as
“ “closed,” institutionalized arenas of action” are also expected and desired as a source of
power, like in the case of gambling or sports (Giddens, 1990, 128). Both arenas of action,
where the chances of winning or loosing are calculable and the outcomes are uncertain.
In the case of outguessing the other in social arenas, not to lose is part of the institu-
tionalized mechanisms. The institutions are not closed and linked to outside influences
and, while outguessing the other, influencing outside social and natural systems: “Like
in the arms race, the institutionalised risk environment of markets cannot be kept con-
fined to its own “proper sphere.” Not only do extraneous risks force themselves in, but
the outcome of decisions within the institutionalised framework constantly affect those
outside” (Giddens, 1990, 129). The arms race and the idea of protecting one’s own in-
stitution from external and dangerous influences is an example of creating new risks by
reacting to outside risks. I would argue that by giving one gun to the earth, there is no
strategy involved of how to get rid of this massive threat for human life on earth. New
institutions need to be created, a new awareness need to be evolve, new institutionalized
laws implemented, and people need to be convinced to hand out their tools without
using them. Yet at the same time the knowledge of how to produce and how to use
those devices does exist as part of human knowledge for the rest of human history. The
technology of war is an expert system, produced by human expertise.
3.1.4. Utopia – taking care of risks
The expert, the human entity as such, in an institution of organized human knowledge, is
a risk for humanity: “Experts often take risks “on behalf” of lay clients while concealing,
or fudging over, the true nature of those risks or even the fact that they are risk at all”
(Giddens, 1990, 130-131). To this end, it is an individual’s decision to create a risk or
abstain from it. What if all humans are part of a risk system and we cannot minimize
it? What are the next steps to create a system that incorporates the risk system, a
über-risk system of humanity? What logic or what language is needed to form such a
system in careful steps, still following the logic of modernity and the idea of outguessing
the other, but within a different time-space dimension?
Giddens provides different answers (compare Rosa et al., 2014, 92–94). In his book he
first describes a “post-scarcity order” (Giddens, 1990, 166), a “more coordinated global
political order” of nation-states (Giddens, 1990, 168), to then pose the idea of an “overall
system of planetary care” (Giddens, 1990, 170). He finally describes an “Utopian” state
of the world, a reorganized modernity: “a radical reorganization of time and space”
(Giddens, 1990, 178).
The concept of scarcity, Giddens explains, is based on the need structure of individuals
and institutions, expressed in certain structures of thinking and acting out in life. It
is a relative concept. Today’s lifestyles are predominantly based on the concept of
economic growth, an emergence of new ideas and markets to create and satisfy needs
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and expectations. A post-scarcity order would, according to Giddens, questions this
lifestyle and market logic and also would question the logic of wealth: “While some
resources are intrinsically scarce, most are not, in the sense that, except for the basic
requirements of bodily existence, “scarcity” is relative to socially defined needs and to the
demands of specific lifestyles. A post-scarcity order would involve significant alterations
in modes of social life, and expectations of continuous economic growth would have to be
modified. A global redistribution of wealth would be called for” (Giddens, 1990, 166).
Giddens goes on to propose that a world order in peace is not unrealistic, although
still yet utopian, from today’s point of view, given the grown interdependences on a
supranational level and shared or at least similar interests of national states (Giddens,
1990, 169).
The awareness of interdependencies may result in intensified coordination on a global
political order and an awareness, rather the outguessing, of the global other: “So far
as the relations between states are concerned it seems evident that a more coordinated
global political order is likely to emerge. Trends towards increasing globalisation more or
less force states to collaborate over issues which previously they might have sought to deal
with separately” (Giddens, 1990, 168). These newly formed social institutions, beyond
the pre-defined logic of political power and economic growth mechanisms, could follow a
logic of care, including the ecological system, bringing in basic values of humanity into
reasoning and decision making: “An overall system of planetary care might be created,
which would have as its aim the preservation of the ecological well-being of the world as
a whole” (Giddens, 1990, 170).
Giddens then proposes his potential order of the world, what he names “Utopia”:
“Utopian prescriptions or anticipations set a baseline for future states of affairs which
blocks off modernity’s endlessly open character. In a post-modern world, time and space
would no longer be ordered in their interrelation by historicity. Whether this would im-
ply a resurgence of religion in some form or another is difficult to say, but there would
presumably be a renewed fixity to certain aspects of life that would recall some features
of tradition. Such fixity would in turn provide a grounding for the sense of ontological
security, reinforced by an awareness of a social universe subject to human control. This
would not be a world that “collapses outward” into decentralised organisations but would
no doubt interlace the local and global in complex fashion” (Giddens, 1990, 178). Gid-
dens’ Utopia has some restrictions and might be a break from the idea of openness. In
my interpretation, openness might be a complete utopian state of modernity. The state
of uncertainty, as the birthplace for entrepreneurial ideas as Knight (1921) outlined, or
in the case of the open universe, described by Popper (1982).
In Giddens interpretation, the openness of his utopian worldview is disembedded from
modern interpretations of time and space, religion, and social control. What prevails is
an awareness of the global human other, an awareness of the local other and someone’s
belonging to a community. Humans in this sense are local and global entities at the
same time, since the new time-space relations do not separate between both entities. As
time becomes an individual interpretation, mobility between different places becomes far
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or close, fast or slow not in comparison to others but in line with someone’s individual
rhythm. Since the world then becomes one entity and a space of shared awareness society
will transform and develop the abilities for dialogue (Giddens, 1994). The society is able
to solve problems without armed conflicts. For Giddens, the mutual awareness of the
other and each others time and space will from a global cosmopolitan society (Giddens,
2002).
3.2. Risk communities of humility
How to perceive risks and how to react to the known and unknown, the perceived
and ignored risks today and in the future? How could humans organize themselves
to create an awareness of risk? What could a social place look like? Risk might be
something that is in us, part of ourselves and our community, not an outside threat.
How could humans create an Utopia that makes Anthony Giddens feel satisfied or might
be surprise to his line of thought? There is no single answer, yet. One approach,
I argue, is to create decentralized risk communities that define their own time-space-
dimensions depending on the risk they are responsible for. Such communities could
combine communicative skills, trust, and social and technical experience to develop
technical and social solutions. If trust is a crucial and central aspect for ontological
security, as Giddens claims, creating trust in the communities by involving all relevant
social actors is a mayor step towards any form of risk relationship and decision making.
I would not start to define community as a given entity of size or place. Communities
from my perspective define themselves through their perception of risk, that then defines
their time-space-distance. The question of a waste disposal for nuclear waste creates
different time-space-distances and forms a different community than the question of a
waste disposal site or landfill for municipal solid waste.
Risk in this sense has its own character and social meaning because it has always
been part of social and individual life. Risk perception then is an understanding of risk
as a social entity. Risk also then is something to meet with respect, dignity, and awe.
Maybe risk or the language that is used to find socially acceptable solutions for risks, will
become more an religious, a self-reverencing, sounding character, or to recall Giddens’
words: “the resurgence of religion in some form or another” (Giddens, 1990, 178).
3.2.1. Building resilient communities
The idea of describing risk as an element of social life, to be respected with awe, has been
introduced by Sheila Jasannoff (2006). She calls her approach “Technologies of humility”
(Jasanoff, 2006, 39), a concept that is based on four questions: (1) “What do we know
about the risk and how do we know it?” (2) “Who is likely to be hurt?” (3) “How
will losses be distributed?” (4) “How can we reflect most effectively on our collective
experience of vulnerability and loss?” (Jasanoff, 2006, 41). The first question is the
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question of “framing” the problem, the second questions pleads for the “vulnerability” of
society or a possibly affected community. The third question reflects the “distribution”
of risk within the affected society, and the fourth question asks for the “deliberative”
process that take place when risks are managed or governed.
Jasanoff’s concept is a critique of traditional risk management and the predominant
policy culture in most societies. Her reflections are around the theme of governing
risks instead of managing them. Governing risks involves a broader aspect of societal
knowledge than managing risks which emphasizes experts knowledge and clearly defined
methods for making decisions. The adequate framing of a problem is important. A too
narrowly or too broadly framed problem, or as she says a problem “simply [framed] in
the wrong terms” (Jasanoff, 2006, 41) will result in solutions with the same deficiencies.
According to her experience as a researcher, the reflection around the frame, the frame
analysis, is an important feature, one that is most often an ignored aspect in policy-
making. What is missing in the policy culture, from her point of view, are systematic
methods to detect dominant approaches to frame risks. In line with her explanations, I
argue that communicative techniques should be used to assess a risk’s adequate dimen-
sions, in Jasanoff’s terms dimensions of narrowness or broadness, in Giddens’ term the
time-space distance.
The second focal point in Jasanoff’s concept of the technologies of humility is vul-
nerability. Vulnerability changes the point of view from an outside perspective to a
self-perceived inside perspective. Vulnerability changes the reference point and gives
voice to the perceptions that exist within the community or defined social risk spaces.
Jasanoff explains: “Risk analysis have traditionally viewed at-risk individuals or popu-
lations as passive objects in the path of the risk to be characterized. People are seen as
exposed to the risks that the manager wishes to control; their exposure is then assessed
through techniques of formal quantification. One problem with this approach is that the
risk manager’s judgement is taken as the reference point for determining vulnerability,
rather than the affected subjects’ self-perception” (Jasanoff, 2006, 41). What outside
risk management or expert practices have in common is an oversimplification and stan-
dardization of affected individuals, creating aggregated entities when using statistical
classification methods. The analyzes are based on objective physical or biological crite-
ria, such as ‘most exposed people,’ or ‘children or women,’ ignoring differences within
the groups or additional vulnerability factors, such as historical development of the com-
munities or inter-social connectedness. From Jasanoff’s point of view, the strength of
communal knowledge and local networks does matter to a great deal, particularly for
the resilience of communities in case of risk events. Jasanoff’s approach gives individuals
a participatory role, an active membership in the risk governance process, with the pos-
sibility of influencing decisions by contributing knowledge and local expertise. Her aim
is to avoid expert discourses, distant and separate from regions and individuals at risks;
and above all, to avoid that sophisticated, yet limited, techniques of risk management
perceive the actual affected people as mere objects of analysis rather than vital and
important sources of information and knowledge (Jasanoff, 2006, 42).
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Her third focal point ‘distribution’ points to the inequality of distribution of losses.
As examples of risks events where poor people were disproportionally affected by this
events, Jasanoff mentions the tsunami in Asia in 2004 and hurricane Katrina in the U.S.
in 2003. Her critique of a technical risk assessment: that exposure assessments do not
adequately assess inequality. From her point of view, risk assessment procedures do not
take into account people who are already poor because they seemingly have less to loose.
In her concept of risk governance, poor people who are most vulnerable to risks, would
also be taken into consideration. Jasannoff’s aim is to design concepts for people at risk
independent of their social status and social influence.
Deliberative practice of risk governance, in terms of deliberative thinking, deliberative
learning, or deliberative settings, is the fourth part in Jasanoff’s concept of technologies
of humility. Her aim is to define a concept that is able to learn from its own practice. A
deliberative practice is able to change and question risk management’s basic assumptions.
The concept enables to change the frame, the expert’s practices and the predominant
communication processes. A concept that is constantly questioning the core foundations
of risk management, by focusing not only on causes but also on the context, by taking
into account individual experiences and opinions as well as outside assumptions and
objective measurements. A concept that also challenges today’s risk institutions and
their practices. Her critique is that people within their institutions resist to learn: “The
capacity to learn is constrained, as I have suggested, by the limiting features of the
frame within which institutions reflect on their prior actions. Institutions see only what
their governing discourses and practices allow them to see. Thus the framework of risk
assessment continually reorients the expert learner’s attention back towards prediction,
with its emphasis on improved modeling and management of cause” (Jasanoff, 2006, 43).
Jasanoff’s focus is not on predicting risks, but on mutual learning, on collecting ex-
perience, on understanding different angles of observation. In her opinion, risks most
often have a variety of causes and consequences which are open to interpretations and
vary between different point of views. Deliberative learning is designed as a process to
open institutionalized practices of risk management to a variety of opinions and perspec-
tives for past and for potential risks. Risk governance, as Jasanoff claims and will also
be discussed in more detail in Section 9, is designed as a social process that considers
risks as ambiguous, uncertain, and complex (compare also Rosa et al., 2014, Chapter 8:
131-137). The process of risk governance beyond expert’s knowledge activates society’s
potential in governing outcomes than can affect their social life in different degrees: “In
the shift towards risk governance, the aim should be to construct institutions of civic
deliberation, through which societies can reflect on ambiguity and assess the strengths
and weaknesses of alternative explanations. Deliberative learning, in this sense, may be
messier in its processes and more modest in its expectations than expert practices of
calculating risk; but it would be rightfully more ambitious in seeking to learn from the
full extent of relevant experience and in building, on that basis, more resilient societies”
(Jasanoff, 2006, 43).
Risks in Jasanoff’s perception are abstract and today all societies are risk societies
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(Jasanoff, 2006, 38). Risks become real when they materialized into harmful events.
Risk events harm and are “injurious events”, doing painful harm to the living body of
society and actually “damage human lives and solidarity” (Jasanoff, 2006, 38). Jasanoff’s
sense of words, in my opinion, reflects that human lives and grown social entities of any
size and historical background are unique living entities, that are vulnerable and can be
damaged and hurt. Society, from this perspective, can be interpreted as a living body or
as a vital organism. Society, in that sense, is not a passive and distant object anymore.
Important is the perception of the consequences: negative outcomes are events that hurt
and injure societies and their individual’s lives.
Some events like a hurricane or an earthquake cannot be prevented, nor their conse-
quences and damages for society. As a consequence, Jasanoff’s concept is designed to
strengthen society, to make them more resilient when reacting to these events. From
her point of view, risk management most often fails to predict risks and neglects the
needs in the case of a harmful event: “Given the range and severity of injurious events
that can overtake us unawares, and the woeful shortcomings of emergency response de-
spite decades of expert risk management, perhaps the important question is not how to
predict events more accurately but how to ensure greater resilience if and when they
occur” (Jasanoff, 2006, 38). Her concept tries to convince that a deeper understanding
of the social context, like the historical grown structures and the municipal organiza-
tion of a community, will rather lead to less damage in the case of a bad event than
experts’ predictive models of causes and probabilities, ignoring social inequalities and
its fatal consequences for communities: “The challenge, in other words, is to move away
from a near-exclusive focus on cause and probabilities – on calculating the incalculable
– towards a deeper understanding of the contexts within which injuries are experienced,
and often exacerbated with painful inequity” (Jasanoff, 2006, 39).
3.2.2. Beyond expert systems
Managing risks, as Jasanoff states above, is the practice of “calculating the incalculable”
(2006, 39) whether the risks are predictable or not. Jasanoff’s idea of risk governance
rejects superior perspectives and centralized system of knowledge and expertise and
follows an approach that aggregates knowledge and experience starting from the bottom
of society. Knowledge that in her point of view would not be accessible to scientific
reasoning: “Governance, by contrast, draws its strength from below, by aggregating
communal knowledge and experience, preferences and concerns, which no science has
brought under its control. Humility, nut hubris, is the animating spirit of governance”
(Jasanoff, 2006, 40). Governance opens the analytic horizon to a wider understanding of
risk to go beyond methods of predictive sciences and a narrow framing of management
procedures (Jasanoff, 2006, 29).
Historical events in the 20th century changed the nature and the meaning of risks
yet the social processes to analyze and to understand risks are still based on methods
61
3. Risk as a consequence of modernity
that perceive risks as calculable and insurable: “The latter half of the twentieth century,
however, gave rise to risks that escape humanity’s powers of prediction, in part because
there is little or no direct historical memory to fall back on in evaluating them. Some
are so infrequent, distant in time or causally complex that they are literally, as well as
figuratively, incalculable; others arise through historically contingent human behaviours
that no one, it seems, could have imagined, let alone foretold. Yet such risks may be
catastrophic, at the level of individual as well as communal life” (Jasanoff, 2006, 29).
She continues by mentioning nuclear technology and the possibility of a nuclear war to
demonstrate that these incalculable and unforeseen risks are not only threatening entire
human life but also not controllable anymore: “[N]ot only the continued threat of a
nuclear holocaust but a succession of more or less devastating natural and human-made
disasters have kept alive the spectre of essentially incalculable, and hence uninsurable,
risks. How to govern these – not simply manage them – has emerged as on of the greatest
technical and political challenges of the early twenty-first century” (Jasanoff, 2006, 30).
Governing today’s complex and trans-national risks has become a major task or chal-
lenge for today’s societies, independent of their national borders (Jasanoff, 2006, 31).
Conflicts among affected people, experts, policy makers, and citizens might challenge the
process of governing risks, especially by gaging policy relevant knowledge and by con-
sidering whose knowledge is reliable and explaining why: “How should conflicts among
experts, interest groups and, indeed, national governments be resolved?” (Jasanoff,
2006, 32) Jasanoff keeps asking. Similar to Charles Perrow (1999) previously mentioned
in Section 2.4.6, Jasanoff sees today’s risk discourse dominated by power-structures that
undermine any attempts to open the risk dialogue to the public and, hence, to a real
democratization of the dialogue: “... explore the troubling implications for democracy,
as risk discourse and practice come to be dominated by powerful cadres of experts, allied
with public and corporate policymakers, in the new, opaque formations of the regulatory
state” (Jasanoff, 2006, 32).
Jasanoff criticizes the narrow scientific concept of risk assessment, especially the pre-
dominant assumption that the best experts will produce the best knowledge, and are
able to classify risks according to their own defined measures: “From the technocratic
standpoint, the dominant problems are to find the right experts and produce the best
knowledge. Most risk worth worrying about, the technocratic perspective holds, can
be estimated on the basis of solid data, good models and (in an increasingly popular
phrase) ‘sound science” ’ (Jasanoff, 2006, 33). From the technocratic point of view, lay
people’s perception, if not in line with expert’s views, must be wrong because the best
knowledge has already be considered and taken into considerations. From an experts’
perspective, public risk perception is full of methodological flaws and individual ways of
reasoning. Laypeople most often judge affectively and emotionally, and, hence, are not
comparable with rational reasoning. Sheila Jasanoff is asking about the skeptical views
ordinary people hold on experts’ opinions: “Why do publics often respond negatively
to risks that experts deem negligible? In looking for answers, expertise in risk analysis
became coupled with tacit theories of public opinion formation. If publics worry un-
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duly about small risks, many concluded, it must be because of technical illiteracy and
poor understanding of science, superstition, media hype or manipulation by political
interests. The study of public risk perception itself emerged as a new social science”
(Jasanoff, 2006, 33). Jasanoff also criticizes the theoretical explanations of public risk
perception research. Non-expert knowledge is assumed to be biased and distorted. “Such
research [on public’s risk perception] presumes that risk policy should not concern it-
self with distorting contextual variables that alter ‘perception’, but should look only at
mathematically calculated probabilities of harm. It thus leaves intact the technocratic
promise of being able to estimate risks with reasonable certainty and attributes the dis-
crepancies between expert judgements and public perceptions to laypeople’s inherent
(and, by definition, distorting) cognitive biases. Rationality, for the expert assessors of
risk, lies squarely on the side of scientific prediction and management. Concern about
risks, especially those deemed small or negligible by experts, is correspondingly, and
asymmetrically, labelled as biased or irrational, and treated as needing special cognitive
explanation” (Jasanoff, 2006, 33).
Humans who are irrational don’t need to be given the right to express themselves and
hence don’t need to be part of a political process, aimed at solving problems. This could
be one interpretation of Jasanoff’s critique on an experts’ perspective, which assumes
that public risk perception is irrational or distorted. If Jasanoff’s interpretation of public
risk perception research is true, the assumption of irrationality and distortion, as I will
call it for now, is a very strong assumption able to excludes important information
from risk decision processes with potentially fatal consequences for humans and their
communities.
I conclude from Jasanoff’s explanation that if scientific evidence shows that the as-
sumption of irrationality and distortion can be rejected or at least cannot hold empirical
prove, theoretical explanation of public opinions and public’s expression of concern might
be advised to question its basic assumptions on rationality. Public risk managers might
consider incorporating all available knowledge so as to not to lose additional opinions
and public evidence of potential risks and perceived risks. Governance might be a term
that expresses the will of the elected or gained decision maker, experts, and representa-
tives of the given power-structure, to listen to concerned public voices and to open up
the dialogue to all available knowledge.
I conclude that the practice of mutual dialogues might be a keystone to form and foster
an active citizenship, especially with regard to possible reactions, answers or solutions
to known or ignored harmful risk situations today and in the future. An annoying but
active public voice might be today’s best teacher for discovering answers and measures
that will help to build a global society of humility. First and foremost, most important
for the purpose of scientific progress, the annoying public voice is the best change to
question one’s own assumptions and the foundations of my own scientific knowledge.
Karl Popper’s (1959) basic claim to finding ways to test its own basic assumptions is
still one of the most demanding and challenging prerequisites for anybody who is in
charge of knowledge and is in power to institutionalize knowledge. Jasanoff’s attempt
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encourages us to constantly find a different angle for observing and describing social
practices. She questions the socially accepted foundations of knowledge and opens up
the dialogue to new practices. Her voice claims that knowledge is a value, needing to be
kept and publicly expressed to improve human welfare (Jasanoff, 2006, 34).
Before analyzing public risk perception in more detail, I want to give Sheila Jasanoff
the last word in order to shed more light on my research topic of individual risk percep-
tion and how I hope to contribute to the question: “Is it possible [...] to imagine a regime
of democratic risk governance that allows for the possibility of change and yet makes
room for the questions, doubts, fears and preferences of non-expert publics?” (Jasanoff,
2006, 35). I will focus on that question at the end of my empirical research when dis-
cussing how different socially expressed preferences can be incorporated in a concept of
governance (Section 9). This is a necessary question to answer in the future, as Jasanoff
suggests describing her idea of risk governance: “Such governance would foster discovery
and innovation in a world in which, all concerned, zero risk is an unattainable ideal, but
it would also take into account public preferences and concerns, as well as cross-cultural
differences in wants and needs” (Jasanoff, 2006, 34).
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Part II.
Towards a deeper understanding of
nuclear risk perception
4. Risk perception in social sciences
4.1. Risk perception as a multidimensional concept
An aware society evaluates risks from different perspectives, most often considering past
experiences. In this sense, risk varies between individuals and has a historical beginning.
Jasanoff argues: “whereas risk is normally seen as a property of the indeterminate future,
a dark foreshadowing of things to come, I will argue that risk is better seen a projection
of what we already know, have experienced and think we should control” (Jasanoff,
2006, 28). Regarding risk perception as an example of individual experiences with
risk, different ways of interpreting and judging risks, seem to be an essential element
of public’s risk perception. Risk perception depends on individual’s awareness and is
empirically based on intuition, emotions, and past knowledge: “In this respect, risk is a
product of human imagination, disciplined and conditioned by an awareness of the past.
That awareness, moreover, is necessarily partial and selective: the past is not the same
for everyone who experiences it” (Jasanoff, 2006, 28).
For me it seems that the social space of risk with its different sounds, shades, and
densities of perception, is a space of risk perceptions, ranging from irrational intuitive
feelings to rational technical accounting. Risk is a composition of empirical evidence,
theoretical hypothesizing, and testing that reveals its contours of risk and its social per-
ception among different cultures in varying degrees. Ortwin Renn and Bernd Rohrmann
(2000b, 214-215) conclude that based on previous and ongoing research on risk percep-
tion, there is no clear tendency towards one of the above described extreme explanation
approaches: “[...] neither the claim of irrationality as the main source of intuitive risk
perception, nor the claim of a deterministic relationship between universal risk charac-
teristics and perceived risk can be sustained in the light of empirical evidence presented.”
The shades of risk, observed through the authors’ lenses spanning at least two decades of
empirical risk perception research, are manifold, containing a universe of knowledge, not
only regarding how people perceive harm or hazards, but most importantly how people
perceive the state of their world. Risk judgements, in this sense as a socially shaped
impression of the world, is a normative judgement of the ongoing processes of social and
technical development: “In fact, risk judgements indicate more than just perception of
riskiness – they reveal global views on the development of humankind, on technological
progress, on the meaning of nature, and on the ‘fair’ distribution of chances, benefits
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and risks” (Rohrmann and Renn, 2000, 42).
Risk perception research, the mere dry and flat term, might reveal its hidden and
vitalizing sound by perceiving the work of scientists as an attempt to mirror the beauty
of human minds. Human minds might be worrying and looking fearfully into the mir-
ror, they might be trusting and relaxed, or they might be enthusiastic and aware of
themselves, all the while expecting or looking forward to the next sudden adventure.
Risk perception research in that sense is more than the assessment of a term. For me
it is the art of portraying vibrations in society and the attempt – only the attempt not
the expectation – to create a composition of observable differences across and within
societies.
Risk’s multi-dimensional nature is a common characteristic, observable in empirical
risk perception studies. The manifoldness of risk perception lays in the complexity and
the multitude of possible individual and social factors that frame individual perceptions
of risks. The empirical results question the predominant technical interpretation of risk
as a product of probability and consequences (Rohrmann and Renn, 2000, 41). The
richness and wealth of observable differences add knowledge and alternative explanatory
patterns to the meaning and understanding of risk. Risk as a holistic concept is more
than the prediction of future’s negative consequences, as practiced in technical risk
assessments. Risk perception is connecting to historical social consciousness, as Sheila
Jasanoff mentioned above (Jasanoff, 2006, 28). Research on risk perception shows that
the subjective awareness of risk is able to take into consideration subjective evaluations of
future consequences, a variety of context factors, complex social views of the world, and
intuitive mechanisms to deal with uncertainty and probabilistic information. Because
risk is a multi-facetted concept, from a social science perspective, risk is perceived as a
social phenomenon to be understood rather than as a technical thing to be controlled:
“Furthermore, the experience of risk is not limited to the threat of facing harm in the
future. It includes subjective predictions of possible outcomes, the social and cultural
context in which the risk is experienced, the mental images the risk situation evokes,
the perception of the players who are involved in the risk situation and the judgements
about fairness and equity related to the distribution of potential hazardous events. In
this sense, risk is a social construct rather than a physical entity” (Rohrmann and Renn,
2000, 41).
Assuming that future’s risk management processes do need to involve public opinions
to manage and react sufficiently, sustainably, and efficiently to actual or potential risks
on a global scale, effective risk communication is essential. How people perceive risks can
improve risk communication. Risk communication, as described by Renn and Rohrmann,
is based on the exchange of information between all parties involved in a risk issue
(Rohrmann and Renn, 2000, 42). A better understanding for all involved parties of how
humans think and judge the magnitude of a risk and to what degree people accept risks is
useful for an egalitarian risk communication process. More information than just tables
of mortality rates and amount of accidents combined with numbers between zero and
one – the range of probabilities – might help to assess risks adequately and equitably.
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At least an understanding of alternative views helps to solve past conflicts and provides
all involved actors to understand other people’s opinions: “Whether the particular aim
of risk communication is (A) advancing knowledge, (B) behavior modification or (C)
co-operative conflict resolution, the awareness and consideration of people’s existing
risk perception is a precondition for successful work” (Rohrmann and Renn, 2000, 42).
Renn and Rohrmann furthermore claim, that if the aim of risk management is to solve
conflicts a deep knowledge about the alternative ways of human thinking, reasoning,
and behavior, in short the awareness of a risk’s multi-facetted nature, is essential to
create an awareness of the consequences of individualized or institutionalized decisions
(Rohrmann and Renn, 2000, 42).
In social sciences the term risk perception is the conventional definition of people’s
view on risks. “The term “risk perception” refers to people’s judgements and evaluations
of hazards they (or their facilities, or the environment) are or might be exposed to. Both
experience and beliefs are to be considered” (Rohrmann and Renn, 2000, 14-15). It is
assumed that people receive information about an actual outcome, like experiencing an
accident, and process the information. People use mental processes to form opinions and
attitudes with regard to the origin of the risk and the consequences. The information
can be both related to experienced risks or to possible future outcomes of human action
or natural events (Rohrmann and Renn, 2000, 14).
Important topics in social science research on risk perception are large-scale technolo-
gies, especially technology-induced hazards, like nuclear power (Rohrmann and Renn,
2000, 16). This hazards have become more prominent in public awareness after major
nuclear accidents, such as Three Mile Islands (USA, 1979), Chernobyl (Ukraine, 1989),
ad nd Fukushima (Japan, 2011). Other large-scale technologies are chemical industries,
and the consequences of related accidents, such as Bophal (India, 1984), as well as more
recent topics of genetic engineering or nuclear waste disposals. Risk perception research
also became a relevant element in risk analysis when the discrepancy between expert’s
and laypeople’s judgements and evaluations of risks became obvious and could no longer
be ignored within the domains of risk research. As mentioned above, research on risk
perception helps to complement the technical risk assessment process by creating an
awareness of how people perceive and construct the reality with regard to undesirable
consequences. In the next part I want to describe the very principles of risk perception
research.17
According to Renn and Rohrmann (2000, 17–18) in social science, two approaches have
been developed to study risk perception. The first approach, called the psychometric
approach is primarily interested in laypeople’s opinions about risks in contrast to experts’
views. From this point of view, risk is a subjective concept and social criteria, not
an objective measure. When including psychological aspects, scientists examine the
17 In this part I will refer mostly on the study of Renn and Rohrmann (Rohrmann and Renn, 2000)
and will add necessary information from primary literature to supplement the already very precise
and excellent overview on risk perception research provided by the authors.
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cognitive structure of risk perception by using different quantitative methods like factor
analysis, structural equation models, or multiple regression. The cultural approach,
as second approach, looks at risk perception from a macro-sociological perspective. In
a rather theoretical than empirical way, social scientists define risks as socially and
culturally constructed elements, determined by predominant norms, values and other
cultural factors (e.g., Beck, 1992; Luhmann, 1990; Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983; Dake,
1992). From such a point of view, the context in which dangerous events occur or the
risk of future hazards is discussed and assessed, determines individual’s risk perception.
In my research, I am analyzing individuals risk perception on nuclear technology in
a cross-national comparison using national survey data from the International Social
Survey Programme (ISSP, 2012). I want to briefly outline the main approaches of
quantitative empirical research on risk perception.18
Empirical studies on risk perception focus on different sources of risks or hazards19.
Studies widely differ in their research question: some focus on a particular set of hazards,
like activities, substances, or technological risks, while other studies focus on one specific
risks, such as smoking or diseases like AIDS or Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE).
Nuclear energy is a major topic in empirical risk perception research, as Renn and
Rohrmann point out: “most frequent issues are large-scale technologies, above all nuclear
energy” (Rohrmann and Renn, 2000, 19). The studies on a specific risk subject can be
further divided into studies of people who are actually exposed to a risk, such as people
who live near a nuclear power plant or people working for a chemical factory, and studies
of individuals who are asked to evaluate a risks without having been exposed to a specific
risk.
In empirical studies respondents are asked to judge different risks aspects. In most
cases the dependent variable, the variable of interest, is respondent’s judgement or ac-
ceptance of the perceived magnitude of the risk. Beside risk’s magnitude often additional
qualitative features of a risk, such as dreadfulness, familiarity or controllability are asked.
Other studies are interested in benefit aspects of the risk source or a judgement of the eq-
uitability of a hazard’s or activity’s risks and benefits. Additional options are to ask for
the personal relation to hazards or the level of acceptability like the willingness-to-pay
to reduce risks (Rohrmann and Renn, 2000, 20).
The empirical basis of risk perception research varies widely, according to Renn and
Rohrmann (2000, 20, 22 (Table 4)). Most often convenience samples, like student groups
or other ad-hoc samples are used to conduct risk perception. In some case, specific so-
cietal sub-groups like feminist groups, ecological oriented organizations, engineers or
18 I do not wish to consider qualitative approaches such as interviews or focus groups, or content analysis
(compare Rohrmann and Renn, 2000, 18) as negligible, but my scope and efforts are limited at that
stage of my research and a more comprehend approach to understand the different dimensions of
risk perception research might be subject of more detailed future research.
19 “ “Hazard” refers to a situation, event or substance that can become harmful for people, nature or
human-made facilities” (Rohrmann and Renn, 2000, 14).
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teachers are asked for their opinions. An disadvantage is the small sample size of em-
pirical studies20. For these reasons, unlike the ISSP data set I am using in my research,
most studies cannot claim to be a representative sample. In case of cross-national or
intra-national comparisons the ad-hoc sampling is a problem because the comparabil-
ity of results between countries is problematic and the validity of generalized results
from the sample to a higher societal entity, like the whole country is questionable: “the
restricted comparability and cross-validation can be considered as a disadvantage. In
any case it is indispensable to check carefully a study’s methodological approach before
findings are interpreted and generalized”(Rohrmann and Renn, 2000, 23).
Scientists, who are interested in cross-national comparisons, most often do a compar-
ison of two countries, most often the country they are based in, like in the case of Paul
Slovic (2000a; 1987), a pioneer in risk perception research, the United States and other
mostly European or developed western countries, such as France (Slovic et al., 2000a) or
Japan (Hinman et al., 1993). Cross-national studies quite often focus on nuclear power
and not on multiple or a set of hazards. Studies on Asian, African or South American
countries are rare (Rohrmann and Renn, 2000, 20). Researchers are far from being able
to draw a global picture of individual’s risk perception.
In most quantitative empirical studies, the cognitive structure of risk perception is
analyzed with statistical methods such as factor analysis, multiple regression, or struc-
tural or causal modeling. The comparison of risk judgements between different croups
is most often analyzed using mean-difference comparison (ANOVA).
My empirical research (see Section 6, Section 7, and Section 8) focuses on the hazard
of nuclear power and is related to the most frequently questioned risk feature: the per-
ceived magnitude of nuclear risk. The data of the International Social Survey Programme
(ISSP) allows for a cross-national comparison using representative national survey sam-
ples, an advantage of my studies. The scope of questions to evaluate individual’s risk
perception, is limited to the predefined set of variables and categories developed and
tested by the ISSP’s member committee.
4.2. Theoretical approaches of risk perception
If we consider risk as a socially constructed entity, based on information and social
communication (compare, Luhmann, 1986; Rohrmann and Renn, 2000) about an actual
or possible hazard, the way people perceive or judge information and how they actually
construct an opinion, is a central question for explaining the emergence of risk perception.
20 Compare research by Fischhoff et al. (1978) as an example for a small and selective sample.
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4.2.1. Heuristics: intuitive reasoning of probabilistic information
Heuristics are intuitive mechanisms people use to process information to judge a situation
or alternative situations. Intuitive heuristics are especially important to process complex
or uncertain probabilistic information (Rohrmann and Renn, 2000, 24). In every day
life, people usually try to reduce complexity by drawing inference of a limited degree
of information. The way people process probabilistic information and judge risks is not
based on the expected value approach, predominantly used in scientific risk assessments.
Psychological studies show for example that participants most often choose risk averse
decision options when possible losses are high and choose risk prone decision options
when the possibility of gaining something seems high (compare e.g. Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979). The intension to balance risk taking behavior can be observed when
people choose to avoid major losses rather than to maximize their gains (Rohrmann
and Renn, 2000, 25). Studies that try to explain human’s perception of probabilistic
decision making come to the conclusion that if the expected value is taken as reference
point, people show deviant behavior in drawing inferences from probabilistic information.
These, from the probabilistic’s point of view, observed anomalies, are called biases21.
Biases are the dominant term to describe discrepancies in human behavior violating
logical rules (Rohrmann and Renn, 2000, 25).22
The following biases are discussed in literature most often:
1. Availability bias: events or situations, that are immediately available to people’s
awareness are perceived as more probable than events that are not immediately
mentally accessible (Rohrmann and Renn, 2000, 25; see also Tversky and Kahne-
man, 1973; Lichtenstein et al., 1978, and Boholm, 1998, 138).
2. Anchoring effect bias: probability judgements are biased towards the immediate
first available information or the “perceived significance of the information” that
comes into one’s mind (Rohrmann and Renn, 2000, 25; compare also Rottenstreich
and Tversky, 1997).
3. Representativeness bias: particular events experienced or events that can be
related to familiar properties or known situations are perceived as more typical
or likely than events based on dry information represented by relational numbers
such as frequencies or probabilities (Rohrmann and Renn, 2000, 25).
21 Why they are called biases or even irrational reasoning is a discussion I do not want to go into
here. I think I am in line with Jasanoff as shown above (Jasanoff, 2006, 33). I think that scientific
theories, and their underlying assumptions, their historical development, and the different discussions
within a scientific-discipline, need to be reflected from a meta-theoretical perspective, before theories
are employed to explain irrational or biased behavior. Probabilistic reasoning is a specific way of
perceiving the world. Probabilistic thinking based on expected values is a highly artificial way, given
the underlying assumptions, that the reality is expected to be known (Gigerenzer, 2008a, 2003, 1996,
1991; Ellsberg, 2001, 1961).
22 Compare Tversky and Kahnemann (1974) for an overview of the concept of heuristics and biases
and for a critique see Gigerenzer (1991).
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4. Avoidance of cognitive dissonance bias: situations or events that directly
influence an individual and after processing the information are challenging some-
one’s existing belief system, are tend to be ignored to different degrees (Rohrmann
and Renn, 2000, 25; compare also Rohrmann, 1994).
The interesting question to me is how people use information to judge risks. There
is an observed gap in laypeople’s perception and expert’s judgements of risk situations.
Heuristics may be one explanation for the observed discrepancies, even though the exter-
nal validity of the above mentioned laboratory studies is limited. Every day situations
provide more information and are more familiar to people than artificial scientific exper-
iments designed to create judgements based on numerical information such as relative
frequencies (Rohrmann and Renn, 2000, 25).
4.2.2. Psychometric – qualitative – aspects of risk perception
What are the qualitative characteristics of risks that shape individual risk judgements
and estimations? This is the main question in this section. How laypeople attribute
certain characteristics of risk sources, as well as attributes to a hazard’s outcome, is of
interest. The assumption is that each type of risk has its own situational characteristics
which vary between individual’s opinions (Rohrmann and Renn, 2000, 26). What is of
interest, to borrow Paul Slovic’s book title, is the ‘Feeling of Risk’ (Slovic, 2010). The
feeling of risk is influenced by external attributes like the expected number of fatalities or
losses and the catastrophic potential of a risk. Whereas the actual number of fatalities
correlates only weakly with risk perception, as empirical studies indicate (Rohrmann
and Renn, 2000, 26), the catastrophic potential of low-probability high-consequence
risks seems to cause strong feelings of dread. Dreadful events are more threatening to
respondents than risks with the same or higher expected value but lower catastrophic
potential, even if the probability of the risks are to be regarded as more likely. The most
prominent example is the example of nuclear accidents and car accidents. Car accidents
are according to their expected value of fatalities and losses more dangerous than the
rare events of nuclear accidents, but are perceived as less dangerous.
Beside this more general distinction based on the catastrophic potential of a risk source
or its potential outcome, more specific attributes of risks are evaluated and observable if
respondents are asked to distinguish between different properties associated with a risk
(Rohrmann and Renn, 2000, 26). The most common qualitative aspects of a risk are a) a
risk’s perceived dread potential regarding the possible consequences, b) the familiarity of
a risk source, and c) a person’s perceived personal control over the consequences and the
probability of occurrence of a risk. Further important qualitative risk characteristics are
institutional control and the potential to blame specific social institutions or individual
persons who are responsible for the risk situation. Qualitative aspects measure how
equal benefits and losses in case of a risk are distributed among the affected people.
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Furthermore, the potential to take a risk voluntarily or being involuntarily exposed to a
risk, is also an aspect in risk judgement.
There is also evidence that people associate their own beliefs or belief systems with the
causes of risks. For example in the case of technological risks beliefs about technology
are associated, in case of a natural disaster the beliefs about ecology and nature are
associated. With regard to the assumption of cognitive dissonance, i.e. the avoidance
of emotional stress and conflicting feeling due to new information that challenges one’s
existing belief-system, one can explain why respondents who associate positive attitudes
to a risk source rank a risk as less threatening and more threatening when negative
emotions are associated with the underlying beliefs of a risk source (Rohrmann and
Renn, 2000, 27).
To examine the relation between the above described qualitative characteristics and
individual risk evaluation, it is important to discuss each characteristic’s assumed po-
tential effect (Rohrmann and Renn, 2000, 26 (Table 6)). An increase in risk tolerance is
assumed to be observed among respondents when risks are characterized as personally
controllable, taken voluntarily, and perceived as familiar. Risk tolerance decreases when
risks are perceived as a dread, if risk sources are artificial or human induced, and if a
risk’s benefits are distributed inequitably. If institutions are perceived to be responsible
for a risk source or can be held accountable, the individual risk tolerance depends on
the trust and confidence in the respective institution or the given political system.
Such qualitative aspects of risk perception and evaluation have been analyzed with
factor analytic methods to aggregate the single characteristics into main factors. Sci-
entists analyzing the factorial structure of risk aspects most often find a two factorial
solution. The first factor is the dreadfulness of a risk and second the familiarity of a risk
or the degree of knowledge of a hazard (Rohrmann and Renn, 2000, 29-31). According
to Slovic (see for an overview: Slovic, 2000a, 224-225; see also Slovic, 1987) the first
factor ‘dread’ contains risks that are characterized as uncontrollable, dreadful, catas-
trophic and/or of global catastrophic potential, with fatal consequences, not equitably
distributed, are a high risk for future generations, not easily reduced, are risk increasing,
hence, are not balancing gains and losses, and are involuntary. Among the evaluated
risks, nuclear weapons and nuclear power score highest on first factor’s characteristics
(compare Figure 5 on page 73). The second factor, ‘familiarity’ of a risk or ‘unknown’
risks, includes risks that are judged as not observable, to having delayed effects, are
new, and unknown to people and science. New technologies like chemical or biological
technologies score high on this factor. A third factor comprising the number of people,
exposed to the risk is observed in several studies.
In regard to laypeople’s perception of risk the first factor ‘dread’ seems to be correlated
to people’s critical evaluation of risks. Slovic reports that risks scoring higher on the
‘dread factor’ are also risks, respondents wish to see stricter regulations from public
authorities (Slovic, 2000a, 226). Slovic’s research on individual risk perception reveals
that experts’ perceptions of risks differ widely from laypeople’s opinions when judging
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Figure 5: Two-dimensional factor space of risk perception.
risks and specific risk characteristics (Slovic, 2000a, 226, 224 (Table 13.1)). Summarizing
studies on the psychometric paradigm he concludes laypeople’s opinions depend on the
context the problems or risks are set in. Laypeople’s judgements can be based on the
hard facts of annual fatalities, if asked for, but also depend on softer qualitative and
situational aspects. Experts’ views on risks, in contrast, are strongly based on, or
gravitate towards, the common technocratic view of perceiving risks as annual fatalities
(Slovic, 2000a, 223).
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It seems to me, that laypeople take a more heterogeneous view of the world, allowing
a-priori for a higher diversity of information. That knowledge is not necessarily based on
more precise information, in terms of numbers and figures. If risk perception is related to
feelings, the social context and the perception of one’s social context intuitively influences
risk opinions. The intuitive judgement of risks reflects how safe people perceive the world
or their individual social context to be. Slovic argues that a gap between experts’ and
laypeople’s opinions can indicate that people are not willing to accept the level of risks
they perceive in their social environment. He claims that “the gap between perceived
and desired risk levels suggests that people are not satisfied with the way that market
and other regulatory mechanisms have balanced risks and benefits” (Slovic, 2000a, 223).
Regarding the balance of risk, intuitive judgements about risks could serve as an indictor
how well social mechanisms are functioning to guarantee an acceptable safety level and
a feeling of comfort. I conclude that if the imbalance between perceived and current
risks is high, an unwanted event like a nuclear accident, can have drastic consequences
for a society. In emotionally laden risk environments there is a high social sensitivity
or emotional activation potential to implement changes in order to change the existing
safety structure.
I furthermore argue that either form of information, laypeople’s feelings as well as
experts’ knowledge about a state of the world, are at any time only initial views. New
evidence is able to change this initial view, but there is no guarantee that people are
actually willing or even able to change their beliefs. In case of new evidence, an update
of someone’s initial (a-priori) information can vary drastically. On the one hand new
information can lead to no change, on the other hand new information can drastically
change someone’s initial views. Research indicates that new information that does not
challenge the existing belief system, is more likely to be interpreted as reliable than new
evidence that contains disturbing information: “[...] disagreements about risk should not
be expected to evaporate in the presence of evidence. Strong initial views are resistant to
change because they influence the way that subsequent information is interpreted. New
evidence appears reliable and informative if it is consistent with one’s initial beliefs;
contrary evidence tends to be dismissed as unreliable, erroneous or unrepresentative [...]
When people lack strong prior opinions, the opposite situation exists – they are at the
mercy of the problem formulation. Presenting the same information about risk in differ-
ent ways (eg, mortality rates as opposed to survival rates) alters people’s perspectives
and actions” (Slovic, 2000a, 223).23
In their research Kahneman and Tversky (compare for example Tversky and Kahne-
man, 1981, 1982; Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Kahneman, 2003) the authors express
that the framing of a situation influences an observer’s perspective and can result in dif-
ferent decision making processes. From their view, negatively described situations, for
example a description of an outcome framed in number of fatalities instead of survivors,
lead people to want to avoid these situations. Similar situations framed differently, for
23 The author cites research of Nisbett and Ross (1980) regarding people’s resistance of initial views
and refers to Tversky and Kahneman (1982) regarding risks presented in different ways.
74
4. Risk perception in social sciences
example by mentioning the number of survivors, helps the decision maker accept the
situations (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). The authors conclude, that the framing of
a situation has an effect on how people evaluate the situation, even if the information
and facts related to a risk, e.g. the number of fatalities and survivors or the likelihood
of an event, remains the same. Kahnemann and Tversky furthermore conclude that
invariance of information, as assumed in the rational choice paradigm, cannot proof to
hold in real life decision making processes (Kahneman, 2003, 703). The evaluation of a
situation seems to be more influenced on how easy people can approach and understand
the situation they are judging. The framing of a situation is perceived as given and
accepted. I suggest that the framing of a situation is correlated with the individual
degree of ignorance, unconsciously reverberating the sound in the risk environment.
4.2.3. Ripple effects – the drop in the tea cup
The art of change, as I interpret it, is the art to constantly be willing to perceive
one’s views and ideas as incomplete, outdated, and willingly, although not necessarily
consciously, ignoring information. It is a process of avoiding to be on either side of the
extreme: of not being absorbed by the randomness of the constant endless stream of
new human ideas and events happening in the present moment, all the while, not being
resistant to change by ignoring emerging evidence of very slow or sudden developments.
To me it seems that the stiff and set concept of experts’ risk interpretation, a concept
that is only appropriate in case of sound empirical evidence, has created the perceived
imbalance between accepted and desired risks.
In the case of risks, the common procedure of only considering direct consequences
to victims as relevant information to evaluate risks is not appropriate. Research on
historical events reveals that in case of accidents, such as a nuclear accident, the impact
of such an event spreads beyond the direct or expected costs of an extreme event. An
unwanted event can cross social boundaries and affects companies and industries who are
not or only to a minimal extend related to the accident. Paul Slovic calls this spread of
impact, from the initial impact to outside and only distant related social places, “ripple
effects” (Slovic et al., 1984; Kasperson et al., 1988; Slovic et al., 1991). Ripple effects
are like the last drop of tea poured out of a pot of Japanese green tea that drops in the
center of a full cup of tea: “[A]n unfortunate event can be thought of as analogous to a
stone dropped in a pond. The ripples spread outward, encompassing first the directly
affected victims, then the responsible company or agency and, in the extreme, reaching
other companies, agencies and industries. Some events make only small ripples; others
make larger ones” (Slovic, 2000a, 227). As an example Slovic describes the consequences
of the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident in 1979, with no direct fatalities and only few
known fatalities from related health damages. The company owning the utility had huge
financial damages. The ripple effects crossed company’s boundaries in that sense that
stricter regulation and new safety standards were imposed on the industry by U.S. agen-
cies, leading to higher costs for operators and consumers nationwide. The consequences
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rippled beyond national boundaries with consequences for the nuclear industry and the
operation of nuclear reactors all over the globe. Furthermore, greater public opposition
to nuclear power emerged as consequence of the accident with far reaching consequences
for nuclear technology in the future. Slovic concludes that traditional analysis and a
mere economic view on the costs of risks are ignoring the “higher order impacts of an
unfortunate event” (Slovic, 2000a, 227).
One important factor to determine the seriousness of an event the perceived risk and
public’s risk judgement. The seriousness or the “signaling potential” (Slovic, 2000a,
228) of an event is related to the dread factor described above. A negative event in an
unfamiliar system, like a nuclear power plant, might reveal the obviously catastrophic
potential of the technology as well as hidden associations with that unknown and dread-
ful technology.24 Indeed, people’s negative emotions, fears and anxieties with nuclear
technology, are not only associated with the danger of a nuclear accident but also with
the existence, use, and development of nuclear weapons (Slovic, 2000a, 229-230). In that
sense one might conclude that riding a train might be riskier in terms of fatalities, but
the total number of train wrecks in the past might have no impact of observable ripples
in your cup of tea; there is no last drop of tea left in your tea pot of past memories when
it comes to a train wreck, the surface of your tea stays calm, unless you or somebody you
know have been on the train. In contrast, you can still feel and see the ripples created
by the nuclear bombs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This drops of tea are still present in
your tea pot of human memories and constantly dripping in my cup of tea.
These long lasting memories might be one reason for the opposition against a specific
technology like nuclear power, even though experts assume that this technology is safe. It
seems that experts’ tea pots of nuclear memory are empty. From laypeople’s perception,
the tea pots are full and emptying the pot is not possible because, as Slovic emphasizes,
nuclear energy is not seen as beneficial to the whole society given the unacceptable
high risks (Slovic, 2000a, 229). He explains the observable opposition among population
by the extreme positions nuclear technology takes in the psychometric factor space,
as described above. Nuclear technology is perceived as uncontrollable, unknown and
unfamiliar, dreadful, inequitable, catastrophic, and assumed to affect future generations.
At the same time people are aware that not so many people have died because of nuclear
technology. And still, both perceptions, the quite low number of fatalities and the
extreme dread potential of nuclear technology are not contradictory for laypeople, as
Slovic’s studies show.
Referring to the potentially high impact on ripple effect Slovic (2000a, 230) concludes
24 The catastrophic potential in the case of an accident can be described in Ortwin Renn’s semantic
image of the “Damocles Sword”, a risk perceived as a random event that bears large catastrophic
potential and comes like a disaster without any warnings and chance to prepare (Rohrmann and
Renn, 2000, 27). In addition to the Damocles Sword Slovic brings up the image of an herald
who is“a harbinger” of more dramatic mishaps in the future, caused by the same technology. The
TMI accident can be interpreted as a herald of more dramatic accidents or consequences of nuclear
technology (Slovic, 2000a, 228).
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that for nuclear technology, even a small accident like Tree Mile Island might have large
consequences across social boundaries. One reason is that the topic will get attention in
the media. Slovic further points out that experts’ attempt to educate people to prove
that nuclear is safe enough for human societies will fail because of the lack of empirical
evidence. Doubts about the technology will always remain because this technology can-
not be proven to be managed and governed safely: “Attempts to ‘educate’ or reassure
the public and bring their perceptions in line with those of industry experts appear
unlikely to succeed because the low probability of serious reactor accidents makes em-
pirical demonstrations of safety difficult to achieve. Because nuclear risks are perceived
as unknown and potentially catastrophic, even small accidents will be highly publicized
and may produce large ripple effects” (Slovic, 2000a, 230).
Nuclear technology is not a good pupil. It is a stubborn child, not accepting given ra-
tionalities. It has the catastrophic potential, similar to the image of a Damocles’ Sword.
In the case of nuclear waste, a problem not discussed in this dissertation, nuclear tech-
nology can also be perceived as a slow killer, a “Pandora’s Box” as Ortwin Renn (2000,
28) pictures. A risk that is an invisible threat with delayed effects, non-catastrophic
and transmitted by information rather than personal experience, a risk people need to
express high levels of trust to institutions responsible for managing that risks. The claim
to governing nuclear risks in a responsible way for future generations is a challenge for
today’s risk entrepreneurs.25
4.2.4. Rationality and chaos
It seems to me that there is a conflict in society between how different people, experts
as well as laypeople, perceive and respond to uncertainty. Otherwise I cannot explain
25 I use the term risk entrepreneur in the sense introduced in Section 2.4.4 by Knight (1921), to use a
more vague or open term of a risk manager. The term risk experts as I have used it so far in my
dissertation is meant to be an ideal type, used as the prototype of a mind that only counts a narrow
idea of scientific reality, based on rational logic and ideal numbers. I am also picturing the risk
expert as a prototype of scientific chauvinism as Paul Feyerabend had been noticing in the scientific
community. Traditions of thoughts that either want to removed or re-educate incompatible voices,
methods and its results: “Scientific chauvinism triumphs: ‘What is compatible with science should
live, what is not compatible with science, should die’. ‘Science’ in this context means not just a
specific method, but all the results the method has so far produced. Things incompatible with the
results must be eliminated” (Feyerabend, 1993, 36). A risk entrepreneur might be the prototype
then of an incarnated risk governance creature, an master of risk governance, an artist, a care taker.
I have to confess, my inner picture of my risk expert’s prototype, I have never met one, is based on
second hand information like the one mentioned above by Charles Perrow, Sheila Jasanoff, or in this
case by Paul Slovic. Slovic cites an expert who expresses his anger about laypeople’s irrational fears
of nuclear power: “A nuclear physicist and leading advocate of nuclear power contented that: ‘The
public has been driven insane over fear of radiation [from nuclear power]. I use the word “insane”
purposefully since one of its definitions is loss of contact to reality. The public’s understanding of
radiation dangers has virtually lost all contact with the actual dangers as understood by scientists’
” (Slovic, 2000a, 229).
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why there are voices claiming that laypeople should be better ‘educated’, as Slovic men-
tions (Slovic, 2000a, 230). Furthermore, experts interpret peoples judgements under
uncertainty as ‘irrational’ or ‘biased’, as proponents of early heuristic research point out
(compare Section 4.2.1). Michael Smithson (2008) describes the roots of this social con-
flict by outlining and exemplifying the results on psychological research on how people
respond to uncertainty. It seems that the underlying assumptions of people who judge
other people’s judgements as irrational or biased are the assumption that humans cog-
nitive capacities are limited (Smithson, 2008, 209; Jaeger et al., 2001, 152) and certain
people do not use their full cognitive capacities. Hence there are judging people, per-
ceived as smart, and judged people, who are deemed less smart regarding uncertainty.
This basic underlying assumption, from my point of view, is that experts are by defini-
tion smarter and experts’ views by definition more true. Do we observe a self-fulfilling
prophecy, when people are judged as more or less smart?
Research results conclude, that people scoring higher in tests of mental ability and
performance, behave more in line with probability theory and are not led systemati-
cally astray by heuristics (Smithson, 1997, 2008, 210).26 The rationalist model has been
criticized by the school of bounded rationality. Herbert Simon’s bounded rationality
approach (Simon, 1982) assumes that humans, or organisms, have limited capacity to
process the complexity of information, but decision making is strongly influenced by the
structure of the environment. This means that a social environment is influencing the
decision making process: “The environment we shall discuss initially is perhaps a more
appropriate one for a rat than for a human. For the term environment is ambiguous. We
are not interested in describing some physically objective world in its totality, but only
those aspects of the totality that have relevance as the “life space” of the organism con-
sidered. Hence, what we call the “environment” will depend upon the “needs,” “drives,”
or “goals” of the organism, and upon its perceptual apparatus” (Simon, 1956, 130). For
Simon there is not only humans and their characteristics, like intelligence, but also the
constraints due to the characteristics of one’s life space. Decisions in uncertainty are
limited to all of these constraints. Smithson further explains bounded rationality as an
approach that reflects the way humans make trade offs between cognitive efforts and the
needed or wanted accuracy of a judgement. Humans, he concludes, adopt their cogni-
tive capacities to the necessities that are set by the environment (Smithson, 2008, 210).
Furthermore, many real-world situations do not reveal enough information to allow for
an optimal decision strategy.
26 Hogarth (1980) gives examples of situations in which people do not follow probabilistic theory and
give biased responses like in the example of the gambler’s fallacy (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972).
The gambler’s fallacy is a tendency to believe that a data generating process, that creates ideally
randomly created events over an endless period of time, is itself self-correcting. That means, if an
event, like an nuclear accident, is happening more frequently than expected, it will be expected to be
less frequent in the future; or if an event, like an nuclear accident, is not happening in the expected
way, it will happen more often in the future. Voices who prophecies after a nuclear accident that an
accident will not happen soon again or see more accidents happening in the near future are trapped
in the gambler’s fallacy.
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Smithson further refers to research that shows that heuristics are fast and frugal de-
cision making processes and hence appropriate in realistic environments, even though
they are perceived as suboptimal compared to normative strategies, based on proba-
bility theory: “[H]euristics used by people that are fallacies in the casino are effective
in more realistic although uncertain environments” (Smithson, 2008, 211). In his own
research (Smithson, 1997) he compares people’s judgement of chaotic processes and of
random processes. Chaotic processes like weather forecasts, turbulences or stock-market
performances are difficult to predict, hence, uncertain in the long run, even though the
underlying processes are deterministic (compare also Figure 4). The long term predic-
tion of chaotic processes is difficult, because chaotic processes are sensitive to minor
changes in the influencing factors, therefore they are not assumed to reach stationarity
but are aperiodic and anti-persistent.
Smithson assumes that humans’ decision making capacities are designed to judge
chaotic processes and are able to adapt to chaotic environments because there is em-
pirical evidence that numerous natural processes are chaotic in the sense of determin-
istic chaos. Smithson questions the basic assumption in standard normative theories of
stochastic processes, defining stochastic processes as a sequence of independent events
gravitating towards a stationary equilibrium in the long run: “It is worth mentioning
that many natural processes exhibit (anti-) persistence and nonstationarity, whereas
standard normative theories of judgement and decision making assess human perfor-
mance against strategies which are optimal only for processes that are stochastic (i.e.,
with independent event) and stationary” (Smithson, 1997, 65). He observes that people
judge chaotic processes better than random processes in terms of accuracy and under-
dispersion. He points out that the observation of less under-dispersion is an important
feature indicating that the extreme fluctuations of chaotic processes are taken into con-
sideration by people’s judgement and awareness of chaotic processes. In that sense, he
concludes that people judge the extreme events or outcomes of chaotic processes better
than of probabilistic processes (Smithson, 1997, 65).
I feel it is interesting to question the assumption of stochastic and probabilistic pro-
cesses as criteria for rational decision making. The normative assumption of an equi-
librium and stationary tendency of probabilistic processes is questionable as well as the
assumption of risk environments as random spaces. If chaos and not randomness is the
underlying process of many natural and social events, probabilistic reasoning might not
account for extreme events properly. In that sense people’s heuristics might be more
sufficient for risk environments and deserve to be taken into consideration in risk assess-
ment processes. I assume the case of a nuclear accident or a nuclear war to be a chaotic
rather than a random event, based on a sequences of deterministic processes and not on
stochastic processes, even though the underlying processes are not well known to human
knowledge.
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4.2.5. Risks as feelings
Feelings are considered to play an important role in judging risks and can be perceived
as a factor explaining the discrepancy between experts’ and laypeople’s judgement on
perceived risks. Loewenstein and colleagues (2001) question whether the empirically
observed gap is caused on how risks are processed cognitively or affectively. In their
risk-as-feelings hypothesis the authors conclude that firstly emotional responses for prob-
abilities and outcomes, the two dominant factors for traditional risk assessment, differ
from cognitive judgements of people named by the authors as “cognitive consequential-
ists” (Loewenstein et al., 2001, 274). Secondly, there are factors that influence emotions,
but are not recognized as influential factors in cognitive evaluation. Emotional responses
to risks are perceived to be more insensitive to probability changes. The insensitivity
as such depends on the emotional impact related to the outcome. Small probabilities
tend to be overweighted, for outcomes that are easy to imagine and that evoke negative
emotions like fear or dread in the case of negative outcomes, as well as positive emotions
like hope in the case of positive outcomes (Rottenstreich and Hsee, 2001).
Different emotional reactions that form subjective probabilities are able to explain dif-
ferences in experts’ and laypeople’s risk evaluation of low-probability high-consequence
risks like nuclear power. Loewenstein and colleagues include additional factors into their
risk-as-feelings model that might influence people’s emotional reactions to risks. The
factors they name are vividness, how people can imagine a risk’s consequence, experi-
ence and personal exposure to the outcome, as well as the past history of conditioning
(Loewenstein et al., 2001, 271). These features are subjective feelings and emotional
processes that differ from rather objective features used in cognitive assessments, like
probabilities and impact of consequences.
For me, the question of whether emotions are problematic or useful for risk judgements
is open. Psychological research alleges that emotions play an important role and blocking
emotions might result in negative consequences to the decision making process: “In
contrast to the historical view of emotions (and other “passions”) as destructive influence
on decision making, much of the new work highlights the role played by emotions as
informational inputs into decision making and the negative consequences that result
when such inputs are blocked” (Loewenstein et al., 2001, 268).
Antonio Damasio’s “somatic marker hypothesis” (Damasio, 1994) presents a school
of thoughts that highlights the importance of emotions. Damasio posits that somatic
reactions are part of individual’s judgement of different alternatives by providing rele-
vant information about the desirability of each option. If these emotional reactions are
blocked, the decision making process is impaired, even if all cognitive abilities are func-
tioning properly. Research by Wilson and Schooler (1991) further indicate that people’s
ability to make decision is also impaired if people are asked to consider systematically all
of the advantages and disadvantages of all available alternatives. The authors conclude
that suppressing affective inputs by considering all information to carefully results in
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preference choices that are not optimal. Zajonic (1980) contributes evidence that af-
fective reactions happen faster than cognitive evaluations. These immediate emotional
reactions can be interpreted as driven by deep rooted or high-priority concerns that
indicate the awareness of an impending danger (compare Loewenstein et al., 2001, 268).
Given the obvious impact and necessity of emotional reactions and evaluations on
people’s decision making processes, Loewenstein et al. develop the already above men-
tioned risk-as-feeling hypothesis. The risk-as-feeling hypothesis is combining emotional
and cognitive evaluation processes based on outcome and subjective probability judge-
ments and factors like vividness, immediacy, and experienced memories. The hypothesis
“[...] postulates that responses to risky situations (including decision making) result in
part from direct (i.e., not cortically mediated) emotional influences, including feelings
such as worry, fear, dread, or anxiety. People are assumed to evaluate risky alterna-
tives at a cognitive level, as in traditional models, based largely on the probability and
desirability of associated consequences. Such cognitive evaluations have affective con-
sequences, and feeling states also exert a reciprocal influence on cognitive evaluations”
(Loewenstein et al., 2001, 270).
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information processing (e.g., Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Epstein,
Lipson, Holstein, & Huh, 1992; Sloman, 1996; Windschitl &
Weber, 1999). Sloman, for example, distinguished between rule-
based and associative processing. Rule-based processing is a rel-
atively controlled form of processing that operates according to
formal rules of logic and evidence and is mediated by conscious
appraisal of information. A response driven by rule-based pro-
cessing follows from the execution of one or more rules that are
assumed to be relevant to the task (e.g., modus ponens or the
conjunction rule). Associative processing is a more spontaneous
form of processing that operates by principles of similarity and
temporal contiguity. In associative processing, the situational con-
text influences responses directly, just as associatively based prim-
ing influences the recognition of a target word. Pathways and
patterns of activation follow principles of similarity and temporal
contiguity; the stronger the association between two concepts
(which depends on similarity, repeated joint exposure, etc.), the
more activation passes from one to another. Because associative
processing is not mediated by conscious appraisal it is difficult to
suppress its influence on judgments and decisions.
In support of his two-process dichotomy, Sloman (1996) pro-
vided examples from reasoning, categorization, and judgment re-
search in which people find two simultaneously contradictory
responses—one presumably mediated by associative processing
and the other by rule-based processing—to be compelling for a
given problem. For example, although people know that a whale
does not fit the classification of "fish," statements like "technically
a whale is a mammal" suggest that people are influenced by the
similarity betwee  whales and fish. Windschitl and Weber (1999)
showed that associative processing of contextual information af-
fected judgments of subjective likelihood even in situations where
numeric estimates of likelihood were provided by credible experts.
Focusing narrowly on the topic of decision making under risk,
we attempt to integrate these two strands of literature, one showing
that emotions inform decision making and the other showing that
emotional responses to risky decision situations—that is, anticipa-
tory emotions—often diverge from cognitive evaluations. As dem-
onstrated by the many studies that support the somatic marker,
affect-as-information, a d affect heuristic theories, emotional re-
actions and cognitive evaluations typically work in concert to
guide reasoning and decision making. However, anticipatory emo-
tional reactions sometimes diverge from cognitive evaluations and,
when they do, the emotional reactions often exert a dominating
influence on behavior. We attempt to explain when and why such
emotional reactions diverge from cognitive evaluations of risk and
to explain how these responses interact to determine behavior. The
theoretical framework we propose, which we label the risk-as-
feelings hypothesis, provides a parsimonious account of a number
of risk-related phenomena that are not explained by existing con-
sequentialist models of risky decision making.
The risk-as-feelings hypothesis, illustrated in Figure 3, postu-
lates that responses to risky situations (including decision making)
result in part from direct (i.e., not cortically mediated) emotional
influences, including feelings such as worry, fear, dread, or anxi-
ety. People are assumed to evaluate risky alternatives at a cognitive
level, as in traditional models, based largely on the probability and
desirability of associated consequences. Such cognitive evalu -
tions have affective consequences, and feeling states also exert a
reciprocal influence on cognitive evaluations. At the same time,
however, feeling states ar  postulated to r spond to factors, such as
the immediacy of a risk, that do not enter into cognitive evalua-
tions of the risk and also respond to probabilities and outcome
values in a fashion that is different from the way in which these
variables enter into cognitive evaluations. Because their determi-
nants are different, emotional reactions to risks can diverge from
cognitive evaluations of the same risks. As illustrated in Figure 3,
behavior is then determined by the interplay between these two,
ofte  conflicting, responses to a situation. Note that the term
decision in Figures 1 and 2 is deliberately replaced with behavior
in Figure 3. This substitution reflects the observation that many
types of emotion-driven risk-related behaviors, ranging from panic
reactions (e.g., slamming on the brake when one skids on ice) to
the agoraphobic individual's inability to leave the house, do not
seem to reflect decisions in the sense that the term is usually used.
The risk-as-feelings hypothesis is similar to the somatic marker
hypothesis, the affect-as-information perspective, and the affect
heuristic in drawing attention to the important role played by affect
in decision making, but the risk-as-feelings hypothesis has a some-
Anticipated outcomes
(including anticipated
emotions)
Other factois
e.g., vividness
background mood
Behavior
Figure 3. Risk-as-feelings perspective.
(Source: Loewenstein et al., 2001, 270, Fig. 3)
Figure 6: Risk as feelings: factors influencing individual’s risk evaluation.
A graphical overview Figure 6 of the risk-as-feelings hypothesis as presented by Loewen-
stein and colleagues (Loewenstein et al., 2001, 270) summarizes the influencing factors
and the assumed influence of feelings on behavior27 or decision making and outcomes
like a risk judgement.
27 The authors emphasize how they purposefully use the term behavior instead of the commonly
used term decision to indicate that emotionally driven risk evaluation processes can be observed in
extreme panic reactions as well as agoraphobic fear and the inability to be in public spaces. Both
are emotional reactions that do not fit well into the standard scheme of rational decision making
(Loewenstein et al., 2001, 270).
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4.2.6. Prototypes of uncertainty and a framework of ignorance
I will return to the emotional aspect of people’s risk perception when discussing the
affect heuristic in Section 4.2.7 as one explanation of how people do react to immediate
unexpected information that might be caused by an nuclear accident like the most recent
nuclear accident in Japan in 2011. I will now explain concepts that define prototypes
and characteristics how people deal with uncertainty and, hence, create a predominant
social ignorance structure. I then will explore uncertainty constructs that go beyond the
standard explanation of probability. At the end, I will discuss results of cross-national
studies and highlight additional aspects that help to reflect inherent biases Western
research traditions on uncertainty might have.
Smithson identifies three traditional orientations in psychology that deal with peo-
ple’s evaluation of uncertainty or the unknown (Smithson, 2008, 206-207). The first
tradition or prototype he entitles the “knowledge seeker.” The knowledge seeker is seen
as constantly seeking out new information and experiences, and assumes prior beliefs
need to be updated as part of a learning process. This prototype of person tolerates
uncertainty and is able to accept ignorance, at least in the short run, to obtain addi-
tional information. Knowledge seekers are open to new forms of communication, and
they communicate and share their views fully and honestly. In his open and closed
mind theory, Rokeach (1960) describes authoritarian people as intolerant of ambiguity,
intolerant to multiple and heterogeneous ideas and beliefs, and against deviations from
the ideological, religious or political, dogmas. Open minded people, however, are open
to counter evidence and ambiguity, perceive unfamiliar information freely, exchange and
listen to new ideas and are open to change (Smithson, 2008, 212). In the aftermaths
of World War II Rokeach (1960) developed a bipolar typography comparing a ‘gestalt
type’, who needs to know and understand and a ‘psychoanalytic type’ who is charac-
terized by defending itself against threatening aspects influencing reality.28 He observed
that gestalt types, compared to psychoanalytic types, are less authoritarian and less
prejudiced, tend to avoid religious dogmatism, are better at problem-solving, politically
progressive and more appreciative to art and its merits.
The second tradition, characterizes people as seeking to reduce uncertainty. Smith-
son calls this tradition “certainty maximizer” (Smithson, 2008, 206). From this line of
thoughts, (e.g., Mandler 1984; Izard 1991) uncertainty has a negative impact on one’s
emotional state. Uncertainty is assumed to cause fear and intense anxieties. Gudykunst
and Nishida (2001) go even further to claim that anxieties can be interpreted as the
emotional equivalent to perceived and externally induced uncertainty. Comparing both
traditions, Smithson concludes that there is a “natural tension” between the prototypes of
certainty maximizer and of knowledge seeker (Smithson, 2008, 206). I will return to this
conflicting traditions of how people deal with uncertainty when discussing different prac-
28 Rokeach’s research was inspired by the desire to understand right-wing-authoritarianism and is in
the tradition of a broad field on research on the authoritarian personality, such as earlier study by
Adorno and colleagues (Adorno et al., 1950).
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tices of risk assessments in Section 9. I assume that an authoritarian approach of solving
risks is displayed in a linear and problem controlling approach of risk assessment, based
on military order structures, whereas approaches in the tradition of knowledge seeking
and openness to change might emphasize the importance of uncertainty to understand
the deeper meanings of a threatening nature’s problem.
The third decision making prototype in cognitive psychology is called the “intuitive
statistician-economist” (Smithson, 2008, 206). This normative viewpoint on how humans
reflect information and make decisions has a lot in common with decision models in the
tradition of neoclassical economics. The underlying assumptions are based on probability
theory and a perception of humans as hedonistic beings and utility maximizers who
avoid pain and seek pleasure. With these assumptions, a model can be derived that
explains how people maximize their subjective expected utility. The probabilistic part
in this model is the assumption that humans are able to quantify and transform their
perceived uncertainty about a state of the world into one single numerical estimate.
The number is cognitively derived according to the principles of probability theory. The
second assumption, the assumption on a hedonistic seeking human nature, or hedonistic
preference structure, assumes that decision-makers are able to quantify different options
or outcomes of perceived states of the world as utilities, based on a numeric calculation
of benefits and costs. After the calculus of utilities humans are able to order their
preferences. The expected utility number is the combination of the assigned probabilities
and the number of the utility calculus. The highest expected utility number is the one
humans will prefer because it is maximizing their subjective expected utility. That is
one assumed process how humans quantify their decisions rationally.
In their discussion on the rational action framework (RAF), Rosa and colleagues
(2014, 53) point out that in many empirically observed social processes the assumption
of a quantifying and utility maximizing rational actor cannot be met. They furthermore
observe in the scientific world, that the basic assumptions of the rational actor paradigm
have been modified with additional ad hoc assumptions. They conclude that the ad
hoc adjustment of the underlying assumptions indicates a weakness of the theory and,
following Kuhn’s (1970) idea of scientific paradigms, might not lead to a collapse of the
theory but to an integration into another broader scientific paradigm (Rosa et al., 2014,
67). The authors emphasize that, especially regarding the process of risk evaluation, the
basic assumption that human’s decision making processes can be modeled as a process
of optimization and maximization does not hold. They claim that social actions are
determined and constraint by other human’s actions or structural conditions of the
environment. In this sense the relationship between humans and humans and humans
and their environment defines the logic of the decision making process: “Most individuals
are not able to calculate the likely impacts of their own choices in situations where many
actors are likely to interfere and structural conditions are likely to change constantly”
(Rosa et al., 2014, 67). Rosa and colleagues, inspired by Naomi Klein (2007), have sharp
words for proponents of the rational actor paradigm implying that RAF’s theorists prefer
to empty the bathtub they are in, than to leave the wrecked ship: “many RAF theorists
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have become ardent proponents of changing the world in the direction of the model
rather than adjusting the model in the direction of the world” (Rosa et al., 2014, 67). In
complex social environments, in space and time unites, optimization processes are not
leading to efficient and satisfying outcomes for every actor but are able, as I assume, to
create unwanted conflicts among the actors and hence more risk to the whole entity.
At this point I feel it is useful to discuss different concepts and principles of uncertainty.
The psychologist’s assumption is that even though there might be objective uncertainties
the field of interests are subjective (Smithson, 2008, 207). The dominant approach in
risk evaluation is the assumption that uncertainty can best be modeled and depict in
objective numbers derived from the principles and axiomatics of probability theory.
From this perspective the concept of probability and its underlying logic of randomness
is treated as uncertainty. The concept of randomness and probability is based on a
situation seen as a game of chances, like in a casino29, and the normative assumption is
that people are maximizing their subjectively expected utility (Edwards, 1954, 381).
In psychological research, a second construct of uncertainty is the effect of delayed
outcomes and consequences of individual actions (Smithson, 2008, 207). Outcomes that
happen sooner are perceived to have a larger magnitude. In that sense, humans desire
good outcomes and want them to happen sooner; in contrast, bad outcomes are per-
ceived more worthy the sooner they are expected to happen. As a consequence, delayed
outcomes are perceived to be uncertain. Certain outcomes are outcomes happening in
the present moment. Decision theory that is taking the effect of delay or time into con-
sideration predicts that people will behave risk averse for delayed gains and risk seeking
for delayed losses in the future (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; for an overview see
also Frederick et al., 2002).
Smithson presents a third construct of uncertainty he calls “absence or lack of clar-
ity in information” (Smithson, 2008, 208). In an environment with of imprecise or no
information, probabilities cannot be derived. This field of research is broad and termi-
nologies like ambiguity, vagueness, incomplete information, and non-specificity are used
in a quite unstructured way to describe the lack of precise or sufficient information in the
decision making process. Uncertainty in the meaning of absence or lack of information,
a-priori or after empirical investigation, can be compared to Knight’s strict meaning of
uncertainty as discussed above (Knight, 1921, 231). This construct of uncertainty is also
inspired by Keynes’ thoughts on probability or the absence of probabilities in a social
environment (Keynes, 1921).
In his experiment on betting on outcomes with known probabilities or ambiguous
information (if probabilities are not known), Daniel Ellsberg tries to find an answer
29 An illuminated casino in Monte Carlo, guests are coming, watching each other curiously; you can
feel the dense and concentrated atmosphere in the space of hope and desire; you are sitting next to
a silent gentlemen who orders a Martini without ice; you decide to ask for his name: “You can call
me Mr. Uncertainty, Random Uncertainty.” A new adventure to save the world begins – you and
all your decisions are part of it.
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to the question: “[a]re there uncertainties that are not risks?” (Ellsberg, 1961, 643).
He can demonstrate in what has became known as the Ellsberg paradox (see for a more
detailed discussion on the Ellsberg paradox Camerer and Weber, 1992) that people prefer
a choice situation with uncertain probabilities over the option of known probabilities.
From the axioms of decision making people should have either no preference or should
rather prefer the known situation, ‘the devil they know’, than the unknown situation,
‘to buy a pig in a poke’. Ellsberg points out that his results are not random but willingly
wanted, that people’s choices are an “operation of definite normative criteria” (Ellsberg,
1961, 656-657). He even asked people perceived as experts and familiar to probabilistic
reasoning about their behavior. He concludes that people deliberately chose the option
and wanted to make the decision, even though they know they are violating the criteria
of subjective expected utility: “Yet the choices themselves do not appear to be careless
or random. They are persistent, reportedly deliberate, and they seem to predominate
empirically; many of the people who take them are eminently reasonable, and they insist
that they want to behave this way, even though they may be generally respectful of the
Savage axioms” (Ellsberg, 1961, 656).
In his book ‘Ignorance and Uncertainty’ Smithson (1989) introduces a more elaborate
concept of ignorance of how people and social groups organize non knowledge. He dif-
ferentiates between different levels and kinds of ignorance. The most obvious distinction
of different levels of ignorance is “conscious ignorance” or the fact that we “know that
we do not know”, and “meta-ignorance”, the fact that we “do not know that we do not
know” (Smithson, 2008, 208). I introduced the idea of ignorance mentioned by Aven
and Renn (2009, 9) above when discussing how to define risk (see Section 2.4.3). Smith-
son states that the language we use, e.g., English, has developed a language designed
to rather eliminate ignorance by emphasizing the ability to express knowledge claims
and state facts of the world, than to enunciate ignorance. Same he claims is true for
the scientific community where the awareness of ignorance is a neglected and not well
established field. He remarks that there is no accepted science of non-knowledge, such
as a “Sociology of Nonknowledge” (Smithson, 1989, 2).
Smithson’s taxonomy on ignorance embeds uncertainty, with its elements such as prob-
ability, ambiguity, and vagueness30 in a broader concept of ignorance. For an overview
of his taxonomy of ignorance see Figure 7. He argues that ignorance, as well as knowl-
edge is socially created and depend on the position of a social group or of an individual.
Knowledge as well as ignorance therefore is an object of social negotiation (Smithson,
1989, 6). Any social system by constructing its reality depending on different viewpoints
is on the one hand producing anomalies, deviant information that does not match the
existing viewpoints or social skills to communicatively integrate them into an existing
system of beliefs, and on the other hand strategies defending the existing viewpoints.
In Smithson’s words, ignorance is a strategy to deal with “anomalies and other threats
to established cognitive order” (Smithson, 1989, 7). From my point of view, Smithson
takes a thoughtful angle when introducing his concept of ignorance. A perspective that
30 Vagueness includes fuzziness and nonspecificity.
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(Source: Smithson, 1989, 9, Fig. 1.1.)
Figure 7: Smithson’s taxonomy of ignorance.
is directing a reader’s curiosity to a broader space opening one’s mind to carefully reflect
on the meaning of non knowledge.
The author’s starting point of reflection is to find a distinction of how society has
created a socially accepted practice to cope with anomalies. Ignorance, Smithson claims,
is constituted in part of error and in part of irrelevance. He starts with an example
of everyday language and the distinction between the active voice of ‘ignoring’ and the
passive voice of ‘being ignorant’. ‘Ignoring’ is an active social state of deliberately paying
inattention to an object or situation, or purposely not looking at something. Ignoring as
an active act is a “declaration of irrelevance” (Smithson, 1989, 7), in his taxonomy called
‘irrelevance’. ‘Being ignorant’ to the contrary implies a passive social state that is based
on distortion or incomplete knowledge. Ignoring as a state is “an erroneous cognitive
state” (Smithson, 1989, 7), in his taxonomy called ‘error’.
Separating irrelevant and erroneous views, as two different perspectives of reality, has
different implications for a socially perceived reality. The first strategy of ignoring is a
way of excluding conflicting information denying their existence. The second strategy
of being ignored implies an inclusive strategy for coping with conflicting information.
The strategy to declare anomalies as irrelevant is a negative way to ignore them and
results in banishing them from reality (see Figure 7). Fields of banished information are
‘utopicality’, to declare something as folk wisdom, ‘taboos’, socially enforced irrelevance,
or ‘undecidability’, declaring words as fantasy and fiction (Smithson, 1989, 8).
An erroneous view on the contrary allows the observer to enter a space of anomalies,
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a space that is not able to be perceived consciously. This framework of reality is open to
new information and therefore an inclusive strategy, open for changes in reality. Accord-
ing to Smithson ‘error’ itself is divided in ‘distortion’ and ‘incompleteness’. Distortion
in degree, like a systematic error or bias, Smithson terms ‘inaccuracy’ (I’ve always done
it like this, I cannot explain the accident.). Distortion in kind, like a wrongful substi-
tution, he calls ‘confusion’ (Hups, that was the wrong button I pressed - sorry for the
accident.). Error termed as incompleteness is called ‘absence’ in its kind (That was a
complete new situation – the neutrons started to sing Elvis Presley songs and the pro-
tective cover started to laugh and cracked up, we sincerely regret the accident.) or error
in degree, termed ‘uncertainty’. As above mentioned uncertainty includes terminologies
like probability, ambiguity or vagueness (There was a tiny probability left, a number of
many zeros and a one at the end we could not exclude from our calculations, it was a
random accident.) (Smithson, 1989, 7-8; Smithson, 2008, 208).
In my point of view, Smithson’s taxonomy and its different levels and kinds of ig-
norance, offers a picture of the term risk perception in its whole nature, including the
beauty of ignorance. Ignorance, and risk perception as part of it, is a dynamic and
opens up new spaces for reasoning and thinking. I perceive risk perception as one, out
of many, indicators to direct attention to tendencies and developments of distortion or
irrelevance, tendencies that systematically, purposefully, unintentionally, or randomly
exist in society. Allowing individuals to express their opinions about risks indicates the
manifold facets of ignorance and non knowledge.
Smithson’s concept is not static but assumes that social systems interact with each
other. Smithson (1989, 8-9)31, refers to Mary Douglas (1973) and her interpretation of
taboos as socially enforced irrelevance. Irrelevance in the sense of taboos is a devise to
create rules that define parts of the social life as relevant and vice versa irrelevant. Active
ignoring, socially allowed ignoring, in that sense, creates safety. Historical examples
of the 20th century are the Holocaust and the nuclear bombing of Japan in World
War II, both acts of active ignoring (covered in taboos) that cannot be kept under the
cover of silence and are a key element to open the space for new controversy because
history needs to be covered in a story (Curthoys, 2008).32 What seems obvious in
the world of historical knowledge also applies to the world of scientific knowledge and
its taboos. Douglas (1973, 100-101) describes science as a system that is cognitively
ordering its environment and is, hence, producing anomalies. As any socially constructed
culture, science also needs to defend its defined space by confronting the anomalies with
appropriate strategies of defense. Douglas points to the Western intellectual culture and
highlights the sophisticated normative paradigms, such as probability or decision making
theory as such a defense strategy. Smithson also states that the Western intellectual
culture is a strategy of exclusion, a social practice of actively ignoring other forms of
knowledge that are not based on the scientific paradigms and principles; realities that
31 See also Bammer et al. (2008).
32 An oppressed and slaughtered history of human history cannot be sealed for long – slaughtered and
oppressed souls find their way back in in the glamourous stories of modern history.
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are ignored or tabooed by the principles of logic, mathematics, or any other forms of
accepted forms of reasoning (Smithson, 1989, 8-9).
Society’s interplay of ignoring and being ignored seems to me a fruitful process to dis-
cover densities in humanity’s spaces of interaction. Gaps between experts’ and laypeo-
ple’s perception of risk or cross-cultural differences in society’s risk perceptions might
be a suitable indicator to locate dense spots of human interaction. Research on risk
perception might help to detect those ideological blind spots and sealed spaces of social
interaction. Philip Tetlock (2002) discusses a broader framework of uncertainty. He
assumes that people intuitively react different to uncertainty depending on their deeper
motivation to act. He describes five different prototypes that deal with uncertainty.
The ‘intuitive scientist’ seeks the truth. An ‘intuitive economist’, his second character,
seeks utilitarianism and acts in accordance with this purpose. Also the metaphor of an
‘intuitive politicians’ (coping with accountability demands), of an ‘intuitive prosecutor’
(trying to enforce social norms), and of an ‘intuitive theologist’ (protecting sacred values)
enters the space of decision-making procedures in uncertainty. Tetlock explains conflicts
that for instance, the scientific perspective of seeking the truth might not be appropri-
ate or functional from a theologist’s perspective, who defends his or her God from being
erased by scientific logics of reasoning. Tetlock also detects the defense mechanisms
of not accepting one another’s rules of accountability, as the primary challenge of risk
management and risk communication (compare Smithson, 2008, 208). Tetlock’s (2002,
468) proposed framework of “functionalist pluralism” is an approach of mixed metaphors,
maybe confusing at the beginning but necessary for theory building. His aim is to open
the social space for mutual understanding of the other, concluding: “The looming chal-
lenge will be to develop viable mixed-metaphor models of how people resolve conflicts
among functionalist imperatives” (Tetlock, 2002, 468). He claims for mixed typologies,
observing that cross-functional conflicts arise when people’s primary functionality, such
as the scientific demand for seeking truth, is crossing a boarder of a deeper basic func-
tionality. For example someone realized that by seeking the truth his or her work is
only to polish career and to ‘create’ results. Or somebody hurts someone and realizes a
conflict with his or her ethic value system. Tetlock’s interpretation of cross-functionalist
conflicts is “[t]he general theme seems to be cybernetic: People discover they have enough
of a functionalist mind-set only after they have had more than enough” (Tetlock, 2002,
468). His proposal for an “integrative agenda” will not solve the “battle for explanatory
primacy” (Tetlock, 2002, 468) but such a framework could structure the discussion and
lead it into a direction where extreme positions are recognized not as anomalies of a
system, but as a starting point of communication. Multiple and conflicting viewpoints
are the core of an integrative framework.
For my concept of a risk entrepreneur, Tetlock’s advice is to keep a functionalist
pluralism’s mind: “Functionalist pluralism model the mind as a polyglot polity popu-
lated by semiautonomous functional fiefdoms, each with its own operating principles, in
uneasy coexistence. They tend to be suspicious of monistic proposals, such as Green-
wald’s (1980) totalitarian ego, viewing them as special cases in which a particular set of
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functions – those stressing cognitive order, continuity, and self-image protection – have
achieved self-regulatory primacy” (Tetlock, 2002, 468).33 This “self-regulatory primacy”
seems to be the need for certainty in a world of uncertainty. The risk entrepreneur as
prototype balances the needs of certainty and uncertainty independent of a functional
framework or changing social environment. In that sense the risk entrepreneur provides
a space of certainty and uncertainty for extreme functional views of a certainty seeker
and an uncertainty seeker. Certainty in this sense is not an immovable and desirable
state of the world, the holy grail o knowledge, anymore, uncertainty on the other hand
leaves its connotation of a mystical myth and can be integrated in the social discourse as
a complex state of an intrinsic open world and a place for potentially new and creative
solutions, such as Afifi and Weiner (2004) suggest in their framework of interpersonal
communication.
Functionalist pluralism and the pluralist’s demand of being “suspicious of monistic pro-
posals,” as mentioned above, does not stop at national or cultural boarders as research by
Nisbett and colleagues (2001) indicates. The Western worldview of a dualistic true-false
logic, oriented to categorize reality by artificially defining boundaries of distinction has
been questioned in cross-cultural research. It seems that people for example in Asians,
on average, tend to be more oriented towards seeking relationships and similarities be-
tween objects, perceiving oneself as part of the whole entity not one category, whereas
Westerner try to identify objects, categories and rules to order objects in categories and
to identify themselves as member of a category.
Reflecting the debate of risk perception an important aspect is that the corresponding
view on uncertainty and its tradition of perceiving uncertainty as probability is ideo-
logical biased and culturally Western. The risk entrepreneur crosses cultural boarders
and acknowledges the space of the excluded middle, the contradiction, from a Western
perspective (see Smithson, 2008, 214), that a proposition if not true, does not need to
be false. An either true nor untrue state is permitted and can be accessed if necessary
in the debate of risk environments, thanks to a wider understanding of uncertainty and
ignorance as outlined above.
For empirical risk research, one can conclude that people who are asked to evaluate
a risk’s perceived danger, such as the danger of nuclear power, uncertainty might be
expressed as a tendency to choose a ‘neither nor’ perspective rather than a more ex-
treme statement of approval or rejection of a danger’s risk. The sources of uncertainty
are many fold as Smithson points out in his work (Smithson, 1989, 2008). Uncertainty
can be expressed in strategies of irrelevance, like taboos expressed in defensive rejec-
tion of a danger or hidden behind a historically created curtain of innocence, guilt or
shame. Furthermore strategies of irrelevance like undesidability, expressed in a ‘nor true
nor false’ expression of risk perception shape a society’s coping strategies with uncer-
tainty. The complex and ambiguous nature of a low-probability high-consequence risk,
like nuclear power, might also result in judgements based on error and its many faces
33 Tetlock refers to Greenwald’s (1980) paper on the totalitarian ego.
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like confusion, inaccuracy, and uncertainty because of lacking empirical evidence and
contradictory information. From Tetlock’s (2002) pluralistic view, conflicts between dif-
ferent perspectives exist. Different sets of functions exist in a society like the metaphor
of the intuitive scientist, seeking truth and transparency or the metaphor of the intuitive
politician seeking for accountability, rhetoric, and secrecy. The pluralism of mind-sets
might already exist in a person’s judgement of risk. In this sense, risk perception is
already an expression of a personal conflict. Reflecting the multifaceted nature of in-
dividual risk judgement, measured risk evaluation is a vague concept in terms of its
explanatory power, and scientifically accepted concepts of accuracy. The reasons that
are guiding a mind to evaluate a risk are manifold opening a wide space for conflicting
interpretations, almost purposefully rejecting to be captured in the concept of causal
inference and scientific reasoning. I will come back to explanatory factors of nuclear risk
perception when discussing empirical research on cross-national comparison of nuclear
risk perception in Section 5.
4.2.7. Affect heuristic
Before focusing on empirical research on nuclear risk perception, including cross-cultural
or cross-national risk perception, I want to introduce two concepts of how new informa-
tion, such as information of a nuclear accident, can alter individual’s evaluation of risks,
in my case the risk of nuclear power. An external shock, like a nuclear accident, can
be assumed to be a source of information that is able to influence people’s functional
mind-set, their affective, as well as analytical system, creating an openness to reflect
one’s own perspective. The social reactions to the external shock might also be able to
change the procedures and rituals how the actual social system is managing, regulating,
and governing the risk. First, I want to discuss the concept of affect heuristic; secondly
I want to discuss and introduce the framework of the social amplifications of risk.
As described in Loewenstein et al.’s risk as feelings hypothesis (Loewenstein et al.,
2001), emotions are able to play a role in the evaluation of risks (compare Section 4.2.5).
In the following part, I want to highlight the mechanisms and theoretical explanations on
how underlying affect mechanisms interplay with more obvious or conscious rational and
analytic mechanisms in people’s decision making process. I will refer mostly to research
on the affect heuristic by Paul Slovic, Melissa Finucane, Ellen Peters, and Donald G.
MacGregor (Slovic et al., 2002, 2004, 2007; Slovic, 2010). Slovic and colleagues argue
that affect is related to a consciously or unconsciously perceived feeling state, evoked by
a positive or negative reaction to a stimulus. The mechanism is an intuitive judgement
of a state as either good or bad. The affective judgement of a risk situation is happening
rapidly and automatically, maybe without being noticed by a person. The authors argue
that “reliance on such feelings can be characterized as “the affect heuristic” ” (Slovic et al.,
2004, 312).
Like the risk as feelings hypothesis or Antonio Damasio’s above mentioned somatic
90
4. Risk perception in social sciences
marker hypothesis (Damasio, 1994), Slovic and colleagues emphasize the importance of
an emotional system as a mode of reasoning and thinking. The intuitive judgement of
a situation is an experiential mode of thinking. According to Seymour Epstein (Ep-
stein, 1994; Epstein et al., 1992), there are two distinguishable modes of how people
perceive reality. The first, he calls the “experiential mode”, perceives reality intuitively,
automatically, non-verbally, and narratively. The second mode, the “rational mode”, is
a deliberative, analytical, verbal, and rational state to perceive reality (Epstein, 1994,
710).
Each system is characterized by complementing aspects. Epstein and colleagues define
twelve attributes characterizing each mode of thinking (Epstein et al., 1992, 329, Table
1):
According to the authors the experiential system is characterized as:
1. Holistic
2. Emotional: pleasure-pain oriented (what feels good)
3. Associationistic connections
4. More outcome oriented
5. Behavior mediated by “vibes” from past experience
6. Encodes reality in concrete images, metaphors, and narratives
7. More rapid processing: oriented toward immediate action
8. Slower to change: changes with repetitive or intense experience
9. More crudely differentiated: broad generalization gradient, categorical thinking
10. More crudely integrated: dissociative, organized into emotional complexes (cognitive-
affective modules)
11. Experienced passively and preconsciously: we are sized by our emotions
12. Self evidence valid: “experiencing is believing”
In contrast, what Epstein and colleagues (1992, 329, Table 1) call the rational system
is characterized as:
1. Analytic
2. Logical: reason oriented (what is sensible)
3. Cause-and-effect connections
4. More process oriented
5. Behavior mediated by conscious appraisal of events
6. Encodes reality in abstract symbols: words and numbers
7. Slower processing: oriented toward delayed action
8. Changes more rapidly: changes with speed of thought
9. More highly differentiated, dimensional thinking
10. More highly integrated
11. Experienced actively and consciously: we are in control of our thoughts
12. Requires justification via logic and evidence
Slovic and al. argue that both systems follow rational logics and, hence, they differ-
entiate between the “experiential system” and the “analytic system” (Slovic et al., 2004,
313). They further argue that in the history of human evolution on earth the expe-
riential system was the dominant mode of thinking, optimized to survive throughout
evolution. With socialization and the evolutional change of humanity having more con-
trol over the environment, the analytical mode of thinking became the dominant force
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of human reasoning.34 Slovic at al. (2004, 313) criticize the idea of a purified rational
mind and its guises because of the dominant weight it gained in recent history, purposely
separated from the emotional processes human reasoning actually is based on: “As life
became more complex and humans gained more control over their environment, analytic
tools were invented to “boost” the rationality of our experiential thinking. Subsequently,
analytic thinking was placed on a pedestal and portrayed as the epitome of rationality.
Affect and emotions were seen as interfering with reason.”
The concept of two separated systems for human reasoning, the ‘good’ rational system
and the ‘bad’ emotional system, is questioned by framework of the affect heuristic and
empirical evidence on the effect of emotions on human reasoning. The affect heuristic is
based on the assumption that “affect is essential to rational action” (Slovic et al., 2004,
314). And it is more. Finucane and colleagues describe the ongoing and permanent
interaction of the experiential and the analytic mode as “the dance of affect and reason”
(Finucane et al., 2003). Any rational decision based on analytic thinking is comple-
mented or prepared by an emotional reaction or affective process. In line with Zajonc
(1980), the authors are convinced that affective reactions provide guiding information
and orienting mechanisms by reacting to stimuli. These reactions are an efficient way
to deal with a complex and uncertain world. It is also an reaction to detect and avoid
dangerous situations (Slovic et al., 2004, 313).
Damasio (1994) argues that affective reactions are caused by positive or negative
images associated with present or future events. He explains that human thinking and
reasoning is to a large extent made up of images, and positive or negative feelings that
are associated, in his words “marked”, by those images. These associations or markers
are directly linked to somatic reactions perceived in the body. In that sense, the negative
or positive feelings and its somatic reactions interact with the mind. Positive images
or outcomes are liked with a pleasant sensation. Hence, the imagined or perceived
situation is perceived as an object of incentive. Negative feelings, on the contrary, create
an unpleasant bodily state and are perceived as an indicator of a dangerous situation.
Damasio concludes that somatic markers improve the decision making process, leading to
a more efficient outcome for the individual. His conclusion is based on empirical research
on decision making, observing that people with limited ability to perceive somatic marker
perform worse in the decision making procedure. The interplay of feelings and mental
images might be a mechanism of biological regulation, developed through evolutional
learning in human history; and might still be the guideline for effective human reasoning,
Damasio hypothesizes (Damasio, 1994, xii).
The theoretical concept of the affect heuristic, as proposed by Slovic and colleagues
(2007, 1335), is based on Damasio’s assumption that stimulus images are marked by feel-
ings, either positively or negatively. The authors furthermore assume that the degree
differs to which images or representations of events are marked or tagged with affective
34 The rational mind as the “juggernaut” of a new age as Giddens already portrait the dynamics of
modernity (Giddens, 1990, 131).
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emotions. Hence, the intensity of the marker differs with the stimulus image. Further-
more, it is hypothesized that an affect pool contains all the positive as well as negative
markers that are associates either consciously or unconsciously with all perceived im-
ages. In the case of a judgement people intuitively refer to the affect pool and sense the
intensity of a marker associates with the real or imagined image. Images are mapped
in different ways due to the affective quality of a stimulus image; and the markers are
also used in different ways, depending on the ability for an affective or rather analytical
interpretation of a situation.
Given the complexity of affective mapping, it is obvious to assume that individual’s
affective reactions differ across individuals. It also has been shown that an individual’s
tendency to rely on experiential thinking varies across individuals (compare for example,
Gasper and Clore, 1998). Beside individual differences in affectively tagging images
and relying on the affect pool’s information, the tasks as such differ. Different choice
situations or stimuli images reveal different degrees of information and might not provide
all attributes to map the images unequivocally: it might be the case, as Slovic and
colleagues summarize, that “tasks differ regarding the evaluability (relative affective
salience) of information” (Slovic et al., 2004, 314).
According to the proponents of affective heuristic, the guidance of affective reactions
provide a readily available and effective process to judge complex as well as uncertain
situations, even performing probability judgements: “Using an overall, readily available
affective impression can be easier and more efficient than weighting the pros and cons
of various reasons or retrieving relevant examples from memory, especially when the
required judgement or decision is complex or mental resources are limited” (Slovic et al.,
2004, 314). The above mentioned assumptions of a simplifying process – a mental short
cut – based on affective, readily available information states lead to the conclusion that
affect serves as a heuristic (Finucane et al., 2000a). The availability or representativeness
heuristic (compare e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1973; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)
serves in a comparable way as a mental short cut using imaginability, memorability, and
similarity as cues for probabilistic decision making. Slovic and colleagues even argue
that the availability heuristic might be based on affect as well as on imaginability (Slovic
et al., 2004, 317). They argue that memory images are tagged with affect and, hence,
either positively or negatively associated with easily remembered information, resulting
in more or less weight for risk judgement. Affect might therefore explain in part a
bias observed by Tversky and Kahneman (1973) in people’s probability and frequency
judgement. As will be explained later in more detail Slovic et al. (2000b; 2007) find that
a proportional representation of information expressed in probabilities or percentages is
attributed with greater weight in judgement situations.
How can the affect heuristic and the experiential mode of judgement contribute to gain
a better understanding of people’s varying dimensions of individual risk judgements?
The discussion of empirical results, mostly derived in experimental laboratory designs,
might shield more light on the affective component on decision making. It might also
explain why gaps between experts and laypeople are likely to observe. As mentioned
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discussing the psychometric paradigm (compare Section 4.2.2), research by the “Oregon
Group”35 showed that the acceptance of a risk is strongly correlated with the perceived
dread of a hazard (Slovic, 1987; Fischhoff et al., 1978). It can be assumed that affective
stimuli images are guiding the evaluation processes of a risk. Affect might even be, as
Zajonc (1980) proposed, the dominant force in judging risks and benefits.
In a study by Alhakami and Slovic (1994), an inverse relationship between risk percep-
tion and a risk’s benefit of an activity was observed. The inverse relationship means that
lower risks perception correlates with higher perceived benefits of an activity. People
were asked to rank an activity on a bipolar scale, such as good or bad, to map imposed
negative or positive emotions on that activity. The strength of the emotional mapping
was correlated to the inverse relationship of perceived risk and perceived benefits. The
authors hypothesize about the interplay – or the ‘dance’ – of feelings, risks, and benefits
that favorable feelings towards an activity are reducing perceived risks and are increasing
perceived benefits. Vice versa, unfavorable feelings might result in judging an activity as
riskier and less beneficial. The authors conclude that people’s judgement of the activity
does not only depend on how people analytically think of an activity and its outcomes
but to a great degree also on how people affectively perceive the activity and its potential
outcomes.
Further research by Finucane and colleagues (2000a) tests the affect heuristic and its
assumption that affect acts as a confounding factor in risk and benefit judgements. Ma-
nipulating the stimuli image, by providing additional positive or negative information
of the risk or benefits of an activity should result in a corresponding inverse judge-
ment of the associated factors, the authors hypothesize. For example, if additional
negative information of an activity’s risks is provided, the perceived benefits of that
specific activity should decrease. Accordingly, if an activity is described as beneficial
the additional information should result in a lower risk perception. See Figure 8 for an
exemplified illustration of the above hypothesized relationships. In their study Finucane
et al. tested people’s risk and benefit judgements of nuclear power. By providing addi-
tional information of the technology’s benefits people judged the perceived risks lower;
and providing additional information about nuclear technology’s risks resulted in a de-
crease of perceived benefits. In an additional study under the experimental condition
of time pressure, this inverse relationship, influenced by the information provided, in-
creased greatly. The authors conclude, that affect is influencing to a varying degree the
judgement of perceived risks and benefits and becomes more obvious when the time to
think and to use the analytical system is reduced. Hence, risk judgements are not only
a process of deliberative thinking but also process of affectively perceived experience
(Slovic et al., 2004, 315).
For my research on nuclear risk perception the theoretical approach as well as the
empirical results on the affect heuristic seem to emphasize the importance of emotional
35 Renn and Rohrmann (2000, 17) call Slovic and colleagues’ research group on risk perception, re-
spectfully the “Oregon Group.”
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ship is generated in people’s minds is suggested by
the fact that risk and benefits generally tend to be
positively (if at all) correlated in the world. Activ-
ities that bring great benefits may be high or low in
risk but activities that are low in benefit are unli-
kely to be high in risk (if they were, they would
be proscribed).
A study by Alhakami and Slovic (1994) found
that the inverse relationship between perceived risk
and perceived benefit of an activity (e.g., using pes-
ticides) was linked to the strength of positive or
negative affect associated with that activity. This
result implies that people base their judgments of
an activity or a technology not only on what they
think about it but also on what they feel about it. If
they like an activity, they are moved to judge the
risks as low and the benefits as high; if they dislike
it, they tend to judge the opposite—high risk and
low benefit.
Alhakami and Slovic’s (1994) findings sug-
gested that use of the affect heuristic guides percep-
tions of risk and benefit as depicted in Fig. 2. If so,
providing information about risk should change
the perception of benefit and vice-versa (see
Fig. 3). For example, information stating that risk
was low for some technology should lead to more
positive overall affect that would, in turn, increase
perceived benefit. Indeed, Finucane et al. (2000)
Perceived
benefit
Perceived
risk
Affect
Fig. 2. A model of the affect heuristic explaining the risk/
benefit confounding observed by Alhakami and Slovic (1994).
Judgments of risk and benefit are assumed to be derived by
reference to an overall affective evaluation of the stimulus item.
Source: Finucane et al. (2000).
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Fig. 3. Model showing how information about benefit (A) or information about risk (B) could increase the overall affective evaluation
of nuclear power and lead to inferences about risk and benefit that coincide affectively with the information given. Similarly,
information could decrease the overall affective evaluation of nuclear power as in C and D. Source: Finucane et al. (2000).
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Figure 8: Illustration of affect heuristic (example risk perception of nuclear power).
reasoning. If the theoretical assumption of the analytical and the affective system cannot
be rejected, it might be the case, on one hand, that affective processes are directing or
even steering, at least to some varying degree controlling, the analytical or rational
processes in risk evaluation’s decision making procedures. The affective mapping of
images can be assumed, to different degrees, for experts as well as for laypeople. I
also conclude that a technology’s negative stimuli images are creating strong affective
reactions, for both laypeople and experts. Due to the inverse relationship of risk and
benefits, the affective laden negative images in the past, like the images of Hiroshima,
nuclear tests or the accident of Chernobyl, are reducing the perceived benefit and hence
are increasing the perceived risk of nuclear technology.36 I hypothesize that experts’
36 In the language of Bayesian updating, the a-priori estimate of a technology’s risk is not only based on
the amount of information and the analytical processing of the information, but also on the affective
mapping of stimuli images that are associated with a technology. Additional empirical evidence
of a new accident is updating the a-priori evaluation of nuclear technology. The sudden shock
of an accident is putting additional affective weight on the a-posteriori evaluation, decreasing the
ambiguity or uncertainty of the evaluation. Hence the density of a new estimator of a technology’s
risks has a credibility interval that is more narrow compared to the a-priori estimator’s credibility
interval. I hypothesize that the likelihood as well as the certainty estimation of a negative future
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affective images are more driven by numbers and statistics, as well as on past experience
as a technocratic risk manager. As a consequence their experiential system reacts in
the opposite way. From an technocratic perspective a negative image of nuclear war or
an accident is a motivation to improve the technology and perform even better in the
future. This could mean negative examples are decreasing the risk and are increasing
the benefits for an experts’ experiential as well as analytic system.
The second conclusion I draw from research on the affect heuristic is based on the
amplifying force of a sudden change. I assume that an sudden nuclear accident like the
accident in Fukushima can be interpreted as an incidence that created time pressure
on people’s risk evaluating strategies. If time pressure is blocking analytic deliberation
the emotional processes are interplaying in the risk-benefit evaluation. The negative
images of an accident might create a sudden increase in laypeople’s risk perception.
It might be the case that experts’ reaction under time pressure will have the opposite
effect. Defending their positive pool of images their dance of risk evaluation highlights
the benefits, protecting the individual’s believe system to concede victory to empirical
evidence.
Epstein’s (1994) and Loewenstein et al.’s (2001) as well as the affect heuristic theories
(e.g., Slovic et al., 2004) of dual processing of information also explain how people pro-
cess probabilistic information and how that process is related to affective mechanisms.
The experiential system, as characterized by Epstein and colleagues (1992, 329, Table
1) and shown above, perceives reality through experienced information stored through
images or narratives. The information is connected and laden with feelings. The ex-
periential system is trained for rapid processing and immediate grasping of information
and to translate information in broader, narrative categories, in its extreme case in the
bipolar narrative of good and bad. It changes slower and changes are based on perceived
evidence. The rational or analytical system functions by seeking for cause-and-effect cir-
cumstances that can be processed according to logical rules and evidence. The language
to describe reality is a coded language of abstract symbols for both words and numbers.
Analytic thinking, using a symbolic language, can create its own multi-dimensional re-
ality. Reality can change by definition: safe is what is defined as safe according to the
rule of the master-minds of safety.37 Symbols like numbers help to generate safety, hence
outcome, e.g., the likelihood of a new accident, will be increased by additional information of a
sudden accident. Resulting in an increase in risk perception. The change depends on the a-priori
deliberative and affective information processing as well as on the effect of affective reactions when
new information is provided to update the a-priori evaluation. Because of the affective mapping
of the new information, the change in risk perception might be permanent and hardly changed
by additional beneficial information of the technology. It might also be the case that because of
conscious or unconscious affective mapping of new information, the sudden shift in risk perception
might decrease again. However even when risk perception decreases to the basal level, the images
stored in the affective pool can be reactivated as in the case of a new accident and might result in an
even greater amplified reaction due to the combination of new and stored affect-laden information.
37 For example: the discussion of the question of the optimal balance of risks and benefits and the
acceptability of a risk started with Chauncey Starr’s approach to use economic data like fatality
or income statistics to generate a measure for the acceptable tradeoff of risk and benefits (Starr,
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what is safe also depends on the symbols that can be analytically associated with the
definition of safety. Realities that cannot be encoded in symbolic language cannot be
treated as relevant information – it cannot even be traced – this information does not
exist in this particular information processing mode.
Studies on the symbolic representation of numbers, as for example a study by Slovic
and colleagues (2000b), show that risks expressed as probabilities were perceived as less
dangerous, compared to the representation format of risks as relative frequency. It seems
that the enumerator containing the actual cases, like number of nuclear accidents or the
number of people dying after being infected by a disease
(number of accidents
X
)
, creates
affect-laden images, independent of the size of the population at risk, the number of
the denominator:
(
X
population at risk
)
. That image is stronger than an image evoked
by an abstract proportional number, like a probability, a relative frequency that had
been transformed and standardized according to rules of scientific logic. It seems to me
that the narrative rules to transform or describe information seem to influence the risk
evaluation process.
The language in which a risk is presented seems to have an decisive impact on how
people judge risks. A study by Hendrickx et al. (1989) examines the effect of different
representation formats of a technology’s safety. In an experimental study, information
was presented in a number format using relative frequencies or in a narrative format,
as an accident scenario. Both formats influence people’s risk judgement. It turned out
that narrative factors, like the cognitive availability of a scenario and quality aspects
like personal control, are more effective to create an affect-laden image of a risk. It
might be the case that the combination of affect-laden narrative representation of a risk,
for example through media coverage, and the tendency to rely on the mere number of
events in terms of relative frequencies instead of transforming the information into a
complex standardized number like a probability, that the combination of both informa-
tion processes lead to people’s tendency to overestimate a risks frequency, as observed
for example by Lichtenstein et al. (1978).38 I conclude that the observed risk judgement
is, at least to some degree, a combination of the availability heuristic and the affect
heuristic that lead to emotionally weighted available information.
Research on risk judgements and the effect of affect-laden images reveals that the
representation of information in probabilities, i.e. a proportion, weights more in a de-
cision making process than the corresponding outcome information in terms of losses,
expressed in units. Studies by Bateman and colleagues (2007) on the attractiveness
of gambling situations state that the attractiveness of a gamble was more sensitive to
1969). Fischoff and colleagues (1978) introduced an alternative approach using psychometric analysis
deriving to the conclusion that perceived risks are higher than the risks levels that had been defined
as acceptable by the approach Starr suggested. Consequently, they question the analytic process,
especially the information used to generate safety-measures, used by regulation agencies to justify
a technology’s safety for society.
38 For critical comments on the research design and the accuracy of the term bias see the comment of
Shanteau (1978).
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changes in the probability of winning than to changes of monetary losses. Affective
mapping might be an explanation of these dominance of proportions or probabilities.
Probabilities are easy to map and compare because they have a constructed ‘natural’
upper and lower bound. Losses expressed in unit outcomes like money or fatalities do
not have a reference scale. To map an image or information into an affective category
like good or bad or attractive and unattractive a diffuse scale with unlimited units like
the amount of a currency (e.g., 100 USD) or number of fatalities (e.g., 150 people) does
not reveal enough information to map an image precisely. Studies on life saving indicate
similar results (e.g., Fetherstonhaugh et al., 1997; Baron, 1997).
Given the assumption that symbolized numbers, like probabilities, weight more than
symbolized numbers of outcomes like units of fatalities, it might be the the case, as I
hypothesize, that both numbers should not get mixed together because of the difference
in meaning they bear. My ad-hoc hypothesis in case of nuclear risk perception is that
experts’ dominance of the analytical encoding of information is guiding an (prototype)
experts’ mind towards the small probability of an accident. In line with the theoretical
encoding of reality an expert is interpreting the small probability as impossibilities. The
actual numbers of an outcome are perceived as not relevant, because the probabilities are
encoding and therefore diminishing the already symbolic number of a natural number (a
nonnegative integer (N0) like 0 1 2 3) to an even different encoding system of complex
number like the rational numbers (Q). Rational numbers allow for numbers in the range
between 0 and 1.39 Through symbolic encoding the numbers are not affective laden
anymore. It might be the case, a second ad-hoc hypothesis, that the process of symbolic
encoding is an highly affective process. It means that the art of encoding according to
the rules of probability theory is an emotionally process related to positive outcomes and,
hence, mapped in the affect pool as positive. In this emotional process of encoding, the
quality of the initial information, the historical narratives and the assumptions behind
the encoding process are getting neglected in the procedure to derive the final number.
The analytical mode needs the reality as numbers, to communicate and to tell a
story based on numbers; whereas the experiential mode needs the reality translated in
feelings to be able to communicate and to tell a story based on feeling. Both processes,
I conclude, are more or less complex heuristics to understand life and make decisions in
a natural environment.
For laypeople’s judgment of risks it is important to notice that probabilities might
be perceived not gradually, but more or less categorically. Laypeople’s encoding can
be assumed to be a rough encoding, giving more weight to the affectively perceived
outcomes. Such categorical perception is based on the notion of possible versus not-
possible. The categorization process might be stronger in uncertain situation and when
highly emotionally mapped images such as images of a disaster are available. If the
consequences are perceived as very positive or extremely negative, the affective mode
reacts more sensitive to the possibility of an event rather that to the probability or
39 Even more complex encodings of reality is allowed in the classes of real numbers (R).
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likelihood of an event (Slovic et al., 2004, 318). In that sense very small probabilities,
like the probability of a nuclear accident are getting great weight, independent on the
symbolic coding of the derived likelihood of an accident and independent of additional
(positive) information of the hazard’s source. Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) demon-
strate in an gambling experiment that if a gamble’s potential outcome is perceived as
very emotional, an affect-rich outcome, the attractiveness of a gamble is getting quite
insensitive to probability changes. Which means, technically speaking, that the assumed
non-linear S-shaped weighting function is getting more extreme if a lottery is involving
affect-rich outcomes and less S-shaped, hence, more linear, if the outcome is affect-poor
(Rottenstreich and Hsee, 2001, 186, Figure 1).
Slovic and colleagues (2004, 319) point out that the experiential system, based on the
categorical encoding, does encode numbers in a non-linear way, that can be perceived as
a bias. The authors observe that the affective system regards small changes as impor-
tant as in the way that ego wants to save one life if ego sees alter suffering. The system
does not multiply the emotions to any degree becoming indifferent when the numbers of
people suffering are getting into thousands and millions, the system is not designed to
calculate feelings according to the rules of math. There is bias in “psychologic number-
ing” (Fetherstonhaugh et al., 1997) guiding the experiential system in decision making
processes. Slovic et al. (2004, 319) emphasize that the experiential system is able to
send misguiding information.40
Slovic et al. see their concept of the affect heuristic as a contribution to risk manage-
ment, especially towards the question how the complex interplay of affective and rational
reasoning can be used to lead to sustainable risk management. They ask: “Now that we
are beginning to understand the complex interplay between emotion, affect, and reason
that is wired into the human brain and essential to rational behavior, the challenge be-
fore us is to think creatively about what this means for managing risk. On the on hand,
how do we apply reason to temper the strong emotions engendered by some risk events?
On the other hand, how do we infuse needed “doses of feeling” into circumstances where
40 Aside: I am not so sure if ‘misguiding’ is the right term. If the world is linear there is a bias. In
a nonlinear world, there is no bias and hence no misguidance. It depends on the point of view
of the observer and the assumptions that defined the ‘mis-’ in the guidance part. I assume, that
what is called the ‘mis-’ can only be proved by history and future’s reality and not by present
interpretation of reality and its normative assumptions on human behavior. Therefore, I would
suggest not to speak of misguidance of the experiential system. I would suggest to use a neutral
term, such as ‘listening’ or ‘consulting’. I also would suggest to see the individual as the active
part in the communication process with both systems. Not systems are communicating with the
individual, but individuals are communicating with their systems – consciously or unconsciously.
People are listening with varying degrees of awareness to the languages of their experiential and
analytical system and the information the languages provide. People then decide (conscious or
unconscious) to use the information to decide to act. These processes are influenced by different
kinds and levels of ignorance as shown by Smithson (1989). In that sense there is no misguiding or
misleading strategy, but different ways to react to reality and encode the information into different
languages. It also means that there is no faulty judgement but only different judgements – my world
is an empirical and not a normative world.
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lack of experience may otherwise leave us too “coldly rational?” ” (Slovic et al., 2004,
319). As answers to their questions, the authors underscore the distinction between
decision utility and experience utility (compare e.g., Kahneman, 1994; Kahneman and
Snell, 1992). According to behavioral decision theories, time is the factor that proves
if the decision utility is constant and not changing with more experience. A decision’s
utility might differ greatly after a certain time. The ability to constantly monitor deci-
sion’s utility enables societies to learn from experience and to react to past decisions. In
this sense, decisions are not a gamble anymore and uncertainty not an object to control
but a factor to understand for it contains the information that we need to improve life
on earth. The meaning of affect in this process is an important factor because it is an
indicator for change. I assert that humans cannot control emotions with the techniques
of ignorance, whereas you can control theoretical assumptions, based on rules, through
the techniques of ignorance. In that sense Slovic and colleagues conclude “[...] the af-
fect heuristic enables us to be rational actors in many important situations. But not
in all situations. It works beautifully when our experience enables us to anticipate of
our decisions. It fails miserably when the consequences turn out to be much different
in character than we anticipated” (Slovic et al., 2004, 319). In this sense it is more
than reasonable, I boldly conclude, that the experiment of nuclear power, based on no
experience, was an affective decision: ‘it was the time to do it.’ The empirical evidence
is showing that the idea of nuclear power is too dangerous for future life on earth, which
may be proved with more experience. It is time to react and use the analytical, as well as
the affective mind, to find a solution to manage the risk of nuclear power in the future.
I want to summarize the part on the affect heuristic by pointing out the most important
aspects for my research on nuclear risk perception. I think a crucial aspect is the
assumption that there are many functional systems of human reasoning. From the
scientific perspective it is assumed that there are two systems: the experiential system
and the analytical or rational system. It is assumed that experiential knowledge is the
underlying knowledge system in any judgement processes, no matter to what degree the
analytical mode is activated. It is further assumed that there is an interplay, a dance,
of affective reasoning and analytical reasoning (Finucane et al., 2003). I derive the
first conclusion that any judgement of nuclear risk is primarily an affective judgement
based on experience. This judgement is influence by past information of the risk. The
information is associated to feelings, mostly negative or positive feelings that have been
tagged or mapped, or associated over time with the risk source. Information based on
proportions or numerically classified outcome figures differ in the ability to be mapped
due to different human strategies to process information. I derive the second conclusion
that it is possible that in the unexpected case of an accident for the interplay of affect and
reasoning to lead to an increase in the gap between laypeople and experts. On one hand,
laypeople will perceive the information as a negative stimuli and will judge the risk as
less beneficial and riskier, due to the inverse relationship of risk and benefit judgements
of a risk. Therefore, I assume that risk perception on nuclear energy for laypeople
should increase after an accident. On the other hand, where experts are concerned, I
assume that in the case of an accident, if the number of fatalities is low, an expert’s
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risk perception will not change, in fact it might even reduce it. The prototype expert,
completely relying on the analytical mode of reasoning, will judge a risk on an event’s
probability and an event’s consequences. Since an accident is likely to happen according
to the laws of probability at any moment with the same assumed probability only the
consequences will be evaluated. If the magnitude of an event is lower than expected,
e.g. if less people die, an prototype expert’s risk perception will not increase.41 Experts’
nuclear risk perception therefore, I conclude, will remain quite stable over time.
The theoretical implication of the affect heuristic furthermore sheds light on differ-
ent mechanisms for decoding and translating information about risks. Experts’ risk
judgements depend on the accepted social factors that are rationally considered to be
taken into consideration for an indicator of consequences, such as a cost/benefit utility
judgement by the risk experts’ community. Experts’ information of reality is encoded
in abstract symbols, like words and numbers, perceived through conscious appraisal.
In contrast I assume, that prototype laypeople base their judgements on a categorical
judgement, like good/bad or dangerous/not dangerous. The information about reality
is rather encoded in images and narratives, perceived through vibes and feelings.42
I want further take into consideration the aspect of biases in human reasoning, as
mentioned in research and used in scientific language. I claim it is a misleading term.
I think that the nature of reality leads to the illusion that there are biases in human
reasoning. The existence of a bias is, as far as I understand, an indicator for an observer’s
inner structure of ignorance, as introduced by Smithson (1989). I believe that ignorance
structures in society, designed to eliminate uncertainty, create biases. On the contrary,
ignorance structures that incorporate uncertainty do not create biases. The first one is
a closed system of human reasoning, the later one an open system of reasoning. Both
systems are necessary for societal functioning and the interplay of both systems bear the
forces for peaceful social change. Changes based on both, analytical and experiential
knowledge, are necessarily biased from either point of view. Bias in that sense is a
representation of uncertainty. Knowledge in that sense is a term for the whole spectrum
of information of conscious or unconscious, past and present, encoded reality. If there
are no socially created biases, but only uncertainty in human reasoning, the act of
listening becomes more important in order to create awareness, to understand and learn
of other abilities and techniques for encoding reality. I assume that the aspect of mutual
recognition of different and contradictory aspects of human reasoning will be a key
element to create socially accepted governance structures that are able to govern risks
in the future. I will discuss this point in more detail in Section 9 of risk governance.
41 It might even be the case, that the additional information will lead to an improvement in nuclear
safety standards imposed by regulation agencies. In that case it is possible that experts’ nuclear risk
perception will increase again, because benefits of technology (measured in terms of cost/benefit
calculation, not in fatalities this time) will decrease, making nuclear a less attractive technology.
42 These assumptions, I ask to consider the reader, are only ad-hoc reasoning based on my summary
of previous research. Research in this field is only beginning to get a better understanding of the
complex structure of human reasoning as Finucane and colleagues emphasis (Finucane et al., 2000a,
13).
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4.2.8. Social amplification of a risk’s sound
So far I have laid out a multifaceted concept of risk. Starting from a discussion on
the ontological and epistemological interpretation of risk, then broadening and opening
the scope to the more complex processes that shape individual’s risk awareness, judge-
ment, and evaluation. So far two major points remain still unanswered. First, why
is there a gap between experts’ and laypeople’s judgements of risk. Secondly, why do
some risks, like nuclear power or risk events, like a nuclear accident, seem to induce
high levels of public concern with social and economic consequences while other risks
do not seem to have the power to actually bring forth change in the social reality. The
work done by Slovic (1987) (compare Section 4.2.3) explains in part the complex nature
of risk perception, for example the influence of a risk’s perceived catastrophic poten-
tial. He furthermore mentioned a hazardous event’s potential effects that ripple across
social boundaries, the drop of water in a teacup. The social amplification of risk frame-
work (SARF) (compare e.g., Kasperson et al., 1988, 2003; Pidgeon et al., 2003), as I
will explain in this chapter, has the aim to be a comprehensive concept of how risk is
experienced in society (Renn et al., 1992, 138). Risk perception in this framework is
understood as a broad concept of how uncertainty is processed in society and how the
potential or actual consequences of an event or activity, are evaluated and perceived.
Risk from that perspective is created by observing and communicating actual or hy-
pothesized risk events like accidents or incidents (compare Luhmann, 1990). Risk is
related to social knowledge and social decisions or reactions to existing danger. Danger
in that sense is the possibility of future damage related to external events (Luhmann,
1990, 225). According to the underlying theoretical concept, risk events, if not detected
and communicated, are more or less irrelevant for the existing social order (Kasperson
et al., 2003, 15).
According to the framework, as consequences of communication processes, transfor-
mation processes are implemented and the results are changes in technologies, in social
practices, such as land cultivation, in ideological structures and cultural identity pat-
terns. The awareness of risk is not only the experience of a physical harm and the direct
reactions to that harm, but a consequence of a process of interpretation of a hazard,
involving different social actors and decision making processes. Risk in that sense is to
some extend an objective property of an event and to some extend a social construct
(Short, 1989). A concept neither squeezed into the narrow scope of technical deter-
minism and neither dismissed into the arbitrary spheres of total relativism. The need
for a broader framework to explain the complex structure of risk perception and social
responses to hazardous events is obvious.
The social amplification of risk framework is an attempt to integrate different ap-
proaches in risk perception, as well as risk communication research able to combine
existing studies from the psychometric studies of risk perception, cultural studies, me-
dia research, and from studies of organizational responses to risk (Kasperson et al.,
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2003, 13).43 The motivation to design a new theoretical concept arose, as emphasized
by the authors of the initial SARF-paper in 1988 (Kasperson et al., 1988, 178), from
the need to explain why more or less minor risk events, from an experts’ point of view
based on technical risk assessment, can result in unexpected massive public reactions
with socio-economic and political impacts. The puzzling reality on risk is that on the
one hand there are the hazardous events like chemical, nuclear accidents, aviation ac-
cidents, terror attacks, or diseases that are able to create increases in public focus and
concern, termed in the SARF terminology as risk amplification, while at the same time
risks such as radon gas, smoking, or automobile accidents receive only a limited fraction
on public attention from society, resulting in, what is termed in the SARF terminology,
risk attenuation.
Known factors that shape individual’s risk perceptions are familiarity with a hazard,
voluntariness and the catastrophic dread potential of an adverse event (compare Slovic
1987). Also heuristics have been broad forward to explain how people intuitively process
risk information (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973; Slovic et al., 2007). The shortcoming of
these mostly psychological studies are that they ignore the complex nature of information
processing and exclude different social and cultural context factors that might influence
individual risk evaluation. I also mentioned sociological approaches that focus rather on
the organizational capability of risk management and the underlying power structures,
due to competing demands of various social groups that shape risk decision making
processes (Perrow, 2006, 1999). This social amplification of risk framework incorporates
given approaches and tries to explain how a risk event is perceived by individuals and
might lead to unexpected higher-order social impacts, not related to the initial event.
The amplifying process (compare Renn et al., 1992) starts with a risk event. The
event can be a sudden physical event, like a nuclear accident, or it could be an increased
awareness of hazardous events, like the problem of nuclear waste storage, or in the non-
nuclear scenario the discovery of e.g., the ozone hole. Individuals and social groups, in
a next step, detect different characteristics of the event and decode or interpret them
according to their given mental modes or societal perceptions. The perceived information
is then transformed into messages and communicated between individuals or groups. In
this sense, individuals and groups, act as amplification stations through communication
processes and behavior (Renn et al., 1992, 140). Risk then is more than the experience
of the physical harm or the perceived direct magnitude of consequences, as posed in
traditional risk assessment, it can only be properly assessed when social interaction
processes are considered that also shape the interpretation of the event or the existing
risk information. It is possible that some events lead or – to keep the terminology of the
teacup – ripple through society leading to secondary or tertiary consequences, affecting
43 As Renn and colleagues (1992, 138) point out, the assumption of traditional risk analysis of risk
as a concept of probability and magnitude of consequences, even thought formally correct, does
not match the perceived reality in society leading to misunderstanding and sophisticated ignorance
statements (Freudenburg, 1988). Referring to Douglas and Wildavsky (1983), the authors rather
enhance social values and attitudes as well as cultural identity as influencing factor of how people
perceive and react to risks.
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unrelated technologies, markets or social institutions at distant places. Such higher
order impacts are impacts for instance on markets through changed consumer behavior,
stricter regulation, litigation, stigmatization of products, communities or facilities, or a
loss of credibility and trust. Kasperson at al. (2003, 16) point out that the spread of an
initial risk event transforming into a societal risk experience of higher order impact is an
important part of the risk amplification framework, because the spread of impact might
enforce, in the case of risk amplification, or might put constraints to, in the case of risk
attenuation, political interventions of risk reduction: “The social structures and processes
of risk experience, the resulting repercussions on individual and group perceptions, and
the effects of these responses on community, society, and economy compose a general
phenomenon that we term the social amplification of risk ” (Kasperson et al., 1988, 179).
To illustrate the higher order effects that are conceptualized in the framework I want
to show, the hypothesized effects (Kasperson et al., 1988, 182). According to the au-
thors secondary or any higher order impacts as a consequence of a risk amplification or
attenuation process through behavioral responses are effects such as:
• effects on affection, perception or images of a risk, like attitudes against technology,
social apathy or stigmatization of a technology, environment or risk managers;
• effects on the physical environment of a risk, like impact on local sales, property
values or economic activities;
• effects on political practices or social order, like a change in the political climate
or culture and additional social demand and pressure on political institutions;
• effects on the physical nature of the risk itself, like additional social practices (feed
back mechanisms) controlling the risk;
• effects on the direct reaction of a risk, like social disorder and protests, better
regulation, change in training, increased liability, change in trust and acceptance
of other technologies or social institutions that govern society.
Higher order impacts of risks as presented above are able to change the social structure
unexpectedly and in various ways. A critique by Rip (1988) on the framework also
mentions that the framework is designed rather to explain the intensification of a risk,
based on fatal events, like the Three Mile Island accident and social reactions to that
event, than the constant and distant changes of the social risk structure, unnoticed
by the public or most social organizations. This critic also points out that the nature
of the signal is the key element in the starting process of risk signal amplification or
attenuation. It is thus important to understand how risk signals are socially interacted
(Rip, 1988, 194).
In the social amplification and risk framework, the interaction, i.e. the amplification
or attenuation of risks and its risk signals, happens through processes that transform and
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filter the receiving signals according to the given social rules and procedures. Informa-
tion passes through social or individual amplification stations, increasing of decreasing
the volume of the initial risk event. The communication process emphasizes certain as-
pects and can alter the symbols and images associated with the signals. Amplification
stations are individuals, members of social groups, or members of institutions such as
the mass media, scientific institutions, non governmental organizations, political insti-
tutions, or governmental agencies. The communication culture and the worldviews of
each amplification station can influence the amplification process of risk events (Peters
and Slovic, 1996; Vaughan, 1995).
According to the authors of the framework (see Kasperson et al., 1988, 2003; Renn
et al., 1992), the framework is not a fully developed theory, rather a conceptual frame-
work providing a guideline to describe and test risk problems. The term of amplification
is taken from communication theory to underline the idea of the attenuation and in-
tensification of signals during its transmitting process. Information is transmitted from
an information source through various intermediate transmitter before received by an
receiver. “An information source sends out a cluster of signals (which form a message)
to a transmitter, or directly to the receiver. The signals are decoded by the transmitter
or receiver so that the message can be understood. Each transmitter alters the original
message by intensifying or attenuating some incoming signals, adding or deleting others,
and sending a new cluster of signals on to the next transmitter or the final receiver where
the next stage of decoding occurs” (Kasperson et al., 1988, 180) the authors explain.
The metaphor of amplification has been criticized by Rayner (1988, 202) for of not
representing the complexity of the risk evaluation process. Rayner points out that the
idea of a passive signal, created by a risk, perceived, transmitted, and received does not
reflect the initial problem. If risks and its information are already part of a social process,
the most interesting question is how the signals are selected, transmitted, and perceived
in different ways. The technical metaphor of an amplification station might be, from
some viewpoints, a jammed transmitter for the concept. My response to this critique
is that the technical term of an amplification process, based on the idea of signals, is
very useful to emphasize the active act of processing information. If a signal is the
basic unite of a message, the key question for any risk assessment process is how signals
are evaluated and judged. Socially learned techniques which create an awareness of
signals are then a main point of interest, in my opinion. A better understanding of these
techniques will also help to combine different viewpoints or at least create an awareness
that there are many ways to react and interpret signals. The term signal enables the risk
entrepreneur to observe the context that creates distinctions of higher-order observations
(Luhmann, 1990, 224). In their reply to critique Kasperson and colleagues (2003, 37)
similarly argue that the conceptualization of the amplification process, the process of
transmitting information through social or individual stations, does include the meaning
or is based on the idea that any knowledge of a risk is to some degree socially constructed.
Indeed, it is the context not only the content of decision making that is of interest for
the researcher. Kasperson et al. (1988, 180) point towards the complexity of transmitting
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information in a social context. From their point of view, signals and their messages have
only a meaning within an existing sociocultural context. Without guiding mechanisms,
a receiver is not able to encode the meaning of a message. Sources and signals in that
sense are not independent entities. A receiver perceives and links the signal to the
source, or previous transmitters, and forms an opinion about the relationship. Each
message can contain different meanings, with factual, inferential, value-related, and
symbolic meaning (Kasperson et al., 1988, 180). A factual message delivers the facts
about the source of a risk, such as ‘a nuclear power plant in Japan’ and the content of the
risk, ‘emission of dangerous substances’. An inferential message provides information
about possible consequences that can be drawn from the given situation, for instance
‘the emissions exceeded a certain level and are a health threat’. Cultural symbols are
attached to a risk source and transmitted by both factual or inferential messages due
to value implications associated with some social institutions. In the case of nuclear
industry there can be symbolic connection, such as to protests at nuclear test sides or
to a clean and cheap source of energy.
According to the concept of the social amplification of risk framework, signals are
processes by individual and social amplification station through communication devices
like media, written conversation, or direct conversations. Social amplification stations
are according to Kasperson et al. (Kasperson et al., 1988, 181) institutions and people,
such as:
• scientists or scientific institutions who provide and create knowledge, like the tech-
nical assessment, of a risk;
• public agencies;
• risk management institutions;
• non-governmental social activist organizations;
• personal networks and peer groups;
• opinion leader within social networks, social groups or social organizations.
Social amplification stations engage in the risk communication process in many ways:
by using heuristics to process information, by attaching personal or institutional values
to the information, by interpreting the perceived message within the personal network
to validate the information. The validation or the feeling lead to behavioral intensions
to either take actions or to tolerate the given risk situation, to finally take actions to
tolerate, accept, ignore or to change the risk (Kasperson et al., 1988, 181).
It is furthermore assumed (see Kasperson et al., 1988) that individual or social am-
plification stations are able to change the intensity of a signal. The amplification of a
signal is able to happen at any stage of the transmitting and receiving process, or even
twice when the message is received and recoded. A transmitter structures the message
106
4. Risk perception in social sciences
before sending the message to a receiver. When receiving the message, the receiver en-
codes the message and evaluates the signals. Any transmitter is also a source of new
information because the original message is firstly translated from the source into a
new message before send to the receiver. The encoding and translation of a message
follows institutional rules and different expected interests of the receiver or transmitter
according to their role requirements. Social groups or social stations of amplification act
according to their own rules beyond individual values or interpretation patterns; they
act in accordance with their interests, and encode or transmit information with their
own historically grown standards: the scientific community processes information with
a different standard compared to a media editor board of a news magazine or a press
agency of a political institution.44 In this sense, it becomes obvious that risks are a
social experience and any stage of processing information can be assumed to contribute
to the perceived consequences of a risk: “Social amplification of risk denotes the phe-
nomenon by which information processes, institutional structures, social-group behavior,
and individual responses shape the social experience of risk, thereby contributing to risk
consequences” (Kasperson et al., 1988, 181).
In my concept of a social risk entrepreneur the individual still is the focal point of
interest.45 Each individual, as single unit or part of a broader social group, firstly reacts
with an individual decision to a risk signal. In this sense, a risk entrepreneur is at first
a receiver of information. The individual also is a holder of given (a-priori) information.
Four aspects shape risk information processing and signaling: 1) the intensity of the new
information, 2) the given (a-priori) information, 3) the decoding and evaluation process
of the new information, and 4) the process of combining or integrating both (a-posteriori)
information. All four aspects are able to constantly change risk signals through social
transmitting by either increasing or decreasing a signal’s volume. The above described
decoding depends on the compatibility or inconsistency with previous beliefs, stimuli
or values and results either in ignorance, with the consequence of attenuation, or in
attraction, resulting in intensification of the signal: “The decoding and evaluation process
determines the receiver’s selection of significant information. The components of the
decoded message that are inconsistent with previous beliefs, or that contradict values to
which the receiver feels attracted, are ignored or attenuated. If the message is attractive
or consistent with previous beliefs, the signals are intensified” (Renn et al., 1992, 141).
Renn et al. also provide a detailed scheme of eight steps of how individuals process
signals and draw inferences by encoding and translating information of risks (Renn et al.,
1992, 142: Table 1 “Steps in individual perception of information”; own formatting):
44 Tetlock’s (2002) idea of different sets of functions and encoding strategies of risks, compare Sec-
tion 4.2.6, can be applied to to the SARF concept.
45 A focal point in the sense of the definition by the New Oxford American Dictionary: “the point at
which rays or waves meet after reflection or refraction, or the point from which diverging rays or
waves appear to proceed.” (NOAD, 2005)
107
4. Risk perception in social sciences
1. “Passing through attention filters: Selecting and further processing signals from the
environment, other individuals, and the media”.
2. “Decoding of signals: Deciphering the meaning of the signals (investigating factual con-
tent, sources of information, explicit or implicit inferences, value statements, overt and
hidden intentions of information sources and transmitters, and cues to assign credibility of
information and information source)”.
3. “Drawing inferences: Arriving at conclusions about the allegedly revealed intentions of
the source and the transmitter, employing intuitive heuristics (common sense reasoning) for
generalizing the information received, and using symbolic cues for judging the seriousness
of the information”
4. “Comparing the decoded messages with other messages: Analyzing the meaning of
the message in the light of related messages from other sources or previous experience”
5. “Evaluating messages: Rating the importance, persuasiveness, and potential for personal
involvement on the basis of the perceived accuracy of the message, the potential effect on
one’s personal life, the perceived consistency with existing beliefs (to avoid cognitive disso-
nance), reference group judgement (to avoid social alienation), and personal value commit-
ments”.
6. “Forming specific beliefs: Generating or changing beliefs about the subject of the message
or to reassert previously held beliefs”.
7. “Rationalizing belief system: Sorting and reinterpreting beliefs in order to minimize
cognitive dissonance”.
8. “Forming a propensity to take corresponding actions: Generating intentions for
future actions that are in accordance with the belief system”.
(Source: Renn et al., 1992, 142)
The information processing draws the attention to an important aspect: risk is more
than a rational or technical term; risk is more than a feeling or experience; risk is more
than the existence of a risk source; risk is also a social information you can listen to;
risk is a sound! Risk is the sound of uncertainty or in the strict sense the sound of
ignorance. Whereas in the previous concepts risk was perceived as a constant entity, in
the social amplification of risk framework risk is a non constant entity; each signal carries
the capacity to change in volume at any time. The non constant nature of risk holds
for both the objectivist perception of a physical risk and the constructivist perception
of socially created risks. If risk has access to uncertainty the interplay of physical
processes, analytical and experiential reasoning as well as communicative interaction is
able to constantly change the existing information, due to the information contained in
uncertainty. If the described interplay exceeds socially accepted boundaries risk becomes
visible and might change its volume, making the new information perceivable – a new
sound emerges – and changes the ignorance structure in society. I might go too far, but
risk in this sense is an own organism, or an indicator of a more integrated social system.
A risk entrepreneur who is constantly sensing the existing uncertainty structure might
be able to listen to the change in the ignorance structure. She or he is not only able to
understand and speak the different mental modes and the encoding schemes of informa-
tion, as described for example by Epstein and colleagues (1992), he or she is also actively
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listening to the signals. The entrepreneur is part of the risk structure and also outside of
the existing communication processes, because an entrepreneur is a social amplification
station and in this role constantly changing the ignorance structure and the existing risk
signals. In this sense, it is impossible to be the independent higher-order observer of the
world in the sense of Luhmann (1990), since signals are transmitted through the whole
risk organism and it might be beyond human ability to exclude oneself from this process.
The art of change for a risk entrepreneur could then to be an amplification station that
receives, encodes, and translates all available signals in order to form a message and to
send the signals that best represents the existing information of the present ignorance
system. The hypothesized abilities of listening to the sound of risk go beyond – as far
as I know – scientifically accepted evidence and empirical testing. The sound of risk
might also only be a metaphor that helps to describe the integrating power of risk for
individual, social, and other forms of life on earth. Listening to the sound of risk enables
humans to listen to each other, not by silencing voices but by enabling voices to speak
and to be integrated in the existing dialogues. Risk in my opinion, therefore, is not only
changed by technical solutions, but by communicative processes. Balancing the sound
of risk is an art to be discussed at the end of my dissertation.
In line with the above described scenario of spaces of ignorance, the authors of the
social amplification of risk framework are interested how risk or the perception of risk
is processed in the information system: “The interaction between risk events and social
processes makes clear that, as used in this framework, risk has meaning only to the
extent that it treats how people think about the world and its relationships. Thus
there is no such thing as “true” (absolute) and “distorted” (socially determined) risk.
Rather the information system and characteristics of public response that compose social
amplification are essential elements in determining the nature and magnitude of risk”
(Kasperson et al., 1988, 181). Empirical research using the approach has tried to test
influencing factors and the causal structure of the interaction process.
On the individual level a study by Trumbo (1996) evaluated the relationship of the
dread/knowledge dimensions, proposed by the psychometric work of Slovic and col-
leagues (e.g., Slovic et al., 1981) and the classification of individuals as risk amplifiers
or attenuators. He found that amplifying a risk correlates with the perceived individual
risk whereas attenuating a risk correlates with the satisfaction of institutional responses.
Empirical findings of a 128-hazard-event study (Renn et al., 1992; Kasperson et al.,
1992) reveal two major aspects for risk perception research. First, it seems that social
responses to hazards are based on rationality and rational reasoning, in contrast to the
widespread opinion that people’s judgements are biased. Second, when comparing the
magnitude of casualties and the extend of exposure to a risk, it turned out that exposure
to a risk is more likely to shape individual risk perception. It seems that exposure to a
risk is a more influential factor than previously recognized since it also correlates high
with higher-order impacts like media coverage and public responses. Pointing out to
the interplay of magnitude ‘of’ a risk and exposure ‘to’ a risk the authors conclude that
“these findings are particularly interesting because expert judgements on risks usually
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rely on estimates of expected fatalities rather than on exposure. These results show that
individuals took exposure as their reference point, whereas the media and some societal
groups seemed to take into account both of these characteristics of hazard (though they
also placed more emphasis on exposure). However, the fairly high correlations between
the number of casualties and the magnitude of social impacts suggest that human harm
is also a major driver of societal impacts” (Renn et al., 1992, 151).
The media reflects both magnitude of and exposure to risks. This means that expo-
sure as the main driver of risk perception is able to be transmitted through society by
media and amplified by social interaction in personal networks. The observed process of
amplified risk signals through individual and social processes is able to produce higher
order social consequences, as assumed by the framework (Renn et al., 1992, 154). The
observed gap between risk experts and laypeople in the seriousness of a risk might also,
at least to some part, be explained by the observed different weighting of magnitude
and exposure. A toxic cloud, the authors offer as example (Renn et al., 1992, 154-156),
traveling above a large area, with no casualties might be perceived as more dangerous
compared to a toxic cloud in a building that leads to several people injured or killed.
The causal analysis of the interplay of different factors also reveals that magnitude of
physical consequences of an event is influencing societal impacts only indirectly (Renn
et al., 1992, 156). The results of the 128-hazard-study reveal an potentially underly-
ing structure of higher-order impacts. The results, as the authors critically remark,
cannot prove the causal mechanisms completely because higher-order impacts such as
magnitude of and exposure to a risk have been estimated indirectly through experts’
judgements. These indicators were reliable measures, but their validity could not be
tested.
Further research, analyzing the role of mass media (by analyzing newspapers) con-
cludes that the amount of coverage of a risk event is not resulting in a massive amplifica-
tion of risk perception (Freudenburg et al., 1996, 40). The role of media is important in
shaping overall awareness of a risk, and also creating the space to discuss risks (Vaughan
and Seifert, 1992). Media’s role as a social amplification station is also limited because
of a tight interrelation of media and other contextual factors, historical facts, and so-
cial group interests. I conclude, after discussing the above mentioned literature, that in
the same line as the public is not the chaotic and irrational receiver and sender of risk
information, research also indicated that the volume of media coverage is not the main
loudspeaker of social amplification processes.
Research on organizational management of risk and processing of risk information
also reveals that the volume of signals can be amplified and attenuated due to many
factors that are influenced by the structure and the communication culture of an or-
ganization (Freudenburg, 1992, 1993; Short, 1992; Perrow, 1999; Turner and Pidgeon,
1997; Turner, 1978). A bureaucratic attenuation of information flow or the self-interest
of divisions, economic constraints or interests, management’s vanity and messy rule of
thumb decisions, as well as complex historically grown animosities within organization
are influencing inter- and intra-organizational relationship. These processes can result in
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an underestimation of risks, and in an ignorance and accumulation of risk signals until,
eventually, a risk event occurs. The unprepared organizational reaction to an event is
then a signal that is perceived by the affected or not-affected population and shapes
individual’s risk perception and trust in higher-order institutions. If the risk manage-
ment of a hazard is brought into question because of public’s concern about the safety
or controllability of a risk, stigmatization can happen. As the word stigma implies, an
individual or place is marked as disgraced because it lost its reputation and respect and
is considered as a risk for society.
Stigmatized risks are likely to have higher-order impacts and to ripple across original
boundaries. Studies of stigmatized technologies, like nuclear power (Flynn et al., 1998)
or nuclear waste facilities (Slovic et al., 1991), reveal that a nuclear technology, once
perceived as the promise of modernity and endless welfare, can be stigmatized irreversibly
into an object of dangerous threat and an example of distrust in management and
regulation agencies across social communities.
Stigmas emerge, as Gregory et al. (Gregory et al., 1995) conclude, if a known or
unknown social standard is violated by a social actor. For instance an oil spill, such
as in 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, is polluting (per-
ceived innocent) beaches and endangering the (as innocent tagged) wild life in the area.
Hazards, characterized as dangerous or involuntarily exposed, as well as impacts that
are perceived as inequitably distributed are more likely to be stigmatized in an case of
a risk event as risks with other characterizations. It is also the case, such as in the
case of nuclear waste repositories, that geographical areas are stigmatized because of
the higher risks the area entails. Stigmatization can also be perceived as an indicator
of inequitable distributed risks, Kasperson and colleagues point out (Kasperson et al.,
2003). The authors explain that what is marked as stigma is often related to uncer-
tainty, ignorance, and non-knowledge. Even though stigmatization happens in society,
the complex nature of stigma, i.e. the mechanisms to understand stigma and the direct
effects of stigmatization, can only be well understood by controlling the social, cultural,
and economic structure of a community or stigmatized technology (Gregory and Satter-
field, 2002). Stigma, can be concludes, is one amplification mechanism explaining how
people respond to information about a risk (Kasperson et al., 1988, 185-186).
Kasperson and colleagues (2003, 31) point out that social trust can be considered as
a social amplification mechanism for higher-order impacts. Trust, like trust in people,
technologies, or institutions seems to be an important factor that determines how people
perceive, transform, and respond to new information (Cvetkovich et al., 2002). Trust can
be considered in the framework as a higher-order impact, because of its asymmetric na-
ture (Slovic, 1993, 2000b). As will be explained in more detail below (see Section 5.2.3),
trust is created over time and based on many trust building processes. Throughout the
whole trust building process, social trust keeps its fragile nature, i.e. it can be easily
destroyed and it is difficult to recover trust after a trust destroying incident. According
to the asymmetry principle, negative events tend to be more visible and, hence, have
a higher impact to destroy trust than have positive events. In contrast to the rather
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fuzzy, ambiguous, or elusive nature of positive events (Kasperson et al., 2003, 31) neg-
ative events such as accidents, a lying and misleading management, or other forms of
apparent lack of responsibility, are well-defined and take a specific form, that can be
easily perceived, communicated, judged, and classified (analytically or emotionally) as
good or bad. Hence, in a risk evaluation process, a trust destroying event gets greater
weight compared to the number of invisible or ambiguously defined good (non-negative)
events (Cvetkovich et al., 2002).
Social scientists analyze trust as part of the political culture and as part of a soci-
ety’s social capital (Inglehart, 1988, 1990; Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1993, 1995). For
a community or social entity trust creates expectability through mutual confidence. If
trust is shared within the community in a more specific context trust, is transformed
into credibility of each social actor. Social trust can be defined as “a person’s expecta-
tion that other persons and institutions in a social relationship can be relied upon to
act in ways that are competent, predictable, and caring” (Kasperson et al., 1992, 169).
Credibility is aggregated trustworthiness and, in contrast to trust, can be defined as “the
generalized impression of an enduring and continuous experience of the trustworthiness
of an organization” as Renn draws the line between credibility and trust (Renn, 2008,
223). Trust is a social construct created over time trough a manifold system of mutual
recognition and assurance and social communicative and behavioral processes.
Ortwin Renn assigns seven components to characterize trust (Renn, 2008, 223: Table
7.1, (own formatting); see also Renn and Levine, 1991):
1. “Perceived competence: The degree of technical expertise in meeting an institutional
mandate”
2. “Objectivity: The lack of bias in information and performance as perceived by others”
3. “Fairness: Acknowledgement and adequate representation of all relevant viewpoints”
4. “Consistency: Predictability of arguments and behavior based on past experience and
previous communication efforts”
5. “Sincerity: Honesty and openness”
6. “Faith: Perception of goodwill in performance and communication”
7. “Empathy: Degree of understanding and solidarity with potential risk victims”
(Source: Renn, 2008, 223: Table 7.1.)
Trust itself is not always attributed to the risk source or the risk signals as such, but
rather to underlying basic values that evaluate the behavior and the risk communication
processes of risk administrators (Siegrist and Cvetkovich, 2000; Siegrist et al., 2000).
In order to avoiding higher-order ripple effects, the risk communication process gains
importance and weight in the risk management procedure. A successful strategy for
avoiding societal conflicts on a risk source can be to address and include all basic values of
the affected community into the risk assessment process (Edwards and von Winterfeldt,
1987; Arvai et al., 2001; Rayner and Cantor, 1987). In creating a higher-order trust
structure, the process of finding a solution that people in agreement with can be efficient
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both in terms of exchanged information and avoiding conflicts on the individual and on
any higher-order level.
The concept of the social amplification of risk shows that the basic evaluation of
risks and its risk signals depends on the existing social structure of risk perception, the
trust structure, and the culture of how the risks have been implemented into society.
The risk communication process, as the major factor in creating trust, acceptance, and
credibility towards a risk source and its management, is one of the key elements of
effective and sustainable risk governance. As described above, trust is based on successful
management of a risk source and effective risk communication (Kasperson et al., 2003,
45). Studies clearly indicate (compare e.g., Kasperson et al., 1992; Flynn et al., 1993;
Jenkins-Smith, 1991) that distrust affects risk perception positively (increase in risk
perception), changes public reactions to risk signals positively (increase of risk signal
volume) and changes acceptance of a risk negatively (decrease of acceptance). The lack
of trust also leads to higher political activism or, if that is not possible, to social apathy.
My summary of the social amplification of risk framework is framed so as to show the
complex interplay of psychological, social, political, and economic factors that constantly
shape and change a society’s risk arena. The framework is not a fully developed theory
and it is important to mention, that only empirical evidence will prove the applicability
of the framework. For my research on risk perception, it is a useful concept that helps to
explain empirically observable anomalies in risk perception research. The technical view
on risk is not enough to understand the nature of risk perception and the underlying
factors that influence risk communication processes. I hypothesize that ‘how’ not ‘what’
is the key question of risk management processes in the future: How are risks created?
How are risks perceived? How are risks communicated? How are risks affecting commu-
nities? How is the sound of risk? The questions for the ‘what’ remain important: What
is a risk? What is risk perception? What is effective risk communication?
The ‘how’ is describing an process with constantly changing states of the world: how it
is, is perceived, felt, experiences or analyzed. The ‘what’ represents for me the scientific
ideal of explaining what is and the ideal of moving closer towards the true knowledge
– maybe it is an impermanent state of knowledge that is constantly changed and in-
fluenced by imperfect knowledge. The framework helps to remind that even the best
explained ‘what’ is still an empirical question and will be proved by evidence and not by
assumptions – Popper’s (1959) black swan is looming everywhere. Maybe for the field
of risk research, future research questions are not the disturbing sounds of risk and how
to control them, but rather how to incorporate the sound of risk in a community’s exist-
ing trust structure. Jasanoff provides some thoughtful insights related to my thoughts
(Jasanoff, 1993, 2006). How does the old and endlessly wise sound of risk help humanity
to become part of a growing global community? Or more specifically for my research:
How does the sound of nuclear risk help to form a global risk governance community
able to create credibility and solution to deal with the (negative or non-negative) risk of
nuclear power for future generations?
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In that sense I will continue in my dissertation to evaluate empirical results on nuclear
risk perception research in a cross-cultural comparison. I will narrow my focus, leaving
the broad and wide concept of the social amplification of risk framework, bowing in
honor to the basic idea and the beauty of the efforts that came together to create such
inspiring work. It might not be the final Arc de Triomphe or the Trafalgar Square of risk
perception research. The framework nevertheless is a square of risk research bringing
together different scientific approaches. The authors of the framework conclude: “a
particular policy strength of the framework is its capacity to mesh emerging findings
from different avenues of risk research, to bring various insights and analytic leverage into
conjunction, and (particularly) to analyze connections, interrelations, and interactions
within particular social and cultural contexts” (Kasperson et al., 2003). On that square
there are different monologues and dialogues simultaneously happening (compare for an
overview Figure 2 on page 8). I will focus on the space that is defined by the scientific
dialogues on nuclear risk perception.
5. Contextual and individual factors shaping risk
perception
In this section I will present theoretical approaches to explain observable and theoret-
ically assumed differences in risk perception in the population, and provide existing
empirical evidence to test theoretical claims. For my empirical research on nuclear risk
perception, it is important to take a wide range of possible influential factors into con-
sideration, before selecting the factors I can test given the existing data. Investigating
the relationship of socio-demographic factors and risk perceptions helps to understand
the complex nature of how risk perception is embedded in the public and in diversified
social life (Vaughan and Nordenstam, 1991; Cvetkovich and Earle, 1985). To what de-
gree conceptual assumptions and hypothesized relationships can be generalized across
all groups of society, remains the perennial question in my research.
5.1. Introduction: what matters?
As mentioned and hypothesized upon in the concluding words upon the social amplifi-
cation of risk framework, the evaluation of risks depends upon, aside from psychologic
factors, individual factors and the existing social structure, cultural foundation, symbolic
communication practices, and the institutional trust structure that exist in society. It is
therefore not sufficient to consider risk judgements procedures as an independent mech-
anism that is solely based on technical, psychological, or intuitive evaluation patterns
by single individual entities. For instance, the psychologic research does not address the
question how historical or social and cultural influences shape individual opinions and
judgement patterns of evaluating uncertain outcomes and qualitative risk characteristics
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(Renn, 2008, 119). Anthropologist and sociologists have tried to define cultural factors
that shape, mediated through cultural values, encompassing worldviews, that as such
are influencing risk perception patterns.
According to the proponents of a cultural approach, social norms, values, and histor-
ically learned practices that are deeply rooted in society form social structures or social
entities that react in a specific way to risk or express a certain kind of habitual risk be-
havior within their group (Beck, 1992; Thompson, 1980; Thompson et al., 1990; Sjöberg,
2006). Thompson for instance hypothesizes that different social patterns forming risk
perception combine individual and context mechanisms of reasoning. Since there exist
multiple patterns in society, more than one perception is possible. Depending on the
observer’s viewpoint these patterns are cultural biases of individuals risk perception:
“Since risk is very much a moral question (and never more so than when it is being
asserted that it is not) and since, as the history of risk assessment clearly demonstrates,
widely divergent convictions as to what the risks ‘out there’ are can often coexist within
the same society, this hypothesis should also provide us with a theory capable of han-
dling these cultural biases both as to how risks are perceived and as to how they are
evaluated” (Thompson, 1980, 6).
Sjöberg’s approach is to address different view points on specific risks in society that
have a deeper meaning and deeper roots than the easily identified gap between laypeople
and experts. Pointing for instance to the “silent majority” (Sjöberg, 2006, 683), he
addresses a group of people who tend to neglect risks and even create stable social
mechanisms, like attitudes, to not accepting risks.
Given a social entity with different views on risk, the naive theoretical question that
arises is: how is society balancing different risk attitudes?; or more specifically: how
are different risk attitudes balances in a society with different cultural attitudes to-
wards risks and socially created control structures to punish or reward each position?
(Thompson, 1980, 4). The underlying assumption behind the question is that there are
empirically observable differences within a society that can be explained by theories that
address cultural, value or macro-context based explanations. These theories should also
provide a reliable and valid classification framework. A question that further arises is:
how are socio-demographic factors, such as gender, age, or social status able to explain
differences in individual risk perception? To answer these questions, in this section I first
discuss theories and frameworks that addresses the question of cultural factors; second, I
analyze the influence of sociodemographic variables on individual risk perception; finally,
I evaluate empirical research on cross-national differences in risk perception to develop
a more global perspective on risk perception, focussing on nuclear risk perception.
115
5. Contextual and individual factors shaping risk perception
5.2. Values, worldviews and institutional trust
5.2.1. Values
Values, as understood in social science, are constructed mental principles that provide
guidance for individuals to judge or evaluate objects or situation as good or bad, desirable
or unfavorable, as well as true or false to react in a specific behavior (Frankena, 2006,
638). What is valued as good or bad in a culture finds its expression through beliefs,
moral principles, and social norms. Societies have created mechanisms to reward and
sanction members who conform to or deviant from existing values. Hence, values do not
change rapidly or unexpectedly and influence a member’s individual identity, depending
on the degree how someone accepts the existing values.
Public risk evaluation is influenced by value based judgements on risk qualities, like
the equity in the distribution of risks, voluntary or involuntary exposure to a risk, or
the perceived control over uncertain outcomes (Slovic, 1993, 675). Risk, from a social
science point of view, expressed by Slovic (2000b, 392-393), is a deeply value-laden
concept. A concept that has been invented by humans to understand a dangerous and
uncertain world, and to cope with the consequences of that uncertainty. This subjective
interpretation of risks, does not see risks as ‘real’ or ‘objective’ or independent of humans
perception ‘out there.’ Dangers do exists, their interpretation is subjective and depends
to a varying degree on cultural values.46
Technical or ‘objective’ risk assessment can be assumed to be based on rational val-
ues emphasizing efficiency and expertise. These values are formed by scientists and
professionals in the risk assessment community. More democratic values emphasize sub-
jectivity, experience, and historical and cultural understanding as foundation for risk
evaluation processes. Fiorino (1989) states that the observed gap between experts and
laypeople in their risk evaluation is the widest when rational risk judgements confronts
laypeople’s democratic and social values47. Fiorino concludes that these differences ex-
ist because they are “expressions of democratic values, and that these values affect lay
reactions to risk problems” (Fiorino, 1989, 294). In this sense Ronald Inglehart (e.g.,
Inglehart, 1988, 1990, 1997) assumes a change in economically developed societies from
materialistic values towards post-materialistic values. He describes a shift in a society’s
value structure from values that emphasize the security and the economical survival of
a community towards the participatory opportunities and a community’s individual as
well as environmental health and wellbeing. From Inglehart’s point of view, differences in
46 Even technical risk assessment, like the probabilistic assessment of a nuclear accident, as Slovic
(2000b, 393) points out, is based on (aggregated) subjective judgements and assumptions about the
underlying theoretical models (e.g. the probabilistic theory) and conventions what information (e.g.
the concept of fatalities) to chose.
47 Social values Fiorino (1989) mentions are: social stability and cohesion, wisdom of past errors in the
community, social distribution of risks and benefits, acceptance of management, ability for political
participation, confidence and trust in agencies
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risk perception can emerge due to different levels of materialistic and post-materialistic
values among a community’s members.
For modern societies, it can be assumed that different values and value cluster exist
at the same time and that they find their expression in peoples assumptions and value
judgements about risks. People who emphasize economic values might see technological
development as a favorable mean to create and keep prosperity, while more environmental
oriented people tend to disregard technological development and perceive it as a threat
to one’s own or the earth’s health (Renn, 2008, 119).
Summarizing his insights on the state of value research, Renn (2008, 120: Table 4.6)
defines four value cluster: traditional values, work ethics, hedonistic values, and post-
materialistic values. Each cluster is defined by certain values (characteristics), that
provide a certain function to society:
1. “Traditional values (examples: patriotism, ethic identity, social status, family stability) have
the function of a group and cultural identity.”
2. “Work ethics (examples: diligence, punctuality, efficiency, discipline, deferred gratification)
have the function of functionality and efficiency.”
3. “Hedonistic values (examples: consumption, enjoyment, fun, immediate gratification) have
the function of incentive and motivation.”
4. “Post-materialistic values (examples: harmony, social responsibility, environmental quality,
decentralization, quality of life) have the function of moral legitimation and cultural com-
mitment.”
(Source: Renn, 2008, 120: Table 4.6 )
In his evaluation of value research Renn (2008, 120) finds no evidence for a shift to-
wards more post-materialistic values, event though they are expressed more prominent
when people are asked for value preferences. Empirical research indicates that hedonistic
and materialistic values tend to be ranked higher by individuals who rate technologi-
cal risks and risks from economic activities lower. People who express preferences for
environmental quality, social harmony, and democratic values tend to show higher risk
perceptions for technological risks and economic activities (Boholm, 1998; Rohrmann,
1994; Edwards and von Winterfeldt, 1987). Furthermore, research indicates evidence
that individuals open to technical change, career oriented in their work ethic, and lib-
eral in their political view worry technological risks less then people who dedicated
themselves to a more alternative and critical lifestyle (Renn, 2008, 121).
The statistical explanatory power of values in most empirical analysis is quite low and
lower compared to the explanatory power of psychometric factors (Zwick and Renn, 2002;
Sjöberg, 2000). It is therefore assumed that values influence individual risk perception
rather indirectly, providing the individual decisions making process with selection filters
and emotional or rational weighting mechanisms, especially in conflicting situations.
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5.2.2. Cultural prototypes
It seems that, from the cultural theorists’ point of view, risks are subjective interpreta-
tions of what a social context defines as risks. This implies that over time there should
be a clear distinction between different social contexts, with shared values, worldviews,
and social practices to exchange these views and, hence, different types or characters
of risk perception. Thompson states when outlining his idea of a Cultural Theory:
“The result of all this is that individuals in different social context will tend to home
in onto distinctive strategies that will enable them to act so as to steer some optimal
personal course through all these socially-imposed rewards and penalties” (Thompson,
1980, 5). He continues by reasoning that the mutual manipulation of individuals leads to
a clear separation of different risk cosmologies, cultural clusters or cultural prototypes.
In his approach to define a “anthropological theory of perception” (Thompson, 1980, 6),
Thompson emphasizes that societies have a mechanism to create value based cluster that
help people to distinct between different alternatives of perception in the way that the
external world will be perceived through that cultural lens. Risk, in this sense, is a moral
question. The integration of moral judgements into technical risk assessments or into
the psychometric research might close the puzzling gap between experts’ and laypeople’s
risk perception as Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky outline in their book ‘Risk and
Culture’: “[...] the key terms in the debate over technology are risk and acceptability.
In calculating the probability of danger from technology, one concentrates on the risk
that is physically “out there,” in man’s intervention in the natural world. In determin-
ing what is acceptable, one concentrates on the uncertainty that is “in here,” within a
person’s mind. Going from “out there” to “in here” requires a connection between the
dangers of technology and people’s perception of those risks. Neither the one approach
(that the perils of technology are objectively self-evident) nor the other (that all percep-
tions are subjective) can connect the two. Only a cultural approach can integrate moral
judgements about how to live with empirical judgements about what the world is like”
(Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983, 9-10). The authors state that people ignore most of the
dangers that are surrounding them, what leads to a bias of selected aspects.
Ignorance is identified as the distinctive factor why people worry about some risks
and chose a way of life that is adopting to that risks. Therefore, each form of social
life is resulting in a specific “risk portfolio” (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983, 8). These
portfolios also implicate that within certain groups with given values some states of
the world are feared and some are not feared: “common values lead to common fears”
(Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983, 8). As already stated by Jasanoff (2006), Douglas and
Wildavsky claim that the distinction between ‘perceived’ and ‘real’ risks does not exist
until the danger had happened and the actual social behavior can be evaluated. What
is defined a-priori as risk, i.e. before the danger happens, is based on social selection
mechanisms, emphasizing some and ignoring others: “The cultural bias is integrated
to social organization” (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983, 8). The “cultural selection of
danger” (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983, 15) hence is an intuitive mechanism of social
organization because individuals are not able to hold all possible views within themselves
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and are forced to choose and select between different biases. At the same time, by
choosing or adapting to their social institutions they also choose their risk portfolio and
their cultural bias. Each social form of organization has its own bias that enables them
to find solutions for different kinds of danger. According to the Cultural Theory there is
no such organization that can claim to be objective or unbiased; if so, only within their
given worldviews and the dangers they face.
The cultural subgroups or cultural prototypes define what they perceive as risk. Ac-
cording to Thompson (1980, 2) society differs in two dimensions and various subgroups
define themselves within this dimensions. The first dimension represents the density of
group cohesiveness or the degree of identification with a group (the group dimension).
In its extremes this dimension ranges from a society of ‘individualized’ entities (i.e. an
infinite number of groups) and a society of ‘collectivized’ entity (i.e. one group). The
second dimension represents hierarchy or to what extend the subject is accepting the
given structures of a social system. That dimension shows to what extend the individual
is involved into its organizational procedures, hierarchies and rules (the grid dimension).
The grid dimension ranges from an ‘egalitarian’ society to a ‘hierarchical’ society.
In literature four or sometimes five types of cultural prototypes are defined: en-
trepreneurs, egalitarians, bureaucrats and stratified individuals (Douglas andWildavsky,
1983; Rayner, 1990, 1992; Dake, 1992, 1991; Grendstad, 2000; Grendstad and Selle, 2000;
Thompson et al., 1990). Thompson (1980, 3) defines also a fifth prototype, the hermit.
In Figure 9 the different cultural prototypes are displayed and will be explained in more
detail (compare Renn, 2008, 121–122, 122: Figure 4.1).
1) The ‘entrepreneur’ is characterized by a low degree of hierarchy and a low degree
of group cohesion. The prototype’s perception of risk is focusing on both short and long
term risks with a tendency to favor short term risks. Risk are perceived as an opportunity
and a chance to complete tasks and to reach individual goals. Risks for personal rewards
are approves and risks for the benefit of all are less popular. Organizations or groups
representing the entrepreneurial prototype do not perceive equity issues as a problem
and want governmental regulation to refrain from regulation and to support competitive
markets. This pragmatic view is legitimized by the maxim: “If I don’t do it somebody
else will do it” (Thompson, 1980, 6).
2) The ‘egalitarian’ prototype is characterized by a low degree of hierarchy and a high
degree of group cohesion. The egalitarian prototype sometimes is also called the ‘sectist’
(Thompson, 1980, 3). Both long and short term risks are perceived, focusing on long term
risks to guarantee the survival of the group. Risks for personal gains are penalized within
that group whereas risk, taken by a member as a duty for the totality are symbolically
rewarded. The principle is to avoid risks unless they are a threat to the whole entity or
public good. Egalitarian groups developed a strong sense for solidarity and equity and
are less interested in competition and individual freedom. Concerned about the long-
term stability of the group, egalitarians developed mechanisms to abandon activities or
risk taken social behaviors even though they might be perceived as opportunity, following
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(Source: Renn, 2008, 122: Fig. 4.1)
Figure 9: Five types of cultural prototypes.
the collectivist’s or egalitarian’s survival strategy “small is beautiful” (Thompson, 1980,
6).
3) The ‘bureaucrat’ is characterized by a high degree of cohesion and a high degree
of hierarchy. Long and short term risks are perceived as controllable. Rules and proce-
dures, performed by capable management institutions will guarantee that risks can be
handled safely. Bureaucrats rely on strategies and perceive a risk problem as solved when
the best strategy is implemented through social organizations in society. Hence, risks
are acceptable as long as organizations and institutions developed routines to control
them. The collectivistic manipulation or control happens through ritualism. Bureau-
120
5. Contextual and individual factors shaping risk perception
cratic groups or social entities rewards members who take risks for the totality and
penalize risk taking behavior for personal gains. All risks can be controlled through
social group mechanisms: there is “a place for everything” (Thompson, 1980, 6).
4) The group of ‘stratified individuals’ or ‘atomized individuals’ is characterized by a
low degree of group cohesiveness and a high degree of hierarchy. People of that group
believe in hierarchy but do not identify themselves with the existing hierarchies. Life is
perceived as a lottery and the world a world of constant risks and changes. Since they
do not accept the hierarchy, stratified individuals trust only themselves, are willing to
take risks and also the rewards, since risks are a fact of life. They reject risks taken
by the group and, hence, imposed on them. This prototype’s inherent confusion and
perception of randomness hinders the individual to combine cause and consequences
of risk situations; at the same time, as an individual survivor strategy, it enables the
individual to belief, like a millenarianist, in a imminent better state of the world – a
world without any risks.
5) The ‘hermit’ or ‘autonomous individual’, as fifth category, is placed in the center
of the grid-group space. They are characterized low in hierarchy and low in group co-
hesiveness. Individuals of that group perceive short term risks and accept risks as an
opportunity, if they do not get to involved in any hierarchy or group dynamics. These
self-centered persons, are not going against someone or avoid to put pressure on some-
one if taking a risk – in contrast to the ‘entrepreneur’ they do not try to externalize the
consequences of the risks they choose to take. Hermits are able to believe in hierarchy
if they accept the hierarchy as a structure within a broader context of superior perfor-
mance and knowledge. The short-term optimistic attitude towards risks (i.e. perceiving
risks a-priori as an opportunity) on the one hand and their willingness to also accept
institutional solutions or regulations on the other, enables autonomous individuals to
mediate between different cultural groups in conflict situations.
Wildavsky and Dake (1990) and also Ripple (2002) developed measures to operational-
ize individual adherence to four cultural groups: hierarchical bureaucrats, egalitarians,
individualistic entrepreneurs, and fatalistic atomized individuals (see also Oltedal et al.,
2004, 22-24). Hierarchical group adherence was measured by asking questions about
patriotism, law and order (e.g., “One of the problems with people is that they challenge
authority too often” (Oltedal et al., 2004, 22)), ethical standards, and the lack of dis-
cipline among young people (e.g., “I think there should be more discipline in the youth
of today” (Oltedal et al., 2004, 22)). Individuals or entrepreneurial worldviews were
measured by questions upon support for continuous economic growth to improve quality
of life, private profits, incentive oriented systems for those who work more and take
more risks (e.g., “In a fair system people with more ability should earn more” (Oltedal
et al., 2004, 22)), and weak governmental control (e.g., “A free society can only exist
by giving companies the opportunity to prosper” (Oltedal et al., 2004, 22)). Egalitarian
worldviews were operationalized in empirical studies on Cultural Theory by measuring
attitudes towards social equality, trying to diminish distinctions in the system such as
wealth, gender, race, or authority (e.g., “I would support a tax change that made people
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with large incomes pay more”; “The world could be a more peaceful place if it’s wealth
were divided more equally among nations”; “Racial discrimination is a very serious prob-
lem in our society” (Oltedal et al., 2004, 23)). The atomized individual’s or fatalist’s
views were measured by asking questions on the unpredictability about life (e.g., “The
future is too uncertain for a person to make serious plans” (Oltedal et al., 2004, 23)),
distrust on social systems (e.g., “A person is better off if he or she doesn’t trust anyone”
(Oltedal et al., 2004, 23)), and the distrust of individual action (e.g., “Even if you work
hard you never know if that will help you do better”; “It seems to me that, whoever you
vote for, things go on pretty myth the same” (Oltedal et al., 2004, 23)).
Empirical studies by Dake (1991) and Wildavsky and Dake (1990), testing Cultural
Theory’s predictions, prove the expected relationships between worldviews and risk per-
ception. People expressing a more egalitarian biased worldview perceived technological
risks as high and ranked their benefits low. Risks that also rank high as dreadful and
unknown in the psychometric approach (e.g., Slovic, 1987) such as ‘the threat of a nu-
clear war’ or the ‘risks from nuclear energy’ correlated high with the egalitarian view.
People with a hierarchical or bureaucratic bias tended to rank risks higher that were
challenging the given order, like the ‘respect of authorities’. Entrepreneurs expressed
their cultural bias by expressing higher concerns about the stability of economy and the
freedom of choice, such as the ‘stability of the investment climate’ (Dake, 1992, 30).
Dake (1991, 78) also points out that in his study on 300 San Francisco Bay area cit-
izens, people with a hierarchical worldview related themselves towards a moderate and
caution personality style, with moderate expectations, associated with a conservative
political orientation. In contrast was egalitarianism related to a more confident and
forceful personality, expressive and assertive, and associated with a liberal political ori-
entation. I point out on the personality style, because these soft individual factors might
find their expression in broader frames like cultural worldviews and biases or political
orientation. If the question of ‘how’ people express their concerns is the key question
for risk dialogues (among all citizens (in a globalized world)), then this information can
be of more scientific or societal value compared to statistical evidence, expressed for
instance in explained variance (R2). If the question ‘what’ is highest related to risk
perception, then the statistical evidence measures like significance levels or proportion
of explained variance are the test criteria.
In his summary on Cultural Theory Renn (2008, 123) points out that empirical studies
do observe a relationship between risk perception and cultural worldviews (Langford
et al., 2000; Grendstad and Selle, 2000; Bouyer et al., 2001; Rippl, 2002). Many studies,
however, show non-significant relationships or only weak correlations (Marris et al.,
1998; Brenot et al., 1998; Sjöberg, 2001; Zwick and Renn, 2002). Sjöberg (1995; 2000)
repeatedly points to the low explanatory power of Cultural Theory in empirical studies.
As a reply to that critique, Susanne Ripple (2002, 162) remarks that the Cultural Theory
is a very basic theoretical concept that, by simplifying reality, uses only few basic factors,
such as values, to explain the phenomenon of risk perception. If variables that are
not embedded in the broader theory of cultural prototypes are used to explain risk
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perception, such as in the case of the psychometric model, and if both concepts are
compared based on this numbers, the argument of explanatory power as quality factor
of the theory is hardly to hold.
It is to question whether the Cultural Theory can be perceived as a theory or rather
should be treated as a hypothesis and not an empirically proved theory (Renn, 2008,
123). Renn for instance (Renn, 2008, 123) criticizes, in line with other (e.g., Johnson,
1987; Oltedal et al., 2004; Sjöberg, 1995) that the Cultural Theory is characterizing
social entities such as organizations and groups and not individuals. If groups cannot
clearly be separated in the four or five prototypes, actually the ‘atomized individuals’
as well as the ‘hermit’ are hardly to find organized as a group, reducing the measurable
prototypes to three, the problem of falsification arises. Any groups behavior that is
observed can be explained by a mix of prototypes. Renn (2008, 123) concludes that on
the individual level there is evidence that people tend to be more egalitarian or more
entrepreneurial.
In terms of risk communication it is important to adapt the communication style for
the people to listen, such as scientists, engineers, business people, environmental activist
to communicate the same information across various social entities without creating ir-
ritation. In that sense, Renn further concludes, the Cultural Theory is an important
concept, because values are taken into the concept of risk perception, broadening the
scope of possible explanatory factors. Emphasizing on values and worldviews also en-
ables the observer to imply expressed interests and utility expectations into the broader
framework of culturally explanatory factors.
Whether the Cultural Theory is an empirically provable theory or not is a philistine
scientific discussion in my opinion, and I hope Paul Feyerabend (1993; 1970) would
agree. Maybe the theory’s tautological character, is not a problem, but a merit of this
approach and takes the debate about incompatible perceptions of risks a step further.
Maybe even closer to a possible solution. If we imagine that societies are somehow
connected by cultural boundaries; and if these boundaries comprise what ever exist of
social ideas, communication and behavior; if individuals within societies are constantly
creating new balances of group cohesion and hierarchical order between cultural clusters
and within cultural clusters48, then whatever is happening within these cultural entities
is as such a tautology. In this very abstract notion of a changing social entity, the
dynamic is not linear, but a constant flow of action and reaction from the smallest
social entity (e.g., an individual signal) to the boundaries of the largest social entity
(e.g. the cultural boundaries of social groups). These signals are reflected back by the
largest social entity and are perceived again by the smallest social entity; returning the
perceived information back to the edges of the system, an so on. In this concept, the
ripple effects do not follow a linear dynamic, but ripple back to the core source of signal,
and return back to the boundaries of the pond.
48 This social entities are not closed systems as emphasized by Luhmann’s system theory (Luhmann,
1995; Rosa et al., 2014, 102-109).
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Maybe the image of a pond as used by the proponents of the ‘social amplification of
risk framework’ (Kasperson et al., 1988; Slovic, 1987) should be actually changed to the
idea of a tea cup. A pond, as an image of an as such infinite entity without boundaries
is simply too big to describe a society that is living in an world with defined boundaries.
If a drop of water drops in the center of a full tea cup, the ripples go from the center
to the cup’s edges, return to the cup’s center, pass the center and go back to the edges.
This concept of the constant rippling effect of water in a tea cup is tautological because
it depends of the degree of ignorance, whether a ripple is perceived or not. The degree of
a risk’s ignorance depends on the individual position in the tea cup – on the individual
and social awareness of social change.
A tautological concept allows to perceive the social reality as a reality of constant
changes, within given differently shaped social boundaries. The exchange of information
across different levels of social and hierarchical organizations might be a modal that
enables society to learn and adapt from the constant flow of ripples. If the social correc-
tion mode is working, i.e. if the mix of worldviews is balancing the new information, the
ripples, as perceived by individuals, should lose its intensity and are not a threat to the
social entity anymore. If the ripples are constantly moving from the core of human risk
perception (individuals) to the periphery of human risk perception (cultural groups),
without losing its intensity, if the social mechanisms of ignorance are not able to create
a balance, the society will develop new mechanisms to cope with the risk. Whatever
that solution is for the society, it is the best solution a society is able to create within
its own structural boundaries. It is a social process.
Douglas and Wildavsky (1983, 194-195) have tried to point to the cultural biases, the
cultural lenses that shape each risk judgement. They see their contribution to the debate
whether risks are an objective entity or subjectively perceived, by pointing to the fact,
that moral and political issues shape the debate about risks. They wisely state: “At any
one time there are questions which cannot be formulated, still less asked or answered.
But in each generation something can be asked that could not be asked before. Ours has
a special experience of other cultures and expertise in assessing cultural bias” (Douglas
and Wildavsky, 1983, 195). In terms of technological risks, like nuclear technology, the
cultural bias can be expected to be many fold and the debate whether the technology is a
source of help or of harm, will echo back and forth in the concert hall of risk perception.
If one sees the Cultural Theory as a theory which only explains group differences be-
side its terminology that helps to inspire further research, there will not be much power
to explain risk perception. Oltedal et al. (2004, 30) point out that individual differences
within groups or organizations, as well as similarities among cultures need to be recog-
nized. The authors point out the importance of taking social and cultural group history
into account. Historical heritage, influences the level of trust towards hierarchies and
authorities within a culture. Since the level of trust, the authors emphasize (citing em-
pirical research by Biel and Dahlstrand, 1995), is related to risk perception, individual’s
trust in institutions or authorities should be considered as explanatory factor to shape
individual’s risk perception.
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5.2.3. Trust in institutions
In modern societies, trust in social institutions has become an important element for so-
cial stability since the number of abstract technical systems has increased, along with the
levels of perceived complexity and uncertainty in societies (Giddens, 1990; Beck, 1992).
Today most risks are not perceived directly, rather indirectly through social media or
other networks. As a result in most cases, external information, provided by social in-
stitutions, has replaced individual’s direct experience of risks. Social learning processes,
therefore, rely on information provided by the information source. Consequently, gen-
eral trust in the information source is an important factor for an individual’s perceived
security. According to the complexity reduction thesis (Löfstedt, 2003, 419), the pub-
lic delegates risks to public authorities, agreeing at the same time to accept the risks
judgements carried out by the regulatory agency (Luhmann, 1980). The public on the
one hand is dependent on the credibility of the information source and public institu-
tions providing information, while relying on the other hand, on trust and confidence
the public expresses to risk agencies. Therefore, successful risk communication and in-
dividual risk perception depend on the level of perceived public trust (Löfstedt, 2003,
2005; Breakwell, 2007).
According to Löfstedt (2003, 420), trust in public authorities is characterized by
three elements: fairness, competence, and efficiency. An acceptable level of ‘fairness’
is achieved if the process or the outcome is perceived as impartial. Impartial behavior
by the regulator means that everyone’s interests are taken into account and the available
information is communicated equally to each interest group. The element of ‘compe-
tence’ is the degree to which the agency has the scientific and practical expertise to meat
all criteria to best deal with the process. ‘Efficiency’ is the perception that the agency is
not wasting public money being in charge of the risk, but is spending taxpayer’s money
for the best possible processes and outcomes. Beside these three elements of trust, Renn
(2008, 124: Table 4.7) emphasizes five more elements as constitutive components of
trust: objectivity, consistency, sincerity, faith, and empathy (see also Barber, 1983; Lee,
1986; Slovic, 1993). ‘Objectivity’ is a bias free information procedure performed by the
agency and perceived by all parties. ‘Consistency’ is the element that expresses how pre-
dictable an agency’s performance is, given past experience and previous communication
procedures. ‘Sincerity’ is the degree of honesty and openness. The element of ‘faith’ is
the perceived goodwill of an agent regarding its performance and communication style.
‘Empathy’, the fifth element, is an agent’s ability to be aware and to understand the
feelings and expectations of other parties and to respond in an respectful manner. These
combinations of elements of trust are assumed to balance out negative public feelings
about a complex and uncertain environment.
In social science research on risk perception, trust in institutional performance is ex-
pected to be an important explanatory factor for risk perception, particularly in cases of
risks that are perceived as very dangerous, dreadful, and unfamiliar. In these cases in-
dividual’s trust in social agents can countervail doubts and, hence, is balancing negative
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risk perception. In the case of distrust, even negligible or small risks can be perceived as
very dangerous, resulting in considerable ripple effects. This asymmetric effect of trust
and distrust has been observed in various studies (e.g., Siegrist and Cvetkovich, 2000;
Siegrist et al., 2000; Cvetkovich et al., 2002; Viklund, 2003).
Because trust is an important factor for governing and manage risks in a modern so-
ciety, the asymmetric forces of distrust can substantially influence social practices. As
Parson (1960) points out, trust on the aggregated level is a generalized medium to enable
social differentiation. To enable social differentiation through different social agencies,
people a-priori pronounce trust to the risk managing agency, enhancing a society’s effi-
ciency and economic performance (Fukuyama, 1995). Modern societies, therefore, rely
upon the trust and credibility of its members: “The reliance of technological society
on trustful relationships between and among subsystems has never been stronger than
today” (Renn, 2008, 126). Renn (2008, 125) furthermore remarks that empirical studies
indicate a decline of trust in political institutions, industry and also in science, compared
to trust levels in the 1960s (Löfstedt, 2005; Siegrist and Cvetkovich, 2000; Siegrist et al.,
2000).
A variety of studies indicate that higher levels of trust in risk managing institutions
result in lower risk perception (Kunreuther et al., 1990; Bord and O’Connor, 1992;
Flynn et al., 1992; Slovic, 1993; Biel and Dahlstrand, 1995; Jungermann et al., 1996;
Cvetkovich and Löfstedt, 1999; Siegrist and Cvetkovich, 2000; Wachinger et al., 2013).
This negative effect of trust can be observed particularly for nuclear risk perception and
trust in nuclear risk managing institutions. Cross-national studies in Western-Europe
and the United States for example, on the relationship of risk perception and trust show
that the levels of trust vary between countries (Viklund, 2003; Slovic et al., 2000a).
Viklund (2003) also remarks that the relationship of trust and risk perception varies
between general and specific trust49, and that the relationship depends on the type
of technological risk that is managed by an entrusted agency. In case of nuclear risk
perception, expressed trust in an authority to protect against nuclear risks relates clearly
to the perceived risk. In Sweden and France, trust in a specific agency, such as the
national nuclear energy authority, is a factor influencing nuclear risk perception; however
in the United Kingdom, only trust in national government could be observed as predictor
for individuals risk perception (Viklund, 2003, 736). A cross-national comparison of
49 Trust usually is operationalized as the degree to which people agree or disagree on a statement on
how trustworthy respondents perceive other people or institutions (general trust) or how authorities
help to protect citizens (specific trust) (Viklund, 2003, 730). For example, specific trust of expert’s
knowledge on nuclear power was operationalized by Slovic and colleagues (2000a, 88) by asking:
“We can trust the experts and engineers who build, operate, and regulate nuclear power plants.”
Respondents in the U.S. and French sample could decide to “Strongly disagree”, to “Disagree”, to
“Agree”, or “Strongly agree” to the statement. General trust in the International Social Survey
Programme 2010 (ISSP, 2012) is operationalized as a question: “Generally speaking, would you
say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”
Respondents can choose a value between 1 and 5 on a scale with the limits of “You can’t be too
careful” (scale 1) and “Most people can be trusted” (scale 5).
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nuclear risk perception in the U.S. and France by Slovic and colleagues (2000a) further
indicates that different levels of trust exist between societies, even though the levels of
nuclear risk perception do not differ much in both countries. In their study, French
respondents had greater trust in the credibility and competence of their nuclear risk
authorities, as well as nuclear industry, compared to the U.S. counterparts. French
respondents also expressed greater trust in experts’ behavior, favoring experts rather
than the public to decide about the necessary steps in managing nuclear risks. Slovic and
colleagues therefore conclude, that different “democratic models” (Slovic et al., 2000a,
57) are shaping individual’s acceptance of technological risks. French respondents, even
if they believe that they have little control over the risk, express trust to experts and
authorities to control the risks, whereas in the U.S. respondents express more skeptical
views about their risk managing authorities. In my empirical work in Section 6 I will
discuss differences in nuclear risk perception and the role of trust in France, the U.S.,
the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan again in more detail.
In the case of unfamiliar and complex risk technology, such as nuclear power, trust
matters. The knowledge individuals express about a familiar or unfamiliar technology
can be an explanation for different levels of trust regarding different technologies. Siegrist
and Cvetkovich (2000), as well as Sjöberg 2002 found support for the hypothesis that
an increased knowledge about a risk is weakening the relationship of trust and risk
perception regarding that specific risk. The level of trust for a technology is, as Sjöberg
(2001) assumes, a signal of ignorance or uncertainty. Renn (2008, 126) argues that
laypeople’s judgement of a risk agent’s credibility depends on the perceived uncertainty
that is associated with a specific risk. The (un)conscious feeling of ignorance, as I
conclude, can find its expression in the levels of perceived trust, when judging a risk.
Hence, trust in public authorities and institutions might be an indicator of an ambiguous
feeling of ignorance or uncertainty and of an imbalance of security and control towards
a specific risk within a society.
The asymmetric relationship of trust and risk perception puts the risk managing
agency in an unwanted predicament. A single mistake can evoke suspicious doubts
and can destroy public trust in risk managing institutions immediately without warning
signals. Since trust can easily be destroyed, but is hard to gain back, a destroyed balance
of trust between risk takers and risk bearers is able to provoke public action, like protests,
against a risk or its risk managing authorities (Bord and O’Connor, 1992). In contrast,
as Renn (2008, 126) argues, risk’s seemingly stochastic nature can also cover up for all
management mistakes or any forms of mismanagement by referring to the randomness
of an unexpected event, like a nuclear accident.50
50 The risk entrepreneur might reflect: ‘Due to the inherent ignorant nature of human beings, the
stochastic error can always be blamed to be the evil; and to some degree this blame is always
justified, because of the stochastic nature of life on earth – wait, who wants to control the stochastic
nature of life on earth? Right, ignorant human beings and its various forms of social organizations.
She or he is getting into an infinite regress and the reflection is turning into a tautological explanation
of what risks and its risk communication processes might be.
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Risk managing agencies are continually forced to legitimize their action or inaction
in case of an unwanted event. Even though in most cases, single events do not prove
management failures, they are able to change the public perception of a risk. If the
balance of trust among all parties is destroyed or tainted the consequences of an event
can ripple through society having long lasting effects on laypeople’s perception of a risk
source and its risk managing institutions.
Studies on trust in public agencies (e.g., Kunreuther et al., 1990; Slovic et al., 2000a)
for instance, indicate that the decline in nuclear risk perception for the U.S. relates to an
increased distrust in the domestic atomic regulation authorities, a “crisis in confidence”
as Slovic (1993, 676) states. The crisis in confidence as observed in the U.S., can be
hypothesized, to still be related to a single negative event, like the nuclear accident at
Three Mile Island (e.g., Slovic et al., 1984, 470). Slovic (1993, 679) argues that initial
trust or distrust influences how people perceive a negative event and reinforce initial or
a-priori beliefs and perceptions. People, distrusting nuclear power prior to the accident,
interpreted the accident’s outcome as a situation where luck is what avoided a melt
down and a catastrophic disaster for all parties involved. In contrast, people, trusting
the technology a-priori, perceived the accident as a demonstration of how the safety
procedures functioned in the expected way; the accident as an example of how well the
system could be controlled by the agents in charge of the risk.
A study by Nakayachi (2015) in Japan, tested the hypothesis that after the 2011
Tohoku Earthquake and its devastating consequences for the population and economy,
public’s trust in official authorities and risk managing institutions, decreased across all
institutionalized risk areas. The author calls the effect the “contagion hypothesis,” hy-
pothesizing that the general trust level in experts’ expertise is expected to decrease and
spreading in unrelated risk areas rippling over the boundaries of the original disaster
(Nakayachi, 2015, 58). The study could reject this hypothesis. A comparison of trust
levels across 51 risks and technologies, using cross sectional data from two representative
samples in 2008 and 2012, showed that trust levels for risk areas of ‘earthquakes’ and
‘nuclear accidents’ did, as expected, significantly decrease The trust level of 30 out of
the remaining 49 risks did not change and in 19 cases the levels of trust in 2012 were
significantly higher than in 2008. The author concludes that while a spread of distrust
seems to be plausible after a major disaster, what occurred in Japan was a “seesaw effect”
or a contrast effect (Nakayachi, 2015, 60). This contrasting effect indicated that popu-
lation’s worries were sensitized to the risks of earthquakes and nuclear power, whereas
their concern for other hazards diminished. The author’s critical remark is that the shift
in public trust, with higher levels of trust for other public institutions, is able to create
a culture of comfort which ignores or disregards other hazard’s catastrophic potential.
Wachinger and colleagues (2013) point towards the negative side effects of high levels
of public trust. High levels of trust, as they assume, lower public risk perception as well
as decrease public’s preparedness for unexpected or long-term hazards. In his overview
on studies on safety culture in organizations, Conchie and colleagues (2006) also remarks
that trust is a multidimensional concept. The authors distinguish between trust, distrust,
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and creative mistrust. An organization’s safety culture that is based on trust and creative
mistrust, according to the empirical results, turned out to be most effective for the safety
of all parties. In that sense I conclude, that if trust is perceived as a level of ignorance
in society, high levels of trust, in any authority, do not reflect realistically the levels
of non-knowledge that exist due to the stochastic nature of risks. Any risk assessment
processes that are designed to eliminate uncertainty, hence, also create an artificial
atmosphere or ‘zeitgeist’ of trust and are deliberately peculating public’s credit of trust.
A well designed risk assessment, I think, takes the different dimensions of trust into
consideration and creates an atmosphere of distrust and creative mistrust in order to
create, through constant listening and questioning, the best available risk solution for
all affected parties.
5.3. Sociodemographic factors shaping risk perception
5.3.1. Gender roles
I will now turn to reflect the effect of gender on risk perception with the focus on nuclear
risk perception.51 When talking about the gender differences in risk perception, I first
introduce the socialization approach, explaining gender differences by the socialized role
of being a woman or an man in society. I then explain in more detail five hypotheses
that have been put forward to explain gender based differences in environmental risk
perception. In a next step, the theoretical explanations will be confronted with empir-
ical results of mostly quantitative risk perception research. The empirical research will
be classified in three categories: a) overall environmental concern and general risk per-
ception research; b) specific risk perception, especially nuclear risk perception research
compared to non-nuclear risk perception research; and c) risk perception research on
local and (site-) specific level compared to broader levels of concern.
As will be shown, the gender differences vary depending on the category of risk per-
ception. I am not able to give a complete overview of the entire empirical research that
has been done in that field. The main geographical focus will be on research in the U.S.
complemented by cross-national research, since Boholm claims that the “effects of gender
vary cross-nationally” (Boholm, 1998, 150). I finish this section by emphasizing that a
person’s self-identity can also be understood as a concept of self-perception representing
itself in categories such as ‘femininity’ and ‘masculinity’. This categories of self-identity
are a threshold for perceiving the world rather than the actual and physical gender.
Regarding concerns about environmental and technological risks, women have been
observed to consistently express higher risk perception in comparison to men. A closer
examination of the theoretical explanations, that have been put forward so far, indicate
51 In this part I rely to a great extend on an excellent study done by Davidson and Freudenburg (1996).
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that the underlying social mechanisms are more complex and intertwined than the obvi-
ous biological differences of men and women would suggest. It does not seem to me that
risk perception can be divided in a dichotomous sphere of male and female perspectives.
Differences in the socialization process of women and men are an obvious explanation
for why humans develop different roles in their social environment (e.g., Chodorow,
1978). From a Western perspective and accepting the Western nucleus family model as
the standard social entity of socialization, female children, identifying with their mothers
are assumed to develop a relational perception whereas male children, observing the role
of their fathers, are assumed to develop a controlling role. The theoretical explanation
suggests that because male children are different than their mothers, they are able to
objectify themselves and the world around them. As a result, boys develop a distant
relationship to their environment and the desiring to control this distant, relational,
and objectified relationships. Men identify themselves in relation to their environment.
Women, in contrast, identify themselves as part of their surrounding environment and
their community.
Davidson and Freudenburg (1996, 305) critique this explanatory approach, as too
narrow and too closely related to the Western family model, perceiving the female role
as the homemaker and caretaker and the male role as the breadwinner and provider.
Yet the authors remark, that even if the standard family model does empirically not
exist anymore because, for example, of single parent families or women in both roles as
breadwinner as well as caretaker, the role image still exists in society and is reproduced
by its social institutions and social practices. The self-identification process based on role
expectations therefore still influences individual choices regarding education, occupation
or parenting, the authors conclude.
An individual’s socialization process itself should also be reflected in the attitudes
towards science and technology and be measurable in different responses towards tech-
nological risks for society. According to the socialization or role model approach, at-
titudinal differences between men and women should be explained by different roles,
related attitudes, and derived risk perceptions practiced over generations. According to
this approach, men are expected to perceive themselves as more knowledgeable about
technology and social development, expressing higher levels of trust in social institu-
tions. Historically, men have been involved in creating and self-recruiting scientific and
technological institutions. These male dominated domains of society can be assumed
to be essentially or ‘holy’ for male’s self-identity. Ideal Western role-model men are ex-
pected to defend their self-identity and by that their holy cows, manifested, for example,
in beneficial technological industries, efficient management procedures and scientifically
proven knowledge claims. Men as the assigened family providers are expected to ex-
press higher concerns for economical development than for environmental consequences
of human behavior. Typical role-model women, to the contrary, are expected to focus
on their family’s and community’s health and safety. With this assumption, women are
expected to express higher concerns to environmental problems or technological risks
when risks are perceived as a health and safety threat for a specific social entity, such
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as their families, local communities, or the world.
In their theoretical overview, Davidson and Freudenburg (1996, 316) identify five
major hypotheses that can explain differences in risk perception between gender. It
is also a scheme for classifying existing empirical research on the assumed gender gap.
The first and second aspect are the hypothesized differences in knowledge and trust in
institutions; the third hypothesis focuses on the concerns for economic development; the
fourth and fifth aspect, regard safety and parental concerns as drivers for differences in
risk perception.
The authors go on to identify three categories or dimensions of risk perception studies
to test their hypotheses. The first dimension of studies are general attitude surveys,
which do not ask about a specific environmental risk. The second type of studies are
studies examining specific environmental attitudes. This category includes studies ex-
plicitly designed to test attitudes towards nuclear energy or nuclear waste, while studies
evaluate individual’s risk perception of environmental issues that are not related to nu-
clear, such as acid rain, toxic waste or contamination, genetic engineering, or genetically
modified foods. The third area are studies evaluating environmental concerns about
local or site-specific issues or non-site-specific environmental risk issues with a regional,
national, or global scope of interest. Given that wide spanned dimensions of empirical
research, the expected gender differences can be tested across different areas of concerns.
The empirical results show (cf., Davidson and Freudenburg, 1996, Table 1: 311–313)
that the gender effect is most pronounced for nuclear issues, with women expressing
higher concerns for both site-specific issues and non-site-specific issues (e.g., Nelkin,
1981; Brody, 1984; Slovic, 1999). In studies related to non-nuclear risks, women tend
to show higher risk perception. The differences in risk perception are stronger if the
environmental issues, such as toxic contamination, are site specific. Qualitative studies
on local environmental issues reveal that women often are in a leadership role and take
responsibility for improving the situation and opposing for instance local waste storage
sites (e.g., Levine, 1982; Freudenburg and Pastor, 1992). Davidson and Freudenburg
(1996, 316) also remark that observable differences differ in their actual or measurable
statistical strength. The consistent findings regarding environmental issues, such as nu-
clear energy or local toxic contamination, are also statistically strong. Broader questions
on environmental concern do not only show inconsistent results of the direction of the
gender effect, the observed differences are also not very strong in the measured scale,
most often measured in percentage points.
Five hypotheses or directions of explanation have been put forth to explain gender
differences in environmental risk perception. Davidson and Freudenburg (1996, Table
2: 320–321) call them: 1) the “Knowledge Support Hypothesis” , 2) the “Institutional
Trust Hypothesis” , 3) the “Economic Salience Hypothesis” , 4) the “Safety Concern
Hypothesis” , and 5) the “Parental Role Hypothesis”.
The first hypothesis, the “Knowledge Support Hypothesis” (Davidson and Freuden-
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burg, 1996, 317-319) assumes that men, in contrast to women, are more knowledgeable
about existing environmental risk issues. It is assumed that people who are more in-
formed about risk issues will be less concerned about a risk’s assumed negative outcomes
on safety and health for society and environment (Kuklinski et al., 1982; Lopes, 1991).
Empirical results in the Davidson and Freudenburg review show that on average men
are more knowledgeable about a risk’s technical details, supporting the first assumption
of the Knowledge Support Hypothesis. The second assumption of the hypothesis cannot
be confirmed empirically. The assumed relationship that more knowledgeable people
perceive less concern about environmental risks has been rejected in many studies. The
relationship even differs in its direction, indicating that people who oppose a technologi-
cal or a site-specific environmental risk are better informed than a risk issue’s proponents
(Arcury et al., 1987; Solomon et al., 1989). In the case of the Love Canal (New York)
toxic waste disaster for example, local activists, mostly women, opposing a controversial
risk were better informed than its local supporters (Fowlkes and Miller, 1987).
A study by Kuklinski and colleagues (1982) furthermore examines the relationship
between knowledge and political ideology among American citizen. The core values that
people invoke on their decision making processes about nuclear energy issues differ among
informed and uninformed people. The authors find that better informed individuals
invoke core political ideological values, such as being liberal or conservative in their
decision-making process, whereas uninformed people invoke values that are not related
to their political ideology. Less informed people also tend to seek advice within their
social groups, whereas “ knowledgeable citizens felt no need to take directional cues from
groups” (Kuklinski et al., 1982, 633). Ideological and traditional values are core features
influencing judgements of unfamiliar environmental risks and evaluating uncertain policy
choices. This effect is stronger and more pronounced for better informed people. Less
informed people tend to rely more on core values that are not related to their political
ideology, allowing them to accept different opinions provided by groups. These results
pertain to citizens of the United States and to research results in the United Kingdom
(Costa-Font et al., 2008).
In their conclusion about the Knowledge Support Hypothesis Davidson and Freuden-
burg (1996, 318-319) advise rejecting the hypothesis or scrutinizing the results and the
operationalization of a study with scientific skepticism because the evaluated empiri-
cal evidence differs in its direction. More studies are even pointing in the unexpected
direction of higher expresses concern associated with higher levels of knowledge.
The second hypothesis, the “Institutional Trust Hypothesis” (Davidson and Freuden-
burg, 1996, 319), reveals a clearer empirical pattern, with high levels of empirical evi-
dence in the United States, supporting the hypothesis (Freudenburg, 1993; Flynn et al.,
1992; Fox and Firebaugh, 1992; Slovic, 1999; Bella, 1987; Slovic, 1993; Rayner and Can-
tor, 1987). The hypothesis holds that men in contrast to women tend to have more trust
in institutions, especially in governmental, scientific, and technological institutions. It is
furthermore assumed that there is an inverse relationship between trust and risk percep-
tion with the expectation that respondents expressing higher levels of trust will express
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lower environmental risk perception.
Empirical results do indicate that women tend to trust institutions less than men
and express higher levels of concern, confirming the expected negative relationship. An
aspect that is part of the observed gender gap related to trust in scientific institutions
is, as indicated in a study by Hornig (1992), that female respondents see higher risks
and less benefits in scientific development. A study by Hamilton (1985) on toxic waste
in local communities indicated that women with children not only express higher levels
of concern, but are also more active in organizing opposition and in questioning public
authorities. Since most studies that Davidson and Freudenburg (1996, 319) examine
show the expected negative relationship between trust in institutions and technological
risk concern, and find that women tend to trust authorities less, the Institutional Trust
Hypothesis hypothesis cannot be rejected. The results even indicate that, at least in the
U.S., trust in institutions is a factor that cannot be neglected when explaining observed
gender difference in environmental risk perception.
The third hypothesis the “Economic Salience Hypothesis” (Davidson and Freudenburg,
1996, 322) assumes that men, compared to women, are more concerned with economic
issues. It is also assumed that individuals who are in the labour force, independent of
their sex, are likely to be more concerned about economic issues. The hypothesis as-
sumes that there is an inverse relationship between economic concerns and environmental
concern, indicating that individuals expressing higher concerns regarding economic is-
sues are more likely to express lower concerns on environmental risks. The Economic
Salience Hypothesis is in its conception not a pure gender specific hypothesis because it
incorporates the interaction of gender and employment status on risk concerns.
In a study by Stout-Wiegand and Trend (1983), the authors assume that economic
concerns among men are the reason for observed lower risk perception among men.
Among men and women working in energy-related industries, women who expressed
higher levels of environmental concern where also more skeptical about technological
developments compared to their male colleagues. Male colleagues expressed less con-
cerns about future energy developments, independent of their levels of environmental
concern. Men and women not working in an energy-related industry did not show gen-
der differences. This results indicate that men in the workforce, who are more concerned
about the economy, are more enthusiastic about future developments, independent of
their environmental concerns. Studies comparing environmental risk perception among
full-time employed men and women showed that on average women express higher levels
of environmental concerns compared to men (Mohai, 1992). Additional empirical studies
focusing on the employment status and risk perception indicate that with full-time em-
ployed individuals, both men and women tend to express higher levels of environmental
concern (Blocker and Eckberg, 1989).
The Economic Salience Hypothesis cannot be confirmed because empirical studies
provide mixed results. The gender gap should be independent of the employment role
an individual has in society. Factors other than economic concerns or the idea of being a
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family provider should be considered in order to explain the gender gap. One approach is
to identify the source of a risk more accurately. For instance, Stern and colleagues (1993)
find that women perceive nuclear technology as an environmental problem whereas men
tend to see it as a technical or scientific problem.
The fourth hypotheses identified by Davidson and Freudenburg is the “Safety Con-
cerns Hypothesis” (Davidson and Freudenburg, 1996, 323). The hypothesis assumes that
women in comparison to men rank health and safety issues as more important. This
relationship should be expressed in higher levels of environmental risk concerns among
women, especially when risks are exposed to the family or the local community. Among
the five hypotheses taken into consideration, the Safety Concerns Hypothesis receives
the clearest support. All the examined studies (cf, Davidson and Freudenburg, 1996,
321: Table 2) show consistent support for the hypothesis (e.g., Brody, 1984; Solomon
et al., 1989; see also Greenberg and Schneider, 1995; Forbes and Sells, 1997).
The empirical findings support the theoretical explanation that women created a
higher awareness for safety and health issues because of their social role as care provider
and nurturer. For future research, the authors encourage and propose to test this theo-
retical explanation by analyzing women’s and men’s employment status in relationship
to both of their roles in the household. Then the combination of the role of economic
provider (the Economic Salient Hypothesis) and the role as caretaker (the Safety Con-
cerns Hypothesis) is able to shield new light to the complex structure of worldviews,
social roles and institutionalized power structures in society that interplay and create
differences in risk perception – differences that then are labeled gender gap. The term
gender in that case serves as a marker for social mechanisms that created and are still
creating these differences, mechanisms which have not yet been revealed.
The “Parental Role Hypothesis” (Davidson and Freudenburg, 1996, 325) holds that
children at home will have opposite effects for women and men. Women in the role
as mothers and care providers will express more concerns regarding health and safety
issues (compare the Safety Concerns Hypothesis), whereas men in the traditional role as
fathers and economic providers will express higher levels for economic issues and lesser
concern about technological or environmental issues (compare the Economic Salience
Hypothesis). Empirical results for that hypothesis in the United States show mixed
results and do not support the hypothesis in its purity. For instance, studies by George
and Southwell (1986) as well as Blocker and Eckberg (1989), show that men’s support
for a new industrial development such as a nuclear power plant is higher among fathers.
Other study shows that fathers in comparison to men without children, express higher
concerns for local toxic contamination (Hamilton, 1985). Women with children were
identified as the most concerned group supporting the Safety Concerns Hypothesis. A
resent study by Simon (2013) supports the assumption that parents express greater
concern for nuclear risks. The analysis showed that women who lived with children were
more likely to show lower support for nuclear power compared to women not living with
children. In this study mothers compared to fathers also expressed higher concerns on
nuclear issues, supporting the Parental Role Hypothesis.
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The mixed results for the Parental Role Hypothesis, as well as for the Economic
Salience Hypothesis indicate that traditional sex roles are changing or are a theoretical
artifact. The comparably strong support for the Safety Concerns Hypothesis and the
Institutional Trust Hypothesis indicates that women and men differ in their perception
of social reality and on their perception of the environment. Women seem to show a
greater awareness for the health of the environment. Men in contrast express a greater
awareness of the power structure of their environment. In my opinion in both cases
different ideas or feelings of responsibility seem to be the energies that create a gap in
risk perception.
A core catalysts of the gap is knowledge or an individual’s self-assessment in the
existing or accepted knowledge structure. Those who assess and created, and reproduce,
the existing knowledge structure and the educational system, perceive themselves as
more knowledgeable. If knowledge is seen as a factor to eliminate error or uncertainty,
hence a mean of power to diminish risks, a knowledge structure that provides ideologies
that explain uncertainty and reduce error is able to reduce risks. Those in society
who are assumed to be more knowledgeable, therefore should be express lower risk
concerns. This assumed result can be found in empirical research as shown above. The
empirical findings also show the opposite results, indicating that those who are expected
to know more are also more concerned. The Knowledge Support Hypothesis does not
hold because the empirical test shows mixed results.
Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz (1994) suggest taking into consideration broader shaped
value concepts incorporating power, status, equity and trust, or alienation to identify
societal subgroups that are distancing themselves from society by expressing very low
levels of risk perception. In their study on environmental health risks, the authors
observe a gender gap with men expressing lower levels of concern. Controlling for so-
ciodemographic factors among men, a subgroup of white men is identified that expresses
very low levels of technological risk perception. These subgroup is also characterized
to be better educated, having higher incomes, and were politically more conservative.
These white men also tended to express greater trust in government and authorities
that manage technological risks. Beside these factors white men are also more likely, on
average, to be less concerned about the poor and to be more willing to impose risks on
people in society without consulting them or asking for any agreement.
Flynn and colleagues (see also Boholm, 1998, 151) argue that the observed white
male effect counts as an example which proves that an approach that tries to explain
the observed gender gap referring to biological differences between women and men is
insufficient. The empirical results speak against a biological explanation for risk per-
ception and the gender gap should be more or less equally distributed across biological
and social stratification as well as across ethnic or cultural boundaries. The historically
grown social experience among subgroups in society, independent of their sex or biolog-
ical ‘equipping’, should also be considered to be relevant to explain gender differences.
Observing a subgroup of extreme responses, such as in the case of white men in the
U.S. expressing very low levels of risk perception, indicates that there is a bias towards
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greater acceptance.
The reasons for this skewed distribution among American men could be hypothesized
by referring to the social role that subgroup had played in society in the past. White
men were in charge of institutionalized social life and have been controlling, managing,
and benefiting from the system they took care of. Higher levels of income and education
are an indicator for the higher status they gained over time. The subgroup’s knowledge
and familiarity with the system makes the individuals of that subgroup to perceive some
risks, such as environmental or technological risks, as less risky in their cost/benefit
calculation. Technology and nature seem not to be a threat for white male’s ideological
and biological existence on earth – maybe more complex social issues like sharing power,
ideologies, and goods are perceived as a risk. Beside the reported study by Flynn et al.
(1994) the white male effect in the United States was also found and discussed in more
resent studies such as by Finucane et al. (2000b) and McCright and Dunlap (2011).
The gender gap, I conclude and hypothesize, is a ‘gender’ gap within the subgroup of
men. What creates the lack of error, the ignorance of ignorance, is an identity that wants
to control someone’s changing world based on explanations, rather than understanding,
trusting and not feeling responsible, and accepting rather than questioning. In this sense
institutionalized science is trying to teach the world and its members that the world can
be explained by accepted principles and we can trust the underlying assumptions. What
the world is trying to teach institutionalized science and its members is to question
the underlying assumptions and to accept that the world in its complexity and inherent
mechanisms cannot be explained. Science is not an art of questioning, science has become
a tool which serves to explain and rationalize. These subgroups in society that still are
able to question will be able to change the world without using the force of their hands,
but the words of their ideas. The observed gender gap indicates that there are different
ideas in the world, of how to perceive and to govern risks in social environments.
5.3.2. Masculine identity
The relationship of identity and risk perception, is not a factor to be neglected in order
to build a broader understanding of gender’s risk perception. Kahan and colleagues
(2007) argue that activities are perceived to have lower risks if they play an important
part in reinforcing someone’s cultural identity. In that sense, risk judgements can be
interpreted as a way to reinforce core values and cultural norms that individuals be-
lieve in. The authors even go so far as to talk about an “identity-protective cognition”
(Kahan et al., 2007, 465), such as the above mentioned white-male effect. In a study
of adolescent boys, for instance, behavior useful to prove their masculinity was judged
as less risky (cf., Reardon and Govender, 2013, 753-754). The aspect of masculinity
may not turn out to be the most important aspect in analyzing nuclear risk perception
or risk perception. Nevertheless, I have chosen to include this theme in my disserta-
tion in an attempt to understand more about how socially constructed role-models are
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reproducing views that shape the way individuals perceive their environments through
communication and behavior. I am especially interested in the aspects of what is called
traditional masculinity or hegemonic masculinity.
In literature on masculinity, traditional or hegemonic masculinity is used to describe a
particular type of masculinity that is in the dominant position and able to reinforce the
legitimate order of patriarchy in society (Reardon and Govender, 2013; Connell, 1993,
1995; Donaldson, 1993). This dominant position allows members of the traditional mas-
culine subgroup to stay in power, to define and impose norms and ideals for on the
whole of society. It is assumed that in return for their contribution in keeping social law
and order, the patriarchs receive a patriarchal bonus. This entails that beside the mate-
rial bonuses, such as higher income or better opportunity structures in institutions, the
“patriarchal dividend” is also payed off in immaterial privileges such as honor, prestige,
and authority (Reardon and Govender, 2013, 754). These different privilege structures
are reinforced by different subgroups in society. Since almost all men have built on this
patriarchal structures it is assumed that men have the tendency to try to maintain the
given order.
The theoretical concept of hegemonic masculinity assumes a negative effect on in-
dividual’s risk perception if the risk is threatening resources or means of defending
masculine identity and the patriarchal dividend. Presuming this relationship is correct,
risk judgements of inequality issues, technological development, environmental change,
contamination or pollution, violence, national conflict and global development should
correlate with perceived masculinity. Technological or environmental risks are often the
consequence of social developments, technological developments, or institutional devel-
opments that were created to defend the dominance of one specific type of masculine
identity, protecting and reproducing a hegemonic type of masculinity. The traditional
form of masculinity, as Reardon and Govender (2013, 756) conclude, should not only be
related with higher acceptance levels for hazardous technologies such as nuclear power
or higher acceptance of bellicose decisions, it should also be related to adverse health
and safety behavior on the individual level, such as alcohol use, unsafe sexual practices,
and dangerous driving.
Empirical studies indicate that men who try to separate from the hegemonic mas-
culinity, representing “progressive masculinity” (Reardon and Govender, 2013, 756), are
expressing higher levels of concern for environmental risk and inequality (cf, in the case
of South Africa Reardon and Govender, 2013). This group of men is also more easily to
mobilize for environmental movements (Connell, 1990). Reardon and Govender support
the hypothesis that men in South Africa identified as traditional or hegemonic mascu-
line, are more likely to support activities that are associated with the core masculine
norms such as “toughness, risk-taking, bodily strength and invincibility” (Reardon and
Govender, 2013, 765). The authors compare the interaction of types of masculinity and
the cultural prototypes as described above in the chapter of Cultural Theory (compare
Section 5.2.2). Empirical results in South Africa indicate that hierarchical worldviews
are related to the hegemonic masculinity type and related to lower environmental risk
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perception. The hierarchical order with its firm segregation and classification of age,
race, and class structure within society (Wildavsky and Dake, 1990; Dake, 1991; Dou-
glas, 2003) and its means of social control and subordination, is closely linked to the
patriarchal power structures that are based on the idea of inequality and gender dif-
ferences. In contrast to the hierarchical prototype, the egalitarian worldview correlated
with the anti-hierarchical type of masculinity, both related to higher environmental risk
perception.
The combination of cultural worldviews and gender differences might be a useful ap-
proach to open the discussion to the conflicts among subgroups in society such as women
and men within certain cultural entities or the conflict of men and men within a given
social entity, for example the conflict between different generations. Individual risk
judgement, I hypothesize, could be an indicator of hidden and deeper conflicts within
societies and different subgroups and cultures (Tansey, 2004). In a qualitative study
in Japan with in-depth interviews, Morioka (2014) tried to identify the influence of po-
litical and economic institutions on men’s risk perception focussing on the mechanisms
of how these institutions reproduce a hegemonic capitalist and masculine ideology of
self-identity. Morioka judges sharply concluding that “the ‘mechanisms of self-identity’
including masculinity shaped by modern institutions play a critical role in risk society.
The consequences of narrowly defined manhood can be unexpected, far-reaching and
damaging” (Morioka, 2014, 111). Her judgement is based on qualitative interviews in
the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster in 2011 comparing the risk perception of nu-
clear radiation between both sexes. Men, including fathers, tend to express lower risk
perception compared to women and mothers. Men’s interpretation of the risk, as ob-
served by the author, is to perceive radiation as a threat to financial stability and not to
own health or the family’s well-being. Norms, imposed or performed at work, played an
important role to ignore the potential threat of the actual risk as well as the concerns
expressed by women and spouses.
An other observable mechanism of ignorance was self-censoring and not expressing
concerns at work, so as not worry colleagues. Respondents reported that they felt badly
touching someone’s feelings, by expressing concerns. The prevalent norms of silence
and denial, as seen in powerful economic and political institutions serve its members as
identity-protection mechanisms as well as justification of the system against critiques
(Morioka, 2014, 110).
The author concludes that the nuclear fallout in Japan can be interpreted as a threat
to the hegemonic masculinity structure in society and its institutions. Men’s lower risk
perception can be interpreted as a defense strategy to defend the existing system they
have created and work for and believe in. The author explains that the Japanese system
is built on the principle of economic supremacy (kei-zai-yusen-shugi). In that case, deny-
ing or ignoring a risk and taking action against someone who expresses risk concerns is an
expected consequence, such as in the case of employed husbands who get angry in con-
versation with their concerned spouses. The interviews revealed that husbands believed
in the information structure that existed in their place of work, perceiving colleagues as
138
5. Contextual and individual factors shaping risk perception
reference points, and following the work norm to adjust to others. In the sense of the
social amplification of risk framework, in the case of Japan, the institutions mediated as
a diminishing factor attenuating the risk and avoiding ripple effects. The sexual division
of labor, helping to create a functional family turned out to be dysfunctional in the case
of the nuclear accident. Men expressed lower risk perception while being part of the
more powerful workforce lead to decisions that brought family members, especially chil-
dren in danger. Whole families did not leave the contaminated area because women did
not want to or were not able to leave the area without their husbands. Men preferred
to stay with the status quo, prioritizing work over health questions, sticking to their
masculine identity as breadwinner (Morioka, 2014, 109).
The radiation risk of Fukushima is one example of an environmental risk that societies
can be confronted with. The new situation after the risk could lead to fundamental
changes for the whole society. In that sense risks and their unpredictability can be a
challenge, as in the case of Japan, to the foundations of society if the system is built on
values and norms that created the risk (Feygina et al., 2010). Morioka points out that
anti-nuclear activists, challenging the existing system in Japan, tend to be people who
are not part of the workforce, such as students, freelancer or retirees (Morioka, 2014,
110).
In the case above of hegemonic masculinity, the ideology is designed to avoid change
and to maintain the existing structures of inequality. The inequality between gender
and race, the capitalist system, imperialism and global inequality are reproduced by the
existing social structure (Connell, 1993). The inequality structure is based on hierarchy
and power. Connell makes the point that in the tradition of European masculinity, from
his point of view, the first group identified as masculine were the conquistadors, a group
of men, segregated from society, defining themselves as soldiers and sea traders, not to be
controlled by a state authority (Connell, 1993, 607). According to Connell, the actual
institutionalized foundation of masculinity in European/American society took place
during the dynastic wars in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. Masculine power
got institutionalized in the establishment of a strong national state structure at that
time. One core element of state construction and hegemonic masculine gender order was
the role of military and military values: “The centrality of warfare in these developments
meant that armies became a crucial part of the developing state apparatus, and military
performance became an unavoidable issue in the construction of masculinities” (Connell,
1993, 608). Hence, masculinity became the dominant gender order in the class of gentry,
a powerful class of people in European and American society, dominating the military
apparatus of a state at that time. Masculinity was based on a code of honor and a
willingness to take violent action against an opponent. The duel, as the most honorable
one-to-one combat, turned out to be the proof for gentry masculinity.
During industrialization and political revolutions, the state apparatus became more
rationalized and masculinity more regulated. The Prussian officer corps is a good exam-
ple of a code of honor combined with an bureaucratically rationally organized violence
apparatus. The superiority of industrialized weaponry and war science enabled Euro-
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pean countries and its political, military, and economic institutions in the nineteenth
century to colonize most parts of the world. Allowing the hegemonic masculine type of
men to be the hegemonic type of a man. Tendencies for social change before and at the
end of World War I did challenge the hegemonic masculinity resulting in more radical
forms of masculinity, like fascist movements in Europe, glorifying the irrationality of
violence, inequality and superiority. The victorious armies after World War II, the Red
Army and the U.S. armed forces stopped fascism but continued to grow in a destructive
quantity, establishing a “bureaucratic institutionalization of violence” (Connell, 1993,
609). During the Cold War technical expertise became an important core element of
masculinity, in addition to the military code of honor and violence as a mean to maintain
order, because scientific expertise became more and more relevant to the development of
economic growth and more importantly to the development of weapons that guarantee
military superiority.
Industrialization also changed the family structures, allowing men to separate from
family life, establish a working class, be the breadwinner and the domestic patriarch,
and to organize themselves in unions. As a result, masculine ideals became the dominant
culture in the broad population and not only in the nobility or gentry of society.
More recently in the 1980s, according to Connell, the entrepreneur in business has
emerged to be a new form of masculinity. This generation of entrepreneurs, mostly in
finance industry, uses a language that is full of gender and military terminology, terms
such as “trusting entrepreneurs, opening up virgin territory, aggressive lending, etc.”
(Connell, 1993, 614). Not only in business schools, but also in risk assessments the
language used to talk about solving risk problems is also based mostly a masculine,
i.e. based on a military jargon of dominance. The historical picture I have tried to
depict in order to describe the concept of masculinity, is obviously based on a thin
empirical evidence (cf., Connell, 1993, 619) and is a hypothesized recourse back to some
historical developments that could have been potential influences shaping the existing
gender differences, observable in today’s society.
I want to close my observations on gender differences and the concept of masculin-
ity by asking what predisposes a society toward a militaristic behavior. Regarding the
interconnectedness of nuclear energy and nuclear weaponry, the support for the peace-
ful nuclear energy should be interlinked to the question of acceptance of nuclear war
technology. One potential answer could be found in levels of gender equality within
a society and a society’s predisposition to militarism. According to a study by Hoy
(1994) the relationship between gender inequality and militarism is – if it exists – very
weak. However, the study also revealed that the authoritarian character, as defined and
conceptualized by Adorno and colleagues (1950), is more likely to be hostile against
outgroups and more willing to subordinate groups of society, such as women.
From my perspective the communicative relationship of an individual towards a risk
is of importance. If someone is interested in understanding a risk, to understand how
‘something’ has the ability to change society, multiple perspectives are necessary to
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observe a risk’s nature. Risks in this sense can only be understood if people understand
the communication structures used in society to talk about and to define a risk. If risk
solutions were to be based on the principles of equity, the existing gender gap should
be closed to make sure that all parts in society, independent of their historically shaped
presence or weight in institutions and decision making, have an equal voice to express
their opinion (MacGregor, 2010; Olofsson et al., 2014). Gender balanced risk managing
practices will probably lead to a more accurate understanding of risks.
5.3.3. The gender gap in cross-national comparison
In this section I will present two results from national and cross-national research to
describe how risk perception, with a focus on the assumed gender gap, is perceived across
different societies. In an Swedish study on risk perception, no ‘white male effect’could be
found (Olofsson and Rashid, 2011; Olofsson and Öhman, 2014). The authors hypothesize
and conclude that social inequality creates different levels of risk perception within a
society, and that in an egalitarian society such as in Sweden, no lower risk perception
for dominating groups is produced. The authors suggest to call the white male effect
more appropriately the “societal inequality effect” (Olofsson and Rashid, 2011, 1030).
In the same sense, Slovic argues, when concluding that the observed gender gap is
based on sociopolitical aspects such as power, alienation, trust, and status. From his
perspective the problem of risk conflicts is “deeply rooted in the social and political
fabric of our society” (Slovic, 1999, 693). He remarks that studies on experts, such as
physical scientists (Barke et al., 1997) and toxicologists (Slovic et al., 1997) show that
women express higher concerns of risks than their male colleagues. The results show that
the gender gap remains, even when controlling for knowledge and occupational status,
indicating that the roots of the observed differences are located deep in a societies
consciousness.
The influence of knowledge on environmental risk perception or environmental con-
cern is worth a cross-national comparison. A study by Shields and Zeng (2012), using
‘The China Survey’, reveals that on average women consider environmental problems
as less serious than men. The differences in percentage points are not that big and in
the multiple regression analysis the gender effect is not significant. What is of interest
is that better educated people, people who are married and people who trust less in
government officials tend to show higher concerns about the environment. The authors
therefore conclude that the observed gender gap exists due to the women’s discrimina-
tion in education and poverty. The trade off between economic progress in China and
environmental degradation could be a reason why men perceive environmental problems
as a serious threat for China’s economic growth in the future. This complex interplay
of environmental degradation and economic development for developing countries might
be a reason for the reversed gender gap in China.
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5.3.4. Age
Age is assumed to serve as sociodemographic predictor of environmental and techno-
logical risks concern in society. From a cultural theorist’s point of view, older people
are expected to have a more traditional worldview, tending towards a hierarchical bias.
Furthermore, it is assumed that older people become less integrated into society, they
therefore develop the views of a stratified individual or the biases of a fatalist worldview
(Grendstad, 2000, 224). This assumption was empirically supported by Peters and Slovic
(1996, 1438). Since more hierarchical biased people are assumed to show lower risk per-
ception, it can be hypothesized that older people tend to express lower risk perception
or environmental concern.
Van Liere and Dunlap (1980, 182–183) hypothesize a negative correlation between
age and environmental concern. The theoretical explanation the authors provide is that
younger people are less integrated into the existing dominant political, economic, and
educational system (compare also Malkis and Grasmick, 1977). Since environmental and
technological risks are a result of the existing dominant system, younger people should
express higher support for environmentally friendly reforms and pro-environmental ide-
ologies. Younger people are assumed to be more supportive of changes for more sustain-
able system. Older people who have built the system are more likely to express their
opposition against progressive value changes, changes in communication and decision
making. According to the socioemotional selectivity theory (Carstensen et al., 1999) it
is also assumed that older people try to maintain harmony in their social group and,
hence, orient themselves more according to existing social norms.
An additional approach to explain different responses of environmental risk perception
among different age groups is based on the theory of generations by Karl Mannheim
(1972). Mannheim asserts that historical events occurring during certain periods of
life, such as in the period of being a young adulthood, are able to affect a generation
throughout their entire lifetime. According to this generational approach, post-war co-
horts involved in the civil right movement in the U.S. or the anti-nuclear war movements
in Europe should be more sensitive to pro-environmental attitudes or ideological shifts.
Van Liere and Dunlap argue that the recurring news of environmental problems in the
past decades should have kept a higher awareness of environmental problems alive, re-
sulting in an even higher environmental risk perception once the young adults move into
adulthood (Van Liere and Dunlap, 1980, 183).
There is also a tradition in the scientific community of pursuing a more economic
shaped approach resulting in a cost-benefit analysis. Research in that area on the effect
of age on individual’s risk perception is using measures that are quantifying individuals
risk perception through measures such as willingness to pay (WTP) to reduce a risk
or the measure such as the value of a statistical life (VSL). As Dockins and colleagues
(2002, 337–338) summarize, WTP as well as the VSL estimates show the highest levels
for people of age 40. There is consistency in the results that the effect declines as people
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get older. The estimates differ widely for younger people. For younger people, it is
assumed that they worry more about potential risks compared to older generations (Ce-
bulla, 2009, 52), especially for employment insecurity. Even though the globalized world
with its complexity bears many opportunities for the young generation, it also increases
the chances for potential losses and increases pressure on younger cohorts. This pressure
could result in a resurrection of traditional values and in higher acceptance of technolog-
ical risks to support a society’s existing economic model. On the other hand, it has been
argued that younger people face a longer life span or time-horizon than older people. Fu-
ture oriented goals are more likely to be discussed and developed by younger individuals,
therefore it can be assumed that the awareness of negative environmental consequences
due to the existing economic and political system is higher among younger generations.
As a result, higher risk awareness and awareness for environmentally responsible choices
could be higher among young people with a longer time horizons (Wiernik et al., 2013,
828).
In a meta-analysis on the age effect on different environmental variables, such as
environmental concern, values, attitudes, and environmental behavior, Wiernik et al.
(2013, 844–845) conclude that in most cases individuals of different ages and generations
did not show differences in their environmental attitudes and behavior. The authors
observe that older people tend to rely more on traditional norms, such in the case of
traditional work values, on conserving resources, and to avoid harm to the environment.
For people in the workforce an age-difference are unlikely to be observed, the authors
conclude.
The aging effect, expressed in value change towards more conservative values as indi-
viduals got older, was observed in a study of acceptance of a nuclear power plant (George
and Southwell, 1986). The age effect was obvious for males with children, who were older
and more likely to support the licensing of a new nuclear power plant. This effect was not
observable among women with or without children. A generation explanation can be put
forth. In the case of nuclear power older respondents were socialized to nuclear power in
the early ages of that technology when nuclear power was perceived as a merit to social
growth and a source of unlimited and cheap energy for the future. This early optimism
is unlikely to be observed among younger generations, who faced different technologi-
cal and economical crises during their socialization (George and Southwell, 1986, 732).
This generational effect should be observable for both sexes, though the effect should
be more obvious for the dominant male character as the creator of the technological age
and its institutions than for women, who benefited from their husband’s technological
innovations and decisions.
Given the different explanations, the assumed negative effect of age should be assumed
not to be clearly pronounced across all societies. Younger generations might see more
opportunities in the future and show more willingness and openness for change. It may
be possible to encourage younger people to be open to change existing social practices
and institutions, in contrast to older people who are less willing to adopt changes and
to rethink existing ideas. At the same time older people, being more experienced, will
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be more careful about their social environment and may be evaluating changes and
individual actions more carefully (Morris and Venkatesh, 2000; Smola and Sutton, 2002).
5.3.5. Social status: education, income, and occupation
In the literature on environmental concern, it is assumed that environmental concern is
positively related with social status or social class, identified by education, income, and
occupational prestige (Van Liere and Dunlap, 1980, 183). The environment is perceived
as a valuable good that will become an object of greater awareness, once an individual
has satisfied all its basic material needs. Maslow’s hierarchy of need theory (Maslow,
1970), the underlining theoretical model, holds that the most important basic material
needs that need to be met are security and economic stability. The assumed positive
relation between class and environmental concern has been questioned, arguing that
poorer classes usually are more exposed to polluted areas as well as more dangerous work
environment. This direct experience of poor environmental conditions should result in
higher environmental risk awareness among members of the lower class or people having
lower social status. Vaughan and Nordenstam (1991, 52) argue that previous research in
the United States on risk perception does not support the assumed positive correlation
between class and risk perception. Especially for risks, such as nuclear waste and toxic
contamination, minorities express higher levels of concern, at the same time they are
exposed to higher levels of social risks, such as unemployment and crime.
A French study by Bastide et al. (1989) showed that French respondents with higher
education and higher income, living in urban areas, were more likely to underestimate
the frequency of causes of death from various deceases and accidents. Respondents with
lower socio-economic status, being unemployed or living in a town, on the contrary,
were more likely to overestimate the frequency of causes of death. The authors explain
the high levels of perceived risks among lower class respondents by assuming that an
insecure social position will result in a feeling for greater hopelessness. The overall feeling
of insecurity and loss of control eventually will cause higher levels of concern and will be
expressed through an overestimation of risks, as the authors conclude (Boholm, 1998,
148–149).
In a Scandinavian and North-American comparison of environmental concern, higher
educational levels were found to be consistently related to higher levels of environmental
concern among respondents in all countries (Olofsson and Öhman, 2006). This result
confirms prior assumptions about the positive relationship of environmental risk per-
ception and education (see for instance Dietz et al., 1998). The effect of socio-economic
status and environmental risk perception is assumed to vary according to the specific
risks that are asked to be evaluated and judged. Broader environmental concerns, such
as climate change, seem, as in the case of a study in Great Britain, not to be related to
respondent’s acceptance of nuclear power (Corner et al., 2011). I assume that nuclear
power is seen as a source for economic growth and social stability. People with higher
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education, especially within the subgroup of men, tend to express lower levels of risk
perception; yet at the same time, they express higher levels of environmental concern.
Nuclear power from that perspective is not perceived as a threat to their health or to
the society.
5.3.6. Political ideology
A consistent finding in scientific literature on nuclear risk perception is that more con-
servative or right wing oriented person express lower levels of nuclear risk perception
(e.g, Eiser et al., 1990; Van Liere and Dunlap, 1980). The above discussed white male
effect in the United States (Flynn et al., 1994; Finucane et al., 2000b) is an quite obvious
example of how political ideology, in combination with socio-economic status, hierarchi-
cal, individualistic, and anti-egalitarian worldviews is shaping individual judgements of
environmental and technological risks for society.
According to Dunlap (1975) environmental attitudes are able to be related to polit-
ical ideologies, first, because environmental reforms in many cases have negative con-
sequences for existing business and industry structures, due to higher costs and more
regulation. Second, in many cases environmental reforms require social changes and new
and innovative political and societal actions. Hence, the political ideology hypothesis
according to Dunlap (cf. also, Van Liere and Dunlap, 1980, 185) can be summarized
that political ideological cleavages leave a molding in individual’s environmental risk
perception. In the case of the United States, the cleavage is between Republican and
Democrats, and more broadly speaking between more left liberal and more right-wing
conservative individuals.
Dietz and colleagues also note that “political liberalism” serves as a very consistent
ideological factor to predict environmental beliefs and pro-environmental action (Dietz
et al., 1998, 464). It seems, as Finucane et al. (2000b, 170) conclude in their study
on the white male effect in the United States that hazardous technologies and activities
are perceived as a greater risk for people who put “more weight on distributing wealth
equitability and endorsing community-based regulation” as well as put less weight on
the “importance of individual achievement,” social values that are closely related to po-
litical liberalism. The value gap and the predominant left-right distinction, not only in
the United States, can be found in many areas of life. Liberal, left wing ideologies on
the political identity scale are associated with the ideas or social domains of progress,
quality, feminism, and other vague concepts such as flexibility, chaos, and rebellious-
ness. Conservative right wing ideologies are associated with hierarchy, order, stability,
tradition, and conformity (Jost et al., 2008, 126).
As Kahan and colleagues (2007) argue a specific subgroup will try to protect their
individual and their sub-group specific identity, based on a strong commitment to pre-
defined cultural norms. It is important to understand that a more conservative ideology,
committed to maintaining the existing order, is based on an emotional process combined
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with social activities. Any outside attempt to challenge or question the existing order,
and with that the emotional foundations and its expressed social activities, will, result
in system justification tendencies. This effect will be stronger for people who place
themselves on the right hand side of the political ideology scale, compared to people on
the left hand side of the scale (Jost et al., 2008). In line with Feygina et al. (2010),
McCright and Dunlap (2011, 1165) argue that beside the system justification tendency
also the tendency to denial environmental as well as technological problems, such as
climate change or nuclear power is higher among more conservative people. Denying
problems is one means of protecting one’s own identity.
Kahan et al. (2007) furthermore argue that people form their beliefs according to
their cultural worldviews and since they are grouping themselves in different societal
subgroups, these beliefs are reinforced within the specific subgroups. Since there are
social dynamics within these groups that are reinforcing the existing believe structures,
outside or new informations are rarely received without filter strategies that translate
the new information into the jargon of the existing believe system. The new information
will either be accepted and integrated or resisted. Beside these theoretical approaches
based on worldviews and group cognition theory, McCright and Dunlap (2011, 1165)
argue that political and industrial power is an important motivation for the subgroup
of the white male to not change the existing believe structure. With the example of the
tendency to deny climate change among conservative white males, the authors refer to
the media power the conservative political elites and oil industry use to constantly repeat
the message that fits best to maintain their identity and power. McCright and Dunlap
(2011, 1165) point out that conservative white males will continue to denial climate
change “to defend the information disseminated within their in-group and to protect
their cultural identity;” they also will put effort to protect their economic status as the
elite and “are likely to favor protection of the current industrial capitalist order which
has historically served them well.” The hegemonic masculinity, I want to argue, has
created the ideological cleavages and the accumulation of power, implemented through
social institutions, based on inequality and discrimination. For me the most striking
evidence that the dominant system is trying to denial any changes can be found on the
acceptance of discrimination and inequality.52
5.3.7. Urban, rural, and regional differences
In their residence hypothesis Van Liere and Dunlap (1980, 184–185) state that urban
residents should be more likely to express higher concerns about the environment than
rural residents. The authors put forth three possible explanations. First, it is assumed
that urban residents are more likely to be exposed to environmental problems that
52 For instance, Finucane et al. (2000b, 166) show that 40.1% of the subgroup of white male disagree
with the statement “that the world needs more equal distribution of wealth.” In contrast to that
proportion among the rest of the population only (or still) 23.3% disagree with that statement, a
much lower proportion.
146
5. Contextual and individual factors shaping risk perception
affect their health such as air pollution, noise or toxic contamination and, hence, should
express higher levels of concern. The exposure to bad environmental conditions is the
cause for higher levels of concern. A second explanation is based on the assumption that
different occupations lead to different attitudes towards the environment. It is assumed
that rural residents are more involved in nature-extractive occupations that uses the
environment as a resource, such as farming, lumbering, or mining. Rural residents
therefore developed an utilitarian attitude towards the environment and are less aware
to perceive the environment as part of their lives that needs to be protected. A third
explanation, related to the economic growth explanation, assumes that the size of a town
correlates positively with environmental concern because small towns are competing with
larger human settlements and extract their resources to maintain economic growth as a
way to survive (Freudenburg, 1991).
An additional explanation can be put forth arguing that socio-economic status in
rural environments influences environmental risk perception. Bastide et al. (1989, 218)
could show in their French study on risk perception that farmers living in villages were
more optimistic or less concerned about the consequences of risks when rating risks and
its mortality rates. The farmers’ optimistic views showed many similarities to people
who lived in the city or were better educated and had more income. An U.S. study by
Freudenburg (1991) on the contrary, could not find lower levels of environmental concern
among farmers and rangers compared to residents in the same communities. People
working in the agricultural sector were even more likely to express higher levels of concern
compared to people with other occupations. His results support the economic growth
and the nature-extractive explanation because the lowest levels of concern could be
identified among coal mining and growth-related business occupations. Socio-economic
changes in rural communities, such as growing population rates and new employment
opportunities, are also changing resident’s risk perception. In a comparison of different
rural communities across the United States, Hamilton and colleagues (2013) showed that
in areas with high growing populations and occupations that were not resource-based,
residents were more likely to accept environmental rules that were more likely to restrict
economic development.
The relationship between of place of living and environmental attitudes seems to
matter but the empirical results do not indicate that there is one dominant relationship
(c.f. for instance Olofsson and Öhman, 2006) and, hence, no clear explanation can
be identified. The relationship varies between places and between risks (Freudenburg,
1991). Attitudes are associated with socio-economic factors such as the occupational
sector that is dominant in a specific area. The effect of place on environmental risk
concern should be used with caution when used as explanatory factor because socio-
economic factors such as education, income, or gender seem to have comparably more
explanatory power (Dietz et al., 1998).
The effect of place or region should also be reflected from a broader historically and
politically perspective. Environmental topics are highly emotional, of symbolic value
and can be used by decision makers to gain support for their own political ideology or
147
5. Contextual and individual factors shaping risk perception
to oppose existing political power structures, even if there are no economic or deeper
social interests involved (Freudenburg, 1991, 194). The nuclear energy issue, a topic
of high symbolic value, also serves as a political topic to oppose political decision from
state authorities for separatists movements in European countries, such as in the French
region of the Brittany, in the Spanish Catalonia and Basque region, or in the United
Kingdom in Wales and Scotland (Kurlansky, 1981). This seems to be the case, especially
in countries that are politically highly centralized, such as France, and countries that still
have historically grown political conflicts between the central government and cultural
minorities, having the majority in one specific part of the country. As Kurlansky states,
the anti-nuclear movements in that areas are a mixed group of environmentalists and
separatists, creating a security problem for the technology within a government’s national
territory.
5.4. Cross-national differences in (nuclear) risk perception
This section addresses questions about the comparison of cross-national and cross-
cultural approaches to explain risk perception. The overall question is whether there is
a universal explanation of risk perception such as the psychometric paradigm approach
(compare Section 4.2.2) or whether risk perception varies highly due to cultural differ-
ences, the anthropologist’s approach. In the later case, it is assumed that the social
fabric in which humans are embedded are shaping individual’s risk perception: the eq-
uity structure, values of justice and religious ideologies, the concepts of property and
sovereignty, the value of nature (Rappaport, 1996, 160).
Boholm (1998, 160) in her overview on cross-national risk perception studies, states
that comparative studies should aim to improve the theory to explain the observed
results and should contribute to get a deeper understanding of the underlying principles
that may vary across cultural boundaries or are quite similar across different cultures. It
is also important to compare the underlying structure, if possible, that forms individual’s
risk perception in different cultures. For instance, in the case of a comparison of nuclear
risk perception in Japan and the United States (Rosa et al., 2000), different mechanisms
forming risk perception in both countries seem to lead to the same observed levels of
risk perception. Blind empiricism for the sake to produce observable differences, without
reflecting the possible explanatory factors, will not be helpful to reveal the difficult
to access areas of human’s risk perception, especially in a cross-national comparison
(Faucheux, 1976).
In a cross-national comparison between the United States and Japan, Rosa et al.
(2000) tested whether risks, measured with the psychometric paradigm, are perceived
differently between two different cultures (c.f. also Kleinhesselink and Rosa, 1991). Both
countries are on a high industrialized level, however the historical development and cul-
tural heritage of both nations is different. Analyzing nuclear risk perception, the authors
tested the cognitive structures that eventually result in images of a risk’s catastrophic
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and dread potential. Even though the risk perception was quite similar between both
cultures, the underlying processes turned out to be fundamentally different. According
to the author’s model, Japanese respondents create their catastrophic images as a func-
tion of both lack of individual knowledge and perceived little control over risks. The
American respondents seem to perceive catastrophic risk images as a function of lack of
scientific knowledge about a risk and perceived little control (Rosa et al., 2000, 206).
Regarding the cross-cultural validity of the psychometric paradigm Boholm (1998,
143) concludes in her comparison of cross-national studies (e.g, Lichtenstein et al., 1978;
Goszczynska et al., 1991; Karpowicz-Lazreg and Mullet, 1993) that, even if differences in
factor scores appeared, the main factors were related to dread potential and knowledge.
Hence, the cognitive structure of risk perception, as measured by the psychometric scale,
can be assumed to be quite similar across different national and cultural boarders.53
Nevertheless, to claim that the psychometric approach is able to explain all possible risks
in the future seems to go to far: “However, the conclusion that the cognitive structuring
of risk should be regarded as universal seems to reach too far, since it is hardly likely
that the psychometric scales adopted by reasons of their use in earlier studies, would
exhaust all possible meanings of risks” (Boholm, 1998, 143).
A comparison of nuclear risk perception between the United States and France re-
vealed that respondents in both countries express similar levels of concern about nuclear
energy’s hazardous nature (Slovic et al., 2000a). In both countries, nuclear waste and
nuclear energy were perceived as very high risks for safety, health, and environmen-
tal quality. The same levels of risk perception indicate, as the authors remark, that
risk perception cannot explain the different levels of acceptance or reliance on nuclear
energy that exist in both societies (Renn and Rohrmann, 2000b, 215). This result is
surprising because in France nuclear energy is still widely accepted by the major parties
and public institutions. A clear difference between both countries was found in public’s
trust-relationships towards scientific expertise, industry, governmental institutions, and
policy-makers. In France, respondents trusted that the public elites have the best ex-
pertise to make the necessary decision about nuclear power. Respondents in the U.S.
showed lower levels of trust in public elites and expected that citizens should be involved
in the decision making process regarding all nuclear issues (c.f., also Karpowicz-Lazreg
and Mullet, 1993). These historically grown differences in political culture explain the
observable differences in nuclear risk culture in both countries, the authors conclude.
In the United States, people want to be involved in the decision making process, not
trusting public authorities to act in the best possible way or in public interest. In France
the political culture is based on trust in the elite-structure, assuming that the best avail-
able experts will be consulted and that the bureaucratic structure will actually create
the optimal solution. For French respondents, nuclear energy is also more likely to be
perceived as a technology of national interest fostering economic growth and social well
being (Renn and Rohrmann, 2000b, 216).
53 It should be taken into consideration that the sampling process of countries is a non random process.
A generalization on a global scale is problematic.
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Similar to previous research on risk perception in France and the United States (c.f.,
Karpowicz-Lazreg and Mullet, 1993), women in both countries were more concerned
about nuclear power than men. The sub-group of white males in both countries was
more likely to support nuclear power and expressed lower levels of risk perception. White
males in both countries tend to have higher income and were better educated, were more
likely to believed in authoritarian and anti-egalitarian worldviews, and regard risk taking
behavior, technological and scientific progress as source for economic growth and wealth
(Renn and Rohrmann, 2000b, 216). Comparing additional sociodemographic factors,
beside gender, in the U.S. as well as in the French sample (Slovic et al., 2000a, 82–85),
no clear age differences were detected. In both samples people with lower education
expressed higher concerns about future consequences especially the immoral heritage of
nuclear waste for future generations. In both countries, respondents with college educa-
tion or higher education levels were more likely to perceive nuclear as controllable and
well understood by scientists and were more likely to perceive nuclear as an acceptable
risk.
Testing cultural prototypes as explanatory factor for risk perception, Slovic et al.
(2000a) could not separate and identify different groups, suggesting to regard worldviews
as an ideal type of value orientation that individuals use to judge risks. What could
be observed was that respondents expressing more egalitarian worldview tended to be
anti-nuclear, whereas more pro-nuclear attitudes were expressed by people holding more
individualistic and more hierarchical worldviews.
In a cross-national comparison of the psychometric approach, Goszczynska, Tyszka,
and Slovic (1991) tested whether the basic factor structure can be observed across respon-
dents in the United States, Poland, Hungary, and Norway. There was similar agreement
on the two factor structure dread potential and familiarity, across all respondents, espe-
cially in Poland and in the United States. Hungarian respondents, on average, expressed
the lowest risk concerns. The authors hypothesize, that a country’s size and its media
coverage of risk events could be an influential factor that shapes individual’s available
information on risks. The Polish sample ranked warfare and nuclear weapons among
the most dreadful risks. Nuclear energy was perceived as highly unknown but ranked
as a quite moderate threat risk. Economic and social risks, such as economic crisis or
social tensions, were perceived as more of a threat than the technological risk of nuclear
energy (Goszczynska et al., 1991, 190–191).
In a cross-national comparison of samples from Australia, Germany, and New Zealand,
Rohrmann (1994, 160) concludes that cross-national differences in risk perception are
rather small. In all countries, psychological factors, such as dread potential or familiarity,
seem to play a more important role in judging risks than objective criteria such as mor-
tality rates or cost/benefit calculations. Furthermore, individual’s cultural orientations
turned out to be a source to identify differences in risk perception. What Rohrmann
(1994, 152) defines as ‘technological’ orientation seems to influence risk perception neg-
atively. People with a more ‘ecological,’ or ‘feminist’ orientation expressed highest levels
of risk concern. However, what seems to matter more than cross-national differences
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are differences between ideological or societal subgroups within a country. For instance,
in Germany the polarization is higher compared to the polarization in Australia for the
acceptability of technological risks such as chemical industry or nuclear power.
Given the broad spectrum of a society’s explanatory factors on risk perception, and
given the possible interplay of factors within the social fabric, it is of no surprise that in
her comparison of cross-national research on risk perception Boholm (1998, 160) suggests
a more detailed investigation, using quantitative as well as qualitative methods, of the
social “background factors,” such as gender or socio-economic status, and the “ideologi-
cal” factors, such as political orientation. The role of the political power structure and
the underlying trust relationships among elite subgroups, as well as marginalized groups,
seem to reproduce ideological cleavages that are reproducing the order of hierarchy and
authority.
Since risks are socially constructed, risk perception approaches that consider both
views, i.e. the value based cultural and the socio-economic based view, as I conclude,
could be an indicator to detect the prevalent power structure among social entities and
its sub-cultures. The role of national and international media as information source and
amplification stations for changes in risk perception and with that the language how
risks are communicated54 is also a factor, not to neglect in risk perception research in
cross-national comparison.
5.5. The accident effect on nuclear risk perception
In the following part, I will continue to provide an overview of previous studies on risk
perception in either one country or in a cross-national comparison. This part will also
focus on studies that specifically examine the effect of an nuclear accident on people’s
nuclear risk perception, such as the accidents in Fukushima (2011, Japan), Chernobyl
(1986, Ukraine), or Three Mile Island (1979, USA). This overview will by far not be
comprehensive, given the broad range of studies on environmental and technological
risk perception since the 1970s. The aim in this part of the dissertation is to learn
more about the extent and the interplay of the above mentioned social background
factors and underlying ideological factors, in order to get a deeper understanding of the
social structures that shape nuclear risk perception. It is furthermore important for my
work to understand the effect of a sudden event like a nuclear accident on individual’s
risk perception. This overview is quiet selective and done by snowballing a reference
through the available scientific databases, such as ‘Cross Ref’ or ‘pro quest’ using the
keyword search function to search in selected scientific journals for keywords such as
‘risk perception’ and ‘Fukushima.’55
54 Compare for instance for a cross-national comparison of risk communication in the United States
and Germany (Dunwoody and Peters, 1992).
55 Boholm (1998, 137) is reporting a similar strategy for her overview on risk perception research.
151
5. Contextual and individual factors shaping risk perception
A study that quite clearly shows the different individual and social factors that form
nuclear risk perception and attitudes toward nuclear power is Withfield’s et al. (2009)
article ‘The Future of Nuclear Power: Value Orientation and Risk Perception.’ The
authors use an adapted values-beliefs-norms (VBN) model to examine the combined
direct and indirect effects of human values and social context variables that form, from
their point of view, attitudes towards nuclear power. The dependent variable is the
acceptance of nuclear power. Nuclear risk perception in this model is one explanatory
factor of risk acceptance. The authors use a structural equation modeling (SEM) to test
the VBN model. According to the SEM analysis, values such as traditional or altruist
value orientation influence attitudes toward nuclear power indirectly through trust in
political and nuclear organizations. People, holding more traditional beliefs expressed
greater support, whereas more altruist people expressed higher levels of opposition to
nuclear power. Individual demographic factors such as political orientation, age, race,
and gender only indirectly through their value orientation have an effect on nuclear risk
perception and, hence, the support or opposition of nuclear power. Education turned out
to be the only demographic factor that directly influenced individual’s risk perception
on nuclear power. People with lower education expressed higher perceived risks.
According to Withfield and colleague’s work, trust in the managing institutions and
the perceived risk of nuclear power are the main direct influencing factors that define
whether people are in favor or against nuclear power. Values indirectly and directly
also influence attitudes towards nuclear power (Whitfield et al., 2009, 433). Given the
interplay of demographic factors, trust in institutions, and value orientation, the authors
conclude that individuals cannot be blamed for being too rational or too irrational when
forming their attitudes and expressing their judgements about nuclear power: “It shows
that the individual decisionmaker is neither an isolated, cold, calculating maximizer of
the rational actor paradigm, nor is the “cognitive cripple” ruled by incoherent thinking
once believed in the psychology of risk. Instead, the decisionmaker exhibits a rich com-
bination of cognitive insight, social and emotional intelligence, and cultural awareness,
all anchored by fundamental values showing concern for others and the environment”
(Whitfield et al., 2009, 433).
Nuclear attitudes are deeply routed in the value system and not easily changed or
modified by communication strategies, that tries to convince the public of risks and
benefits of technology (c.f. Eiser et al., 1990, 110). The strong reliance on values helps
individuals to select the relevant information behind competing sources of information.
It simplifies the process of testing and assessing the evidence of competing views. The
idea of Bayesian updating (c.f. for example Bassett and Jenkins-Smith, 1992) explains
why depending on the initial strength of individual’s a-priori beliefs, new information
changes these prior beliefs to a varying degree: “In essence, we are suggesting that
members of the public are informal Bayesians, so that their values and general beliefs
are strong priors, and information presented in the media or in survey instruments are
given limited weight in updating assessments” (Whitfield et al., 2009, 427: footnote 8).
I will refer to perceive the public as “informal Bayesians” in Section 7, examining the
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immediate effect of the Fukushima accident on nuclear risk perception.
The authors put forth the argument that the public’s attitudes towards nuclear tech-
nology in the United States are historically grown and closely linked to the anti-governmental
and anti-nuclear protests in the 1970s. This argument underlines the importance of val-
ues that influence nuclear attitudes. Social movements expressed not only concerns
about the thread of nuclear technology and nuclear war, but against a highly centralized
state and a militarily organized security system that would be needed in order to man-
age and control nuclear power. The anti-nuclear movement, was a movement against an
elite system based on the foundations of military and industrial progress, and techno-
scientific reasoning – or as the authors express: a “technoscientific-industrial-military
elite” (Whitfield et al., 2009, 434).
In the United States, as well as in Japan the historical context seems to matter. In
both countries nuclear technology is perceived as a risk because of its combined and
unknown consequences such as the fear of an accident as well the fear of nuclear war
(Hinman et al., 1993). In the case of Japan, contrary to the U.S., nuclear risks are
perceived as known rather than unknown. It is assumed that in the case of Japan the
historical experience of bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 is explaining
the knowledge about nuclear risks rather than cultural differences between these tow
industrialized countries (Kleinhesselink and Rosa, 1991).
In a UK based study using data from the Eurobarometer 2005, Costa-Font and col-
leagues (2008) argue similarly to Whitfield et al. (2009) that attitudes toward nuclear
power depend to a great extend on individual’s political orientation and trust in man-
aging institutions. The authors argue that nuclear is a politically sensitive issue and by
judging nuclear risks people activate basic values that are held and expressed by their
party affiliation: “[t]he party affiliation then becomes their anchor from which to eval-
uate risks” (Costa-Font et al., 2008, 1274). Due to limited knowledge, experience, and
information it is assumed that people use their party affiliation as an anchor heuristic
(compare Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) to evaluate the risk of nuclear power. Results
show that more knowledgeable people express lower acceptance of nuclear power (Costa-
Font et al., 2008, 1284). These results question the assumption that more knowledge
and better information about nuclear technology will reduce individual’s risk percep-
tion. These results support the above mentioned doubts about the ‘Knowledge Support
Hypothesis’ (compare Section 5.3.1) and adds more evidence to what Sheldon Ungar
calls the “knowledge–ignorance paradox” (Ungar, 2000). Knowledge only is one factor of
many in the interplay of values and available information that forms nuclear attitudes.
The complex interplay of values, demographic factors, trust in institutions, and avail-
able information does not allow for the assumption that there “exists any single or stable
public ‘opinion’ on such complex matters” (Pidgeon et al., 2008, 69).
Pidgeon and colleagues, in a study in the United Kingdom in 2005, analyzed public
attitudes towards nuclear power and climate change. In the case of two highly controver-
sial risks, such as climate change and nuclear power, public opinion about the combined
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risks is not a simple risk-risk tradeoff (i.e. that people would prefer one risk over an
other, such as the conclusion, to prevent climate change, people are willing to accept
more and clean nuclear energy) but a value driven evaluation that seeks for new and
more sustainable solution in the future, such as new strategies for renewable energies
(Pidgeon et al., 2008, 81). Historically in the UK, the public has expressed constant
concerns about nuclear energy, especially after the accidents of Three Mile Island and
Chernobyl and still remains skeptical about its use in contributing as a energy source
to tackle the unexpected consequences of climate change (Corner et al., 2011). Corner
and colleagues (2011, 4830) emphasize the concept of “reluctant acceptance”, perceiving
nuclear energy (see also Bickerstaff et al., 2008) as a necessary evil to swallow. It turned
out that environmental values negatively influenced public’s support for nuclear energy
even, if nuclear was framed as a solution to climate change and energy security issues.
The influence of pro-environmental values by activating heuristics to evaluate nuclear
energy indicated that people still perceive nuclear as an uncertain and insecure technol-
ogy. The authors assume that when confronted with a judgement about nuclear energy,
people in the UK seem to feel tension between their analytic and affective reasoning.
Only when people were able to express their concerns about nuclear power, when being
a reluctant supporter, did increase the chances to support nuclear power as a means
against global climate change (Corner et al., 2011, 4831).
The paper by Corner et al. was written right before the nuclear accident in Fukushima.
In a postscript the authors are mentioning the accident (Corner et al., 2011, 4831). From
their point of view, the nuclear accident in Fukushima is comparable with the nuclear
accident of Chernobyl regarding the damage of the power plant, radiation released,
and the loss of safety systems. From the authors’ point of view, it is unclear what
long-term impacts the accident has on nuclear attitudes. Most of all, the accident
reveals the “social resilience” (Corner et al., 2011, 4831) among the public. As nuclear
is perceived as a dreadful and unfamiliar technology, even feelings and attitudes of
familiarity and acceptance are not forearmed to be overrun by latent anxieties and
concerns people still hold (Parkhill et al., 2010). Policymakers, if trying to promote
nuclear as an environmentally friendly technology, should therefore keep in mind, when
deciding future’s energy strategies, the fatal consequences of unwanted negative events
that are able to happen at close or distant placed at any time.
In the following part I now want to more closely examine the consequences of a major
nuclear accident, such as in Fukushima and Chernobyl, on nuclear risk perception in
selected countries. I will start with analyses that examined the effect of Chernobyl.
In a study of a local British community, located near a nuclear power plant, Eiser et
al. (1989) compare attitudes towards nuclear power before and after Chernobyl. The
authors expected that the accident would increase anti-nuclear attitudes. This overall
effect of the accident is assumed to be diminished by several cognitive strategies to resolve
a possible dilemma because of the new incident (c.f., Abelson, 1959). Eiser et al. (1989,
690) mention four strategies: 1) differentiation, i.e for example that British nuclear
power can be trusted but not Soviet one, 2) denial, i.e. for example that people refuse to
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accept the scale of the accident, 3) bolstering, i.e. for example emphasis on the benefits of
nuclear technology, and 4) transcendence, i.e. for example the accident was an unwanted
event that helps to improve and to learn more about the technology. Depending on the
selection and the combination of available coping strategies the assumed negative effect
of a nuclear accident should be less pronounced. As a second theoretical explanation,
the authors mention the “accentuation theory” (Eiser and van der Pligt, 1982, 226).
According to this approach, respondents will rate evaluations of risks according to their
a-priori acceptance of a risk leading to a polarization among members of a community
after an accident. People holding anti-nuclear attitudes will perceive anti-nuclear ratings
as either too rational or as an alarming trend of ignorance in the community leading
to an increase in risk perception. People holding pro-nuclear attitudes prior to the
accident on the other hand will perceive anti-nuclear statements as too concerned and
hysteric, leading to an decrease in nuclear risk perception or acceptance (Eiser et al.,
1989, 691). The reported results of the before and after comparison of nuclear attitudes
show that there was a shift towards more nuclear concern among respondents. Women
were more concerned before and after the accident. It also turned out that respondents
holding more pro-nuclear judgements paid less attention to and were less frightened
by the news reported in the media about Chernobyl. The accentuation effect and,
hence, the polarization was more clearly observable by pro-nuclear respondents. The
authors also state that the absolute changes of nuclear attitudes were not large, given
the large media reports on the Chernobyl accident. Therefore, the “absolute size of this
effect should not be exaggerated” (Eiser et al., 1989, 699). According to the author’s
conclusion, a-priori attitudes towards nuclear energy act as mediator and attenuate or
amplify new information. It is also the case that the rarity of an event of an accident is
perceived as an isolated event or as an event that is part of a more general danger.
A nuclear accident should change or rises conflicts in people’s belief structure due
to at least two possible reasons. The first reason, as explained above, is an update
of the actual probability or consequences of an unlikely event, revealing that previous
estimates have been too optimistic. A Dutch study by Verplanken (1989) supports this
argument, reporting an increase in the assumed probability of a nuclear accident in The
Netherlands. The second concern people may express is society’s vulnerability and the
perceived options individual’s have to reduce that vulnerability in the future (Eiser et al.,
1990).
Renn (1990) analyzed changes in public attitudes towards nuclear power in Western-
European countries after the Chernobyl accident. Regarding the formation of attitudes
after the nuclear accidents he assumes an “inoculation effect” (Renn, 1990, 156). The
inoculation effect states that people holding a-priori positive attitudes will be immunized
against a negative event or the negative information of an accident. People feeling
uncommitted, expressing a-priori a ‘don’t know’ answer, will be more likely to perceive
an incident as an opportunity to make a decision towards more skeptical attitudes of
nuclear power. According to the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), people
with strong attitudes will try to avoid cognitive dissonance due to new information
155
5. Contextual and individual factors shaping risk perception
by ignoring or downplaying unwanted information. This strategy holds best for minor
negative information of nuclear incidents. The initial shock of the new information will
soon be outbalanced by the cognitive heuristics that serves to regain the predominant
attitude.
In case of a major accident simple heuristics to form attitudes do not work anymore
(Renn, 1990, 157). In such a case, cues serves as orientation to form an opinion. As
cues serves the opinion of a strong reference group as well as trust in institutions. Renn
assumes that immediately after an accident all available cues provide negative informa-
tion. Interest groups and other organization will then form new positive laden cues to
provide new evidence so as to overcome the accident’s initial shock. The pre-accident
levels of public’s attitudes can be regained through assurance from trusted public insti-
tutions about a community’s or country’s safety. According to this concept, a constant
change of attitudes will occur if ongoing negative information constantly questions the
positive counter-evidence provided by social groups.
Renn (1990, 159) founds support for his inoculation concept by comparing opinion
polls of the acceptance of nuclear power before and after the Chernobyl accident in
Europe. Countries, such as France, Spain, and the United Kingdom, prior to the accident
showed highly structured, i.e. committed and clearly defined, nuclear attitudes and
were not much affected by direct contamination from the fallout. In these countries,
the sudden shock of the accident did not raise public concerns much, and within a year
attitudes towards nuclear power leveled back to pre-accident levels. Renn concluded,
that because of strong a-prior support of nuclear power in these countries, a permanent
shift in risk perception was not observed. Countries with highly structured attitudes
prior to the accident that were more directly affected by the fallout in Chernobyl, such as
The Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Austria, West Germany, and Switzerland, did react
more dramatically after the accident. Still, the initial shock of the accident diminished
more or less after a year and pro-nuclear attitudes recovered. Greece is an example of
an attitude shift towards more concerns about nuclear power, that did not recover to
pre-Chernobyl levels. Greece was not affected much by the fallout but many people
expressed uncommitted or undecided positions a-priori to the accident. Therefore, Renn
concludes that attitude changes will only occur in countries, or communities, that are
directly affected by the negative consequences or that a-priori hold a strong proportion
of indecisive or indifferent opinions about the risk, an indicator for ambivalent feelings
and opinions. These findings are supported by a longitudinal study in The Netherlands
(Midden and Verplanken, 1990). The authors show that supporters of nuclear power on
average held less stable attitudes compared to opponents. It turned out that supporters
expressed more ambivalent tendencies in judging nuclear risks and benefits compared to
opponents.
The Swedish population was directly affected by Chernobyl’s nuclear fallout. Peo-
ple changed their attitudes because of a change in risk perception and because of the
perceived effects of the accident (Drottz-Sjöberg and Sjöberg, 1990, 146). The shock
was counterbalanced to pre-Chernobyl levels by authorities trying to communicate pro-
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nuclear attitudes that on the one hand emphasized the relevance of nuclear power for
national’s economy, and on the other by expressed trust in the national power industry
and its capability to prevent nuclear accidents. There was one group of people whose
attitudes were much more affected by the accident resulting in higher and long lasting
anti-nuclear attitudes: farmers, as well as women, and people who lived in the Gävle
area, the area that was the most exposed to nuclear radiation, expressed much higher
levels of concerns after the accident. The authors of the Swedish study conclude that:
“subgroups of our sample who reported high levels of worry and of perceived risks, apart
from subjects in the specifically exposed region, fit nicely into a category of subjects
more related than others to food production, human reproduction and care” (Drottz-
Sjöberg and Sjöberg, 1990, 147). The feeling of responsibility for lives of others and
future generations, the idea of care taking, not only for one’s own future but for the
whole social entity might be one main factor that is triggered when you or your commu-
nity is exposed to the immediate and future consequences of a nuclear accident. Men in
the most affected area Gävle show higher levels of risk perception compared to men in
the rest of the country. It seems that the actual stress of the accident combined with
forced changes in daily routines, such as changes in eating habits and outside activities,
affects long term nuclear risk perception.
A study in West Germany, which was also directly affected by the nuclear fallout,
notes the “massive disruption in people’s daily life” for everyday routines, most obviously
the change in peoples’s diet (Peters et al., 1990, 132). The available information and
its inherent inconsistencies, contradictions, and uncertainty after the accident fostered
people’s orientation towards intuitive and emotional judgements, forming a subjective
measure of the given uncertainty. Trust in institutions eroded right after the accident,
indicating that there was no accepted authority in West Germany able to provide enough
information to maintain trust and credibility. The long term consequences of the Cher-
nobyl accident in Germany are reported as being split. On one hand, the uncertainty
about the health threat was not relieved even two years after the accident. What changed
was the alarming public debate about Western Germany’s energy needs in the future.
This debate lost its intensity over time. The authors wonder why the political opposition
against nuclear power did not show higher levels and did not last longer. The authors
conclude that nuclear accidents are perceived as, what Charles Perrow calls, ‘normal
accidents’ (Perrow, 1999) resulting in, what I would call an agony of modernity, or “the
price one has to pay for the highly industrialized society and the consumer-oriented
lifestyle” (Peters et al., 1990, 133). Earle and Cvetkovich (1990) criticized the use of
the term of a ‘normal accident.’ The authors explain, in a response to the Peters’ et
al. paper, that Perrow’s idea of a normal accident, is that normal accidents are not
event that occur outside but an inherent part of systems that are tightly coupled and
complex in terms of their interactions. They are a result of complex technologies and,
hence, ‘normal’ or unavoidable. Chernobyl is an example of an accident of a coupled
and complex system.
A study by Lindell and Perry (1990) reveals, when comparing attitudes towards nu-
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clear power in the U.S. before and after Chernobyl, that the expected likelihood of a
nuclear accident did not change significantly. The authors conclude that the experience
of the Chernobyl accident did not lead to a polarization among respondents, rather to a
convergence revealing that people’s risk perception can decrease by learning that even an
major accident has not the a-priori expected catastrophic potential. This study does not
support the assumption of changes in attitudes after a nuclear accident. The accident did
not change people’s judgement of an accident’s likelihood and people’s vulnerability did
not increase because the accident did not show the a-priori expected fatal consequences.
The Fukushima accident in Japan in 2011, unfortunately, offers the unexpected op-
portunity for social scientists to test changes in nuclear attitudes due to a major nuclear
accident. It can be shown that the nuclear accident changed nuclear acceptance (Siegrist
and Visschers, 2013; Visschers and Siegrist, 2013; Kim et al., 2013). Often the focus of
studies is to explain how risk perception negatively affects acceptance of nuclear tech-
nology (Hartmann et al., 2013; Stoutenborough et al., 2013). The nuclear benefits are
not part of the research question. In a Swiss study Visschers and Siegrist (2013) com-
pare changes in risk perception before and after the nuclear accident. The authors use
a longitudinal panel design of two waves to test how social trust in nuclear regulation
agencies, perceived benefits, and perceived risks of nuclear power influence nuclear ac-
ceptance. Before the Fukushima accident, acceptance of nuclear energy in Switzerland
was influenced to the most part by the perceived benefits and to a smaller degree neg-
atively influenced by respondent’s risk perception. Trust had a negative influence on
perceived risks and a strong positive influence on perceived benefits. The panel design
revealed that trust in 2010 (first wave before the accident) was strongly correlated with
trust in 2011 (second wave after the accident). The model after the accident showed
the same functional relationship as before the accident. After the accident, respondents
reported higher levels of risk perception and lower levels of perceived benefits and trust,
resulting in an overall lower acceptance of nuclear energy in Switzerland. The direction
of the determinants of nuclear acceptance among the public did not change over time. In
the observed time period, the most obvious change and the most influential determinant
was not change in risk perception, but change in the perceived benefits. The authors
put forth two explanations for this effect (Visschers and Siegrist, 2013, 343). Prior to
the accident people already acknowledge the potential fatal consequences of a nuclear
accident and the actual incident is only a confirmation of previously derived expecta-
tions. A closer look at respondent’s potential benefit structure opens the space for an
alternative explanation. Previous studies on nuclear acceptance did show that oppo-
nents of nuclear energy mostly held strong negative images of nuclear power, whereas
proponents hold both, positive as well as negative images of nuclear power (Midden and
Verplanken, 1990; Peters and Slovic, 1996). Hence, it is quite unlikely that people who
perceiv nuclear power as beneficial a-priori to an accident are free of doubts about the
technology. A nuclear accident, such as the Fukushima accident, is able to increase the
negatively laden images of nuclear power among proponents, but does not affect, to the
same degree, the already negatively laden image structure of opponents. The authors
conclude that “the impact of perceived risks had not changed much after the Fukushima
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accident and that perceived benefits remained the strongest predictor of acceptance”
(Visschers and Siegrist, 2013, 343). The authors also emphasize trust as an important
factor that is able to change people’s attitudes towards technologies (cf., Nakayachi,
2015). Trust remains an important factor that indirectly through risk perception and
perceived benefits influences acceptance of nuclear power.
Quite similarly, a more recent Swiss study examined the mid-term effect of the Fukushima
accident in two waves, one conducted 15 months before the accident and 20 months af-
ter the accident. Siegrist et al. (2014) examined explanatory factors behind why Swiss
people changed from proponents of nuclear power to opponents or became undecided.
Similarly to the above mentioned studies (cf., Visschers and Siegrist, 2013; Siegrist and
Visschers, 2013) people with a-priori high benefit perception were less likely to change
their acceptance of nuclear power. People with lower benefit perception, were more likely
to become opponents of nuclear power or undecided. Perceived risks of nuclear power
did not significantly influence changes in acceptance. The authors also controlled for
gender and age as explanatory sociodemographic factors. In the regression analysis, age
turned out to negatively influence acceptance of nuclear power. Older people showed
lower acceptance of nuclear power after the accident, and older people who a-priori ac-
cepted nuclear power in Switzerland were more likely to oppose nuclear power after the
accident. The authors concluded that the accident of Fukushima did not change peo-
ple’s risk perception, but rose doubts about the economic and environmental benefits of
nuclear power for future needs (Siegrist et al., 2014, 361). The geographical distance of
the accident is also a possible factor why changes in nuclear attitudes among the public
can mostly be explained by changes in the benefit perception of nuclear power.
The geographical distance could also be a possible explanation for why, in a compar-
ison of nuclear risk acceptance before and after the accident of Fukushima (Poortinga
et al., 2013) in Great Britain and Japan, the population in Great Britain still held strong
acceptance levels even after the accident. People in Great Britain, for instance, still
supported governmental strategies to increase nuclear power production in the future.
According to the authors, Japanese respondents changed their attitudes “dramatically”
(Poortinga et al., 2013, 1210). The changes in acceptance of nuclear power were influ-
enced to a great extend by low trust levels in Japanese’s safety regulation agencies. The
authors conclude that in Great Britain the benefit structure of nuclear power did not
change after the accident, whereas in Japan it declined. In Japan, the results indicate
that compared to pre-Fukushima levels, at least in the short run, nuclear power was less
accepted as a mean for energy security and climate change mitigation.
The direct effect of the Fukushima disaster on environmental concern in Germany
was examined in a paper by Goebel et al. (2015). The authors use a Difference-in-
Discontinuity model to identify the causal effect of the accident, comparing respondent’s
attitudes before and after March 11, 2011. In Germany there was an immediate increase
in environmental concern56 and an immediate decrease after the German conservative
56 Environmental concern was measured by the question: “What is your attitude towards environmental
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government announced the ‘Nuclear Phase-Out Bill’ (Atomausstieg) on May 30, 2011.
Female respondents showed the strongest effects in changing their attitudes. Support-
ers of the German Green party did not change their attitudes much after the accident,
indicating that supporters of the Green party already had a-priori high environmental
concerns. Green party supporter expressed higher reliefs once the Nuclear Phase-out
Bill was passed. In this case, a sub-group of green female supporters drove the observ-
able changes in attitudes: “In fact, (female) Green supporters are driving the observed
phaseout relief effect” (Goebel et al., 2015, 1161). The authors conclude that a nuclear
accident can impose negative externalities not only to the local population, but can rip-
ple to distant countries around the world. This study also showed that the proportion
of people who perceive themselves as ‘very risk averse’ increased after the accident the
closer the people lived near a German nuclear power plant.
An analysis of media attention in the U.S. after the Fukushima accident indicated that
an increase in media attention leads to a decrease in nuclear acceptance. The authors
assume that after the accident anti-nuclear ideologies and environmental views effectively
mediated the effect of the accident (Besley and Oh, 2014). The authors also identified a
change in individual’s risk and benefit perception in the U.S., assuming that individuals
changed their opinion about governmental institutions responsible for nuclear energy.
Also in a German study by Arlt and Wolling (2015), a media analysis clearly indicates
that agents in the governmental and economic sector changed their attitudes from an a-
priori nuclear prone position towards a more nuclear skeptical position (Arlt and Wolling,
2015, 12). Pro-nuclear positions were only held by the nuclear energy industry whereas
most public actors focused on skeptical topics, such as risk and security. The authors
conclude that media coverage was a main driver in attitude changes among the German
population.
5.6. An integrative model of risk perception
I want to close the section on risk perception by introducing the integrative model of
risk perception developed by Renn and Rohrmann (Renn and Rohrmann, 2000b; Renn,
2008, 141–144). According to the author’s view, and shown in my work, risk perception
is a multi-facetted concept shaped by individual as well as social factors. Individuals
try to integrate attitudes about risks into their existing and consistent belief system.
The socially constructed views of risk can be perceived as more or less strong a-priori
attitudes that can be changed through new hazard specific information, such in a case
of an accident, but it remains unclear to what degree new information is changing pre-
existing attitudes on specific risks.
The integrative framework as described by Renn and Rohrmann (2000b) is an at-
tempt to combine the existing mixture and variety of different scientific perspectives
protection? Are you concerned about it? (a) Very concerned, (b) Somewhat concerned, (c) Not
concerned at all” (Goebel et al., 2015, 1144).
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and school of thoughts, taking into account the whole spectrum, ranging from intuitive
individual heuristics to culturally shaped worldviews (compare Figure 10). The frame-
work is designed not only to focus on the individual person and its characteristics as
the relevant information processor, but also to integrate higher aggregated social and
cultural influences. The framework consists of four levels; each level is embedded in the
next higher level: “to highlight the mutual contingencies and interdependencies among
and between individual, social and cultural variables” (Renn, 2008, 141). Furthermore,
each level contains individual as well as collective manifestations of risk perception. The
first level includes collective and individual heuristics of information processing. The
second level includes factors for cognitive and affective information processing of risks.
The third level comprises social and political institutions and socio-political individual
factors. The fourth level includes the cultural background and worldviews that shape
individual’s identity.
(Source: Renn, 2008, 141, Fig. 4.4)
Figure 10: Integrative framework of risk perception.
The first level of collectivistic and individual heuristics represents the mechanisms in-
dividuals use to derive and to form their judgements about risks (compare Section 4.2.1).
Heuristics are common-sense reasoning patterns that have been developed in human his-
tory over the course of evolution. They are independent of the actual risk source and
can be applied broadly. Renn also mentions that heuristics may differ across cultures,
161
5. Contextual and individual factors shaping risk perception
even though he states that across cultures heuristics show a “surprising degree of uni-
versality” (Renn, 2008, 141). Studies indicate that heuristics are common in every day
life problem solving processes (c.f. for example, Gigerenzer, 1991, 2008b). Even though
heuristics are an intuitive approach to problem solving, individuals are able to learn
to adopt specific heuristics to specific problems and to use additional knowledge from
logical reasoning or statistical procedures to adjust their a-priori intuitive judgements
(Braga et al., 2015). Renn concludes on the usage of the first level of his framework: “Re-
gardless of the normative value that these heuristics may offer, they represent primary
mechanisms of selecting, memorizing and processing signals from the outside world and
pre-shape the judgements about the seriousness of the risk in question” (Renn, 2008,
142).
On the second level are collective-affective factors that shapes attitudes about a spe-
cific risk source. The qualitative characteristics of a risk source can be examined by using
psychometric variables, such as familiarity, dread potential, or personal control (com-
pare: Section 4.2.2, Section 4.2.5, and Section 4.2.7). Integrating different characteristics
forms the perceived seriousness and dread potential of a risk, that can differ between
societies (Rosa et al., 2000). On the individual level, emotions play an important role
in forming risk attitudes (Loewenstein et al., 2001; Slovic et al., 2002; Finucane et al.,
2000a; Peters et al., 2004). Especially when conflicting information is provided, affec-
tive signals are used when judging risk. On the collective level stigma effects (compare
Section 4.2.8), intertwined with emotional and communicative processes, are a collective
response to avoid reactions to risks.
The third level, the socio-political institution level, entails scientific approaches that
explain the judgements of risks by referring to the social institutions that are perceived
by individuals to be associated with a risk (compare Section 5.2.3). The most im-
portant aspects are trust in political and social institutions that govern risks or the
perceived benefit of a risk. On the individual level, personal values that form judgments
of risk perception as well as social attributes such as the socio-economic status are ex-
pected to influence risk attitudes (compare Section 5.3). Risk on this level is evaluated
through social mechanisms that can be based on concepts of equitable distribution of
risks (Linnerooth-Bayer and Fitzgerald, 1996; Knight and Warland, 2005). The role of
media, as well as an individual’s social background are forming different views on risks
(Wahlberg and Sjöberg, 2000).
The fourth level is the cultural background (compare Section 5.2) that has been de-
scribed by proponents of Cultural Theory (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983; Thompson
et al., 1990; Cornia et al., 2014). Even though Renn holds a skeptical view of this ap-
proach, due to methodological aspects (c.f., also for cautious remarks on the explanatory
power of cultural theory Johnson, 1991; Sjöberg, 2000), he perceives the described four
or five prototypes in Cultural Theory as an useful approach: “All authors agree, how-
ever, that specific culture-based preferences and biases are, indeed, important factors in
risk perception. The disagreement is about the relevance of the postulated four or five
prototypes within the realm of cultural factors” (Renn, 2008, 144).
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For future research Boholm (1998, 160) is summarizing the relevance of individual as
well as for cultural factors to get a better understanding of the multi-facetted nature of
risk attitudes: “Fields for cross-national research into the perception of risks that augur
well for the future, appear to be the role of ‘background factors’ such as gender and
social marginality, education and occupation. Broad ‘ideological’ issues, especially those
relating to understandings of political matters and trust in the orders of dominance and
authority, might also be predicted to attract increasing attention.”
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6. Empirical research I: Cross-national comparison of
nuclear risk perception: Nuclear risk perception in
the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany,
and Japan before the Fukushima Daiichi accident
6.1. Introduction: atoms for peace
In New York City on December 8, 1953, United States’ President Dwight D. Eisen-
hower held a speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations titled ‘Peaceful
Uses of Atomic Energy’. His address became know as the ‘Atoms for Peace’ address.
Eisenhower proposed using nuclear knowledge and nuclear technology peacefully and
suggested building international institutions, such as an “Atomic Energy Agency” re-
sponsible for distributing fissionable materials and knowledge to places in the world in
need of electrical energy. From his point of view, the aim was to make nuclear technology
a means of providing prosperity and wellbeing for humanity to “adapt it to the arts of
peace” (Eisenhower, 1953)57. The former five-star general of the United States Army in
World War II suggested institutional efforts to stop the nuclear arms race. He most of
all points out that the Unites States, as the former monopolist of nuclear knowledge,
is willing to help motivated partners all over the world to use nuclear technology as an
element for peace to stem the symptoms of a rising war that is separating the world in
two blocks: “move out of the dark chambers of horror into the light” to create “peace
and happiness and well being.” “In this enlightened age,” as the President continues to
emphasize in 1953, “the great powers of the earth, both of the East and of the West, are
interested in human aspiration first, rather than in building up the armaments of war.”
Nuclear technology bears the power to bring peace across the world, that is the basic
message Eisenhower addresses in his speech. In his speech the president of the United
States also mentioned the “fearful atomic dilemma,” indicating that the development of
a nuclear bomb had driven the world into a Cold War. To examine this dilemma in
more detail in this introduction, I want to briefly summarize the development of nuclear
technology. How could nuclear technology develop into an important technological means
that on one hand provides a hazardous potential to destroy humanity, the “nuclear
holocaust” (Giddens, 1990, 8; Jasanoff, 2006, 30) as described in Section 3, and on the
other can be seen as able to provide prosperity and peace?
In Alamagordo, New Mexico, on July 16, 1945, the United States successfully tested
the first atomic bomb. On August 6, 1945, the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hi-
roshima in Japan and three days later a second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki,
only few days before Japan surrendered on August 15, 1945, the end of World War II. A
57Document available at http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/all_about_ike/speeches/atoms_
for_peace.pdf (accessed October 15, 2015).
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huge military, industrial, and scientific complex, with a fast investment of money, called
the Manhattan Project, made it possible to create an atomic bomb before the end of
World War II. In August 1949, the Soviet Union successfully tested their first atomic
bomb, accelerating the nuclear arms race. In Arco, Idaho, in December 1951, the Exper-
imental Breeder Reactor I (EBR-1) produces the first small amount of electric power.
In Obninsk, Soviet Union, in 1954, the reactor AM-1 (called Atom Mirny – peaceful
atom) started to operate. In 1953, the first Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) Mark 1
designed for the first nuclear submarine USS Nautilus started operating and after Presi-
dent Eisenhower signed the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the civic nuclear power program
started 1955 with the Power Demonstration Reactor Program and experimental reactors
started supplying electricity in Santa Susana, California and Shippingport, Pennsylvania
in 1957.
In the late 1950s, it seemed that the atom had created a world order without a war
between the two super powers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union. In 1956 Alvin Wein-
berg calls that situation a “Thermonuclear Peace” (Weinberg, 1956, 302) and scientific
knowledge enables that peaceful way of living. From his point of view, the merits of
nuclear technology will be an important element of peace for all human beings. No
radical political ideology, neither nationalism nor communism, will become dominant in
an age of abundance and unlimited energy supply, so his opinion. For Weinberg nuclear
technology is the beginning, the “advent,” of a new “Scientific Era,” a “Scientific Revolu-
tion.” An era without wars, because science will provide enough for everybody: “science
making an abundance available to all” (Weinberg, 1956, 301). The optimism Weinberg
expresses is driven by the conviction that in the near future new revolutionary progresses
in science will solve all technological problems and that all practical and social problems
are solvable through technology and scientific reasoning. In the same enthusiastic way
Admiral Lewis L Strauss mentioned, in 1954, to the National Association of Science
Writers, New York City, that nuclear energy will soon be an energy “too cheap to meter”
(Freudenburg, 1988, 48).58
Nevertheless, freeing the atom bears very obvious its own risks; it is a “Faustian
bargain” between a technological elite and society, as Weinberg emphasizes (Weinberg,
1972, 33). The scientific merits of nuclear technology need specific social conditions,
some of which have not been existing. According to Weinberg, nuclear technologists
provide cheap and clean energy in return ask for social vigilance and long lasting social
58 At that time Strauss was the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission who saw
the atom as an (technical) element of a peaceful future. The quote in full length as published on
the New York Times, August 7, 1955 indicates that cheap energy is perceived as an important
aspect of wellbeing, prosperity, and peace for future generations: “It is not too much to expect
that our children will enjoy in their homes electrical energy too cheap to meter; will know of great
periodic regional famines in the world only as matters of history; will travel effortlessly over the
seas and under them and through the air with a minimum of danger and at great speeds, and
will experience a lifespan far longer than ours, as disease yields and man comes to understand
what causes him to age. This is the forecast of an age of peace.” (Source: http://media.cns-
snc.ca/media/toocheap/toocheap.html (accessed October 29, 2015))
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institutions to take care of the possible risks of nuclear accidents, nuclear transport, and
nuclear waste disposal in the future. He compares his proposed bargain with society
with the nuclear weaponry technology that brought peace in exchange for the existence
of a hazardous technology. The new technology also established new social structures, “a
military priesthood,” as Weinberg calls the institutional structures necessary to control
and to manage the arsenal of nuclear weaponry. In 1972, 20 nuclear power plants
existed in the U.S. producing less than 3% of the total electricity in the U.S., with 40
more nuclear utilities to be ordered a year later. At that stage of nuclear development,
Weinberg prophesied similar demands, such as vigilance and long lasting institutions,
for a society that decided to use nuclear technology not as weaponry but for energy
production. Technologist, from his point of view, can never offer certainty about nuclear
safety in the future, but the best knowledge and means to safely create nuclear energy by
“creating a continuing tradition of meticulous attention to details” (Weinberg, 1972, 34),
by practicing vigilance and by becoming a technological priesthood for peaceful nuclear
energy usage. However he knows that this technology needs a social commitment to
create an infinite stable social system, a “permanent social order,” until a new and better
technology is invented to provide energy for society to a lower level of risk (Weinberg,
1972, 34).
Weinberg concludes that scientific means are limited and nuclear technology cannot be
considered a safe technology. The matter of nuclear safety is a questions that is beyond
the, best and most responsible, scientific scope and judgement because it has “trans-
scientific elements” (Weinberg, 1972, 34). Depending on vigilance and a stable social
order, Weinberg is also aware that not the scientific community nor political elites, rather
society is responsible for deciding about the future of nuclear energy: “The society must
then make the choice, and this is a choice that we nuclear people cannot dictate. We can
only participate in making it. Is mankind prepared to exert the eternal vigilance needed
to ensure proper and safe operation of its nuclear energy system? This admittedly is
a significant commitment that we ask of society. What we offer in return, an all but
infinite source of relatively cheap and clean energy, seems to me to be well worth the
price” (Weinberg, 1972, 34). For Weinberg it is still a “Faustian bargain” and at the end
nuclear is not a technology “too cheap to meter,” as Strauss claimed it. Nuclear has its
price and it is society’s choice to judge the price and to decide to accept the bargain
or not, civic vigilance in perpetuity. Even though Weinberg is an ardent proponent
of nuclear technology, he addresses the social requirements for a safe usage of nuclear
technology.
Weinberg also points out that all social actors within a society and not a technocratic
elite is responsible for deciding how nuclear technology should be used in the future.
Therefore, public nuclear risk perception, as I conclude, can be perceived as an indicator
of public acceptance of nuclear power (cf., Siegrist and Visschers, 2013). Furthermore,
comparing the historical development of nuclear technology within different societies
can help to better understand to what degree nuclear technology is accepted as means
for a country’s prosperity and peaceful development. In this chapter I will examine in
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more detail how dangerous nuclear technology is perceived in five selected societies. I
compare nuclear risk perception in the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany,
and Japan using data conducted in 2010, before the nuclear accident in Japan on March
11, 2011. My aim is to examine the social foundation of nuclear risk perception. I
chose five developed countries because these countries created ambitious civil nuclear
programs in three continents. In these five countries, 223 nuclear power stations were
under operation in 2015.59
The United States and Great Britain were the driving forces behind the Manhattan
Project and the development of the nuclear bomb in World War II. The technological
knowledge developed in the U.S. was shared between both countries after World War II,
enabling Great Britain to develop their own nuclear program in 1952. France developed
their own nuclear weapon program in 1960. The U.S., Great Britain, and France are
three of the five states that are recognized as nuclear weapon states by the Treaty of
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, beside Russia and China. Germany is the largest
European country that decided to stop their civil nuclear energy programme after the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident. Japan developed a huge nuclear project and oper-
ates the largest number of nuclear power plants in an Asian country. The Fukushima
accident brought the nuclear project to a temporary stop. To compare nuclear risk
perception across different countries I analyze social factors that influence risk percep-
tion and compare the results across the five selected countries using logistic regression
models. To better understand the historical development of nuclear technology in all
five countries, I recapitulate the development of the nuclear project in each country and
also social reactions to that development since the beginning of the nuclear age after
World War II. In Weinberg’s language, I want to better understand who is claiming to
be the priesthood of nuclear technology? In the historical revision of the trans-scientific
development of nuclear energy, I want to know: How was the nuclear energy program
established and institutionalized in each country? Did a technocratic elite establish nu-
clear technology or was is a democratic process? How did each country’s anti-nuclear
movements develop parallel to the development of nuclear energy? Was the anti-nuclear
movement able to influence the nuclear project to make it a democratic and not a tech-
nocratic project?
6.2. Historical overview of the nuclear projects and anti-nuclear
movements
In 1980, one year after the Three Mile Island nuclear accident in the United States, Alvin
Weinberg was less optimistic about public support for nuclear energy, because nuclear
59 In 2015, the U.S. had 99, the UK had 15, France had 58, Germany had 8, and Japan had 43
nuclear power station under operation (Japanese’s nuclear reactors listed as operational, are not
producing electricity since the accident). A total of 442 nuclear power stations were world wide
under operation in 2015. Source: IAEA PRIS database, https://www.iaea.org/PRIS/home.aspx
(accessed on March 13, 2016)).
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power seemed to be perceived as having been imposed on society by a dominant elite. He
writes “I am aware of a current mood of rejection of electricity as being the energy form
epitomizing centralization, corporate authoritarianism, and bigness” (Weinberg, 1980).
Byrne and Hoffman (1988) argue in their article ‘Nuclear Power and Technological Au-
thoritarianism’ that in the case of the U.S., France, and Great Britain collaborative
coordination and trans-national technological transfer between governmental, scientific,
industrial, and military institutions were an important element in nuclear energy de-
velopment. From a governmental point of view, in his farewell address U.S. President
Eisenhower (1961)60 calls that institutional conglomerate that guarantees peaceful de-
velopment in a technological era the “military-industrial complex,” with an important
contribution of scientific knowledge: “research has become central” as he emphasizes.
Byrne and Hofmann argue that a consortium of scientific, military, and industrial
interests is interested in the development of nuclear energy. This process is not a demo-
cratic process as the authors emphasize (Byrne and Hoffman, 1996, 2). On the contrary,
institutionalized nuclear development undermines democratic principles and ideals. Fur-
thermore, the nuclear project has created authoritarian structures in politics and econ-
omy promoting authoritarian scientific institutions. Nuclear technology has always been
a promising technology with acceptance in the population. Social protest against nu-
clear technology remained limited, also because nuclear technology is a symbol of the
predominant technological progress that created today’s developed societies (Byrne and
Hoffman, 1988). To what degree the development of nuclear power, though accepted
by parts of the populations, has been a democratic process cannot clearly be differen-
tiated. The existing political setting, or as Kitschelt calls it, the “political opportunity
structure” (Kitschelt, 1986, 58), in a country, allowed state authorities and civil society
actors to influence the development of a country’s nuclear energy program to a different
extend.
In the aftermath of the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, Alvin Weinberg saw the
nuclear project in danger and jopardized by an ill-informed and hysteric public and scien-
tific community, people who are not able to rationally process the possible consequences
of radiation, and, hence, call for irrational actions. From Weinberg’s point of view, this
irrationality is a “modern form of witchcraft” (Weinberg, 1980, 403) that exaggerates
the consequences of a reactor’s radiation and ignores the hazardous potential of natural
radiation. According to Weinberg, the nuclear energy system can only survive if public’s
exaggerated hysteria can be tamed. Complaining about public reactions against nuclear
power he says: “It took two centuries to get over our fear of witches. I hope it will take
much less than that to overcome our fear of this newer witchery” (Weinberg, 1980, 403).
Byrne and Hofmann assume that the apparatus of technological authoritarianism will
answer to any accident with increased efforts to justify the technological development
of interests. From the authors’ point of view, that means, that because of nuclear tech-
nology technical authority will continue to replace political and democratic authority; it
60Document available at http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/PDFFiles/Dwight%20D.
%20Eisenhower%20-%20Farewell%20Address.pdf (accessed, 15. October 2015).
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means that the national security institutions will be granted more competences; meaning
in turn that the technological ideology and the calling for more progress and develop-
ment will be promoted by the authoritarian structures to undermine and further limit
public autonomy and civil rights (Byrne and Hoffman, 1988, 668). In some countries,
such as (West) Germany and to some degree in the U.S., anti-nuclear movements were
able to more or less successfully stop or to slow down the development of the nuclear
project. Beside opposition, there is also support for nuclear technology in these coun-
tries, especially among certain sub-groups within the population, as I will show in my
research.
Nuclear technology, has been and I suppose will always be, a topic that creates tension
in society. I continue to present in more detail the historical development of the national
nuclear projects and the anti-nuclear movements. The comparison of anti-nuclear move-
ments in all five countries has its limitations and is not strictly following a deep and
systematic comparison of different key aspects in each country, because I focus on an
empirical comparison of survey data. Even though I mention the influence of the po-
litical context within which social protest of the anti-nuclear movement is taking place,
I neglect for example to systematically compare a country’s existing political opportu-
nity structure (compare for a systematic evaluation for example Kitschelt, 1986; Rucht,
1990; Carmichael et al., 2012) or do not control for socio-political macro-variables, I
then could use in a hierarchical linear model design (compare for example Jenkins et al.,
2008). Yet to better understand today’s observable differences in survey data, for me it
is important to also understand the historical development of the anti-nuclear movement
and historically grown institutionalized structures in society.
Independent of the anti-nuclear movement, in the case of any social protest or social
movement, it is important to mention that according to Kitschelt (1986, 63-64) national
authorities can better implement policies first, if the state is ruled by centralized gover-
nance structure and not for example by a federal split of competences. Second, if the
state is controlling key market institutions and economic resources, such as the finance
sector, enabling the executive bodies to influence policies independent of the existing
market mechanisms. Third, if the judicial opportunities are low, i.e. if the judiciary is
not independent of the executive decision making bodies, national authorities are to a
high degree immune against third parties who take legal actions to stop policy imple-
mentations (cf. for example De Fazio, 2012; Doherty and Hayes, 2014). The role of state
owned media is also an important aspect that is directly influencing public acceptance
of policy implementations, as Rucht (1990, 212) is mentioning.
6.2.1. United States
The historian, Dieter Rucht remarks that the anti-nuclear movement in the U.S. became
a broad social movement after the energy crisis in 1973 – 1974. As a consequence of the
rising anti-nuclear movement, political institutions in the U.S. started a debate over the
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country’s national energy policy (Rucht, 1990, 198). At that time, the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC), founded in 1946 to develop a peaceful nuclear energy project, was
responsible on one hand to promote nuclear technology, and on the other to regulate
and control nuclear technology. This double function raised doubts among the public
and policy makers. Among the civil society in the U.S., established organizations such
as the Union of Concerned Scientists or the Sierra Club and other organizations, such as
Friends of the Earth or Natural Resources Defense Council, raised their critical voices
and started to argued against nuclear technology and its regulatory bodies. After 1974,
the anti-nuclear movement coordinated themselves better and established a firm network.
At the same time doubts about nuclear technology’s safety raised concerns among the
population. Motivated by the anti-nuclear mass movement and well coordinated anti-
nuclear networks, local groups took more and more legal actions against nuclear projects,
such as new nuclear sites, transport routs or nuclear waste deposals. Access to the mass
media played an important role in the success of the anti-nuclear movement in the United
States. The anti-nuclear movement at that time could activate the mass media, even if,
such in the case of a referendum in California, the initiative was not successful. Beside
the consolidation of the anti-nuclear movement (e.g. the nation wide Critical Mass
Conferences where held in Washington D.C. in 1974 and 1976) and legal intervention
there was other direct action taken against nuclear sites, such at Seabrook, New Hapshire
in 1976.
In the eyes of Rucht, this protest culture was also a general protest against estab-
lished political power structures and a technocracy prone to large technology projects
(Rucht, 1990, 200). Moreover, the anti-nuclear movement developed into a decentralized
but well connected organization that used different strategies and forms of action in all
levels of the political system to stop the development of nuclear power: “Nuclear power
production faced a full-blown oppositional movement with an elaborated ideology, so-
phisticated arguments, a decentralized but effective organizational structure, and a clever
use of strategies and forms of actions” (Rucht, 1990, 200). Similar to Rucht, also Joppke
argues that the anti-nuclear movement in the U.S. was a movement of fragmented and
well organizes groups reflecting well the decentralized political structure of the political
system in the U.S. (Joppke, 1993, 191). The political opportunity structures in the U.S.
is an open and inclusive system allowing interest groups to organize themselves and to
take legal actions against nuclear projects (Dryzek et al., 2002; Kitschelt, 1986, 661).
The slowdown of nuclear projects in the 1970s in the U.S. also happened due to
structural changes in the energy sector. Beside public opposition after the energy crisis,
the nuclear industry market faced also an economic, institutional, and structural crisis.
The industry faced an increase in costs and higher safety standard, and was constantly
struggling with construction delays. At the same time, the demand for electricity was
lower than expected. As a consequence, the utilities in the U.S. cancelled more than
hundred nuclear reactors in the 1970s and 1980s (Yang, 2011, 3025). Structural reasons
such as a fragmented industry and low degrees of standardization among nuclear reactors
led to an increase in costs due to low levels of technological learning among the nuclear
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power plant operator and the producer.
The Three Mile Island nuclear accident in Pennsylvania on March 28, 1979 accelerated
the slow down of the development of nuclear power in the United States. Large protests
against nuclear technology took place in Washington D.C. and New York City. At
that time the anti-nuclear movement established itself as a watchdog able to mobilize
protests against nuclear power. Even thought, the nuclear crisis was not because of the
anti-nuclear movement, Rucht still argued that “the anti-nuclear movement in the USA
has won the battle” (Rucht, 1990, 200). According to Yang (2011, 3027-3028) the U.S.
are not expected to successfully start a nuclear renaissance in the 21st century. From
the author’s point of view, the market in the U.S. is too fragmented and lacking common
standards leading to high costs and construction delays. Because of lower energy demand
and limited regional accessibility, new nuclear projects are small (on average in the U.S.
there are two reactors per site) lowering the ability to learn from previous projects at the
same site. Hence, the industry faces a great financial risks installing expensive nuclear
technologies. Unlike in France and in China, the government in the U.S. is not directly
backing financially nuclear energy projects. Furthermore, in the U.S. regulatory bodies
are not able to prescribe a specific technology to be built but depend on the decision
making process of private investors, most often regional energy consortiums with many
stakeholders. From my point of view, the given economic, political and social structure
in the U.S. makes it quite unlikely that nuclear technology will be revitalized in the
21st century. The nuclear project in the U.S. has passed too many structural changes
since the Manhattan Project started in 1942. In the U.S., the postwar period before the
energy crisis was characterized by a corporatist political structure, independent of public
interests. New legislations broke that unyielding process and created a more pluralistic
process, open for antinuclear interests to influence the licensing process of new nuclear
power plants. This erosion of corporatism resulted in higher costs for utility operator,
who did not get financial support from state authorities. As a result, the cancelation
of already ordered nuclear power plants increased and finally stopped after the Three
Mile Island accident in 1979 (Hatch, 1996, 207). Even though the U.S. was still the
country with the most operating nuclear power plants in 2015 (99 out of 442) it is not
be expected that this number will rise dramatically in the future (currently there are
five power plants under construction, all at existing sites, and 33 have been shut down
permanently) (IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency, 2015). Moreover, the share
of nuclear energy of the total energy production in the U.S. in 2015 was according to
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at 20%.61
6.2.2. Great Britain
In 1954 the UK Atomic Energy Agency (UKAEA) was founded and in 1955 in the
White Paper ‘A Program of Nuclear Power’ Great Britain’s nuclear energy strategy was
61 Source: IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency, 2015, https://www.iaea.org/pris/
CountryStatistics/CountryDetails.aspx?current=US (accessed March 15, 2016).
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presented to the decision making bodies. Already in 1947, it was decided to build a
British atomic bomb, resulting in the first atomic weapon test in October 1952 in Monte
Bello, Australia (Hill, 2013, 347–348). In 1957 the first British H-bomb was tested on
Christmas Island. The first nuclear commercial power plant to open in Great Britain
was Calder Hall in 1956. Soon after, in 1957 the first nuclear accident at Windscale
happened. In 2015, 15 nuclear power plants were still operating and 30 were permanently
shut down.62 The last nuclear reactor connected to the grid was the Sizewell reactor
build in 1995. Great Britain is continuing to build nuclear power plants with foreign
partners. In October 2015, a deal with a Chinese consortium was signed to build two
new nuclear power plants to be connected to the grid in 2025.63
In the early stages of nuclear power, the development of nuclear energy was in the
hands of “consummate administrators” (Hill, 2013, 3) working for the UKAEA. The
UKAEA was an autonomous institution, independent in their decision making power
of elected politicians. Similar to the UKAEA the Central Electricity Generating Board
(CEGB), a nationalized industry, decided autonomous about electricity generating mat-
ters in Great Britain. Elected politicians at that time had almost no or little influence
on national energy decisions. The authorities worked for elected ministers, but the de-
cisions on nuclear power were taken by the authorities and not by the ministers (Hill,
2013, 3). In 2013, according to Hill (2013, 2) all nuclear facilities in operation are owned
by Électricité de France (EDF) and in Great Britain there are no companies able to
build new nuclear power stations. Great Britain needs foreign partners to build new
nuclear power plants.64
In the 1950s, in the early period of nuclear power, the public, as well as the local
communities, more or less supported the technology. In the 1970s and 1980s, public’s
support for nuclear energy changes to opposition: “Environmental groups began cam-
paigning against nuclear power using arguments which were distinctly suspect from a
technical point of view, but which resonated with the general public mood” (Hill, 2013,
4). Already in 1958 the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) started its political
protests (Veldman, 1994, 115) in Great Britain. Among its most well known supporters
were Bertrand Russell and George Kennan. The protest in Great Britain was, according
to Veldman, based on a worldview that was suspicious to technological development and
rejected the idea that scientific knowledge, especially empiricism, was the ideology to
finding truth. There was a tendency towards “transcendence” and the “supernatural” in
the British environmental movement, as Veldman observes (Veldman, 1994, 2-3). The
driving idea behind the anti-nuclear protests was not only to campaign against a dan-
gerous technology, it also was an idealistic movement aimed at creating a better society.
In the 1950s, the CND turned out to be a middle-class movements mobilizing women
62 Source: IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency, 2015, https://www.iaea.org/PRIS/
CountryStatistics/CountryDetails.aspx?current=GB (accessed March 15, 2016).
63 Source: http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-China-agrees-to-invest-in-new-UK-
nuclear-plants-2110155.html (accessed March 15, 2016).
64 The British design of nuclear power stations, mostly built in the 1950s and 1960s, were gas-cooled
reactors, a design not built anymore.
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and men from different social backgrounds, able to mobilize mass protests with several
thousand participants on various marches. The CND was a closed network of indepen-
dent organizations, first campaigning against the British nuclear weapon program, then
in the 1980s, fighting against U.S. cruise missile deployment in the UK (Veldman, 1994,
117). According to Veldman, the CND movement in the 1960s wanted to see Britain as
a peaceful country, without nuclear technology, the neutral power between the two fight-
ing superpowers: “Nuclear disarmament would allow Britain to revivify its own culture.
Britain could then not only lead the neural nations, particularly the developing areas,
into a more peaceful and prosperous future but also serve as a mediator between the two
superpowers” (Veldman, 1994, 118). The topic of nuclear disarmament was also con-
troversially discussed in the Labour Party between left-wing opponents and right-wing
proponents of a British atomic bomb (Brandon, 1987, 45), which continuously fueled
concerns of a broad anti-nuclear movement at that time.
The anti-nuclear movement in the UK, was also a movement protesting against the
undemocratic political process that went along with the development of the atomic
bomb and its institutional structures. Both the decision to start the program, as well as
the final decision to use the bomb, was a nondemocratic process as the CND claimed:
“The Bomb threatened to destroy the very democracy that it was designed to protect”
(Veldman, 1994, 201). In the heart of the campaign’s ideology was also the distrust of
the logic of scientific reasoning and the rational logic of cold war strategy. People, as
the campaigners claimed, should trust their feelings: “CND saw that one of its central
missions was to convince ordinary individuals that they knew better than the experts,
that the almost instinctive emotional revulsion against the idea of nuclear war should
be trusted as much as or more so than any strategic calculation” (Veldman, 1994, 202).
The CND anti-nuclear movement dried out in the 1970s. The British anti-nuclear
movement was born again at the beginning of the 1980s when the Greenham Common
started their protests. The Greenham Common was a protest by women who organized
a camp to protest against nuclear missiles placed at the Greenham air base. This revival
of the anti-nuclear movement led to an increase of local organizations and peace groups
throughout the country. Any ecological or anti-nuclear involvement on the political
level depended on the commitment of the Labour party, as Brandon 1987, 98 states
because an ecological Green party could not be established. According to Koopmans
and Duyvendak the British anti-nuclear movement was a “very weak” movement because
it was not able to actually delay or stop the development of nuclear power plants. The
reduction of the nuclear energy program in the 1980s was not due to pressure from
the anti-nuclear movement but because of other difficulties in the nuclear energy sector
(Koopmans and Duyvendak, 1995, 246 (citing Rüdig, 1990)).
The anti-nuclear movement, as part of the environmental movement in Great Britain,
could not develop strong influences in national politics because the British political
system was, as described above, an informal technocratic system, with no influence of
civil society actors on nuclear issues. In the 1980s, an “authoritarian liberalism” (Dryzek
et al., 2002, 675) led to an active oppression of civil society actors and institutions
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dealing with environmental issues. The political opportunity structure, such as the
voting system, did not allow an environmental social movement to develop and to enter
the political sphere (Dryzek et al., 2002, 676). Great Britain, hence, can be evaluated
as an exclusive political system with low political opportunity structures to establish an
effective anti-nuclear movement.
6.2.3. France
In France political, military, scientific, and industrial elites were able to establish an
electrical energy system that is dominated by nuclear power. In 2015, 76% of the
total electricity production was produced by 58 nuclear power plants in operation, with
one nuclear power plant under construction in Flamanville (IAEA International Atomic
Energy Agency, 2015)65. The French nuclear electricity project started after the energy
crisis in 1974 and was planned, executed, and controlled by centralized and state owned
institutions. After the energy crisis, the French government declared the official policy of
“tout electrique, tout nuclèaire (only electricity, only nuclear power)” (Rucht, 1990, 201).
The design of the nuclear reactors was standardized and the sites larger compared to the
U.S., enabling more plants to be operated at the same site. Since the beginning of the
nuclear project, Electricité de France (EDF) has been the only national utility running
nuclear power plants and has been in charge of electrical power supply nationwide. This
state owned utility is financially backed by the state, which almost completely eliminates
the financial risks of building and running a nuclear power plant.
Due to new developments and rising public concerns about safety and environmen-
tal consequences, nuclear energy became a major public topic and entered the public
sphere in France in the 1970s. Before the energy crisis, the anti-nuclear movement was a
small movement with regional groups concerned mostly with ecological questions, among
them nuclear energy. According to Rucht, the French anti-nuclear movement was the
first movement that was active in Europe, starting its first protest in April 1971, in Fes-
senheim (Rucht, 1990, 200). In 1976, the anti-nuclear movement in France consolidated
and grew with support from the local population scientific groups, but lacked support
from national authorities and political institutions. The state owned medias held a pro-
nuclear opinion and, so in terms of mass media coverage, anti-nuclear opinions did not
get much of a platform. The support from governmental authorities was also lacking,
all major political parties and trade unions held a pro-nuclear position. During a large,
66,000 people, anti-nuclear demonstration in Malville in 1977 the situation between the
protesters and the police escalated. The event harmed the public credibility of the anti-
nuclear movement in the future. In the years after 1977, the movement was not able to
consolidate and failed to establish an ecological party. Rucht states that the movement
in France has always kept its fragmented status also because it was based on strong
individuals, divided by ideological cleavages and also driven by local separatists desires
65 Source: https://www.iaea.org/PRIS/CountryStatistics/CountryDetails.aspx?current=FR
(accessed March 18, 2016).
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in Alsace or in Brittany. Only one nuclear project, the reactor in Plogoff, Brittany, was
stopped 1981 due to public protests (Rucht, 1990, 203; Brouard and Guinaudeau, 2014,
143). The French exclusive political system (Kitschelt, 1986) and the low opportunity
structures for the civil society to gain access into the political arena did not lead to a suc-
cessful anti-nuclear movement and to no political participation in the political decision
making process.
According to Jasper (1996), in France, the forging of a new nuclear energy industry
was successful because it was actively managed by technocratic and industrial elites.
The public authorities could suppress public concerns, especially through media control.
As an example, Jasper refers to the Three Mile Island accident in 1979 when no critical
voices appeared in French medias. The centralized management of the entire nuclear
process led to lower costs of nuclear energy supply and strict regulation made the utility
management more efficient compared to, for example, the U.S. Jasper argues, that a
centralized government and its strong regulation institutions actively managed to make
nuclear energy an energy source and created the success of nuclear energy in France:
“The French managed to make their nuclear optimism a reality” [56](Jasper, 1996). An
analysis by Mycle Schneider (2008)66 states that in France a technocrat elite group of
engineers, graduating from the École Polytechnique was the pushing power behind the
project, more than the elected officials. According to the author, members of the Corps
des Mines have been holding all key positions in the agencies controlling the nuclear
project in France. Nuclear advisors of important political institutions, key positions in
industry and key positions in the regulatory bodies are held by members of the Corps
des Mines. The control of key positions by an elite circle and the monopoly of the
electric utility company EDF allowed for centralized long term planning, independent
of the actual political color of elected members of the government. More than that,
the nuclear project in France never separated into an civil and a military project, as in
the case of the U.S. According to Schneider, the administration of nuclear energy and
nuclear weapons is still under the control of one institutional body (Schneider, 2008, 8).
The French nuclear program has been a success and structural circumstances pre-
vented the nuclear project from a crisis, even after major nuclear accidents such as
Three Mile Island, Chernobyl or Fukushima. Schneider summarizes: “There is no doubt
that the French nuclear program represents a remarkable scientific, technological and
engineering performance. The implementation of a complex chain of facilities from ura-
nium mining to waste disposal, from uranium conversion to reprocessing, from uranium
enrichment to reactor operation over a period of five decades is the result of undisturbed
persistence. The program has been designed, developed and implemented under the
guidance of a powerful technocrat elite, beyond governmental changes and outside par-
liamentary decisions and control” (Schneider, 2008, 38). The scientific project in France,
like the Manhattan Project in the U.S., is an example of how the integration of science,
media, the state, the military, and the industry can form a social complex that provides
66 Available at http://www.nirs.org/international/westerne/258614beyondmythfr.pdf (ac-
cessed on December 15, 2015).
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the free space to create knowledge, infrastructure, legislation, and the energy demand
for a new technology. Since World War II in France, the military, technological, and
economic aspects of the nuclear project have been an important element for French’s
national identity and “French grandeur”, the feeling of national recognition within the
community of sovereign national states (Hecht, 1998, 325).
6.2.4. Germany
Before 1974, the anti-nuclear movement in West-Germany (I will refer in the following
to Germany) was marginal and only provincial. The dominant political practice was a
corporatism between governmental actors and institutionalized actors within a federal
state system. In 1975, anti-nuclear groups peacefully protested against the construction
of a nuclear site in Wyhl, Baden-Württemberg and spontaneously and illegally occupied
the construction site of Wyhl, resulting in an occupation of the site for several months.
The state government of Baden-Württemberg feared negative publicity when using police
force to remove protesters and started to negotiated with the joint protest groups of local
farmers and citizens from the nearby university city of Freiburg. The Wyhl protests can
be seen as the birthplace of a green movement in Germany, beyond traditional social class
boundaries, as Brandon points out: “an unlikely political alliance was struck between
country people concerned with the environment, largely conservative and middle-aged,
and young left-wingers, with a backbone of religious support. This combination was to
form the basis of the Green Movement” (Brandon, 1987, 95). The public authority was
surprised by the social dynamics of the Wyhl incident and could not develop a clear
strategy. In the same year, the license to build a nuclear power plant was withdrawn by
a court.
The example of Wyhl indicates that protest was not the first step of a local community
to raise concerns about a new to build nuclear power plant. Before the protest took place
in 1975, people living in the area, mostly wine farmers and rural conservative people,
were concerned. As a result they tried to address the state government directly to voice
their concerns. The protests started as the local people found out that the leading heads
in the federal government were deeply involved in the utilities and the construction com-
panies. The realization that a political dialogue would not be successful and historical
resentments against the federal state, combined with concerns about the environmental
impacts of a nuclear power plant on the wine region, resulted in direct action against the
nuclear site. The protests in Wyhl are an example how the protest culture of local and
traditional communities against state authorities and non-democratic decision making
processes shaped Germany’s green movement to a large extent: “it is highly significant
that one of the main catalysts of the Green Movement was the revolt by a traditional
conservative and rural community against the ‘technocrats’. Hence the issue of opposi-
tion to alien, technocratic forms of rule was a common denominator of the subjectivist
protest by both the young well-educated middle classes and conservative elements” as
Papadakis concludes (1984, 67). This early peaceful success of the anti-nuclear move-
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ment in Wyhl motivated further protests against nuclear projects in Germany, such as
in Gorleben or Wackersdorf.
In 1977 the mobilization of anti-nuclear demonstrations lead to direct conflicts between
groups of protesters and the police at places like Bronkdorf and Grohnde (Papadakis,
1984). Now facing well-prepared public authorities, the anti-nuclear movement tried
different strategies to influence the decision making process. Direct action and sabotage
were still a means to protest against the technology, along with promoting critical sci-
entific voices. Furthermore, within the established political parties, critical allies were
sought out and found. Education campaigners in affected neighborhoods started to in-
form the public about the potential dangers of nuclear sites for the community’s health
and safety. State authorities claimed that in return the energy is needed to guarantee
prosperity and economic growth (Papadakis, 1984, 69). Moreover, in 1980, the green
movements consolidated and a Green party was founded to directly influence political
decision making processes in the future.
The Three Mile Island accident provided a media platform for Germany’s anti-nuclear
movement. The accident raised the discussion of alternative energy sources for Germany
and the unsolved question of nuclear waste storage, in particular the planned nuclear
waste depository in Gorleben. Rucht summarized that in the late 1970s the nuclear
project in Germany became a widely discussed topic within institutions, such as the
scientific community, trade unions, and established political parties (Rucht, 1990, 205).
The nuclear topic never cooled down in the public sector and parliamentarian debates
and remained a hot topic until the next major nuclear accident 1986 in Chernobyl. Gov-
ernmental institutions at the state and federal levels lost credibility by their reaction to
this event. The Green party and large groups in established parties such as the Social
Democrats (SPD) or the Liberal Party (FDP), started taking an anti-nuclear positions.
The nuclear project slowed down in Germany and never found strong support after Cher-
nobyl. Most recently, after the Fukushima accident in 2011, the conservative government
shot immediately down old power plants and committed itself to nuclear phase-out by
2022, continuing the plan to shout down all power plants by 2021 that had already been
established under the first Social Democrat/Green party federal government in 2002.
Prior to the Fukushima accident, the government, under chancellor Merkel, took a pro-
nuclear position by allowing nuclear utilities to operate longer than 2021 and rethink
the decision of a nuclear phase out in Germany. As a result, protest against nuclear
power continued in the years 2008 till 2010 from direct action against nuclear waste
transports in Gorleben to mass demonstrations in Berlin and Munich in 2010, and, for
example, a human chain between two distant nuclear power plants in Krümmel and
Brunsbüttel. From my point of view, the anti-nuclear reactions with mass protests after
the Fukushima disaster in Germany, are not sudden explosions of irrational fear, but
can be understood in this context as a continuous awareness of nuclear danger that has
been part of the people’s protest culture since the beginning of the nuclear project in
Germany in the 1970s.
The nuclear project in Germany can be called ‘ended’, though a technology, such as
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nuclear technology, can never be called ‘ended’. In the history of Germany’s nuclear
projects mostly private companies, such as Siemens and state owned private utilities
worked together to develop peaceful nuclear technology. The federal government played
an important role in creating this cooperation in order to bring nuclear power to com-
mercialization. In 1955, a Ministry for Atomic Questions was established to coordinate
scientific, industrial, and governmental interests and resources to set up a nuclear project
in Germany. In addition the German Atomic Commission, was established. The idea
of being less independent on important energy resources using nuclear energy was sup-
ported by all established major political parties in Germany till the 1970s. After the
energy crisis in 1973–1974, the nuclear plan was to build 50 more nuclear power plants
(Hatch, 1996, 208–209).
At that time Germany’s nuclear project, a state supported industrial cooperation, was
slowed down because of the successful strategies of the anti-nuclear movement. Accord-
ing to Joppke, because of the tight interests of the federal as well as national government
and industry, the anti-nuclear movement in Germany turned to direct action, also as a
protest against the authoritarian strong executive state (Joppke, 1993, 191). Germany’s
legal system supported successful protests. The German legal court system acts on
the state as well as the federal level, offering more opportunities to access the legal
system and to slow down the licensing process (Kitschelt, 1986, 66). In Germany, un-
like in France, a atom law existed and prioritized safety above economic considerations
(Wiliarty, 2013, 290). Beside the favorable court system and legislation the electoral
system in Germany motivated cooperation between environmental groups to reach the
5% threshold to gain access to the federal or state governments. In 1980, the Green
Party was formed by environmental activist groups and soon gained significant political
influence becoming a powerful political institution for the anti-nuclear idea, resulting
in the fist nuclear phase-out legislation in 2002, by the fist Social Democrat and Green
party government in German history. In Germany, within an exclusive political system,
an environmental movement could develop and institutionalized itself within society and
the political arena. Even though the closed corporate German of a strong state system
existed, the legal as well as political opportunity structures of a federal government
and a proportional voting system allowed also to establish strong civil society struc-
tures (Kitschelt, 1986; Rucht, 1990). The strong state also functioned as a constantly
unifying element for the protest movement, allowing to mobilize people even after the
environmental movement established itself as a Green party in the public sphere. This
development allowed the movement to take at the same time direct and more radical
actions against nuclear project as well as a to take a moderate participatory role in
environmental politics (Dryzek et al., 2002, 671).
6.2.5. Japan
Similar to France, Japan relies on imported natural resources for country’s energy de-
mand. In 2010, Japan was the third largest producer of nuclear energy behind the U.S.
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and France (Nakata, 2011, 110). After the energy crisis in 1974, Japan’s decision mak-
ers decided to develop an ambitious national energy program based on nuclear energy,
which started the nuclear energy program. As a result, before the nuclear accident in
Fukushima, 30% of generated electricity was produced by over 50 nuclear power plant
throughout the country (Feldhoff, 2014). In 1963, a nuclear test reactor was built and
in 1966, the first commercial nuclear power plant started operation. To develop Japan’s
nuclear energy program, the Japan Atomic Energy Commission was built and in 1956,
this commission developed a long term strategy to develop a peaceful national nuclear
program. The government supported the development of nuclear energy in Japan by
spreading positive information about nuclear in the public medias, by supporting the
nuclear industry and by supporting the scientific institutions responsible to educate
nuclear engineers (Nakata, 2011, 99-100). The government also supported the local
communities where nuclear facilities were built. Though the utilities were privately run,
the Japanese government, especially the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI), played an important role in supporting nuclear development. For Nakata it was
a “bureaucrat-led economic structure” that controlled industrial development in Japan
and the joint interests between the government and its institutions, including cooper-
ations with the U.S. military, and the different industries allowed to make the nuclear
project happening (Nakata, 2011, 100). Most recently the Ministry of Economics, Trade
and Industry (METI) controls the nuclear industry, being on the one hand responsi-
ble for the national nuclear power development, and on the other hand to control and
regulate Japan’s nuclear safety.
From the very beginning, Japan’s public was not involved in the nuclear power devel-
opment, aside from deep skepticism about the consequences of nuclear radiation. As in
other countries, the public was expelled from risk assessment processes when new sites
for nuclear power plants where chosen. The consequences of radiation experiences after
the nuclear bombs were dropped upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War
II, created a great awareness of the negative impact of radiation on health. According
to Nakata, the government addressed public concerns by creating shame, blaming civil
society voices for being too skeptical, too vigilant, and creating unnecessary worries in
a country that needs nuclear energy for society’s future development and prosperity
(Nakata, 2011, 101). All 55 nuclear power plants operating in 2010 were built next to
the coastline and the sites were mostly chosen to be rural areas with declining popula-
tion density, because that made it easier to gain the support of local authorities and to
avoid public protests by providing governmental subsidies. Technical reasons, such as
the water cooling process, also led to decisions for building nuclear power plants near
the coastline.
According to Nakata (2011, 113) public protest against nuclear energy within the
Japanese society was quite unlikely due to two main reasons. On the one hand nuclear
sites were located in rather poor areas of the country and different financial incentives
made it attractive to the local communities to collaborate with the nuclear industry and
the government. Beside this structural reasons, it was and still is, a taboo to publicly
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criticize authorities. Japanese’s society is a quite homogeneous society and still quite
unified in topics related to security politics (Risse-Kappen, 1991, 493). Feldhoff therefore
concludes that the role of the government as supporter for nuclear power has been an
essential element that prevented the public from developing a nationwide anti-nuclear
movement in Japan. The rather fragmented movement could never learn to coordinate
and to build networks and institutionalized structures to directly influence governmental
decision making processes (Feldhoff, 2014, 91). For Japan’s governing apparatus, the
peaceful atom is also the entrance hall to keep the option to build a nuclear bomb. A
nuclear phase-out would leave Japan with a large amount of plutonium, able to build a
nuclear bomb, raising international questions about its future usage. A peaceful nuclear
energy program is an important element of national pride and national security sending
the signal to neighboring countries that Japan is able to build the bomb (Kingston, 2014,
117), a message that seems to be important from a domestic point of view.
Nakata also mentions that risk communication to the public is not regarded as mean-
ingful by authorities and nuclear decision makers. The decision makers are convinced
that they have the necessary expertise and knowledge to make the best decision. The au-
thorities are furthermore convinced that the public cannot judge nuclear risks properly,
hence, by avoiding to spread information about nuclear risks, and by avoiding to start a
dialog among all involved actors, the authorities help to prevent unnecessary anxieties
among the public (Nakata, 2011, 113). The strategy to keep secrecy might have been
developed for good reasons. One reason of fear and anxieties could be related to the fact
that Japan lies on the Circum-Pacific earthquake zone and the Japanese Archipelago is
one of the most active seismological areas in the world (Nakata, 2011, 103). The risk
assessment of nuclear power plants in that seismological active areas can never exclude
the risk of major natural disasters, such as earthquakes for any nuclear power plant in
Japan.
Japan’s civil society is an active element of communal life where neighborhood asso-
ciations play an important role in organizing the municipal life and interact with the
local government and household matters, such as organizing recycling (Ogawa, 2014,
52). The anti-nuclear movement in Japan is mostly linked to the peace movement and
activist groups that emerged in the aftermath of Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and nuclear tests
in the Pacific. According to Ogawa, the strongest emergence of that movement was
in the 1960s and 1970s. In the 21st century, political movements in Japan are not a
social phenomenon across the population, but rather supported by people with uncer-
tain employment status, retired people, and freelancers. Before the nuclear accident in
Fukushima Daiichi in 2011, there were no major protests against nuclear power plants
beside ‘not in my backyard’ (NIMBY) protests of local interest groups, such as fish-
ermen, concerned by the construction of a nuclear power plant on the coastline. As
a consequence, even in the 1990s, new nuclear power plants were built without fac-
ing social resistance. The issue of nuclear energy in Japan was a topic that was not
discussed widely in the public: “[u]ntil the recent nuclear crisis, honestly speaking, I
observed that ordinary people in Japan, including myself, were not saying much about
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the country’s nuclear energy policy” (Ogawa, 2014, 59). After the Fukushima accident
the anti-nuclear movement found support in the population to gather for large protests
in 2011 and 2012. The protests after the Fukushima accident and the history of the
anti-nuclear peace movement in Japan demonstrate that a critical mass of public can
be mobilized. For Japan the question is, from Okawa’s point of view, whether these
movements can contribute to long-term political changes in Japan’s political system
(Ogawa, 2014, 61). Aside from the huge public protests after the Fukushima disaster
(the most massive protest since the 1960s, (Kingston, 2014)) the event did not change
the country’s energy policy.
One reason for authorities’ ignorance of public demands is the close link between all
participants that have been involved in Japan’s nuclear project. This alliance of pro-
nuclear actors is called the “nuclear village” (Kingston, 2014), a conglomerate of major
public institutions and interest groups. Kingston (2014, 108) summarizes the nuclear
villages as: “The “nuclear village” is the term commonly used in Japan to refer to the
institutional and individual pro-nuclear advocates in the utilities, the nuclear industry,
the bureaucracy, the Diet (Japan’s parliament), business federations, the media, and
academia.” This network of interests is based upon cooperation and reciprocity offering
power and resources to those actors who share the same interests. The ‘village’, hav-
ing a huge advertisement budget, also massively influenced how media presented the
topic of nuclear energy to the public. As a result, journalists continuously downplayed
the consequences of domestic nuclear accidents prior and after the Fukushima Daiichi
accident.
Different investigations after the Fukushima accident revealed that Japan’s nuclear
energy sectors lack a culture of safety that is due to the close relationship between
regulators and the utilities, with regulating agencies regulating in the interests of the
utilities. The tight connections resulted, for example, in downplaying the possibility of
a tsunami accident for nuclear utilities and denying to implement international nuclear
safety standards before 2011 (Kingston, 2014, 107). According to Kingston, the nuclear
village is powerful, resilient, and able to establish a pro-nuclear government and by
avoiding a energy policy that aims for a nuclear phase out fully able to ignore anti-
nuclear concerns and protests within the society (Kingston, 2014, 109). The closed
political opportunity structures in Japan, as well as public’s moral guilt of blaming
authorities, does not allow civil society actors to establish and to institutionalize nation
wide and long lasting opposition against nuclear power. It remains an open question as
to whether the Fukushima Daiichi accident changed anything permanently in Japan’s
nuclear strategy.
6.2.6. Summary of historical overview
This chapter of my dissertation so far introduced the development of nuclear energy
from the point of view of American elites and summarizes the nuclear development and
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the social reactions within five countries since the atom entered the public sphere. It
is an ad-hock summary with its limitations. By letting Alvin Weinberg and Dwight
Eisenhower express their thoughts, I wanted to take the reader back into the very first
enthusiastic era of nuclear power: the euphoric idea of the atom of peace, the twin-
sister of the atomic bomb, as means for prosperity and growth for humanity. Nuclear
technology was birthed by a gigantic military, scientific, and industrial complex called
the Manhattan Project in 1942. In the historical review, I showed how the nuclear
project has been developed in the U.S., Great Britain, France, Germany, and Japan (see
also Table 1).
Table 1: Summary of key aspects of nuclear energy development
United
States
Great
Britain
France Germany Japan
Nuclear
project
Rapid de-
velopment
till 1974;
state author-
ities only
indirectly
influenced
development.
Moderate
development;
centralized
authorities
promoted
development.
Rapid de-
velopment
since 1974;
centralized
authorities
promoted and
controlled
development.
Moderate
development;
industry and
state authori-
ties promoted
development.
Rapid de-
velopment
since 1974;
centralized
authorities
and private
companies
promoted and
controlled
development.
Anti-
nuclear
movement
Well con-
nected anti-
nuclear move-
ment; success
of local
groups.
Well con-
nected but
weak anti-
nuclear move-
ment through
all levels of
society; dis-
armament
protests; weak
influence on
policies.
Strong move-
ment but
groups failed
to institution-
alize a strong
anti-nuclear
movement;
marginalized
success of
local groups.
Well con-
nected anti-
nuclear move-
ment; green
movement
and con-
solidated
green party;
successfully
reached a
nuclear phase-
out bills.
Marginalized
anti-nuclear
movement;
almost
no protest
against nu-
clear sites;
revival of
protest cul-
ture after
Fukushima
accident.
Nuclear
project’s
future
Very mod-
erate de-
velopment
of nuclear
project.
Pursuing
the nuclear
project with
foreign part-
ners.
Continuous
development
of nuclear
project.
Stop of nu-
clear project.
Stop of
nuclear
project after
Fukushima;
strong ef-
forts to gain
back pre-
Fukushima
status quo.
Opportunity
structure
Inclusive sys-
tem; high op-
portunity for
opposition.
Exclusive sys-
tem, low op-
portunity for
opposition.
Exclusive sys-
tem; low op-
portunity for
opposition.
Exclusive sys-
tem; high op-
portunity for
opposition.
Exclusive sys-
tem; low op-
portunity for
opposition.
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I have summarized how an authoritarian apparatus developed the idea of nuclear
technology, realized it and defended the technology against public opposition. I also
pointed out that not all countries are able to build the institutional conditions to make
nuclear a dominant source of electrical energy in the country on the one hand, and to
build trust in society, or to suppress distrust, to make the public believe in the benefits of
nuclear energy on the other. In the U.S. and in Great Britain, the development of nuclear
power came to an temporary standstill with new power plants under construction. In
Germany the technology has been more or less abandoned. In Japan, an external event
led to a shut down of all nuclear power plants, but it is questionable if the shut down
will be permanent. Given the possibility of future natural disasters in Japan, bringing
nuclear technology back to life on a dragon’s tail can add more risk to Japanese’s society
in the future. France is an example of how nuclear technology became the monopoly
of electrical power resource. A centralized industry within a centralized state, with
centralized finance, centralized universities, centralized medias, centralized police and
no laws against that technology can dictate or successfully provide a technology to
its citizens. Political opportunity structures, as I tried to indicate, play an important
role of how civil society actors are able to develop an anti-nuclear movement able to
influence political decisions to implement and develop nuclear energy. It can be shown
that within a closed and exclusive system (e.g. Germany), as well as in an open and
inclusive system (e.g. U.S.) an anti-nuclear movement can develop and establish itself
successfully, if the political and legal system, as well as independent medias, provide
opportunities to institutionalize anti-nuclear actors in the public arena (Rucht, 1990;
Kitschelt, 1986; Dryzek et al., 2002).
6.3. Research overview and hypotheses
In this section I first summarize the theoretical concept of risk perception. Then, I
introduce concepts for explaining differences in public nuclear risk perception, and derive
hypotheses of expected relationships between nuclear risk perception and individual
attributes.
Risk defined from a social science perspective “refers to uncertainty about and sever-
ity of the events and consequences (or outcomes) of an activity with respect to some-
thing that humans value” (Aven and Renn, 2009, 6; compare also Rosa, 1998, Rosa
et al., 2014). The definition allows the term risk to be perceived as a situation or ac-
tion that has desirable as well as undesirable outcomes. It is related to uncertainties
and not to probabilities, and the consequences of the outcome are not conditioned to
quantifiably outcomes. Risk, as defined here, is not understood as a technical defi-
nition of risk as the product of the probability of an outcome times its consequences
(risk = probability × consequences). In the technical definition of risk, consequences
are usually operationalized as amounts of money or numbers of fatalities. Risks from a
broader perspective are based on a human judgement about an outcome that humans
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value. The outcome is uncertain. According to that definition risk is a subjective evalu-
ation of an activity, such as the evaluation of nuclear power (compare also Section 2.4).
Individual’s nuclear risk perception, for instance, can be evaluated by asking respondents
as how dangerous they perceive nuclear power.
Risk perception research has been intensively examined in social sciences, especially
in the areas of social psychology, sociology, technical risk assessment, and the topic of
risk governance (for an overview see Rohrmann and Renn, 2000 Renn, 2008, see also
Section 4.2). Early research on risk perception started in the 1970s when Paul Slovic
and his colleagues developed the psychometric paradigm (Slovic, 1987, 2010, 2000a).
These studies are characterized by respondents who are asked to judge different risk
sources according to different risk characteristics. The results show that nuclear power
and nuclear weapons are perceived as dreadful, uncontrollable, catastrophic and among
other characters as involuntary. Nuclear risks furthermore are perceived as unknown to
exposed people and expected to have delayed effects. Therefore, nuclear technology is
perceived as dreadful and unknown to the population. These results challenge technical
risk assessments and scientific views that perceive nuclear power as a comparably minor
risk for population. The perceived gap between experts’ and laypeople’s risk judge-
ments is often explained by an irrational and biased judgement of laypeople who base
their judgements on heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973, 1974) and not rational
reasoning. Research on the emotional aspects of risk evaluation can show that laypeo-
ple’s judgement’s are an interplay of an emotional and cognitive judgement – it is all
but an irrational process (Finucane et al., 2000a; Peters et al., 2004; Slovic et al., 2007;
Siegrist and Sütterlin, 2014).
A broader more integrative concept, the ‘Social Amplification of Risk Framework’
(SARF) (Kasperson et al., 1988, 2003, see also Section 4.2.8) aims to explain how an
uncertain activity or event is perceived in society as a risk and how different social actors
and institutions are communicating actual or hypothesized consequences of a risk event.
According to this framework social actors communicate risks differently and can act as
transmitting stations that either amplify or attenuate risk perception in society. Hence,
it is very likely that in different societies risk perception can be more or less pronounced,
depending on the media structure, the political institutions, and the connectedness of
actors in the civil society. This concept, a framework rather than a theory, also provides
an explanation for why sudden events, such as major nuclear accidents, e.g. in Three
Mile Island, Chernobyl, or Fukushima, are able to spread across social boundaries and
are able to affect distant communities, industries, or countries (Slovic et al., 1984, 1991).
Research on the effect of nuclear accidents on risk perception shows that individuals
who prior to an accident were indifferent about the risk of nuclear power are more
likely to turn into opponents of nuclear power than people who supported nuclear power
prior to the accident (Renn, 1990). A-priori beliefs are perceived as very important to
judge nuclear risk after an accident (Eiser et al., 1989, 1990; Van Der Pligt and Midden,
1990; Brede, 1990, see also Section 5.5). An a-priori negative image of nuclear power
will be confirmed by additional negative incidents, people in favor of nuclear energy
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hold both positive and negative images of nuclear power. Hence, individuals holding
negative images are more likely to change their evaluation of the technology towards
a more skeptical perception (Siegrist and Visschers, 2013; Visschers and Siegrist, 2013,
Section 4.2.7). It is assumed that in the short run, accidents can change nuclear risk
perception dramatically, depending on the level of trust in the risk governing institutions
(Poortinga et al., 2013) and the levels of exposure to radiation (Drottz-Sjöberg and
Sjöberg, 1990).
In this empirical chapter, I am not analyzing the effect of nuclear accidents on indi-
vidual nuclear risk perception. I only want to emphasize that the historical experience
of nuclear accidents in different societies at different time points can be an explanation
for different levels of nuclear risk perception within and between societies. To test the
effect of historical events, longitudinal panel data are necessary. The data I analyze for
my regression analyses are cross sectional data conducted in 2010 before the nuclear
accident of Fukushima Daiichi on March 11, 2011, hence, I cannot observe changes of
nuclear risk perception on individual level over time.
In my analyses I focus on the relationship of nuclear risk perception and socio-
demographic factors, which I assume influence individual’s nuclear risk perception (com-
pare Section 5.2, Section 5.2.3, Section 5.3). It is worth mentioning that with the given
data structure I only can analyze relationships and no causal dependencies. Therefore,
the causal dependencies hypothetically expressed here are assumptions based either on
theoretical explanations or empirically observed evidence by previous research. For my
analyses I refer to an integrative framework introduced by Renn and Rohrmann (Renn
and Rohrmann, 2000b; Renn, 2008, Section 5.6) to explain the complex relationship of
risk perception and individual or contextual factors shaping attitudes towards risk, in
my case, towards nuclear risks. The integrative framework of risk perception is designed
to integrate psychological, social, and cultural factors. These factors are nested within
each other. On the personal level, cognitive and emotional factors such as heuristics
or affects are assumed to be influential factors of risk perception67. Individuals, inde-
pendent of their cognitive and emotional status are nested within social contexts and
as such bearer of social attitudes and attributes. In this empirical research, I will focus
mostly on factors located on that level analyzing the relationship of attributes such as
gender, age, and social status, as well as on social values and attitudes. These values
and attitudes are trust towards political institutions and society or attitudes towards
economic prosperity in contrast to environmental safety. Renn and Rohrmann (2008,
143-144) also mention wordviews and the predominant economic and political culture,
manifested in society by its social institutions. In their integrative framework, this level
of cultural factors is the last level that provides explanatory factors to explain individ-
ual’s risk perception. I address this level by testing for individual versus collectivistic
worldviews, as introduced by cultural theorists.
67 In my second empirical chapter, analyzing the effect of the unexpected event of the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear accident on nuclear risk perception I will explain the expected relationship of heuristics and
of affects on risk perception in more detail (compare Section 7.2.1).
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One widely discussed socio-demographic aspect of nuclear risk perception is the as-
sumed and observable difference of risk perception between women and men. One ex-
planation, based on the socialization process of individuals within a Western nucleus
family, assumes that men take the role of the breadwinner and provider, whereas women
are the caretaker and, compared to men, identify themselves more with the commu-
nity and social environment (Chodorow, 1978). According to this explanation, it can
be assumed that men are more concerned about the economic wellbeing of their family
whereas women are more concerned about the health and safety issues for the family and
community. Men from that point of view perceive nuclear risks as a beneficial technical
issue, able to control, whereas women see nuclear as a constant threat for safety and
health. Davidson and Freudenburg (1996) question the direct effect of the socializa-
tion process on risk perception because through social changes the role models between
women and men are not clearly to be separated. Both women and men are bread winners
and caretakers. At the same time, it is still possible that traditional role perceptions
shape individual’s interests, educational or occupational decisions and, hence, indirectly
influence attitudes towards technological risks. Empirical studies clearly indicate that
women perceive health and safety issues as more threatening than men and create a
strong awareness of risks that are a potential threat for their family and community
(e.g., Brody, 1984; Solomon et al., 1989; Greenberg and Schneider, 1995; Forbes and
Sells, 1997). I assume that women, compared to men, express higher levels of risk per-
ception. This effect should be more pronounced in social subgroups where the traditional
masculine role model is still promoted, with men expressing significant lower levels of
nuclear risk perception.
Hypothesis 1: Women, compare to men express higher levels of nuclear risk perception.
Hypothesis 2: Generally speaking the assumed positive effect for women is more pro-
nounced within certain social contextes.
An other aspect in evaluating risks is the perceived knowledge about a risk. It is
assumed that people who have more knowledge about a potential risk express lower con-
cerns. Lower concerns, from this point of view, evolve because an individual’s judgement
is based on rational evaluation of the likelihood of an event and its consequences and
less based on intuitive heuristics and irrational feelings (Kuklinski et al., 1982; Lopes,
1991). Davidson and Freudenburg (1996, 317), in their review on empirical studies, show
that in some studies men express more knowledge about a risk’s technical details. The
authors, furthermore show, that empirical studies among female and male experts on
different risk sources reject the ‘knowledge support hypothesis.’ In this studies, women,
with same levels of education, express higher levels of risk concern compared to their
male counterparts. It is also the case that the assumed effect is reversed, resulting in
higher risk perception among better informed individuals. Hence, knowledge is assumed
to be related to broader values and identities, related to the concept of traditional mas-
culinity, social control, and embeddedness within a social community (Kuklinski et al.,
1982; Costa-Font et al., 2008; Reardon and Govender, 2013; Kahan et al., 2007). For my
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research, I assume that perceived knowledge indirectly shapes risk perception through
social status (compare Section 5.3.5). On one hand knowledge can create higher levels
of self-confidence and, hence, ignorance resulting in a perceived irrational judgement
among the public. Therefore, people who assume that environmental problems are ex-
aggerated should also express less risk perception on nuclear power. On the other hand,
the social reproduction of knowledge through the institutionalized education system in
each society should reproduce its elite structures that supports nuclear power. I there-
fore assume that more educated people perceive themselves as more knowledgeable and
should express lower risk concerns. This effect should be less pronounced among women
because, for example due to socialization, women are less likely to study technical or
economic issues.
Hypothesis 3: People expressing more knowledge about a risk should have lower nuclear
risk perception.
Hypothesis 4: Better educated people express lower levels of nuclear risk perception.
Hypothesis 5: The negative effect of education should be less pronounced for women.
Risk perception is also assumed to be negatively related to trust in political institutions
(compare Section 5.2.3). Individuals who express more trust in political institutions are
assumed to be less likely to express higher levels of risk concerns (Freudenburg, 1993;
Flynn et al., 1992; Fox and Firebaugh, 1992; Slovic, 1999; Bella, 1987; Slovic, 1993;
Rayner and Cantor, 1987; Viklund, 2003). Today, trust in the community and in public
institutions is an important factor because risks are mostly indirectly perceived through
media or taught in schools or universities. The information building process is not based
on direct experience, but on indirect processes, amplified or attenuated by communica-
tion processes in an individual’s social networks (Löfstedt, 2005, 2003; Breakwell, 2007).
The negative effect of trust is expected to vary among different countries because since
the 1960s trust in public authorities is declining to different degrees within Western
societies (Siegrist and Cvetkovich, 2000; Siegrist et al., 2000).
Hypothesis 6: People who express higher levels of trust in governmental institutions
are more likely to express lower levels of nuclear risk perception.
A further aspect negatively related to risk perception is concern of economic develop-
ment in the future. It is assumed that individuals who express higher economic concerns
are more likely to express lower levels of nuclear risk perception (Stout-Wiegand and
Trent, 1983). Economic prosperity is a materialistic value according to Inglehart (1997;
1988) and nuclear power is a symbol of economic growth and a landmark of technical
and materialistic merits of modernity. Beside the value explanation perspective, the eco-
nomic growth assumption is furthermore linked to the occupational status of a person,
assuming that people, independent of their sex, who are part of the labour force are more
likely to be concerned of economical issues (Davidson and Freudenburg, 1996). Empiri-
cal studies cannot confirm the later assumption. A study by Mohai (1992) shows that,
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on average, full-time employed women express higher levels of environmental concern
compared to full-time employed men. A study by Blocker and Eckberg (1989) rejects
the assumed negative relation of employment status and risk perception by finding that
employed people, independent of their sex, on average express higher levels of concerns.
Hypothesis 7: People concerned about the economic development express lower levels
of nuclear risk perception.
Hypothesis 8: Full time employed people express higher levels of nuclear risk percep-
tion.
Hypothesis 9: Full time employed men express lower levels of risk perception compared
to women.
According to Boholm (1998) and also Flynn and colleagues (1994) the fixation on a
value system that is based on traditional values, status, power, inequality, and material-
istic idealism, such as endless economic growth, is fundamentally expressed in a specific
male subgroup of population. Empirical studies can show that, for example in the U.S.,
men on average, who are better educated, with higher income, politically conservative
oriented, and white express very low levels of risk perception, compared to other sub-
groups (see also Finucane et al., 2000b; McCright and Dunlap, 2011). The assumed
relationship of attitudes in favor of economic growth resulting in lower risk perception
can therefore not be rejected for specific subgroups within society. I therefore assume
that higher socio-economic status, operationalized by respondent’s educational degree
and income, influence risk perception significantly (see Hypothesis 3). This effect, due
to socialization, should be more pronounced among men than women. A French study
by Bastide (1989) also reveals that better educated and richer people are more likely
to underestimate the negative consequences of different risks, whereas less educated
poorer people overestimated a risk’s negative consequences. The feelings of insecurity
and hopelessness, the authors assume, leads to a status-induced gap between rich and
poor people. Nuclear power, can be perceived as a technical and solvable problem among
people with higher status, whereas it is perceived as a threat for safety among people
with lower status.
Hypothesis 10: Higher social status, measured through income and education, results
in lower nuclear risk perception.
In risk perception research, age is also assumed to be an influential factor on individ-
ual’s evaluation of technical risks as well as environmental problems. From a cultural
theory’s point of view, older people tend to have more traditional values and develop an
hierarchical bias, resulting in lower risk perception (Grendstad and Selle, 2000; Peters
and Slovic, 1996; George and Southwell, 1986). Younger people are less integrated in the
existing political and economical structures and are more in favor of pro-environmental
reforms and social changes (Van Liere and Dunlap, 1980; Malkis and Grasmick, 1977).
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Older people, being better integrated in society, are assumed trying to maintain or-
der and are more interested in keeping the existing economical and social structures
(Carstensen et al., 1999). All of these explanations assume a negative relationship be-
tween risk perception and age. Research on the willingness to pay in order to solve
environmental problems reveals that the highest support for environmental problems is
among people in the age group around 40 years, with a decline in willingness to pay for
older respondents. This research also shows that due to different time discounting factors
future-oriented goals are more discussed among younger generations, hence, resulting in
a higher awareness of long-term threats to society among younger people (Dockins et al.,
2002; Wiernik et al., 2013). In contrast to the assumed negative relationship, there are
also studies that reveal a positive relationship, arguing that older people, being more
experienced are taking greater care of their social environment and live a less energy de-
manding lifestyle (Morris and Venkatesh, 2000; Smola and Sutton, 2002). Following the
traditional value explanation, I assume a negative relationship between age and nuclear
risk perception.
Hypothesis 11: Age is assumed to negatively influence nuclear risk perception.
Political ideology is assumed to be highly correlated with nuclear risk perception and
environmental attitudes (Eiser et al., 1990; Flynn et al., 1994). It is assumed that
people who hold a conservative political ideology hold values based on hierarchy, order,
stability, and conformity and are against changes in society that are able to challenge the
existing political and ideological mindset. According to that view, pro-environmental
reforms and more regulation on hazardous technologies are threatening the existing
political and economical structure of a society (Dunlap, 1975; Van Liere and Dunlap,
1980). A gap between left-liberal and right-conservative political ideologies should be
observable within societies, with more left-liberal people expressing higher awareness of
environmental risks, especially nuclear risk perception (Dietz et al., 1998; Jost et al.,
2008).
Hypothesis 12: Compared to conservative people, people with a left political orienta-
tion are more concerned about nuclear power’s dangerous consequences.
I also include a person’s location, the place they live, into my analysis because in
literature of risk perception it is agued that respondents who live in urban or rural
areas evaluate environmental risks differently. Van Liere and Dunlap (1980) assume
that people living in urban areas express higher levels of environmental concerns. The
authors argue that people who live in a city are more likely to be exposed to direct
environmental problems, such as air pollution. It is furthermore assumed that people
living in rural areas perceive nature as a resource to be exploited, especially in small
towns that try to compete with other rural areas to attract business development or
want to provide employment opportunities for its inhabitants. This assumed positive
relationship is challenged by contradictory results in studies that cannot prove a clear
relationship, revealing that risk evaluation depends on the specific economical structure
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in the area and on the specific risk that is analyzed (Freudenburg and Jones, 1991;
Hamilton et al., 2013; Bastide et al., 1989; Olofsson and Öhman, 2006). Alternatively,
people living in rural areas can develop strong nuclear risk perception and opposition
(NIMBI, ‘not in my backyard’, phenomenon) if their community is affected by future
nuclear power plant developments or nuclear waste disposals (Keller et al., 2011; Gattig
and Hendrickx, 2007).
Hypothesis 13: The relationship of location, the place someone lives, especially rural
areas, and nuclear risk perception remains unclear. Both arguments to exploit
and protect a community’s natural resources argue for and against higher or lower
levels of nuclear risk perception compared to citizens living in urban areas.
According to cultural theory (Thompson, 1980; Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983; Thomp-
son et al., 1990, see also Section 5.2) social context shapes an individual’s value structure
influencing how people evaluate risks. Individuals base their risk judgement according to
their cultural lens. According to proponents of cultural theory, cultural prototypes can
be identified each of which is characterized by a different risk portfolio. More individual
people are assumed to be risk takers and less concerned about facing risks and solving
risks, within their fields of personal interests. More collectivistic people are perceived to
be less risk prone, perceive outside risks also as more dangerous and try to avoid them,
or want them to be managed by superior authorities such as religious powers or state
institutions. I test this assumption by including a variable that is asking for respondent’s
individualistic or collectivistic worldview.
Hypothesis 14: Nuclear risk perception is assumed to be higher among people holding
more collectivistic worldviews.
I summarize the assumed relationship between social factors and nuclear risk percep-
tion in Table 2.
I assume that the above discussed relationships between social factors and nuclear risk
perception (compare Table 2) do not differ across the five countries in my analysis. The
U.S., Great Britain, France, Germany, and Japan all developed their peaceful or/and
military nuclear program soon after World War II, having successfully connected nuclear
power plants to grid in the late 1950s and early 1960s, before the energy crisis in 1974.
All of the countries experienced high levels of economic growth and are part of the
major advanced economies on this planet. In all countries, civil movements have been
active, with a history of different protests in various forms against nuclear weapons and
nuclear power. I think that this movement is less developed in Japan, only supported
by subgroups in contrast to, for example Germany, a country in witch the anti-nuclear
movement is widely supported within all parts of society. In Germany, I therefore
assume that nuclear risk perception is more homogeneous distributed among population
subgroups. In the U.S., France, and Great Britain I expect to observe clearer differences
within the societies, indicating more pronounced differences between subgroups who
perceive nuclear energy as more dangerous and subgroups in society that perceive nuclear
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Table 2: Assumed relationship of individual social factors and nuclear risk perception.
Hypothesis Factor assumed effect
Hypothesis 1: female +
Hypothesis 2: interaction of social context and female +
Hypothesis 3: knowledge −
Hypothesis 4: education −
Hypothesis 5: interaction education/female +
Hypothesis 6: trust in government −
Hypothesis 7: economic value −
Hypothesis 8: occupation −
Hypothesis 9: interaction occupation/female +
Hypothesis 10: social status (income/education) −
Hypothesis 11: age −
Hypothesis 12: left political orientation +
Hypothesis 13: place of living (rural area) +/−
Hypothesis 14: collectivistic worldview (collectivistic) +
power as less dangerous. This gap should be observable among different social classes and
age groups. Within all countries, a difference should be observed between women and
men, assuming female respondents expressing higher concerns for nuclear risk perception
compared to male respondents.
6.4. Data, methods, and operationalization of variables
To analyze the above discussed relationship between nuclear risk perception and socio-
demographic factors, social values, and beliefs, I use a dataset provided by the Inter-
national Social Survey Programme (ISSP) in 2010 (ISSP, 2012)68. The ISSP69 is an
international consortium of national member institutes that conduct every year a survey
on varying topics in social sciences. In 2010, 2000, and 1993 the topics were on the
environment. The number of member states varies across time as well as a proportion
of survey questions is allowed to be changed between different waves, making it difficult
to compare specific questions overt time and across countries. In the case of nuclear risk
perception, differences in the data structure do not allow for complex analyses across
different time points and between many countries. Therefore, I focus on a cross section
design in 2010, performing multiple regression analysis for each country. Each national
survey of the ISSP claims to be a representative samples of the population, conducted
either in personal face-to-face (CAPI, PAPI) interviews or with self reported question-
naires sent to the respondents. The time points or periods of fieldwork differ for each
68 The data are available for non-commercial purposes via http://www.gesis.org/en/issp/home/
(accessed November 15, 2015).
69 In 2015 there are 45 member states according to the ISSP website (http://www.issp.org/, (accessed
November 15, 2015)).
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country. Some countries, such as Germany or Switzerland, conduct two ISSP question-
naires every second year, covering two topics at the same time. For the ISSP 2010 on
environment, this means that some national member institutes conducted the question-
naire in 2010 and some in 2011. For my analyses I choose five countries whose data were
conducted in 2010. The countries I have chosen for my analyses are the United States
(conducted: 18. March 2010 - 14. August 2010), Great Britain (conducted: 11. June
2010 – 13. November 2010), France (conducted: 01. September 2010 – 31. December
2010), Germany (conducted: 31. May 2010 – 30. October 2010), and Japan (conducted:
27. November 2010 – 05. December 2010).
The dependent variable ‘nuclear risk perception’ is operationalized in the ISSP as an
ordinally scaled variable. Respondents are asked to evaluate whether they ‘think that
nuclear power stations are...’ (1) ‘extremely dangerous for the environment,’ (2) ‘very
dangerous,’ (3) ‘somewhat dangerous,’ (4) ‘not very dangerous,’ (5) ‘or, not dangerous
at all for the environment.’ For the purpose of my analyses, I create a binary variable
combining the first two categories to express that respondents perceive nuclear power as
‘very or extremely dangerous’ for the environment. The reference category is people who
perceive nuclear power as somewhat or less dangerous. I am interested in this analysis of
the subgroup of people who perceive nuclear power as at least very dangerous compared
to a more indifferent or almost not concerned group of people. I am interested which
factors increase or diminish the likelihood to perceive nuclear power as very/or extremely
dangerous. Assuming a causal relationship, I am aware that with the given data structure
I test for relational and not a causal relationship of dependent and independent variables
in the model. To analyze the relationship of the binary coded dependent variable and
various independent variables, I use multiple logistic regression analysis, using stata
software (version 13). I receive average marginal effects or predicted changes by using
the stata ados margins, marginsplot (Williams, 2012), and estout (Jann, 2014; Jann
and Long, 2010; Jann, 2007).
The independent variables are operationalized as categorical dummy variables with
one category as reference category. Gender is binary coded with male as reference cat-
egory. Age is recoded in age groups of 15 years with people age 15–29 as reference
category70 and the oldest category ranging from 75–90. Urbanization defines people liv-
ing in urban areas as reference category and people living in a ‘Town or small city’ and
a ‘Country village’ as separate categories. Education is a variable with five categories,
with the lowest category ‘Now or lowest degree.’ The other categories are ‘Intermedi-
ate secondary complete,’ ‘Secondary complete/ University incomplete,’ and ‘University
degree complete.’ A household’s income is recoded in three categories, ‘lower’, ‘mid-
dle’ and ‘upper’ tercile, based on the income distribution per country, with the lowest
tercile as reference category. Occupational status is a variables with three categories:
people who are ‘not in paid work’ are the reference category. People ‘working less than
40 hours per week’ and people ‘working 40 hours or more per week’ are the two other
categories. Political ideology has three categories with the reference category of people
70 In most countries the minimum age is 18.
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who express to ‘see themselves in the center or have no preference or do not vote’. In
contrast to that people who see themselves ‘left from the center’ are one category and
people who see themselves ideologically ‘right from the center’ are the third category. I
included two trust variables (trust in government and trust in people) with both times
as reference category people who have ‘no preference’. The other two categories of each
variable are people who either ‘trust the government’ or ‘distrust the government’ and
‘trust other people’ or ‘distrust other people’. Trust in people is included in the model
to test whether general trust differs from institutional trust. I include two variables
that test whether people prefer economic growth rather than environmental develop-
ment. The first variable environment asks if people agree (on a five point Likert skale)
to the statement: ‘We worry too much about the future of the environment and not
enough about prices and jobs today.’ People who do not agree to that statement are the
reference category: ‘worry not too much’. The second question economic growth asks
respondents whether they agree that ‘In order to protect the environment [COUNTRY]
needs economic growth.’ This binary variable also has people who do not agree to that
statement as reference category. To test whether more knowledgeable people perceive
nuclear power as less dangerous, I included two binary coded items. The knowledge ex-
aggerated variable has people as reference category who disagree or are indifferent to the
statement that environmental threats are exaggerated. People who express that they do
not know much about the causes of environmental problems are coded as the reference
category for the variable knowledge causes. The final question is integrated in the model
as the attempt to integrate a value question into the model that captures individuals who
perceive themselves as more individualistic or more collectivistic.71 People who agree
to the statement: ‘There is no point in doing what I can for the environment unless
others do the same’, are perceived as collectivistic individuals. People who disagree are
perceived as individualists and are the reference category for the variable collectivism.
For each country, I run four separate models integrating stepwise additional theo-
retical blocks into the model: After (1) testing the effect of gender, age, and degree of
urbanization, I (2) test for the effect of social status: education, income, and occupation.
I then (3) test for the trust variables and party affiliation. In the final model (4) I include
value variables. To test for interaction effects on gender and education and gender and
occupational status, I run a separate model with interaction effects and describe the
results in the text and show separate figures in some cases if the results seem to be of
importance to understand the nonlinear nature of interacting social factors.
71 I am aware that this question could also be associated within the field of social dilemma and collective
actions theories, a subject I do not mention in my dissertation.
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6.5. Results
6.5.1. Risk perception: overall distribution
In the first part of my empirical analyses I describe the overall distribution of nuclear risk
perception in each country at different time points (compare Table 3). For Germany and
Japan, for all three time points (1993, 2000, 2010) data from the ISSP are available. For
the United States and Great Britain data from 2000 and 2010 are available; for France
data for 2010 are available. Because of the given data, structuring a comprehensive
comparison of overall risk perception over time and across countries is not possible. Yet,
the available data still provide enough information to compare the over all level of nuclear
risk perception in 2010 for all five countries. Furthermore, by referring to previous time
points in 2000 or 1993 (or both) it is possible to see whether the distribution in 2010
shows a pattern that has been observed in the past or is following a specific trend.
For this analyses, the nuclear risk perception variable with originally five categories is
recoded in a three point Likert scale.72
The results show that the majority of respondents in Germany perceive nuclear as ‘very
dangerous’ (70% in 2010). The proportion of people who perceive nuclear power plants
as ‘not (very) dangerous’ is stable over time. It seems that since 2000, the proportion of
people who perceive nuclear as ‘somewhat dangerous’ changed their attitudes towards
nuclear power, perceiving nuclear as more dangerous (30% in 2000 compared to 19% in
2010). This is only an assumption because cross-sectional data do not allow to control
for changes on the individual level. Results in Japan show a different development
of attitudes over time. A majority of respondents perceived nuclear power as very
dangerous in the ISSP waves of 1993 and 2000 (54% in 1993 and 58% in 2000). Risk
perception dropped to 39% in 2010. At the same time, the low proportion of respondents
who perceived nuclear as ‘not (very) dangerous’ rose from 12% in 1993 to 22% in 2010.
According to the observed levels of risk perception in Japan prior to the Fukushima
Daiichi accident the population seemed to be proportionally less concerned compared
to previous waves. The middle category of a proportion of one third of all respondents
is comparably stable over time and in the range of the proportion observable in the
U.S., Great Britain, and France. Japan in that sense is not an outlier in terms of
people who chose to answer the middle category.73 Nuclear risk perception in the United
States in 2010 compared to 1993 levels does not indicate major changes. The largest
group of respondents perceives nuclear power as very dangerous: 44% in 1993 and
46% in 2010. In Great Britain for 1993 and 2010 there is a decline in nuclear risk
72 The variable nuclear risk perception was conducted with the same wording and categories over all
three time points. The answer categories ‘extremely dangerous’ and ‘very dangerous’ are recoded
in the category ‘very dangerous’; the answer category ‘somewhat dangerous’ is kept; the answer
categories ‘not very dangerous’ and ‘not at all dangerous’ are recoded into one category ‘not (very)
dangerous.’
73 Some studies mark that people in Asia tend to avoid to chose extreme answer categories, leading to
response biases (compare for example Franzen and Vogl, 2011).
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Table 3: Proportion of nuclear risk perception per country over time.
Country Nuclear power is ... 1993 2000 2010
Germany
very dangerous 65% 57% 70%
somewhat dangerous 24% 30% 19%
not (very) dangerous 11% 13% 11%
N = 2,021 1,416 1,317
Japan
very dangerous 54% 58% 39%
somewhat dangerous 34% 33% 39%
not (very) dangerous 12% 9% 22%
N = 1,242 1,119 1,201
United States
very dangerous 44% 46%
somewhat dangerous 39% 33%
not (very) dangerous 17% 21%
N = 1,403 1,331
Great Britain
very dangerous 48% 39%
somewhat dangerous 37% 35%
not (very) dangerous 15% 26%
N = 1,188 852
France
very dangerous 41%
somewhat dangerous 32%
not (very) dangerous 27%
N = 2,148
Source: ISSP 1993, 2000, 2010 (own analysis)
perception of 9%-points (48% to 39%) and an increase in people who perceive nuclear
as ‘not (very) dangerous’ of 11%-points (15% to 26%). Though the difference to British
respondents’ is only 1%-point, French respondents report for 2010 the highest proportion
of respondents (27%) who perceive nuclear energy as ‘not (very) dangerous.’
The distribution of nuclear risk perception, as measured in the ISSP, in France, Great
Britain, Japan, and the United States is rather similar. The only country that shows a
clear positive trend in nuclear risk perception over time is in Germany. In the United
States, the two time points indicate that nuclear risk perception is on constant levels.
The 2010 data for Japan and Great Britain indicate that, compared to 1993 in Great
Britain or 2000 in Japan, prior to the Fukushima Daiichi accident nuclear risk perception
was declining with less people perceiving nuclear power as ‘very dangerous’ and more
people perceiving nuclear power as ‘not (very) dangerous.’
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6.5.2. Regression analysis
After the above discussed differences in nuclear risk perception between the five selected
countries I want to examine whether there are observable differences on the individual
level that can be used to explain how nuclear risk perception varies within and between
societies. I am interested if, on the individual level subgroups differ across countries
on how dangerous they perceive nuclear energy. A summary of the results is shown in
Table 4. The detailed Table 5 of the full regression models (Model 4 of each country’s
regression analysis) can be find in Section 6.5.3, summarizing the results of each country.
A detailed regression table for each country, stepwise integrating theoretical parts in the
full model (Model 1 to Model 4), can be found in the Appendix (Section 6.7) of this
empirical chapter.
Table 4: Summary of results across all countries
US GB FR GER JP
Female + + + + +
Age − − −
Urbanity +
Education − + − −
interaction: education/female +
Income − −
Occupation −
Interaction: occupation/female
Party (left) + + +
Trust (government) − ++∗
Trust (people) − − +
Environment (worry too much)
Economic growth − −
Knowledge: no threat − − − −
Worldviews
Source: ISSP 2010 (own analysis);
significant effects for dark colored cells with + or − symbol;
positive (green) or negative (red) tendency in colored cells;
∗: lower risk perception for indifferent people (in Germany).
United States of America
In the United States, female respondents are more likely to express higher nuclear risk
perception than male respondents. Results of Model 1 also indicate that people in older
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cohorts of age 45 and older are more likely to perceive nuclear risk as not dangerous or
somewhat dangerous. The age effect for people of age 60 or older remains significant
negative when for social status variables is controlled for (Model 2). People with the
highest educational degree are 21.9% points less likely to express higher nuclear risk
perception than people with the lowest level of education. Also people, living in house-
holds that belong to the highest income group, the third tercile, are also less likely to
perceive nuclear as very dangerous or extremely dangerous. All of the effects discussed
remain significant and do not change much in their magnitude when party affiliation
and trust variables are controlled for (Model 3). Respondents who have a left-liberal
or democratic party affiliation are more likely to express high nuclear risk perception
than peoples who see themselves in the center or as republicans on the political right.
People who express high levels of trust in other people are less likely to express high
levels of nuclear risk perception (-8.4% points) than people who do not trust much or
are indifferent. Trust in government shows no significant relationship. When control-
ling, in addition, for values (Model 4), opinions about economic growth and ecological
development in the U.S. as well as for a collectivistic or individualistic orientation do
not show significant differences. Only people who believe that environmental problems
are exaggerated are significantly less likely to express higher nuclear risk concerns.
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Figure 11: Average marginal effects of education by gender for the U.S.
To test whether the negative effect of education is the same for male and female
respondents an interaction analysis is performed. The results, shown in Figure 11,
indicate that the predicted effects vary between genders. Only with highly educated
people is there a significant higher risk perception between female and male respondent.
For example, women who completed university are 21% points (predicted margins are
44% for female, and 23% for male) more likely to perceive nuclear energy as very or
extremely dangerous compared to their male fellows who graduate from university or
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college. The overall tendency to express lower risk perception with higher educational
degrees is observable for both genders. The negative differences are only significant for
male respondents and not for women. Male respondents graduating from university
significantly express lower risk perception compared to male respondents with lower
educational degrees. The interaction effect indicates that in this sample the negative
effect of education, especially for people holding highest educational degrees, is only
perceivable among male respondents. The above discussed gender gap is not observable
among lower educated people in the U.S.
A second analysis on the effect of occupational status among the sample in the U.S.
reveals that the gender gap is not observable among part time employed (people who
are working less than 40 hours per week) men and women.
Great Britain
The logistic regression results and the derived marginal effects for Great Britain show
that there is a gender gap in nuclear risk perception with women being significantly more
likely to perceive nuclear energy as very or extremely dangerous for the environment.
In Model 1 the likelihood for women to express higher nuclear risk perception is 16.5%
points higher than for men. In the full Model 4 this effect is still 12.9% points higher.
Model 1 to Model 4 show that older people between 45 and 75 are significantly less likely
to express higher risk perception than younger age groups or respondents 75 years and
older. For me the results of the categorical age structure could indicate an U-shaped
effect of age. In the sample, it is also the case that people living in a city are more
likely to perceive nuclear as more dangerous compared to respondents living in a town
or a small city. These results do not change when additional variables are added to the
model. Comparing Model 2, Model 3, and Model 4, controlling for different theoretical
blocks, changes the effect of education and income. There is a positive tendency for
education with significant higher risk perception for respondents in Model 3 and Model
4. The negative effect of people whose household income is in the range of the third
tercile is not significant anymore when value variables are controlled for in Model 4.
Trust in people (Model 3 and Model 4) is an indicator for significantly lower likelihoods
to perceive nuclear energy as very or extremely dangerous. In addition, respondents
who agree that environmental problems are exaggerated are 16.4% points less likely to
perceive nuclear energy as very dangerous. Occupational status, party affiliation or trust
in government, as well as values that express economic growth prone tendencies do not
show significant differences from the reference category.
Separate models with interaction effects for gender and levels of education do not
show different trends for female and male respondents in this sample. Both sexes are
more likely to perceive nuclear as more dangerous the higher their educational degree is.
There is also no significant difference between the gender effects observed for women’s
and men’s occupational status.
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France
In the French sample women, on average are more likely to express higher nuclear risk
perception than comparable male respondents. There is a negative effect observable for
the oldest cohorts. People 75 years of age or older are significantly different than the
reference cohort of respondents younger than 30 years. Social status matters for nuclear
risk perception among the French sample. People who have higher incomes and people
who work full-time are less likely to express higher level of nuclear risk perception. Only
in Model 4, is the negative effect of higher education levels significantly lower compared
to respondents in the reference category of no or the lowest educational degree. People
who trust the government or have no preference, are less likely to regard nuclear energy
as very or extremely dangerous for the environment. The significant negative effect of
a conservative political orientation, compared to the reference category of people who
do not vote or have a preference to the center, observed in Model 3 is not significant
anymore when controlled for value variables in Model 4. Separate analyses (not shown
here) to test the difference between a left and right political orientation show a significant
higher risk perception of people holding a left-wing political orientation, compared to
respondents holding a conservative right-wing orientation. Respondents who agree that
economic growth is necessary to protect the environment as well as people who express
that environmental problems are exaggerated are less likely to show higher levels of
nuclear risk perception.
No or lowest degree
Intermediate secondary complete
Secondary complete/ University incomplete
University degree complete
Ed
uc
at
ion
.2 .3 .4 .5 .6
Nuclear power 'very dangerous'
male female
Predicted margins interaction gender and education (95% CIs)
Figure 12: Marginal effects of educational level by gender for France.
Analyzing the effect of education for women and men separately (compare Figure 12)
indicates that the effect for male respondents is a negative effect. Male graduating
from university are on average about 20% points less likely to express high levels of
nuclear risk perception, compared to males with no or the lowest level of education.
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For women, no significant differences can be observed for educational status, indicating
that higher educated women have the same likelihood to express high levels of nuclear
risk perception than comparable women with lower educational degrees. The observable
gender gap in France is influences to some degree by highly educated men. The gender
gap is not influences by the occupational status as a separate interaction analyses (not
shown here) reveals. Women, as well as men in the sample are less likely to express high
levels of nuclear risk perception when they are in paid work and work 40 hours or more
per week, as shown in Model 4.
Germany
To analyze the German data marginal effects are computed for four models. Model
1 includes the basic socio-demographic variables gender, age, and place of living. In
Model 2, the socio-demographic variables that represent specifically the socio-economic
status of a respondent are included: highest degree of education, household income,
and occupational status. In both model gender is the only significant effect indicating
that for women there is a higher chance of about 15% points to perceive nuclear as
dangerous or very dangerous. Non of the status variables seem to influence nuclear
risk perception significantly. Only when further taking into account individual’s party
affiliation and respondent’s expressed trust in government and people respondents with
the highest educational degree (‘University degree’) are significantly less likely (14.2%
points) to express high nuclear risk perception (Model 3). In Model 3 also people with
a left political orientation and people who do not distrust other people, either trust or
are indifferent, are more likely to express higher risk concerns. The significant effects
of Model 3 do not change when further value questions are included in Model 4. In
Model 4, people who believe that environmental development needs economic growth are
significantly less likely (12.4% points) to express high nuclear risk perception compared
to people who disagree on the idea of economic growth and environmental development.
Lower likelihoods of 16.8% points are also found for respondents in Germany who belief
that environmental threats are exaggerated.
Additional models controlling interactions for gender and the levels of educations, as
well as for gender and the occupational status do not indicate different likelihoods for
women with either higher levels of education or women with part- or full-time employ-
ment. To demonstrate the similar negative effects for women and for men the interaction
effect of education is plotted in Figure 13.
Japan
Results for the Japanese sample indicate that among the socio-demographic variables,
only women show significantly different likelihoods to express higher risk perception
than the chosen reference categories. In Model 4, women are 8.8% points more likely
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Figure 13: Marginal effects of education level by gender in Germany.
to perceive nuclear energy as very or extremely dangerous. Compared to people in the
lower or upper tercile, people with a household income in the middle tercile, tend to
have a higher likelihood to express a higher nuclear risk perception. This effect is not
significant on the 5% level of significance anymore in Model 4 when value variables
are controlled for. Political orientation has a strong influence on nuclear risk perception.
People with a left political orientation are 30.4% points more likely to perceive nuclear as
more dangerous compared to people who favor the center, the difference is even stronger
compared with people holding more conservative political views. People, who neither
trust or distrust other people show lower levels of nuclear risk perception; this effect,
even though negative, is not significant for people expressing that they trust people. In
Model 4, respondents who express more knowledge about the causes of environmental
problems are more likely to be more concerned about nuclear technology than people
who know less about the causes.
No significant differences can be found between both sexes regarding the positive
trends in education and the negative trends in occupational status. Though not signifi-
cantly different the interactions indicate for women who work full time to be more likely
to be more concerned compared to women who work less than 40h a week, or are not in
paid work (compare Figure 14). Men who work more have the tendency to be less likely
to express higher nuclear risk perception, at least in the Japanese sample of the ISSP
2010.
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Figure 14: Average marginal effects of occupational status by gender for Japan.
6.5.3. Summary of regression analysis
Among all observed country samples and all observed models (without interaction ef-
fects) women are significantly more likely on the 5% level of significance to perceive
nuclear power as very or extremely dangerous. The analyses, as performed here, reveal
a gender gap within the observed societies. For this effect and for all remaining factors
compare Table 4 on page 196 and the detailed Table 5 on page 206 with the estimated
effects its significant level and t-statistics.
In all five countries, older people have the tendency to be less likely to express high
levels of nuclear risk perception. This negative effect of age is significantly different from
the reference category in the United States, France, and Great Britain. In Germany there
are no observable age effects. In Japan there could be an inverse U-shaped tendency,
even though not significant, since in the sample, cohorts between 30 and 60 tend to
have higher likelihoods to express higher nuclear risk perception than younger or older
cohorts. To summarize the age effect I conclude that there is a negative tendency that
older people perceive nuclear as less dangerous compared to younger people, especially
for people older than 60 years (born before 1950). This effect is not stable across different
countries, nevertheless since there is no positive tendency, especially not for the older
people, I would not advise to reject the assumption of a negative age effect in future
research. Whether the observed effect is an age effect or an cohort effect cannot be
tested given the available data.
Location, the place people live, shows no clear tendency. Only in Great Britain,
people living in cities are significantly more likely to express higher levels of nuclear risk
perception. This variable seems to be a weak predictor for nuclear risk perception.
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The effect of education, one aspect of the effect of social status, on nuclear risk percep-
tion does not show homogeneous results for the selected country samples. In Germany,
the U.S., and France respondents with higher educational level are less likely, on average,
to express higher levels of nuclear risk perception. This effect is significant for people
with highest category ‘University degree’, compared to the reference category of ‘no or
lowest formal degree’. In the U.S. as well as in France this negative effect is only ob-
servable among males, when interaction analyzes for gender are performed. It is not the
case that the overall negative effect of higher educational levels holds for all countries.
In Japan and in Great Britain male as well as female respondents holding higher edu-
cational degrees are more likely to express higher risk perception. This positive trend is
significant for Great Britain, but not in the case of Japan.
The effect of household income on nuclear risk perception, as an additional aspect of
social status, shows a negative trend in all five observed countries. In the French, as
well as in the U.S. sample this negative effect shows significant lower likelihoods for the
upper tercile, compared with the lower tercile of the country specific income distribution
of the country sample.
Occupational status, as a third indicator of social status, does not indicate an increase
in the likelihood of perceiving nuclear energy as very or extremely dangerous for the
environment. Only in the French sample, were people, in paid work working 40 hours
per week or more, less likely to express high levels of nuclear risk perception. The French
result indicates that compared to other countries the observed significant difference is a
country specific phenomenon. The effect also does not vary between gender. Only in the
Japanese sample, women who are in full-time paid work have the tendency to perceive
nuclear power as more dangerous than men in full-time paid work.
Summarizing the effect of socio-economic status, it seems to be the case that in the
U.S. and in France the assumed negative relationship between social status and nuclear
risk perception is most obvious. This effect is more pronounced for male than for female
respondents in the U.S. and France regarding the relationship with education. The effect,
or more precise the relationship, of socio-economic status is less strong in Great Britain
and in Germany. In Great Britain, education has a positive relationship, but income
a negative one. In Germany, there is a negative relationship between better educated
people and nuclear risk perception and no relationship regarding the household income.
In the Japanese sample, there is no relationship observable between social status and
nuclear risk perception. Occupational status only in France, on average, has a negative
effect on risk perception. Results in Japan indicate a positive relationship for women
in full-time paid work, indicating a gender gap in occupational status among full-time
employed people.
The first value variable I examine is ideological party affiliation for people being non-
voters or in the center compared with people waving for the more left or cheering for the
more right wing dimension of a country’s two-poled ideological landscape. Compared
to the center/non-voter category (the reference category), in all five countries, a left
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ideology is related to a higher likelihood to express high levels of nuclear risk perception.
This effect is significant in Germany, the U.S., and Japan. A political right scaled
ideology results in a lower likelihood to express higher nuclear risk perception, though
the effect is not significantly different from the reference category in any of the observed
samples. Comparing left and right political orientation in separate analyses (not shown
here) the results indicate that in the case of France, there is a significant lower likelihood
to have high nuclear risk perception for respondents who have a right political orientation
compared to respondents who have a left political orientation. In the case of Great
Britain, this effect cannot be observed, indicating that there is no significant different
relationship between party affiliation and the likelihood to perceive nuclear power as
very or extremely dangerous. I therefore summarize that the expected gap between left
and right political orientation can be observed in all countries, although this effect varies
across countries and is not statistically significant in Great Britain.
In this analysis, trust is measured on the one hand in trust in governance and on the
other hand in the overall trust in people. For both measures, the reference category is
the group of respondents who express that they do not trust, either in the government
or in people. It is expected that respondents who do not trust the government or other
people are more concerned about nuclear technology. Assumed is a negative or inverse
relationship between trust and nuclear risk perception, i.e. higher levels in trust are
related to lower levels of nuclear risk perception. In the case of trust in governmental
institutions the expected negative relationship can be observed in almost all countries.
This relationship is very clearly pronounced in France, where respondents who trust the
government or have no preference have a significantly lower likelihood to perceive nuclear
energy as highly dangerous. In the German sample there is a different pattern. Those
who trust and do not trust the government are equally concerned about the dangers
of nuclear technology. Respondents who do not express specific trust or distrust in the
German government are significantly less likely to perceive nuclear as highly dangerous.
One possible interpretation of Germany’s result is that the nuclear issue is an issue that
concerns people who are willing to express their trust or distrust to the given political
situation. The German case for trust in people reveals a relationship that is counter-
intuitive to the expected negative relationship. Those who trust or express no specific
trust-tendency are equally more likely to be more concerned about nuclear technology
than respondents who express to not trust other people. The expected negative rela-
tionship between trust in people and nuclear risk perception can be observed in all other
countries, but the estimated effects only show significant differences in the U.S., Great
Britain, and Japan. The relationship of trust and nuclear power, though indicating an
inverse relationship, does not provide a homogeneous pattern in the international com-
parison for both trust variables. Further international comparative research needs to
test, if the German case represents an outlier.
Economic values are expected to be an influential factor on nuclear risk perception.
It is expected that nuclear technology is an essential element for a country’s future
economic prosperity. Proponents of economic growth should therefore be less likely to
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perceive nuclear technology as highly dangerous. The effect of a belief system in favor
for economic growth seems not to be strong in the international comparison because
the assumption can only be supported by two out of five samples. The expected neg-
ative relationship of respondents who favor economic growth instead of environmental
protection is only significantly different in France and in Germany.
The Knowledge-Support-Hypothesis assumes that respondents who believe that they
know more or better about environmental threats are less likely to express high levels
of nuclear risk perception. People in all five observed country sample who believe that
environmental threats are exaggerated are also less likely to perceive nuclear technology
as very or extremely dangerous to the environment. This hypothesis cannot be rejected
though the effect is negative but not significant on the 5% significance level in Japan.
When asked how much people know about the causes of environmental problems, only
respondents in Japan who express to know more about the causes are significantly more
likely to express high levels of risk perceptions. In the remaining four countries, there is
no clear relationship observable.
The last value-question included in the model to detect an individualistic or collec-
tivistic tendency to solve environmental problems does not show significantly different
likelihoods from zero and does not indicate a homogeneous relationship across all coun-
tries. In the German, French, and Japanese sample more collectivistic oriented people
have the tendency to be more likely to express higher risk perception. In Great Britain
there is tendency for collectivistic oriented people to have a lower likelihood to express
higher levels of nuclear risk perception. In the U.S. sample there is basically no ob-
servable tendency. It is possible that due to the operationalization of the variable the
variable is week indicator for a collectivistic or an individualistic value preference. I
therefore refrain from generalizing the results and only want to indicate that with the
given data and chosen design, there is no observable significant difference between people
with a rather collectivistic or individualistic world view.
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6.6. Conclusion
I draw a conclusion based on the analyzed country samples of the U.S., Great Britain,
France, Germany, and Japan (compare for a summary of the above discussed results
Table 4). There are significant relationships quite similar in all five countries. Subgroups
in all five societies that are more likely to express higher nuclear risk perceptions are
women, younger people and people who have a political left party affiliation, as well as
people who believe that environmental threats are not exaggerated.
From the data in the U.S., I conclude that there is a strong group with high socio-
economic status that perceives nuclear as less dangerous compared to younger people,
lower educated people, and individuals with lower income. The country is not divided
but the data reveal that there is no powerful majority which perceives nuclear power
as dangerous for the environment. Trust in government is not an important factor for
nuclear risk perception as well as nuclear power seems not to be perceived as a necessary
force for economic growth. The anti-nuclear revolution in the U.S. is more likely to be
supported by people who are holding a left political ideology, by women of all age and of
all educational background, since the negative education effect is stronger for men than
for women.
A higher nuclear risk perception and, hence, probably anti-nuclear opinions in Great
Britain are most likely to be perceived by younger citizens and people living in urban
areas, as well as better educated people. It is an open question whether the anti-nuclear
movement in the future can mobilize all parts of society.
The French nuclear project is successful and it seems that either the nuclear project
could build its support structure or the French political system was the ideal sandbox
to develop a French nuclear system. There is no support from the left wing political
ideology to continuously stir the fears of nuclear power in the public debate. Women
and young people are left alone and pressed in a social fabric that produced pro-nuclear
ideology in its key institutions, university, financial power, and occupational prestige.
Trust in government is an important mechanism in France for reducing individual’s risk
perception of nuclear power.
The German results in 2010 suggest that a subgroup of people, mostly better educated
people, people with higher income, and people who believe in economic growth perceive
nuclear as less dangerous. It is also a German phenomenon that people who trust other
people are more concerned than people who distrust. Trust in Germany is a motivation
not an obstacle for awareness of the nuclear threat. Trust can lead to higher social
mobilization to go against the source of threat – the nuclear power plant. People who
trust and who do not trust express the same levels of nuclear risk perception. Even
if there is a gap in party ideology in Germany, it is not the case that the expressed
trust in the government is dividing the alliance of people who perceive nuclear power as
dangerous.
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In Japan, prior to the Fukushima Daiichi accident, there were no incidents that indi-
cated a strong evidence that the country is divided in expressing nuclear risk perception.
Marginalized groups, such as women and people with a left wing ideology perceived nu-
clear power on average as more dangerous. It seems that the nuclear project in Japan is
happening independently of public opinion and public consultation. The low explained
variance in the Japanese model makes me doubting if the operationalization of the de-
pendent and independent variable in Japan is appropriate for measuring nuclear risk
perception and the relationship to socio-demographic variables properly.
Given more or less the same starting point of the nuclear project in all five countries, we
see different patterns of nuclear risk perception and different developments of the nuclear
project. Across all societies, there are people who perceive nuclear risk as dangerous as
well as not dangerous. In the U.S., there is no vital development and a strong anti-nuclear
movement, with a long tradition. In Great Britain, the nuclear project continues on a
moderate level. After the Fukushima Daiichi accident, in Germany the nuclear project
is faded out, a development that was on its way already before the accident in 2011.
The data show that in Germany, nuclear risk perception is very high in almost all social
groups. In Japan and France the nuclear project is about to survive even thought there
were protests on the nuclear project, in the past in France and most recently in Japan.
It is just the case, that in Japan as well as in France, a homogeneous group perceives
nuclear as not dangerous, and are willing to support the technology, as I assume. It
seems in Japan, that the population capitulated and there is no strong group that is
able to say STOP! And in France only the socially weak people perceive nuclear as
dangerous and could say STOP. An exclusive state, such as in France, Japan, and Great
Britain, is able to govern nuclear technology independent of social protests or citizens’
concerns.
I dare to argue, even though I cannot prove this assumption, that the historical devel-
opment of the nuclear project in each country is reflected in the relationship of nuclear
risk perception and socio-economic or value factors as analyzed in this chapter. Respon-
dents in the U.S. that do not trust in government voice the weak role of the nuclear
authorities in the U.S. to promote nuclear projects. In Great Britain, the anti-nuclear
movement was supported by members of the elite and feminist groups. Both are reflected
in the results. The reproduction of the French technocratic elite system can be found
in the data structure, resulting, for example, in high trust in government authorities,
the promotors of the nuclear project in France. Anti-nuclear attitudes are a common
phenomenon across all social classes in Germany. People’s political ideology is also rep-
resented in the federal and state government with the Green party. The ideology got
institutionalized, in contrast to all other countries in this comparison. The data also
indicate that people who are more concerned also trust more and maybe because of that
are willing to mobilize other people. Nuclear technology, hence, is also a threat to social
and political trust. The Japanese case reveals that a strong and nation wide anti-nuclear
movement did not exit in 2010. The data show that beside women and people with a
left-ideology there is no social group that can be addressed to be able to address strong
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fears of nuclear technology.
My conclusion is not free of critique. All data are cross sectional and measured at one
particular time point. Any causal relationship is not provable. On the other hand, the
historical as well as the empirical results, show that there are differences and that there
are similarities. This chapter mentions political opportunity structures (Kitschelt, 1986)
but a more systematic cross-national comparison is not performed. Instead I want to
emphasize the arena concept, because I do not mention it within the theory section of
my dissertation. Dieter Rucht (1990) and Ortwin Renn (2008) describe the conflictual
interaction of different actors in their arena approach. According to this approach, within
given structural settings, conflicting interactions take place between different actors. In
the arena approach, the audience has not a passive role but is an important factor
that can shape the discourse. Conflicting parties, do not only anticipate what effect
their action will have on the conflicting party but also how the audience, as the third
party will evaluate the specific action. The history of the nuclear project is a history
of technological development and social protest at the same time. It is a social process
and an empirical question whether societies and citizens will accept nuclear technology
in the future or if the technology proves to be too dangerous for human living on earth.
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6.7. Appendix
Regression table U.S.
Table 6: Nuclear risk perception in the U.S. (logistic regression with marginal effects as coefficients).
M1 M2 M3 M4
Gender (0=male)
female 0.189∗∗∗ (6.39) 0.185∗∗∗ (6.34) 0.167∗∗∗ (5.72) 0.151∗∗∗ (5.08)
Age (0=<30)
30–44 -0.0284 (-0.62) 0.0284 (0.63) 0.0276 (0.63) 0.0301 (0.68)
45–59 -0.0956∗ (-2.09) -0.0287 (-0.63) -0.0245 (-0.55) -0.0235 (-0.53)
60–74 -0.241∗∗∗ (-5.04) -0.173∗∗∗ (-3.55) -0.156∗∗ (-3.13) -0.146∗∗ (-2.90)
75–90 -0.290∗∗∗ (-4.55) -0.244∗∗∗ (-3.83) -0.215∗∗ (-3.22) -0.208∗∗ (-3.08)
Urbanity (0=city)
town/small city 0.00921 (0.24) -0.0410 (-1.13) -0.0351 (-0.98) -0.0341 (-0.95)
village n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Education (0= no/lowest degree)
intermediate secondary 0.0122 (0.13) 0.0316 (0.32) 0.0241 (0.24)
secondary -0.0789 (-0.99) -0.0527 (-0.62) -0.0572 (-0.68)
university -0.220∗∗ (-2.67) -0.193∗ (-2.19) -0.194∗ (-2.21)
Income (0=first tercile)
second tercile -0.0406 (-1.06) -0.0325 (-0.84) -0.0297 (-0.77)
third tercile -0.174∗∗∗ (-4.27) -0.147∗∗∗ (-3.64) -0.142∗∗∗ (-3.50)
Occupation (0=no occupation)
part time 0.0588 (1.42) 0.0696 (1.69) 0.0749 (1.84)
full time 0.0407 (1.11) 0.0556 (1.53) 0.0546 (1.51)
Party affiliation (0=center/non)
left 0.134∗∗∗ (3.94) 0.126∗∗∗ (3.68)
right -0.0433 (-1.19) -0.0280 (-0.76)
Trust governance (0=distrust)
no preference -0.0121 (-0.33) -0.0156 (-0.43)
trusting -0.0362 (-1.01) -0.0441 (-1.24)
Trust people (0=distrust)
no preference -0.0368 (-1.01) -0.0440 (-1.20)
trusting -0.0844∗ (-2.32) -0.0828∗ (-2.28)
Environment (0=worry not too much)
worry too much 0.0390 (1.17)
Economic growth (0=disagree)
agree on more growth 0.00633 (0.21)
Knowledge threat (0= not exaggerated)
exaggerated -0.107∗∗ (-3.21)
Knowledge causes (0=not knowing)
knowing much -0.0115 (-0.36)
Worldview (0=individualistic)
collectivistic 0.00226 (0.07)
Pseudo R2 0.057 0.103 0.126 0.133
N 1057 1057 1057 1057
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Logistic regression coefficients displayed as marginal effects
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Regression table Great Britain
Table 7: Nuclear risk perception in Great Britain (logistic regression with marginal effects as coefficients).
M1 M2 M3 M4
Gender (0=male)
female 0.165∗∗∗ (4.27) 0.161∗∗∗ (4.08) 0.150∗∗∗ (3.81) 0.129∗∗ (3.28)
Age (0=<30)
30–44 -0.0463 (-0.67) -0.0293 (-0.40) -0.0213 (-0.29) -0.0517 (-0.71)
45–59 -0.205∗∗ (-3.01) -0.185∗ (-2.56) -0.164∗ (-2.25) -0.181∗ (-2.50)
60–74 -0.234∗∗ (-3.20) -0.240∗∗ (-3.16) -0.200∗ (-2.53) -0.191∗ (-2.36)
75–90 -0.109 (-1.02) -0.139 (-1.26) -0.0575 (-0.50) -0.0699 (-0.60)
Urbanity (0=city)
town/small city -0.131∗∗ (-2.87) -0.129∗∗ (-2.84) -0.117∗∗ (-2.61) -0.124∗∗ (-2.81)
village -0.109∗ (-2.06) -0.111∗ (-2.15) -0.0916 (-1.79) -0.0969 (-1.88)
Education (0= no/lowest degree)
intermediate secondary -0.0273 (-0.45) 0.00537 (0.09) -0.00358 (-0.06)
secondary 0.0420 (0.73) 0.0891 (1.55) 0.0843 (1.47)
university 0.120 (1.86) 0.166∗∗ (2.62) 0.163∗ (2.53)
Income (0=first tercile)
second tercile -0.0796 (-1.42) -0.0517 (-0.93) -0.0441 (-0.79)
third tercile -0.175∗∗ (-2.97) -0.133∗ (-2.18) -0.112 (-1.83)
Occupation (0=no occupation)
part time -0.0145 (-0.28) -0.0130 (-0.25) -0.0140 (-0.27)
full time 0.0215 (0.35) 0.0244 (0.39) 0.0247 (0.40)
Party affiliation (0=center/non)
left 0.0244 (0.49) 0.0141 (0.29)
right -0.0826 (-1.76) -0.0602 (-1.28)
Trust governance (0=distrust)
no preference -0.00315 (-0.07) -0.0156 (-0.33)
trusting -0.0346 (-0.73) -0.0458 (-0.98)
Trust people (0=distrust)
no preference -0.128∗ (-2.40) -0.142∗∗ (-2.66)
trusting -0.157∗∗ (-3.03) -0.168∗∗ (-3.10)
Environment (0=worry not too much)
worry too much 0.0884 (1.90)
Economic growth (0=disagree)
agree on more growth 0.0409 (1.06)
Knowledge threat (0= not exaggerated)
exaggerated -0.164∗∗∗ (-3.64)
Knowledge causes (0=not knowing)
knowing much -0.0507 (-1.25)
Worldview (0=individualistic)
collectivistic -0.0566 (-1.45)
Pseudo R2 0.068 0.086 0.107 0.132
N 563 563 563 563
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Logistic regression coefficients displayed as marginal effects
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Regression table France
Table 8: Nuclear risk perception in France (logistic regression with marginal effects as coefficients).
M1 M2 M3 M4
Gender (0=male)
female 0.135∗∗∗ (4.61) 0.0924∗∗ (3.08) 0.0826∗∗ (2.81) 0.0791∗∗ (2.72)
Age (0=<30)
30–44 -0.0468 (-0.53) 0.00163 (0.02) 0.000302 (0.00) 0.00305 (0.04)
45–59 -0.0470 (-0.55) -0.0212 (-0.25) -0.0338 (-0.42) -0.0296 (-0.38)
60–74 -0.117 (-1.34) -0.153 (-1.71) -0.134 (-1.54) -0.115 (-1.37)
75–90 -0.252∗∗ (-2.65) -0.302∗∗ (-3.23) -0.270∗∗ (-2.87) -0.248∗∗ (-2.70)
Urbanity (0=city)
town/small city 0.0467 (1.24) 0.00627 (0.16) 0.0111 (0.29) 0.00634 (0.17)
village 0.0414 (1.19) -0.0103 (-0.28) -0.0137 (-0.38) -0.0212 (-0.60)
Education (0= no/lowest degree)
intermediate secondary -0.0637 (-1.31) -0.0699 (-1.47) -0.0680 (-1.44)
secondary -0.0509 (-1.02) -0.0668 (-1.37) -0.0817 (-1.68)
university -0.0824 (-1.56) -0.0988 (-1.90) -0.118∗ (-2.27)
Income (0=first tercile)
second tercile -0.0921∗∗ (-2.60) -0.0854∗ (-2.49) -0.0856∗ (-2.51)
third tercile -0.133∗∗∗ (-3.36) -0.116∗∗ (-2.99) -0.118∗∗ (-3.10)
Occupation (0=no occupation)
part time 0.0128 (0.27) 0.0138 (0.29) 0.00904 (0.20)
full time -0.142∗∗ (-3.01) -0.118∗ (-2.49) -0.123∗∗ (-2.68)
Party affiliation (0=center/non)
left 0.0632 (1.72) 0.0439 (1.20)
right -0.0853∗ (-2.25) -0.0738 (-1.94)
Trust governance (0=distrust)
no preference -0.0794∗ (-2.40) -0.0769∗ (-2.35)
trusting -0.110∗ (-2.57) -0.0968∗ (-2.28)
Trust people (0=distrust)
no preference -0.0397 (-1.29) -0.0420 (-1.36)
trusting 0.00968 (0.26) -0.0118 (-0.33)
Environment (0=worry not too much)
worry too much 0.00356 (0.11)
Economic growth (0=disagree)
agree on more growth -0.0832∗∗ (-2.95)
Knowledge threat (0= not exaggerated)
exaggerated -0.129∗∗∗ (-4.17)
Knowledge causes (0=not knowing)
knowing much 0.0323 (1.14)
Worldview (0=individualistic)
collectivistic 0.0520 (1.79)
Pseudo R2 0.032 0.065 0.097 0.117
N 1192 1192 1192 1192
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Logistic regression coefficients displayed as marginal effects
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Regression table Germany
Table 9: Nuclear risk perception in Germany (logistic regression with marginal effects as coefficients).
M1 M2 M3 M4
Gender (0=male)
female 0.157∗∗∗ (-4.83) 0.159∗∗∗ (-4.65) 0.160∗∗∗ (-4.81) 0.137∗∗∗ (4.02)
Age (0=<30)
30–44 0.038 (-0.75) 0.0513 (-0.98) 0.0494 (-0.98) 0.0537 (1.06)
45–59 -0.000525 (-0.01) 0.0119 (-0.24) -0.00822 (-0.17) 0.00099 (0.02)
60–74 -0.0286 (-0.54) -0.0418 (-0.71) -0.0453 (-0.79) -0.0207 (-0.37)
75–90 -0.0291 (-0.40) -0.0502 (-0.63) -0.0487 (-0.65) -0.00374 (-0.05)
Urbanity (0=city)
town/small city 0.0176 (-0.45) 0.00863 (-0.22) 0.0196 (-0.51) 0.027 (0.72)
village -0.0325 (-0.82) -0.0459 (-1.13) -0.0285 (-0.71) -0.0298 (-0.75)
Education (0= no/lowest degree)
intermediate secondary -0.00608 (-0.15) -0.0169 (-0.43) -0.0154 (-0.40)
secondary -0.0285 (-0.55) -0.0486 (-0.97) -0.0553 (-1.13)
university -0.0869 (-1.57) -0.142∗∗ (-2.59) -0.132∗ (-2.34)
Income (0=first tercile)
second tercile -0.00346 (-0.08) -0.00837 (-0.20) -0.00921 (-0.23)
third tercile -0.0172 (-0.40) -0.0209 (-0.49) -0.0193 (-0.46)
Occupation (0=no occupation)
part time -0.0622 (-1.22) -0.0603 (-1.22) -0.0545 (-1.14)
full time 0.00196 (-0.04) -0.0065 (-0.15) 0.000667 (0.02)
Party affiliation (0=center/non)
left 0.130∗∗ (-3.18) 0.0947∗ (2.40)
right -0.0642 (-1.33) -0.0842 (-1.80)
Trust governance (0=distrust)
no preference -0.108∗∗ (-2.72) -0.108∗∗ (-2.80)
trusting -0.0516 (-1.12) -0.0157 (-0.36)
Trust people (0=distrust)
no preference 0.101∗ (-2.51) 0.0954∗ (2.38)
trusting 0.106∗∗ (-2.78) 0.101∗∗ (2.72)
Environment (0=worry not too much)
worry too much 0.0287 (0.77)
Economic growth (0=disagree)
agree on more growth -0.124∗∗∗ (-3.84)
Knowledge threat (0=not exaggerated)
exaggerated -0.168∗∗∗ (-4.34)
Knowledge causes (0=not knowing)
knowing much 0.00365 (0.11)
Worldview (0=individualistic)
collectivistic 0.0304 (0.87)
Pseudo R2 0.027 0.032 0.077 0.116
N 811 811 811 811
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Logistic regression coefficients displayed as marginal effects
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Regression table Japan
Table 10: Nuclear risk perception in Japan (logistic regression with marginal effects as coefficients).
M1 M2 M3 M4
Gender (0=male)
female 0.0845∗∗ (2.63) 0.0810∗ (2.29) 0.0835∗ (2.36) 0.0879∗ (2.44)
Age (0=<30)
30–44 0.0924 (1.76) 0.0766 (1.41) 0.0736 (1.38) 0.0740 (1.37)
45–59 0.0196 (0.38) 0.0246 (0.45) 0.0225 (0.42) 0.0329 (0.60)
60–74 0.0182 (0.35) -0.00574 (-0.11) 0.00779 (0.14) 0.00723 (0.13)
75–90 -0.0737 (-1.09) -0.0893 (-1.29) -0.0730 (-1.01) -0.0739 (-1.03)
Urbanity (0=city)
town/small city -0.0121 (-0.32) -0.00805 (-0.21) 0.00536 (0.14) 0.0122 (0.32)
village -0.0379 (-0.89) -0.0379 (-0.87) -0.0238 (-0.55) -0.0155 (-0.36)
Education (0= no/lowest degree)
intermediate secondary n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
secondary 0.0666 (1.38) 0.0668 (1.38) 0.0687 (1.41)
university 0.103 (1.77) 0.102 (1.74) 0.0985 (1.68)
Income (0=first tercile)
second tercile 0.0895∗ (2.07) 0.0858∗ (2.00) 0.0831 (1.94)
third tercile -0.0525 (-1.22) -0.0494 (-1.15) -0.0643 (-1.51)
Occupation (0=no occupation)
part time -0.0402 (-0.88) -0.0254 (-0.56) -0.0247 (-0.55)
full time -0.0375 (-0.84) -0.0234 (-0.52) -0.0284 (-0.63)
Party affiliation (0=center/non)
left 0.304∗∗ (3.22) 0.304∗∗∗ (3.36)
right -0.0583 (-1.47) -0.0603 (-1.49)
Trust governance (0=distrust)
no preference -0.0492 (-1.28) -0.0471 (-1.23)
trusting -0.0191 (-0.29) -0.00806 (-0.13)
Trust people (0=distrust)
no preference -0.0771∗ (-2.17) -0.0726∗ (-2.02)
trusting -0.0430 (-0.96) -0.0403 (-0.90)
Environment (0=worry not too much)
worry too much -0.00445 (-0.10)
Economic growth (0=disagree)
agree on more growth -0.0515 (-1.55)
Knowledge threat (0= not exaggerated)
exaggerated -0.0363 (-0.84)
Knowledge causes (0=not knowing)
knowing much 0.0913∗ (2.36)
Worldview (0=individualistic)
collectivistic 0.0549 (1.70)
Pseudo R2 0.013 0.028 0.043 0.052
N 908 908 908 908
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Logistic regression coefficients displayed as marginal effects
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7. Empirical research II: The Fukushima effect on
nuclear risk perception
7.1. Introduction
On March 11, 2011 a major natural disaster hit the eastern Japanese coast and led
to a humanitarian catastrophe and to a mayor nuclear disaster which is now called
the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident. Both events were a shock for the Japanese
society as well as for humans around the world who could follow the dramatic event on
the news. The nuclear accident can be perceived as a moment of global discontinuity
putting forth the question of how dangerous people in different countries perceive nuclear
power stations.
In this chapter, I will discuss how risk is defined from a technical perspective, an
expert’s view, and how in contrast laypeople intuitively perceive risks. I am interested
how laypeople change their risk perception in case of the immediate evidence of a nuclear
accident at some place in the world. One question I am asking is whether a major nuclear
accident widens the gap in public’s risk perception of nuclear energy, leading to more
extreme views, i.e. to polarization; or does an accident lead to a harmonization of risk
perception in the population, i.e. to solidarity? I artificially try to paint a picture of
on one hand a naive layperson completely relying on intuition, emotions, and heuristics
when evaluating nuclear risk. On the other hand, I refer to the prototype of an analytical
expert who calculates risk perception by the expected utility of negative outcome and
the probability of a dangerous event. I want to remark that I stereotype and assume that
in reality risk evaluation is an interplay of intuitive emotions and analytical reasoning,
or as Finucane and colleagues (2003) title their book chapter ‘Judgment and decision
making: the dance of affect and reason’.
I test my assumptions with empirical data of people’s views on risk perception before
and after the nuclear accident of Fukushima using data from the International Social
Survey Programme (ISSP) Environment Module III (ISSP, 2012). I furthermore see the
unexpected event of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident as a natural experiment,
that divides the population in people who evaluated their nuclear risk perception before
the nuclear accident and people who assessed nuclear risk after the accident using the new
information of a major nuclear accident. I also take into consideration the assumption
that different subgroups within a society are more likely to have higher or lower levels
of risk perception. I therefore want to know to what degree changes in nuclear risk
perception differ between different subgroups.
This research question is in part based on a co-authored project with Dr. Rudolf
Farys (University of Bern, Switzerland) and Dr. Thomas Häussler (University of Bern,
Switzerland). The data and methods part as well as the result part of this chapter are a
result of the co-authored project. In this parts, I use the term ‘we’ to emphasize that we
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all three contributed to the content. I want to emphasize that I owe Dr. Rudolf Farys
the implementation of the research idea in the statistical model as well as the statistical
results and graphical representation. The theory part as well as the conclusion are
my own work. I therefore use the term ‘I’ to indicate a clear separation of my own
contribution and the shared contribution to the research question.
7.2. Theoretical overview
There is no unanimously defined concept or risk in the scientific community (cf., Rosa,
1998; Aven and Zio, 2014; Aven, 2012b; Aven et al., 2011; Aven and Renn, 2009; Campbell
and Currie, 2006). In the following section I differentiate between a technical concept
of risk and an intuitive concept of risk. The former is based on the rational calculation
of expected values, the later is based on an intuitive evaluation of uncertain outcomes.
For a discussion of the definition of risk see also Section 2, especially Section 2.4.
In the technical risk concept, risk is expressed as a function of two components: the
first component is the harm of a negative event multiplied with the second component,
probability (Campbell and Currie, 2006, 150). Risks perceived from this point of view
is understood as an “expected loss” or a “expected disutility” or the “probability of an
adverse outcome” and has a negative connotation (Aven and Renn, 2009, 1). The decision
making process behind the technical risk evaluation is to minimize the expected risk or
the expected disutility.
According to classical decision making theory, the basic rationale behind the decision
making process is to maximize expected utility or vice vera, to minimize expected losses
(Renn, 2008, 103). Proponents of this view assume that individuals are able to reflect
the expected costs and benefits of each decision option. It is furthermore assumed that
individuals simultaneously assign subjective probabilities to the occurrence of each op-
tion. Renn describes risk from that perspective as: “Risk in this sense represents the
net effect of negative or positive consequences associated with each option (magnitudes)
and the assignment of probabilities to each outcome” (Renn, 2008, 103). The assump-
tion of rational decision making holds for situations in which an option has different
consequences, weighted with different probabilities. In the case of nuclear risk a rational
actor is assessing different consequences such as economic benefits, risk for health, and
environmental consequences. Nuclear risk could even be perceived as a multi-optional
risk, given the set of nuclear risks, such as the risk of nuclear weapons, nuclear energy,
and nuclear waste disposal.
The multi-dimensionality of the evaluation process and the rationally assigned weights
and probabilities is a reason that the concept of a rational actor fits in theory, but leaves
room for criticism. This concept is not easily to apply in everyday decision making
processes in real life situations under limited time and information resources. Laypeople
are not well trained to process probabilistic information (Dietz and Stern, 1995; Tversky,
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1972; Jaeger et al., 2001). Laypeople tend to evaluate uncertainty not as probabilities
but turn to different non-probabilistic cognitive processes when assessing the unknown
(Aven, 2012b, 2011). Furthermore, the information processing process of perceiving,
evaluating, and forming beliefs varies between individuals and depends on the specific
context and the given information sources (Renn, 1992; Kasperson et al., 1988).
From a social science point of view, it is useful to use a broader concept of risk
when assessing individuals risk perception. According to Aven and Renn (2009, 3–4) a
broader concept of risk is a concept that (a) does not distinguish between desirable and
undesirable outcomes; (b) speaks of uncertainties and does not assume probabilities and
expected values; (c) evaluates if outcomes are at stake and is not based on the evaluation
of specific consequences. To summarize, the broader risk concept encompasses everything
that humans value. This measure is not based on precise measures of uncertainty, such
as probabilistic point estimators. Risk furthermore is not defined through specific and
precisely defined consequences of an event or action, but rather by a dialogical process
of evaluated outcomes; by evaluating something of human value, that is potentially at
stake.
Rosa (1998, 28) provides a broader definition of risk that is based on the two dimen-
sions of uncertainty and outcomes at stake: “Risk is a situation or event where something
of human value (including humans themselves) has been put at stake and where the out-
come is uncertain.” This definition still implies that risk and risk perception are separate
items. Rosa’s definition assumes that there is a world (out there) that has risks and that
this world is independent of individual’s perception, as Aven and Renn claim (2009, 5).
According to Aven and Renn, the concept of individual’s risk evaluation beyond the
rational framework is not only an assessment of the seriousness of a risk, but also im-
plies a normative judgement of its perceived acceptability and tolerability. The authors
(Aven and Renn, 2009, 6) define risk as a subjective evaluation of events and outcomes
in an uncertain world: “Risk refers to uncertainty about and severity of the event and
consequences (or outcomes) of an activity with respect to something that human value.”
Risk from this point of view is an evaluation process of the uncertainty of an event and
the uncertainty about the potential consequences (compare Section 2.4.3). This defi-
nition in a second step allows a normative judgement with respect to something that
people value. Risk perception then can be understood as a multidimensional judgment
process: “Risk perception, in general, denotes the processing of physical signals and/or
information about potentially harmful events or activities, and the formation of a judge-
ment about seriousness, likelihood and acceptability of a respective event or activity”
(Renn, 2008, 98). To summarize, risk perception is a person’s judgement about a risk.
Risk in Aven and Renn’s concept is mentally constructed by assessing the uncertainty
and does not exist independent of the observer (Aven and Renn, 2009, 8). Risks are
not external features but objects of subjective knowledge, or as Beck claims: “risks are
risks in knowledge” (Beck, 1992, 55). Any individual uncertainty judgement is based on
the available information and personal experience, values and beliefs, reflecting a broad
spectrum of uncertainty aspects, that are ignored in a concept of risk, evaluating risks
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as an expected value of probability and consequences.
Risks expressed as expected values is criticized because by this process of risk as-
sessment potential harm is not adequately reflected (Beck, 1992; Aven and Renn, 2009;
Renn, 2008). Laypeople’s judgement of risks, on the contrary, is based on simplified
judgments procedures (heuristics) and weighting patterns that are able to overweight
or to ignore potential harm. Often the optimal strategy is to avoid major losses than
to maximize expected benefits (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Luce and Weber, 1986;
Covello, 1983; Renn et al., 1992). Renn (2008, 98) also mentions that laypeople’s risk
judgement weights the consequences of an event or action higher than its probability.
Renn further points out (referring to Sparks and Shepherd, 1994; Frewer et al., 2002)
that laypeople perceive uncertainty as a fundamental gap in knowledge and do not refer
to the concept of probability distributions to overcome knowledge gaps and blind spots
of uncertainty. In the non-expert’s world, uncertainty about the potential occurrence of
a risk is a strong criteria depicting how people perceive and accept risks (Renn, 2008,
102–103).
The concept of expected value and its assumption of deriving probabilities to potential
outcomes is a complex process of information processing. Human beings usually use
simpler ways, as rules of thumbs, to assess risks and to judge harmful situation. For
example, in the case of the Fukushima Daiichi accident I assume that people all over
the world rather intuitively than rationally assessed the risk of this nuclear accident as a
harmful outcome or a dangerous situation. In this case, judgement of a new situation is
assumed to be intuitively connected or linked to previous information of similar events,
a-priori beliefs and attitudes, furthermore to intuitively experienced emotions and easily
accessible associations of that event. Given that in laypeople’s risk evaluation all of these
factors play an important part in judging risks, laypeople’s risk evaluation should differ
from experts’ risk evaluation and have the characteristics of an intuitive judgement.
As presented in Section 4.2.1, from a scientific point of view, several factors of an in-
tuitive judgment under uncertainty, so called biasing factors or heuristics, have been
detected and discussed (compare for example Tversky and Kahneman, 1973, 1974;
Lichtenstein et al., 1978; Rohrmann and Renn, 2000; Rottenstreich and Tversky, 1997;
Rohrmann, 1994; Gigerenzer, 1991). In the case of the ‘availability bias’, as well as
the ‘anchoring effect bias’, it is assumed that people judge the risk of an event as more
likely when similar events are known and immediately mentally available. Similarly, the
‘representativeness bias’ also indicates that events that are directly and emotionally ex-
perienced are perceived as known and their likelihood gets more weight than unfamiliar
events, represented by mere numbers and without a narrative. In the case of a nuclear
accident, it can be assumed that the event triggers all three biases and makes people
overestimate the likelihood of a new nuclear accident, as well as develop a pessimistic
view of the potential consequences of the actual nuclear disaster at the Fukushima Dai-
ichi power plant. The ‘avoidance of cognitive dissonance bias’ assumes that people, after
processing new information, try to ignore information that challenges their existing be-
lief system (Rohrmann and Renn, 2000; Rohrmann, 1994). From that point of view,
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a-priori supporters and opponents of nuclear technology should drift further apart in
case of a new accident. Supporters should try to keep their doubts about nuclear risks
as low as possible, by using the information to downplay the risk, whereas opponents
should use the information to emphasize and exaggerate their a-priori judgement of nu-
clear risk. People who hold both views, though, should be influenced by the availability
bias and change their views towards a more pessimistic perception of nuclear power.
The discussion on heuristic biases reveals that people’s risk judgement is an interplay
of cognitive processes, existing belief structures and available information. As a result,
their evaluation is always influenced by qualitative aspects of human reasoning and risk
judgement. It is either biased towards one extreme of mere arithmetic rationality, a
calculated process, or the other extreme of mere intuition, a process that is based on
feeling and perception. The question, therefore, is not whether the view is biased, but
to what degree. Followed by the normative question, whether these biased views harm
the social order and the well being of the society and nature, now and in the future.
7.2.1. The concept of heuristics and a critique
I want to focus my thoughts again on the concept of heuristics and biases, developed
by Tversky and Kahneman Tversky and Kahneman, 1974. First, I want to understand
why something human judge is called biased. I then want to point out that the concept
of heuristics can be used as one potential explanation for how human reasoning can
lead to more extreme results when judging the risk of nuclear power. I also want to
open up the space for a criticism of the concept of heuristics and biases by discussing
the underlying normative concept; a normative concept, that allows to call a judgment
under uncertainty biased or error (Gigerenzer, 1991).
In the first step of my more detailed explanation of heuristics and biases I hypothesize
that heuristics can lead to more extreme opinions about nuclear power’s danger, on the
optimistic as well as on the pessimistic sides of nuclear power’s risk evaluation scale.
To do so, I imagine a fictive population divided into the prototype of laypeople and
the prototype of experts. The underlying assumption I make is that from a layperson’s
perspective, nuclear risk is more likely to be perceived as ‘extremely dangerous,’ whereas
from an expert’s point of view, nuclear risk is more likely to be perceived as ‘not at all
dangerous’. The basic question is how people assess the risk of nuclear power. How do
respondents quantify a risk? In the heuristic and bias concept the quantified measure
of risk should be a quantity of the likelihood and the dangerous consequences of nuclear
power. The assumption is that people use heuristics to make a simplified judgment of
the true probability and harm of an event, a judgment under uncertainty due to limited
information and time pressure. Heuristics help to simplify that complex process of
information processing. While applying heuristics, according to Tversky and Kahneman,
systematic errors can occur leading to observable biases (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974,
1124). The basic question for me is whether individuals, both the prototype of experts
and laypeople, are overestimating or underestimating the risk of nuclear power (compare
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Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, 1124). How does the object of risk occur from an judging
perspective? Are the contours of the risk clear or unclear, and therefore under- or
overestimated?
The representativeness heuristic is used when people judge the likelihood that a certain
process A will lead to a certain outcome B. In the case of nuclear power, the judgment
is the likelihood that nuclear power plants will produce a negative outcome, such as a
nuclear accident. In such a case, information about the existing nuclear power plants
(A) will lead to the judgment of how likely a nuclear accident (B) will occur. To
assess probabilities of dangerous events different processes can be used, depending on
the available information and an observer’s view. Nuclear power can be perceived as
safe technology if the observer counts the number of accidents in relation to the known
accidents of nuclear power plants locally, using a narrow time-space dimension. If an
observer refers intuitively to major accidents, as base line category for the probability
judgment, using a global perspective as time-space dimension, nuclear power can be
perceived as extremely dangerous. How people interpret the “characteristics of a process”
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, 1125) influences individual’s judgment.
The gambler’s fallacy is an example of how different views can lead to a polarization
of nuclear risk perception in a population. The gambler’s fallacy occurs when chance
is perceived as a process that automatically leads to an equally balanced occurrence
of events (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, 1125). In the case of a very low expected
probability of a nuclear accident, the fallacy could be the following: since there has not
been an accident in the past, there will be no accident in the future. This group of people
ignores that chance means that nuclear accidents can happen at any time, independent
of past events and of the expected likelihood of an nuclear accident. On the other hand,
the gambler’s fallacy also leads to an overestimation of nuclear risk for when after a
long sequence of no accidents someone expects the next accident to happen. The nature
of chance has no self-correcting mechanisms which means that a long period with no
accident events does not mean that the next event is more likely to be an accident.
Two aspects, related to what Tversky and Kahneman call the ‘representativeness
heuristic’ are worth mentioning from my point of view. Both point to the description
and the consistency of arguments that form someone’s judgments under uncertainty,
and point to the concrete evidence. Tversky and Kahneman call the process in which
the consistency of a description guides someone’s judgment and not the actual evidence
“insensitivity to predictability” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, 1126). They furthermore
term “illusion of validity” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, 1126) a process in which the
occurrence of an event is primarily assessed based on how the available information
represents the expected outcome. In both cases, if the information available about
nuclear power matches the stereotypes of a safe technology, and is consistent in its
description, any judgment of perceiving nuclear power as not dangerous is perceived as
valid. On the other hand, a consistent and valid description of nuclear as a not safe
technology will lead to a judgment of nuclear as an extremely dangerous technology.
From my point of view, there is no solution for this problem and no correct answer,
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since even the evidence of nuclear accidents does not provide clear information and is an
object which is subject to interpretation itself. Any nuclear accident can be perceived
as an indicator of how safe or dangerous the technology is, it depends entirely on the
consistent and valid interpretation. The measure of change in people’s intuitive risk
judgment, after a sudden event, can shield more light on the intuitive processes of risk
perception, along with how emotions guide people’s risk assessment.
The concept of anchoring heuristic can further be used as an explanation of how
different starting points (anchors) can lead to different judgments of nuclear power’s
danger, especially when uncertainty is an important element of the assessment. If the
starting point of the risk calculation is the worst imaginable case of a fatal nuclear
accident, the perceived risk, i.e. the likelihood of an event and the outcomes of the
event, of nuclear power should be high. Vice versa, if an individual focuses on the
positive aspects of nuclear power as a starting point the intuitive judgment of a risk
should be comparably low74. Tversky and Kahneman point out that according to their
research, people have the tendency to overestimate the probability of “conjunctive events”
and prefer these events over “disjunctive events”, which in contrast are systematically
underestimated (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, 1129). In their example people prefer to
draw a red marble at least seven times from a bag containing 90% red marbles and 10%
white marbles, the conjunctive example, rather than drawing a red marble one time in
seven trials from a bag containing 10% red marbles and 90% white marbles.
When evaluating the risk of nuclear power, the starting point, the anchor, is essential.
What is perceived as a red marble in the above mentioned example? In the conjunctive
example, from a prototype experts’ point of view, red marbles are the events with
no nuclear accident; a layperson’s bag contains nuclear accidents as red marbles. All
judgments will be biased based the given reference point. If the assertion is correct that
people tend to prefer conjunctive over disjunctive events, experts as well as laypeople
should have a tendency to ignore judgment mechanisms that are based on a disjunctive
logic. Once again the true value of nuclear risk is unknown. Only empirical evidence
over time will provide enough information for nuclear risk to be more precisely assessed.
I think that the anchor is a strong predictor for the final assessment. It seems difficult
to be able to see the anchor as a randomly chosen starting point and almost impossible
to assess a risk sufficiently independent of the anchor point. That said, I believe that
an anchor is in fact not a random choice but already conveys pertinent information for
a final evaluation of risk.
An anchoring heuristic could be an explanation for why humans are willing to pro-
duce man made risks such as nuclear technology, by systematically evaluating low levels
of risk perception, without having actual empirical evidence. Tversky and Kahneman
provide some thoughts around the reason why conjunctive and disjunctive events can
74 I here understand risk as the risk of a nuclear accident. Since the true probability of a nuclear accident
is not known, I hesitate to describe the risk of nuclear power as ‘overestimated’ or ‘underestimated’.
I therefore say risk perception is perceived as high or low.
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lead to underestimated risk in large scale processes planned, designed, and accomplished
by human beings (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, 1129). According to the authors’ rea-
soning, events have an conjunctive character if a number of successful steps need to be
carried out in order to reach a goal. In the case where there are many steps involved,
this leads to an optimism and an overestimation of success and an underestimation of
failure. At the same time, to avoid disjunctive events or to draw the red marble, it is
underestimated that one element in this complex system will fail. Therefore, the risk of
evaluating the complexity of a system is also underestimated. Since complex processes
carry both elements, i.e. many steps in complex systems, it is highly likely to overesti-
mate success and underestimate the likelihood of failure. A particular example, Tversky
and Kahneman mention, for a disjunctive process is the risk assessment of a nuclear
power plant. They state: “A complex system, such as a nuclear reactor or a human
body, will malfunction if any of its essential components fails. Even when the likelihood
of failure in each component is slight, the probability of an overall failure can be high if
many components are involved. Because of anchoring, people will tend to underestimate
the probabilities of failure in complex systems” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, 1129).75
Gerd Gigerenzer (1991) criticizes Tversky and Kahneman’s concept of heuristics and
biases. Gigerenzer points out that the concept of heuristics and biases an attempt to
distinguish between a correct and an erratic way of human reasoning under uncertainty.
He emphasizes that research should try to find ways and a language to explain rather
than to judge human reasoning (Gigerenzer, 1991, 102). From his point of view, the
assertion of biased probability estimations is based on a narrow concept of Bayesian
reasoning and can be rejected when the frequentist theoretical framework is applied. The
heuristic framework most often refers to situations in which single events are evaluated
within a non-random data generating process. In these cases it is not possible to speak
of probabilities and or to describe human judgment under uncertainty as biased from
an expected true probability. The basic assumptions to derive probabilities are not met.
According to Gigerenzer, the world of statistics speaks in different languages, a fact that
has been widely ignored so far: “The existence of different statistical models of inference
is a rich resource for developing theories about intuitive inference. This resource has
been rarely touched, possibly because of the misleading normative view that statistics
speaks with one voice” (Gigerenzer, 1991, 103). Only what deviates from a narrow
statistical norm can be expressed as a biased evaluation of a situation or event. From a
broader statistical point of view, this biased judgment disappears.
Gigerenzer suggests considering the structure of the environment as an important
factor influencing human reasoning under uncertainty. Simple mathematical models,
algorithms, or normative assumptions will too soon lead to deviations from an expected
optimum. Not because of incorrect human reasoning, but because of aspects ignored in
the existing environment (Gigerenzer, 1991, 107). Choosing to not apply the same algo-
rithm over and over, again and again, to an existing problem could be the intuitively best
75 Charles Perrow (Perrow, 1999) calls that sort of failures “normal accidents” because the design of the
process is not able to be perfect and due to its complexity an accident is always likely to happen.
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answer within a world of a changing environment. I conclude, that in this case, biased
behavior is an indicator for deviation of an observer’s perspective of the environment
and respondents’ point of views. Gigerenzer calls that phenomenon an environment’s
“surplus structure” (Gigerenzer, 1991, 107). This structure cannot be modeled in simple
a-priori distributions or likelihood assumptions, as performed in the Bayesian model.
A particularly different perception of time and space among individuals might lead to
different perceptions of the reality. Gigerenzer suggests combining statistical theory
and research on social cognition to better understand how humans adapt their decision
making processes within a constantly changing environment. Using a narrow normative
understanding of probabilistic reasoning, as done by the heuristic and bias concept, will
itself mislead people to believe that human reasoning can be separated into right and
wrong, an artificial separation as Gigerenzer demonstrates.76
Based on Gigerenzer’s words, I think that an additional single event, such as a nuclear
accident, could lead to fundamental changes within an individual’s surplus structure and
perception of the environment. I also believe that this judgment will depend on the a-
priori anchor a person has intuitively set. Asking individuals to judge the risk of nuclear
power before an accident might result in a judgment of confidence and/or skepticism in
nuclear technology. The question remains for me, to what degree does the information of
a nuclear accident really change an individual’s risk judgment of nuclear power? Tversky
and Kahneman believe that rational judgment is not only based on “internal consistency”,
i.e the compatibility with the probabilistic norms, but is also based on the entire inner
and outer belief structure an individual is holding (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, 1130).
The avoidance of cognitive biases or cognitive dissonances, is an additional important
heuristic in the process of how humans judge danger within their environment. I con-
clude that the heuristic and bias approach, as well as Gigerenzer’s critical comments,
indicate that human reasoning in uncertain circumstances is a complex process of infor-
mation processing. Rational aspects are only part of the entire process. I assume that
emotional aspects, as I will discussed next, are driving factors for human’s judgment of
risks, especially in the case of nuclear power, a subject with strong opponents, strong
proponents, and people who hold both skeptical and supporting views.
7.2.2. Risk as feelings in case of a nuclear accident
In their risk as feelings hypothesis, Loewenstein and colleagues Loewenstein et al., 2001
point out that subjective feelings and emotional processes, such as the ability to imag-
ine consequences or the personal exposure to an outcome, as well as the past history of
76 Gigerenzer explains in many examples that probability theory is not violated, even if it is claimed by
proponents of the heuristic and bias concept: “I have used classical demonstrations of overconfidence
bias, conjunction fallacy, and base-rate neglect to show that what have been called “errors” in prob-
abilistic reasoning are in fact not violations of probability theory. They only look so from a narrow
understanding of good probabilistic reasoning that ignores conceptual distinctions fundamental to
probability and statistics” (Gigerenzer, 1991, 109).
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conditioning shapes individual’s risk judgment (compare Section 4.2.5). In their concept
objective features, such as the likelihood of an event or expected consequences are con-
sidered, but expected to be only partially influential in the risk assessment process. In
social research (compare for example Zajonc, 1980; Wilson and Schooler, 1991; Damasio,
1994) affective reactions, based on vividness, immediacy, and experienced memories are
considered indicators for expressing feelings of danger. According to Loewenstein et al.
Loewenstein et al., 2001, the combination of emotional aspects and cognitive evaluation
is a more valid indicator of how people perceive risks in their everyday context than
what is perceived as rational reasoning in literature (compare for a discussion on the
rational actor framework Jaeger et al., 2001; Rosa et al., 2014, Chapter 3).
As explained in Section 4.2.7, the affect heuristic (Slovic et al., 2004, 2007) is a process
in which a stimulus consciously or unconsciously evokes a positive or negative feeling.
Intuitively, a state is either judged as good or bad. This emotional reaction is under-
stood as the experiential mode of thinking, in contrast to the analytical mode of thinking
(Epstein et al., 1992; Epstein, 1994). It is called a heuristic because the information is
intuitively remembered and this mental short cut allows for instant judgement of a situ-
ation. Slovic and colleagues argue that affect is an important aspect for rational decision
making processes. Finucane et al. (2003) describe the interaction of the experiential and
the analytic mode of thinking as the “dance of affect and reason.”
The affect heuristic is based on the assumption that images of present or future events
are marked or associated to various degrees, with negative and positive feelings. De-
pending on the emotional images stored a situation creates a somatic reaction when
activated. This reaction is perceived consciously or unconsciously (Damasio, 1994). The
intensity of the reaction differs, depending to the degree of which emotions are connected
with the stimulating event (Slovic et al., 2007, 1335). Empirical research on the affect
heuristic indicates that favorable feeling towards an activity or risk are increasing the
benefits of that risk (Alhakami and Slovic, 1994; Finucane et al., 2000a). This means
that the perceived risk is reduced by positively mapped emotional images associated
with the risk, resulting in a more positive perception of that risk. The same mechanisms
hold for negatively mapped images that lead to an increased perception of risks, reduc-
ing the perceived benefits of that risk. The interplay of affective images and analytic
reasoning is influencing individuals risk assessment. Emotions are especially important
in situations when empirical evidence is missing and “coldly rational” decision making
processes become too dominant (Slovic et al., 2004, 319).
In the case of a nuclear accident, I assume that the different emotional aspects of
intuitive images are important factors influencing individual’s risk perception. In line
with Whitfield and colleagues, I assume that individuals are “informal Bayesians” who
hold strong a-priori beliefs and value laden images about a risk and are able to change
that beliefs when medias are presenting new information about the risk (Whitfield et al.,
2009, 427; footnote 8). In the case of nuclear power, it is assumed that people holding a
positive attitude towards that technology will be immunized against a negative event in
order to avoid cognitive dissonance (Renn, 1990). Furthermore, the change in attitudes
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due to a negative shock is assumed to balance back to its initial equilibrium in the long
run to keep the predominant attitude (Festinger, 1957). This post-shock adjustment
towards the a-priori level should be stronger for people holding a-priori positive attitudes
towards nuclear power than for people who express a-priori uncommitted feelings, hence,
hold stronger negatively laden emotional images. I assume that proponents of nuclear
power are not free of doubts and hold positively as well as negatively laden images
of nuclear power (compare, Midden and Verplanken, 1990; Peters and Slovic, 1996;
Visschers and Siegrist, 2013; Siegrist and Visschers, 2013; Siegrist and Sütterlin, 2014).
To summarize, I conclude that social groups who are known to have the tendency
to hold stronger positive or negative attitudes towards nuclear power react differently
to new information of a nuclear accident. People holding skeptical views, who perceive
nuclear power as dangerous, will not change their opinion, and the negative event only
confirms their view. People who hold a-priori positive emotional images of nuclear
power will only change their attitude to a minor degree, to avoid cognitive dissonance.
Indecisive people holding skeptical as well as positive images of nuclear power are those
most likely to change their attitudes towards a more skeptical risk perception of nuclear
power, perceive nuclear power as more dangerous after a nuclear accident.
7.2.3. Social structure of nuclear risk perception
I will very briefly summarize the expected effect of sociodemographic factors and will
point to expected differences between social subgroups. For a detailed explanation see
Section 5 and the theoretical section in the first empirical chapter (Section 6). Women are
expected to show higher levels of nuclear risk perception compared to men. It is assumed
that different socialization processes form women’s attitudes creating a greater awareness
for potential risk for a family’s and community’s health (Brody, 1984; Solomon et al.,
1989; Greenberg and Schneider, 1995; Forbes and Sells, 1997; Davidson and Freudenburg,
1996; Chodorow, 1978). Men tend to express more knowledge about a risk and base their
judgments on economic benefits and expected likelihoods of nuclear power; also holding
strong values that are based on a concepts of traditional masculinity. Furthermore
men are more prone to avoid cognitive dissonance (Kuklinski et al., 1982; Costa-Font
et al., 2008; Reardon and Govender, 2013; Kahan et al., 2007). I furthermore assume
that people who expect themselves to be more knowledgeable, because of higher levels
of education, are less likely to express lower levels of nuclear risk perception. Age
is expected to be an important influential factor on nuclear risk perception. Older
people are expected to hold more traditional values and are better integrated within
the existing economic and social system, trying to maintain and to improve existing
social and economical order by ignoring environmental threats. As a result, older people
tend to express lower levels of risk perception compared to younger cohorts (Grendstad
and Selle, 2000; Peters and Slovic, 1996; George and Southwell, 1986; Van Liere and
Dunlap, 1980; Malkis and Grasmick, 1977; Carstensen et al., 1999). Trust in people as
well as in political institutions should result in lower levels of nuclear risk perception
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because nuclear risk is a global phenomenon and cannot be directly experienced most
of the time (Freudenburg, 1993; Flynn et al., 1992; Fox and Firebaugh, 1992; Slovic,
1999; Bella, 1987; Slovic, 1993; Rayner and Cantor, 1987; Viklund, 2003; Löfstedt, 2005,
2003; Breakwell, 2007). People with a higher socio economic status, such as higher
levels of income or higher levels of education within a social group should also express
lower levels of risk perception. People with higher economic status are expected to
maintain their status and have higher levels of economic concerns. Better educated
people perceive themselves as comparably more knowledgeable, and support the existing
knowledge structure which created their status. Nuclear power is a symbol of economic
and technological growth, and a symbol of scientific virtue. The technology can be
perceived as an important driver for prosperity and economic growth for a society (Stout-
Wiegand and Trent, 1983).
The immediate change in nuclear risk perception after a nuclear accident should be
more pronounced with people who a-priori hold lower levels of nuclear risk perception:
males, older people, people with higher levels of trust in political institutions, and people
with higher socio-economic status (i.e. higher educational and income levels). Since
people with a-priori already high levels of nuclear risk perception are not expected to
update their attitudes or negatively laden images towards nuclear power much. I assume
that the immediate effect of a nuclear accident will narrow the gap of nuclear risk
perception within a society and I will observe a convergence of nuclear risk perception.
To sum up our theoretical model I derive the following hypotheses for the overall levels
of nuclear risk perception (main effects) and the expected changes within each group
due to the nuclear accident (interaction effect):
H1 Women have a higher risk perception than men (main effect).
H2 Men react stronger to the Fukushima accident because their initial subjective ex-
pectation of the likelihood of an event is lower compared to women (interaction
effect).
H3 Younger people have a higher risk perception than older people because of a less
conservative value structure (main effect).
H4 Compared to older people, younger people react less to the accident (interaction
effect).
H5 Individuals with high socioeconomic status (SES), measured in education levels and
income class, before Fukushima have lower risk perceptions because their expected
knowledge about an accident is higher and they are able to compensate direct
negative outcomes of a nuclear accident easier (main effect).
H6 I don’t expect an interaction effect between SES and the Fukushima accident, as
long as the negative consequences of a nuclear accident are not changing but only
the likelihood of nuclear accidents.
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H7 Individuals with high trust (in politics/technology) have lower risk perceptions
(main effect).
H8 The interaction effect between trust and the Fukushima accident is unclear be-
cause there is an endogeneity problem. I expect that people who after the nuclear
accident still trust in political authorities are people who are strongly activating
their value-belief system and hierarchical worldviews to avoid cognitive dissonance.
Compared to pre-Fukushima accident levels nuclear risk perception is expected not
to change or rather decrease for that sub-population.
7.3. Data and methods
The following part of this chapter is a co-working project with Dr. Rudolf Farys and
Dr. Thomas Häussler, both from the University of Bern, Switzerland. Rudolf Farys did
perform the statistical analysis and produced the graphs using the statistical software R,
interpreted the results, and helped structure the research question.77 Thomas Häussler
added helpful comments for interpreting the results and clarifying underlying assump-
tions. The research idea is to use the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident of March 11,
2011 as a natural experiment. The incident randomly produced two groups that can be
compared using statistical methods. The first group is made of individuals who express
their risk perception before March 11, 2011. In an experimental setting this group is
called the control group. The second group are individuals expressing their nuclear risk
perception after March 11, 2011. This group received new information of a nuclear ac-
cident and is called the treatment group. Since the Fukushima Daiichi accident was an
unexpected event and independent of a data generating process, we assumed that indi-
viduals are randomly divided into a control and treatment group. We use data from the
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2010, Environmental Module III (ISSP,
2012). This survey is a representative sample of at least 1,000 individuals in more than
30 countries (mostly OECD countries). The national samples are conducted at different
time points. Each ISSP member country can chose their own survey period, resulting in
a heterogeneous sample over time unless the survey period is within a reasonable time
frame and follows ISSP’s conducting standards. For this reason, the separate national
samples used in this analysis were conducted in 2010 and 2011. The exact date of the
interviews are reported in the data set. This allows to select national samples with
respondents interviews before March 11, 2011 and after the accident (see Figure 15).
The variable of interest for our analyses is a five-scale item for the question: And
do you think that nuclear power stations are... with answer categories ranging from
extremely dangerous for the environment (1) to not dangerous at all for the environment
77 Rudolf Farys and I presented the results at a colloquium at the University of Zurich, Switzerland
(date: March 12, 2014, title: “Do we change our opinion after the bang? Autopsy of a Fukushima
effect.”) as well as at the International Sociological Association (ISA) conference in Yokohama,
Japan (date: July 18, 2014, title: “Nuclear Risk Perception before and after Fukushima.”).
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(5). We reversed the scale and interpreted high values to indicate people with a high risk
perception. The question specifically asks how dangerous respondents perceive nuclear
power plants for the environment. I think that the question is a valid instrument for
testing individual’s nuclear risk perception. I assume that respondents answering the
question do not differ explicitly between risk for humans and risk for the environment,
since humans as well as all living beings are part of the entire environment.
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Figure 15: Survey period of the ISSP 2010’s 32 member countries. Red line indicates the
date of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident on March 11, 2011 (source:
ISSP 2010, own calculation).
Since the ISSP 2010 contains both, interviews before and after the Fukushima Daiichi
accident, the data allows us to identify a causal effect of the nuclear accident on nuclear
risk perception. We identify the causal effect using two statistical approaches: (1) a
fixed effects estimator (FE), and (2) a regression discontinuity design (RDD). The two
methods rely on slightly different underlying assumptions and identification strategies,
so using both methods is an appropriate means to test the robustness of the expected
causal effect.
Natural experiment
Related to the nuclear accident, we wish to emphasize some basic assumptions related to
the information structure before and after the accident. We assume that none of the peo-
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ple interviewed a-priori could anticipate the exact time and location of the Fukushima
accident. We furthermore assume that after the accident, all of the respondents received
the same information, i.e. that a major nuclear accident happened at the Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear power plant on March 11, 2011. We furthermore assume that the indi-
viduals were randomly assigned to the two groups in the natural experiment. Because
of the data structure, we want to address a few critical remarks. First, as can be seen in
Figure 15) data are clustered by countries. When comparing individuals before and after
the Fukushima Daiichi accident, we are comparing individuals within different countries.
The problem is that countries can differ strongly with regard to their baseline risk per-
ception leading to a bias when estimating the expected ‘Fukushima effect’. Second, it is
possible that within a country sample some people systematically are interviewed later
in the survey period. For example, people employed full time respond later to an inter-
view request were and interviewed at the end of the interview period. We address these
problems using two different identification strategies: the fixed effects approach to con-
trol for unobserved but systematic country differences; and the regression discontinuity
design to give respondents interviewed closer to the accident more weight.
Fixed effects model
A fixed effects (FE) model is performed to address the problem of systematic differences
in nuclear risk perception between countries. Since each country’s average risk perception
is assumed to differ greatly, we need to perform a procedure to make it possible to
compare individuals within different countries. A country fixed effects model demeans all
model variables for each country, therefore eliminating all unobserved heterogeneity that
is time-constant between countries. This enables the possibility of comparing individual
risk perception across countries. Yet, because of the split in a group of individuals that
were interviewed before or after March 11, 2011, the dataset could still be biased by
variables that vary over time and country. It is also the case that most of the countries
do not show any variation within the treatment variable (nuclear accident) because
a country’s survey period entirely took place before or after the Fukushima Daiichi
accident. In this case, it is not possible to split the sample into a control and treatment
group. Therefore we only chose countries where the survey period took place before
and after the accident to identify the treatment effect. These countries are Denmark,
Switzerland, Slovenia, and Canada. With the fixed effect design, it is possible to perform
a fixed effects model with interaction effects for time and country to derive the effects for
the control and treatment group. The effects for each independent variable before and
after the accident are then identified and compared to test whether the gap of nuclear risk
perception is widening or narrowing due to the new information of a nuclear accident. We
also can identify the variables which changed significantly. For the fixed effects analysis,
we only use data from respondents in Denmark, Switzerland, and Slovenia who were
interviewed in March 2011 (n = 638). For Canada, the interview date is only reported
per month because the survey was not conducted in personal interviews, but by sending
questionnaires to the respondents. Since for the Canadian respondents who answered in
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March, we cannot identify the date of their response, all Canadian respondents are not
used in the fixed effects design.
Regression discontinuity design
The regression discontinuity design (RDD), as a second approach for identifying the
causal effect of a nuclear accident on people’s nuclear risk perception, addresses a poten-
tial bias resulting from the time-dimension by giving people more weight who expressed
their nuclear risk perception closer to the accident’s date. The identification strategy is
to define a cut point to split the sample into a control and a treatment group. In the
RDD model, an assignment variable is defined, which is a metric variable with a fixed
cut point, the point of discontinuity. In our case, the assignment variable is time, mea-
sured in days, and the cut-point is March 11, 2011. The basic assumption of the RDD
model is that people who are closer to the cut-point are more comparable and, hence,
get more weight. With this procedure, we avoid having the observed discontinuity as an
artifact due to a biased sampling process and not due to the event itself. The reduction
of possible cases to only cases that are around the cut-point leads to results that are less
biased compared to OLS regression designs, such as the fixed effects model that simply
compares all cased before and after the cut-point with equal weights. To identify the
accident effect in our RDD model we use a bandwidth of 30 days, using only interviews
that are not in far distance from the discontinuity. In the RDD model we use all cases
from the three countries overlapping the nuclear accident (Denmark, Switzerland, and
Slovenia) and also Canadian cases in February and April78 In the RDD model we also
use cases from countries that do not overlap March 11, 2011, but are close to the dis-
continuity; these countries are Israel, Finland, and Lithuania. The total sample size is
n = 7, 681.
We use the FE and the RDD models to test the above mentioned hypotheses because
each model has its own advantages. The RDD allows respondents who responded closer
to the accident more weight, therefore represent the actual effect of the accident more
accurately. With the RDD design, the possibility of a systematic bias due to the date
of the interview within the national sample is then controlled. The disadvantage of the
RDD design is that only a bivariate analysis of separate effects of categorical dummy
variables is possible. The FE-model allows for modeling various metric scaled variables
and estimates interactions in an multiple regression design, but it does not control for
possible biases due to the time since the accident.
78 Since we do not know the exact day of the response we assign the responses randomly to any of the
possible days in February and March.
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7.4. Results
7.4.1. Results of fixed effects model
The results of the fixed effects (FE) model are summarized and graphically displayed in
Figure 16 (for a table with coefficients see Table 11 in the Appendix). The dependent
variable is operationalized on a five point Likert scale, allowing respondents to evaluate
nuclear power in five categories from (1) ‘not at all dangerous’ to (5) ‘extremely dan-
gerous’ for the environment. Thus, the range of the scale is from 1 to 5. Gender is a
binary coded dummy variable with male respondents as reference category. The results
indicate that ceteris paribus women on average report 0.32 scale points higher levels of
nuclear risk perception than male respondents before the Fukushima Daiichi accident
(H1 confirmed). After the accident, the difference remained but the observed difference
of 0.25 scale points was significantly lower compared to the pre Fukushima levels. The
results indicate a consolidation of nuclear risk perception among the observed male and
female cases (H2 confirmed). The effect of age (measured in years) is negatively related
to nuclear risk perception (-0.04 scale-points per year) before the Fukushima accident
(H3 confirmed). After the accident the coefficient increases significantly by 0.03 scale
points, remaining slightly negative (H4 confirmed). Education is a categorical scaled
variable with ‘no formal education’ as reference category and ‘university degree’ as high-
est possible level of formal education. Before the accident, people holding a university
degree show significant lower levels of nuclear risk perception compared to respondents
in the reference category, indicating a negative effect of education on nuclear risk per-
ception (H5 confirmed). The observed negative trend remains, indicating no effect of
the accident on nuclear risk perception. Larger standard errors after the accident lead
to wider confidence intervals resulting in no significant education effect on nuclear risk
perception. Individual’s household income has a negative effect on nuclear risk per-
ception before and after the nuclear accident. The accident did not change this effect.
Summarizing the effect of education and income we cannot observe a change in nuclear
risk perception in either directions. Hence, socio-economic status has in its tendency to
negatively effect nuclear risk perception (H6 confirmed). This effect is not particularly
pronounced and does not change in the case of the Fukushima accident. General trust
is operationalized as an additive index of two 5-point Likert scaled variables asking if
people (a) can be trusted and (b) if people try to be fair. Political trust is measured
in a 5-point Likert scale asking whether people agree that people in government can be
trusted most of the time. There is an observed inverse relationship of general trust and
political trust on nuclear risk perception before the accident (H7 confirmed).
The results of our analysis show that people79 who prior to the accident expressed
higher levels of general as well as political trust, also express lower levels of nuclear risk
perception. This effect remains even though the effect on one hand becomes weaker for
79 Correctly speaking we are not referring to individuals but social sub-groups when speaking of people,
because we do not have a longitudinal sample but a cross-section sample.
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Figure 16: Estimated coefficients of control and treatment groups for the fixed ef-
fects (FE) model with 95% confidence intervals (source: ISSP 2010, own
calculation).
general trust, a convergence of nuclear risk perception, and on the other hand becomes
stronger for political trust, a polarization of nuclear risk perception. Hypothesis 8 is
confirmed when focusing only on the effect of political trust on nuclear risk perception.
We do not know to what degree the effect of trust is a problem of endogeneity since
we can also assume that nuclear risk perception prior to an accident has an influence
on trust in political institutions and actors. The accident can also change people’s
levels of trust in political authorities. People with high levels of nuclear risk perception
might be changing their levels of trust negatively, proponents of nuclear power might
perceive an accident as a proof of their trust in political authorities. For us, the effect
should be interpreted with caution since the data structure does not allow to control for
endogeneity.
7.4.2. Results of regression discontinuity design
Figure 17 shows the result for the regression discontinuity design (RDD) model for the
immediate effect of the accident, using observations within a time span of 30 days to
derive the discontinuity. The horizontal X−axis represents the estimated change in
scale points of nuclear risk perception due to the accident, displaying the estimators
and their 95%-confidence intervals. The results are also displayed in Table 12 in the
Appendix. The overall effect of the accident is significantly different from zero, indicating
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an increase in nuclear risk perception by 0.44 scale points. The results of the immediate
effect show that men reacted significantly to the accident, while women did not (see
also for a detailed visualization of the differences in the discontinuity between man and
women Figure 18 in the Appendix). Older people above the median age of 47 years
changed their risk perception after the accident, while younger people did not show
a discontinuity in nuclear risk perception (see also Figure 19 for more details in the
Appendix). Less educated people reacted to the nuclear accident showing higher levels
of risk perception, while the group of better educated people did not change their risk
perception (Figure 20, Appendix). A significant change in different income groups cannot
be observed (Figure 21, Appendix). People expressing high levels of general trust after
the accident showed significantly lower levels of nuclear risk perception, while people
expressing high levels of political trust did not change significantly their nuclear risk
perception (Figure 22, Appendix).
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Figure 17: Estimated effect of the nuclear accident (with 95% confidence intervals) using
a regression discontinuity design (RDD) and a bandwidth of 30 days (source:
ISSP 2010, own calculation)
To summarize the results of the FE and RDD design: we can show that social fac-
tors systematically influence individual’s nuclear risk perception before and after the
Fukushima Daiichi accident (compare for example results from the fixed effects model
in Figure 16). Furthermore, we cannot reject the hypothesis that after the Fukushima
accident people’s risk perception consolidates and is more homogenized, at least for the
time period examined in the RDD model. Women in all models show higher levels of
nuclear risk perception. This effect is less pronounced after the accident, indicating that
men’s change in nuclear risk perception is more pronounced than for women. Also older
people, people who express general trust and to some degree better educated people
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adjust their nuclear risk perception, resulting in a more homogenized distribution of
nuclear risk perception within the examined population.
7.5. Conclusion
In this paper we argue, that a sudden incident of a nuclear accident narrows the observed
gap in public nuclear risk perception. The results show that, in case of the Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear accident on March 11, 2011, public nuclear risk perception becomes
more homogeneous resulting in higher levels of nuclear risk perception. Not surprisingly,
nuclear power is perceived as more dangerous on average by people interviewed after the
accident. This change in nuclear risk perception is not consistent among all of the people
observed. Social groups who prior to the accident showed lower risk perception, such
as males or older people, expressed comparably more nuclear risk perception after the
accident, therefore, narrowed the risk perception gap. This effect holds for most of the
subgroups we observed in our analyses. Only in the case of the subgroup of people who
expressed great political trust before and after the accident, the inverse effect of trust
and nuclear risk perception increased leading to larger differences in risk perception.
The gap between men and women also narrowed, indicating that men updated their
risk perception more and are getting closer to the on average higher risk perception
level women already held. This indicates that nuclear risk perception is not changing
linearly. This means that people who a-priori to the nuclear accident expressed a high
level of nuclear risk perception cannot to the same degree express a higher level of nuclear
risk perception compared to respondents who a-priori expressed moderate levels of risk
perception.80
The results indicate, as discussed in the theoretical section, that people who hold
both, positive as well as negative images of nuclear power, are more likely to change
their evaluation of nuclear power than individuals who before the nuclear accident held
a very skeptical view on nuclear power. Skepticism might result in doubts and, therefore,
in a higher likelihood to adapt nuclear risk evaluation in the case of a massive accident.
From my point of view, the results support the concept of the affect heuristic (Slovic
et al., 2007), a concept that is based on the assumption that people judge risky events,
activities, and situations upon positively or negatively laden images of that risk. The
degree to which a change in nuclear risk perception actually changes people’s support
for nuclear power (compare for example Siegrist et al., 2014) cannot be examined with
the given data structure. Empirical studies indicate that the change of risk perception
due to a sudden shock of an accident is not permanent but declines again (Renn, 1990).
Even though change in risk perception is not permanent it is evident that nuclear power
bears the potential to increase society’s risk levels to some degree over a period of
time. It seems to be strong enough to undermine people’s political trust. The shock of
80 We also performed a simulation to simulate a possible ceiling effect with the data. The simulation
shows that the observed differences do not indicate a ceiling effect.
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an accident can lead to permanent changes within the social structure of a society or
community. Germany’s experience with nuclear power is an example how both, lack in
political authorities and the increased level of nuclear risk perception after the Fukushima
accident resulted in the manifestation of the historically grown wish in the country to
stop nuclear power production in Germany for ever (compare for example Goebel et al.,
2015).
I cannot prove how people are using heuristics to derive their risk judgment of nuclear
power. Nevertheless, I think heuristics play an important role in human’s risk evaluation.
I also think that heuristics are an underlying driver explaining why we observe differences
of nuclear risk perception especially in the cases when people express extreme low or high
levels of nuclear risk perception. By evaluating risks, heuristics are ignoring to a great
degree all available information and allowing individuals, depending on an individual’s
starting point of information, to only refer to a limited set of options. As I point out
in the theoretical section, the same heuristics can lead to extreme cases of perceiving
nuclear power as very dangerous or not at all dangerous. Unfortunately, the data does
not allow us to test this assumption. The reflections support Ortwin Renn’s concept
of an integrated framework of risk (Renn, 2008) that locates heuristics on the core
of individual’s risk judgement process (compare Section 5.6). Heuristics, as I want to
emphasize, are not biased or based on erratic human reasoning, as claimed and criticized
in literature (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Gigerenzer, 1991). The concept of the affect
heuristic seems to open the space for new discussions on human’s evaluation of risk, at
least in the case of nuclear risk perception the results of this cannot reject the theoretical
concept.
The study also has its limits. Because of the cross-sectional data structure we compare
sub-groups of a control and a treatment group using the event of the Fukushima Daichii
accident as the discontinuity date or cut point. We can only assume that the actual
country samples are unbiased random samples. We assume that individuals in both
groups are comparable. We also do not discuss the role of media and how the information
of the accident differs across the population.81 We assume that the Fukushima Daichii
accident was a global event with high media coverage right after the event in all countries
that are in the ISSP 2010 and that the information is homogeneously distributes across
all people in the sample. Regarding the operationalization of the dependent variable
we assume that the single question we use is a valid instrument to measure individual’s
nuclear risk perception. This means that respondents perceive themselves as part of the
environment and do not differentiate between a risk of power plants for human beings
and a risk of power plants for nature.
My final remark touches the deeper roots of nuclear power and its associated risk
perception within the population. Paul Slovic speaks of risk that can create ripple effects
that cross geographical and societal boundaries once a negative event occurs (compare
81 For a media analysis in the German case see for example (Arlt and Wolling, 2015; Wolling and Arlt,
2014).
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for example Slovic, 1987, see also Section 4.2.3). He uses the image of the ripples a stone
makes when thrown into a pond. In the case of the nuclear accident of Fukushima, I
would go one step further and suggest to speak not of a pond, as an unlimited open
space, but of a tea cup, as a limited space.
I see our earth as a tea cup, as a closed system. In this case, a drop of water creates
ripples that move outwards to the edges of the cup and simultaneously back to the center.
The fear of nuclear power is an empirical fact. The fear of nuclear power is constantly
dripping water in the tea cups of nuclear risk perception. So far, the global society has
been able to handle this level of nuclear fear. But once in a while, the evidence of a
nuclear accident, such as in Fukushima 2011 or before in Chernobyl (1986), or Three
Mile Island (1979) pours a massive drop of fear in this tea cup so that the ripples are
waving back and forth and the overflow of human reactions cannot be controlled in the
cup.
The results of our analysis indicate that the fear of nuclear power is a global phe-
nomenon and that a sudden negative event can increase, at least in the short run,
individual’s risk perception. I assume that this shock has massive consequences for the
inner well being of humans and unexpected consequences for the social and political
structures of the global society. Beside for these fears, the use of nuclear power is an
empirical fact for nuclear accidents are real and also an empirical fact. The next nuclear
accident is likely to happen at any time. The tea pots of fear are filled waiting to be
poured in the cups. There will be consequences, of this there is no doubt. The question
is where and when will the ripple start to move towards the edges of their tea cups and
spill over. Maybe there is a peaceful way to cool down and empty the tea pots of nuclear
power to give those voices all over the world a meaning which perceive nuclear power as
very dangerous.
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7.6. Appendix
Table of fixed effects model
Coefficient Main before SE Main after SE Interaction SE
Female 0.324 (0.0146) 0.255 (0.0286) -0.0684∗ (0.0342)
Age (1y) -0.0425 (0.0047) -0.011 (0.0089) 0.0316∗∗ (0.0107)
Lowest formal education 0.213 (0.0328) -0.006 (0.0822) -0.0244 (0.1078)
Intermediate secondary education 0.576 (0.0325) 0.058 (0.0799) 0.0560 (0.1048)
Higher secondary education 0.473 (0.0321) -0.010 (0.0809) 0.0404 (0.1049)
University incomplete 0.443 (0.0362) -0.144 (0.0884) -0.0965 (0.1119)
University degree 0.171 (0.0361) -0.117 (0.0854) 0.0577 (0.1093)
General Trust 0.667 (0.0076) -0.029 (0.0151) 0.0376∗ (0.0179)
Political Trust 0.398 (0.0072) -0.075 (0.0149) -0.0351∗ (0.0174)
Household income 0.478 (0.0086) -0.050 (0.0169) -0.0018 (0.0187)
∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 11: Fixed Effects model. Display of relevant coefficients and interaction effects
for respondents for the control (‘Main before’) and treatment group (‘Main
after’) (n = 396 (remaining cases of n = 638 from the Danish, Swiss, and
Slovenian March 2011 samples)). Complete model contains country as well as
time dummies for all ISSP countries.
Table and figures of regression discontinuity design
A summarizing table and figures of the separate effects of the RDD model are displayed
below.
Coefficient Estimate SE 95% CI (low) 95% CI (up)
Overall 0.442∗ (0.204) 0.0427 0.842
Males 0.614∗ (0.311) 0.00464 1.224
Females 0.240 (0.246) -0.242 0.722
Young -0.179 (0.356) -0.876 0.518
Old 0.747∗ (0.252) 0.254 1.240
Less educated 0.959∗ (0.293) 0.384 1.534
More educated -0.00195 (0.272) -0.535 0.531
Above median household income 0.443 (0.337) -0.217 1.104
Below median household income 0.553 (0.330) -0.0935 1.199
High levels general trust -0.597∗ (0.2001) -0.990 -0.205
High levels political trust -0.276 (0.197) -0.663 0.111
∗p < 0.05: at least significant at the 5% significance level
Table 12: Summary of RDD regression effects with standard errors (SE) and lower and
upper limits of the 95% confidence intervals. The bandwidth of the model is
30 days.
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Figure 18: Discontinuity of male and female respondents in the RDD model (source:
ISSP 2010, own calculation).
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Figure 19: Discontinuity of older and younger people (split at the median age of 47) in
the RDD model (source: ISSP 2010, own calculation).
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Figure 20: Discontinuity for lesser and better educated people in the RDDmodel (source:
ISSP 2010, own calculation).
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Figure 21: Discontinuity for lower and higher income people in the RDD model (source:
ISSP 2010, own calculation).
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Figure 22: Discontinuity for people with general trust and people with political trust in
the RDD model (source: ISSP 2010, own calculation).
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8. Empirical Research III: Environmental attitudes
after Fukushima: A cross-national comparison of
nuclear risk perception and environmental concern
after the Fukushima Daiichi accident
Acknowledgements: The German version of this chapter “Der Einfluss der Reak-
torkatastrophe auf das nukleare Risikobewusstsein und das allgemeine Umweltbewusst-
sein in der Bevölkerung” (Vogl, 2014) is a chapter in an edited volume “Fukushima und
die Folgen. Medienberichterstattung, Öffentliche Meinung, Politische Konsequenzen”
(Wolling and Arlt, 2014). This translation differs only with minor deviations from the
German version. The results are identical.
8.1. Introduction
On Friday March 11, 2011 at 2:47 pm, Japan standard time, the Tohoku seaquake took
place. As a result of the seaquake, 136 kilometers (85 miles) east of Japanese’s coastline,
50 minutes later, a catastrophic tsunami hit the coastline, devastating costal areas and
severely damaging the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. The natural catastrophe
ended up not only being a humanitarian, ecological, and economical catastrophe for
the region and the country, but also a technological disaster. In three units of the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, the worst possible nuclear accident of a core
melt down happened. On April 12, 2011, in their International Nuclear Event Scale
(INES), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ranked the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear accident in the highest category (category 7) as major accident.82 The Tohoku
seaquake was more than a local shock. It also revealed individual fears of nuclear power
around the world. Anti-nuclear protests and clear repercussions took place immediately
after the accident in geographically distant countries. For instance, German and Swiss
policy makers decided to pass laws for a nuclear phase out (‘Atomausstieg’) by 2022 in
Germany and by 2034 in Switzerland. Countries such as Belgium, Austria, and Japan
also passed laws to regulate stopping nuclear power in the future.
For citizens around the world, the nuclear disaster was an unexpected shock. The
accident revealed that nuclear power’s peaceful use can change immediately and causes
severe damage for the local environment and communities, as well as having unexpected
long-term consequences for citizens and the eco-system. A nuclear accident is an un-
expected event and from a technical point of view, the expected likelihood of a nuclear
accident is very low. As I explained in Section 2.4.6 only a combination of independent
82 Source: https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/fukushima-nuclear-accident-update-log-
15 (accessed July 16, 2016). Before the Fukushima Daiichi disaster only the Chernobyl disaster
(Ukraine) on April 26, 1986 has been ranked as major accident.
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and virtually unlikely incidences lead to a nuclear catastrophe. Not only unexpected
environmental factors, such as the tsunami, but also human error in operating the nu-
clear power units, can lead to such combination of events ending in a mayor nuclear
accident (Perrow, 1999). The two major nuclear accidents of Chernobyl and Fukushima
provide empirical evidence that independent of its expected likelihood an controllable a
core melt down within a nuclear power unit is possible. Nuclear power provides cheap
and clean energy but is also a technology bearing a catastrophic potential for humans
and nature. As a result, the benefits and risks of nuclear power are distributed hetero-
geneously among citizens. The question of how nuclear risk perception differs within
the population is a relevant question, especially after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
accident.
In this chapter I ask to what degree the Fukuhshima Daiichi nuclear accident sub-
stantially changed individual’s nuclear risk perception. Furthermore, similar as in the
two previous empirical chapters (Section 6 and Section 7), I evaluate how nuclear risk
perception and socio-demographic factors, as well as value based attitudes are related.
In addition to my previous research, I compare whether the independent factors are re-
lated differently when regressed, first with nuclear risk perception and secondly with an
index of general environmental concern. Nuclear risk perception is an important aspect
in individual’s decision whether to accept or oppose nuclear power (Siegrist et al., 2005;
Siegrist and Visschers, 2013). Furthermore, people’s behavior, such as support for pro-
environmental policies, also depends on how changes in the environment are perceived
as threats for personal health (Fransson and Gärling, 1999). Hence, analyzing whether
a sudden and rare event of an accident is only a temporary phenomenon or whether it
can change individual’s nuclear risk perception for a longer period of time is a relevant
question for policy makers responsible for the well being of their community.
In this chapter, nuclear risk perception is defined as the perceived danger of nuclear
power stations for the environment. The processing of perceived information about
nuclear power plants results in a judgment and evaluation nuclear power’s dangerous
potential (compare for a general definition of risk perception (Renn, 2008, 98); see also
Section 7.2 in this dissertation). The main research focus is on socio-demographic factors
that correlate with and are assumed to influence nuclear risk perception on an individual
level. Particularly, I want to examine which subgroups in society perceive on average
nuclear technology as less or more dangerous. Furthermore, I want to know if certain
values result in lower levels of nuclear risk perception. For example, people’s trust in
national governments can shape individual’s nuclear risk perception. It is possible that
a nuclear accident leads to an erosion in trust and in order to regain credibility, national
governments need to take political measures, such as a nuclear phase out bill, to gain
trust. As previously mentioned, I am also interested in the question of how nuclear risk
perception and environmental concern are differently influenced or related by individual
socio-demographic factors and attitudes.
This chapter is structured in five parts. In the second part, I discuss the concept of
risk perception and environmental concern. I also discuss the effect of socio-demographic
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factors and attitudes. Information about the data I use, the statistical method as well
as the operationalization of the chosen variables are described in the third part. The
results of the analyses are described in the fourth part. In the final part, I recapitulate
the research questions and discuss the empirical results, address the limitations of my
research, and point to further research questions.
8.2. Environmental concern and nuclear risk perception
Due to the emerging awareness of global climate change and the need to reduce CO2
emissions on the planet, acceptance of nuclear power has gained new relevance in public
discourse. Compared to coal, gas, or oil, nuclear power is supposed to be a clean source of
energy able to reduce a country’s CO2 emissions.83 However, there are uncertain aspects
of nuclear technology, such as nuclear waste disposal, unpredictable nuclear accidents,
and the existence of the military nuclear arsenal that counter balance these aspects.
Nuclear risk perception contains a specific thematic aspect of an environmental prob-
lem, the perceived potential threat of nuclear technology, therefore differing in its scope
from a broader concept of environmental concern. Environmental concern is defined as
“the degree to which people are aware of problems regarding the environment and sup-
port efforts to solve them and/or indicate a willingness to contribute personally to their
solution” (Dunlap and Jones, 2002, 485). This definition indicates that environmental
concern is comprised of several aspects or thematic indicators: firstly, environmental
concern has a cognitive component, indicating that an individual is aware of an envi-
ronmental problem; secondly, a conative component expresses individual’s willingness
to contribute to solve environmental problems; thirdly, also a emotional component is
sometimes mentioned in literature (Maloney et al., 1975; Maloney and Ward, 1973).
General environmental concern is operationalized to measure individual’s overall at-
titudes towards environmental problems (Dunlap and Jones, 2002; Xiao and Dunlap,
2007). Respondents are asked to evaluate their attitudes towards environment and are
not asked to judge attitudes towards a specific environmental problem, such as global
climate change, nuclear technology, or genetically modified food.
Because of its general definition, there is not one standard measure to operationalize
environmental concern. The Diekmann-Preisendörfer-scale (Diekmann and Preisendör-
fer, 2001) is a measure that uses nine questions to capture the above mentioned three
components of environmental concern. Related to this scale, different measures have
been used in national or international surveys, such as the ‘Environmental Conscious-
ness in Germany’ study (‘Umweltbewusstseinsstudie in Deutschland’) (Preisendörfer,
1999), the ‘Swiss Environmental Survey 2007’ (‘Der Schweizer Umweltsurvey 2007’)
(Diekmann et al., 2009), as well as in the International Social Survey Programme’s
83 Perry and Weinberg points out that the use of existing resources of uranium, burned by nuclear fission
will only marginally contribute to reduce the amount of CO2 emissions in the global atmosphere
(Perry and Weinberg, 2001).
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(ISSP) Environmental Modules in 1993, 2000, 2010 (Franzen and Vogl, 2013c,a; Franzen
and Meyer, 2010). Different scales to operationalize environmental concern are used in
cross-national comparative studies using data from the ISSP or the World Values Survey
(WVS) (Marquart-Pyatt, 2008, 2012; Gelissen, 2007; Dunlap and York, 2008).
One important aspect of this chapter is to evaluate how socio-economic factors are
related to both indicators, environmental concern and nuclear risk perception. Compare
Section 5 for an explanation of individual and contextual factors influencing nuclear
risk perception, as well as Van Liere and Dunlap (1980) to explain the social basis of
environmental concern. The question emerges as to whether the relationship can be
expected to differ between both indicators. Economic well being is assumed to influence
positively environmental concern. According to the aﬄuence hypothesis (Baumol and
Oates, 1979; Field and Field, 2009) an intact and healthy environment can be perceived
as a good, people are demanding more if people or a society becomes more aﬄuent.
Inglehart’s postmaterialism hypothesis (Inglehart, 1988, 1990, 1995, 1997; Dietz, 2015)
also assumes a positive correlation between wealth and people’s environmental con-
cern. Different from the aﬄuence hypothesis which assumes a direct effect of wealth
on environmental concern, the postmaterialism hypothesis expects aﬄuence to affect
environmental concern indirectly through a change in individual’s value structure. In
an economically advanced society, greater awareness for environmental issues as well as
higher willingness to contribute to improve the environment is driven by a value system
prioritizing postmaterialistic values, such as ecological stability, the quality of life, or
the right for free speech, over materialistic values, such as economic and social secu-
rity and stability. From the aﬄuence as well from the postmaterialistic approach can
be concluded that more aﬄuent people are more aware of environmental problems and
more willing to contribute to improving the environment. People who grew up and were
socialized in an economically better developed period, such as younger people or people
who gained higher levels of education and higher socio economic status during their life,
are assumed to have developed more postmaterialistic values and express higher levels of
environmental concern. The assumed positive relationship of aﬄuence and environmen-
tal concern is supported by empirical studies (Franzen and Vogl, 2013b,c), even though
the effect differs depending on the measures of environmental concern (Marquart-Pyatt,
2012).
For nuclear risk perception it is assumed that, in contrast to environmental concern,
different mechanisms influence individual’s ability to evaluate nuclear power’s risk for
the environment. Nature can be perceived as a valuable good and people express a
great willingness to protect the environment, at the same time they can perceive nuclear
power as not dangerous or not as a hazardous threat for their quality of life or their local
community. Pampel (2011) emphasizes that the perceived knowledge of environmental
or technological hazards is a potential explanatory factor for individual’s nuclear risk
perception. Empirical studies support the knowledge approach, indicating that better
educated people as well as people with higher income also express lower levels of nuclear
risk perception (Greenberg, 2009; Greenberg and Truelove, 2011; Whitfield et al., 2009).
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The exact mechanism remains unclear because a higher educational degree cannot be
solely understood to increase risk perception. It is possible that beside the direct effect of
knowledge on risk perception, education also indirectly influences risk perception through
higher levels of trust in scientific evidence and technological development, as well as in
political and economic authorities that manage and regulate high risk technologies.84
Since the evaluation of nuclear risk is a complex information processing process, it can
be assumed that individuals perceive nuclear power as more dangerous if they feel that
they have only minor or diffuse knowledge about environmental problems and its possible
solutions and, therefore, an ambiguous knowledge base to evaluate a risk.
People perceiving themselves as politically left oriented are assumed to express more
altruistic values and collectivistic worldviews and express higher levels of environmental
concern, as well as nuclear risk perception. Furthermore, people holding a left-wing
political orientation perceive political regulation for business as well as individual ac-
tors as an appropriate means to solve environmental problems (Costa-Font et al., 2008;
Neumayer, 2004; Heath and Gifford, 2006; Whitfield et al., 2009). Research also in-
dicates that women express more concerns regarding ecological problems and health
aspects in their life and within their community; women also perceive nuclear power as
more dangerous than men (Dunlap and Jones, 2002; Xiao and McCright, 2007; Boholm,
1998; Davidson and Freudenburg, 1996). The overall effect of age is assumed to nega-
tively affect attitudes towards the environment and nuclear risks (Nawrotzki, 2012). I
assume that higher levels of environmental concern as well as for risk perception can
be observed for younger people who want to protect their natural environment, since
they have a longer life expectancy than older people. Younger people also formed their
values and environmental attitudes with the knowledge of Chernobyl’s nuclear accident
in 1986. Environmental concern, as well as nuclear risk perception should be lower for
older people whose values were developed before the issues of sustainable development
and environmental problems became more prominent on the political discourse.
Trust in people, based on principles such as fairness and reciprocity, is assumed to
effect environmental concern positively. Environmental problems, understood as com-
mon good problems are easier to solve when people trust each other and avoid free
riding. Individual’s environmental concern, hence, the willingness to contribute to solve
environmental problems should increase if someone trusts that other people are also
contributing with similar efforts to preserve the common good (Meyer and Liebe, 2010;
Liebe et al., 2011). High levels of trust in this sense indicate people’s convictions to
collectively solve collective problems. Also trust in political institutions responsible to
govern environmental problems and technological risks should positively effect environ-
mental concern. Particularly in the case of a nuclear accident, political institutions are
responsible for protecting the population and for solving a crisis situation. Trust in
institutions is the crucial element to maintain and to reestablish the old order and to
84 Higher levels of education maybe increase the willingness to accept the “Faustian bargain” (Weinberg,
1972, 33), the deal of society and scientific, economic, as well as political stakeholders to provide a
beneficial good in return for the additional risks the whole society has to cope with in the future.
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maintain the belief that technological problems are controllable. Therefore, it is assumed
that people with high levels of trust in political institutions are more likely to express
lower levels of nuclear risk perception (Greenberg, 2009; Whitfield et al., 2009).
I also want to examine whether ambiguity affects environmental concern and risk
perception. In this context, ambiguity is understood as an individual’s uncertainty about
the ability to evaluate the decision making process (Ellsberg, 2001). Uncertainty exists
due to a lack of information about a problem’s or a risk’s causes, and a lack of information
about its possible solutions in the future. Lack of information should result in higher
degrees of uncertainty about the problems and individuals should be less convinced to be
able to actually contribute to solve the problem. People expressing higher ambiguity, as I
assume, should be expressing lower levels of environmental concern, i.e. lower awareness
of environmental problems and lower willingness to solve the problems. An increased
uncertainty about someone’s own risk evaluation process should result in higher nuclear
risk perception.
A major nuclear accident can increase individual’s risk perception due to a loss in
trust not only in political institutions, but more specifically by losing trust in a society’s
ability to govern a risk technology safely (compare Section 5.5 and Section 4.2.2). Several
reasons and qualitative aspects, such as uncontrollability, unfamiliarity, unavoidability
could lead to that change (Slovic et al., 1984). Firstly, a nuclear accident is perceived
as an unlikely event and from a technical point of view, nuclear power plants are de-
signed and managed so that a major accident should not happen. A major nuclear
accident is an example that even the best possible scientific and regulatory efforts are
not able to prevent an, as such, unlikely nuclear accident in the future. Awareness of
the unavoidability of a major nuclear accident can increase nuclear risk perception. Sec-
ondly, the rare event of a nuclear accident clearly shows that a nuclear accident has
severe and unforeseeable long-term consequences for the environment and social life in
the affected region. Accidents in the future will lead to similar scenarios for other areas
in the world. Awareness for human solidarity and concern for future generations can
lead to a higher risk awareness. Thirdly, an accident reveals that beside all existing
knowledge, in the case of an unexpected event, there is little knowledge and only lim-
ited technological means to control the situation. The Fukushima Daiichi accident is
an example of the limited capabilities utility management had in terms of knowledge,
technical expertise, and resources to control the catastrophic situation and to protect
the affected population. Awareness of the uncontrollability of a nuclear technology, in
case of an accident, can increase nuclear risk perception. Fourthly, the accident provides
evidence that nuclear radiation cannot be perceived with human senses. It also becomes
obvious that the scale and the associated health risk of radiation is not intuitively un-
derstandable, demonstrating the unfamiliarity with the risk. In case of a health hazard
from nuclear technology, people are not able to judge the actual risk they are exposed to
on their own, but depend on experts’ judgments and the information provided by pub-
lic authorities. To summarize: the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident clearly showed
that nuclear technology is uncontrollable in the case of a severe accident. Furthermore,
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political institutions did not prove themselves as able to provide reliable information
about the accident’s health risk for the population. Therefore, I assume that due to the
Fukushima Daiichi accident, the evaluation of nuclear technology changed substantially
in the population and increased individual’s nuclear risk perception.
In contrast to nuclear risk perception, the assumption that the accident in Japan is
able to substantially change more general environmental attitudes is less plausible. The
concept of environmental concern comprises general beliefs about the environment and
is shaped by individual’s basic value structure based on personal experience and future
expectations. Hence, it seems less likely that individuals change their overall attitudes
due to a single catastrophic event. Furthermore, the nuclear accident in Japan can be
perceived as a single event in a distant place having no direct influence on other global
or local environmental problems, such as global climate change, the overuse of natural
resources, or the local air and water quality. In the case of the Fukushima Daiichi
accident, I do not assume a substantial effect on individual’s environmental concern.
To summarize the hypotheses of this chapter I want to state:
Hypothesis 1a: A major nuclear accident increases people’s nuclear risk perception.
Environmental concern, in contrast, is not affected by the evidence of a nuclear
accident.
Hypothesis 1b: A major nuclear accident changes individual’s nuclear risk perception
substantially. The effect does not diminish over time.
Hypothesis 2: Women express higher levels of nuclear risk perception and higher levels
of environmental concern.
Hypothesis 3: Older people express lower levels of nuclear risk perception and environ-
mental concern.
Hypothesis 4: There is an inverse relationship between education and income, indi-
cators of social status, and a person’s risk perception. In contrast, there is an
expected positive correlation for education and income, indicators of social status,
and environmental concern.
Hypothesis 5: Higher levels of trust in political institutions as well as general trust in
people is negatively correlated with risk perception, but positively correlated with
environmental concern.
Hypothesis 6: People holding more postmaterialistic values show more nuclear risk
perception, as well as more environmental concern.
Hypothesis 7: Higher levels of ambiguity, i.e. the uncertainty of someone’s own ability
to judge environmental problems, results in an increase in risk perception and
decreases someone’s environmental concern.
247
8. Empirical Research III: Environmental attitudes after Fukushima
8.3. Data and methods
8.3.1. Description of data and operationalization of variables
To test the above mentioned hypotheses, data from the International Social Survey Pro-
gramme (ISSP) 2010, Environmental Module III (ISSP, 2012)85 have been used. The
countries’ survey period was either in 2010 or 2011. Only in Australia, the survey period
was in 2012. To compare the overall effect of the accident on nuclear risk perception and
environmental concern (Hypothesis 1a), I have used all available data for 26 countries.
In my regression analysis, testing all other hypotheses, I only use data from respon-
dents who were interviewed after March 11, 2011, the day of the Fukushima Daiichi
accident. For some country samples, I therefore use a fraction of the whole national
sample. My samples size for the regression analysis is 10,329 respondents from nine
countries (compare Table 13). In all country samples, the same 60 questions of the
ISSP’s Environmental Module and further socio-demographic variables were conducted.
Table 13: Survey period and sample size for the ISSP after March 11, 2011.
Country Survey period Days of field work Number of respondents
(after March 11, 2011) (after March 11, 2011) (after March 11, 2011)
Australia 05/11/2012 – 08/06/2012 88 1,946
Bulgaria 08/19/2011 – 09/24/2011 37 1,003
Denmark 03/14/2011 – 04/05/2011 23 38
Croatia 05/20/2011 – 06/20/2011 32 1,210
Israel 03/21/2011 – 08/15/2011 140 1,216
Latvia 07/30/2011 – 08/13/2011 15 1,000
Mexico 08/18/2011 – 09/19/2011 33 1,637
Switzerland 03/11/2011 – 11/01/2011 236 1,199
Slovenia 03/11/2011 – 06/15/2011 97 1,080
N -total 10,329
Source: ISSP 2010, respondents conducted after March 11, 2011. Date displayed as MM/DD/YYYY.
Nuclear risk perception is operationalized as an index on a five point Likert scale.
Respondents are asked to evaluate to what degree nuclear power plants are dangerous
for the environment. The scale is made up of five categories from “not dangerous at all for
the environment” to “extremely dangerous for the environment”, with higher values of the
variable expressing higher nuclear risk perception. Furthermore, for a better comparison
with the environmental concern index, the original range of the variable from 1 to 5 is
transformed in the value range of 0 and 100. Environmental concern is operationalized
as an index of nine variables that allow respondents to express their judgment on a
five point Likert scale (see for a detailed description of the operationalization of the
85 After the ISSP 1993 and ISSP 2000, the ISSP 2010 is the third module focusing on the environment.
The ISSP data are available at the GESIS data base (http://www.gesis.org/en/issp/home/ (ac-
cessed March 8, 2016)).
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environmental concern index Franzen and Vogl, 2013b,c). Respondents’ answers are
added to an index and transformed into a value range of 0 and 100, with higher values
indicating higher levels of environmental concern. The index’s reliability analysis of all
nine variables results in a still acceptable Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.69.
To measure a potential time effect on both independent variables, days passed since the
nuclear accident on March 11, 2011 are counted in a metric variable for each interview
date. Higher values of the time variable indicate that, given the new information of
the nuclear accident, respondents had more time to update their evaluation of nuclear
power’s dangerous potential for the environment. Also, socio-demographic variables
are tested as potential influential factors on environmental concern and nuclear risk
perception. Gender is added as independent variable with ‘male’ as reference category.
To model the age effect and to control for a potential non-linear inverted U-shaped effect
of age, age in years as well as the squared age variable is used in the model. To test the
effect of respondents’ formal education, a variable with five categories is implemented.
The categories are: ‘no formal education’, ‘primary education’, ‘secondary education’,
‘high school education’, and ‘university degree’. These categories are integrated in the
model as dummy variables with ‘no formal education’ as reference category. Individual’s
metric scaled household income is z-transformed with mean value of 0 and standard
deviation of 1 in order to compare the effect between countries and different currencies.
The z-transformed coefficient is interpreted as the change in nuclear risk perception or
environmental concern if someone’s household income changes one standard deviation.
General trust in people is an ordinal index variable operationalized with two vari-
ables. The first variable measures whether respondents express trust in other people;
the second variable asks whether respondents think that people treat each other fairly.
Both questions are conducted on a five point Likert scale evaluating someone’s trust
on a scale from ‘no trust/fairness’ to ‘trust everyone/perceive everyone as fair’. The
additive trust index has a range from 2 to 10. The variable trust in government asks on
a five point Likert scale to what degree respondents trust a country’s government. Both
trust variables are operationalized so that higher values express higher levels of trust.
Respondents can also express if they prefer postmaterialistic or materialistic values. In-
terviewees can choose to rate two value aspects out of four suggestions, two of which
are postmaterialistic and two of which are materialistic aspects: postmaterialistic value
aspects are ‘protect freedom of speech’ and ‘give people more say in government deci-
sions’, materialistic value aspects are ‘maintain order in nation’ and ‘fight rising prices’.
Respondents can either choose no, one or both postmaterialistic values. The value range
of the ordinal variable postmaterialism is between 0 and 2. Ambiguity is operationalized
as an additive index measuring the degree of uncertainty derived first from the causes of
and second from the solutions for environmental problems. For each variable on a five
point Likert scale, respondents can express their degree of uncertainty. The range of the
variable ambiguity is between 2 and 10, with higher values indicating higher levels of
ambiguity.
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8.3.2. Statistical methods
To analyze the effects of the previously described independent variables on environmen-
tal concern and nuclear risk perception, a fixed effects OLS regression model has been
performed. The sample is an ISSP 2010 sub-sample of nine countries using only respon-
dents who were interviewed after March 11, 2011. The fixed effects model measures
respondents’ deviation from the overall country mean value in order to control for un-
observable country heterogeneity.86 The effect is interpreted as a relative change of the
dependent variable within each country, controlling for each country’s mean differences.
To compare the overall effect of the Fukushima Daiichi accident I assume an exper-
imental design in the data structure. This allows for the assumption that two random
groups, a control and a treatment group, emerged from the Fukushima Daiichi acci-
dent (compare also Section 7). The treatment group are respondents, interviewed after
March 11, 2011. Since I compare environmental concern’s and nuclear risk perception’s
absolute mean differences, I assume that due to the experimental design, systematic
country differences balance each other out. The assumption of a natural experimental
design and the random selection of two groups of people in different countries is realistic
because there are no systematically biased factors for why a country should decide to
conduct their ISSP questionnaire earlier or later. The accident on March 11, 2011 is an
unforeseeably random event in the data generating process. Accepting this assumption,
a comparison of attitudes between a control and treatment groups without controlling
for unobservable country heterogeneity seems plausible.
8.4. Results
The absolute changes of nuclear risk perception and environmental concern after March
11, 2011 are displayed in Figure 23. The results show that nuclear risk perception in-
creased after the Fukushima Daiichi accident whereas the index of environmental concern
showed almost no change. The mean index value for nuclear risk perception for respon-
dents prior to the accident is 67 index points and increased for respondents interviewed
after the accident to 76 index points; environmental concern’s mean index value changed
from 49 to 48 index points, indicating no change due to the accident (Hypothesis 1a not
rejected).
Figure 24 graphically displays the results of the fixed effects OLS regression model
for respondents interviewed after the nuclear accident. The vertical Y−axis contains all
independent variables of the model, the horizontal X−axis displays the effect sizes. For
each independent variable, the effects for nuclear risk perception (light gray) and for
environmental concern (black) are shown. The point marks the estimated coefficient,
86 I also could use an OLS model with country dummy variables to obtain similar effects. In this case
I prefer the fixed effects OLS regression model.
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Figure 23: Mean comparison of environmental concern and risk perception before and
after March 11, 2011 (source: ISSP 2010, own calculation).
the horizontal line displays each coefficient’s 95%-confidence interval87. All coefficients
(with t-values) are also shown in Table 14 in the Appendix. At first glance, identical as
well as reverse effects of the coefficients on both dependent variables can be seen when
comparing the two models.
In the following part, I compare both regression models and their estimated coeffi-
cients. The hypothesis that risk perception changed substantially and does not diminish
over time cannot be rejected. This holds at least for the observed time of a country’s
survey period. The effect of time, the difference between date of the Fukushima Dai-
ichi accident and interview date does not differ significantly from zero, even though the
coefficient has a negative tendency (compare also the numerical estimate of −0.14 (t-
value of −1.00) for every ten days in Table 14). Environmental concern’s time estimate
has a negative tendency but is not significant on the 5% significance level (Hypothesis
1b not rejected). Women show higher levels of nuclear risk perception as well as en-
vironmental concern (Hypothesis 2 confirmed). The effect of age, for both dependent
87 If a confidence interval contains the 0 effect, the effect of the independent variable is not significant
anymore on the 5%-significance level.
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Figure 24: Estimated coefficients of nuclear risk perception and environmental concern.
Fixed effects model with 95% confidence intervals (source: ISSP 2010, own
calculation).
variables follows an inverse U-shaped tendency. The inverse U-shaped effect indicates
that nuclear risk perception as well as environmental concern increased for younger peo-
ple. The positive effect is diminishing over time and turning negative for older people
(Hypothesis 3 partly confirmed). There is an inverse relationship of educational degree
as well as of household income and nuclear risk perception, but not for environmental
concern. People with higher education as well as more household income, i.e. people
with higher socio-economic status, express lower levels of nuclear risk perception. On the
contrary, the relationship of social status is positively related to environmental concern
(Hypothesis 4 not rejected). Also both trust variables, individual’s trust in people and
trust in government, is differently correlated with both independent variables. People
who trust more on average, express lower nuclear risk perception and higher environ-
mental concern. The estimated positive effect is not significant for trust in government
and environmental concern (Hypothesis 5 partly confirmed). Positive effects on risk
perception as well as environmental concern are observed in people who express more
postmaterialistic values (Hypothesis 6 confirmed). People expressing higher levels of
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ambiguity do not show higher levels of nuclear risk perception, but significant lower
levels of environmental concern (Hypothesis 7 partly rejected).
8.5. Conclusion
People’s evaluation of nuclear risk’ dangerous potential increased after the Fukushima
Daiichi accident on March 11, 2011. Individuals’ nuclear risk perception did not decline
as the data show. I can therefore conclude that the sudden shock of the nuclear accident
did not diminish after the accident but remained stable over time, at least during the
period covered by the data. Even though the data did not control the effect of time in the
long run, with the longest period of 236 days in Switzerland, I assume that, on average,
the accident substantially sensitized citizens’ attitudes towards nuclear power. I also
conclude that because of the change in attitudes, in some countries, such as in Germany
or Switzerland, voters immediately expressed concerns and policy makers needed to take
political measures in order to regain trust in their government and to prove their ability
to take responsibility. The nuclear accident and the increased risk perception created
ripple effects (Kasperson et al., 1988; Slovic, 1987) affecting policy making processes
at distant places (compare also Section 4.2.3 and Section 4.2.8). I cannot prove the
assumed link with the given data structure, but the inverse relationship of trust in
government and nuclear risk perception seems to be an aspect worth mentioning. Studies
(e.g., Whitfield et al., 2009; Siegrist et al., 2014) emphasize that political trust is an
important factor in people’s perception of nuclear risk and acceptance of nuclear power.
This could explain why policy makers in distant European countries passed laws to fade
out and to stop nuclear power following the nuclear accident. A possible explanation is
that in a crisis situation a passive government loses political trust and voters are more
willing to change their political preference structure to support parties expressing anti-
nuclear opinions. Because I only can assume the causal relationship between nuclear risk
perception and trust, it is possible that an increase in nuclear risk perception results in a
decrease in political trust and to gain back citizen’s political trust, policy makers decide
to take actions against nuclear power. The causal relationship only can be measured
with longitudinal data (Siegrist, 2014).
The effect of social status, measured in educational degrees and household incomes,
opens the space for further questions and conclusions. On one hand social status is
positively related with environmental concern, while on the other it is negatively related
to nuclear risk perception. The results suggest that people holding a higher educational
level or with higher incomes are more aware of environmental problems and are more
willing to contribute to solving environmental problems. According to the aﬄuence hy-
pothesis, this effect is not surprising since richer people are also expected to be more
willing to invest in their quality of life. Why then, on the other hand, does this sub-
group in the society perceives nuclear risk as less dangerous? A possible explanation
is that people with higher status assess nuclear risk from a rational and technical per-
spective. People with higher education could be more familiar with assessing risks using
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probabilities and are better trained to differ between a potential and an actual hazard.
For example, after the accident people evaluated the likelihood of an additional ma-
jor nuclear accident within their community based on different information and logical
judgment and expected that a new incident was less likely to happen. In addition, it
could be the case that people with higher levels of education evaluate the risk of nuclear
power in relation to risks from other sources of energy, such as coal, gas or oil, and assess
that the number of fatalities from nuclear power worldwide is comparably low compared
to fatalities from, for example, coal mining or oil production. From this perspective,
nuclear power still has the image of a clean, safe, and cheap source of energy with ad-
vantages for nature, society, and economy (Pampel, 2011). Additional studies in the
future on nuclear risk perception could examine in more detail which factors influence
the observed negative effect of social status and nuclear risk perception.
The results reveal how social factors are related to environmental attitudes as well
as nuclear risk perception after a major nuclear accident. The observed effects can be
useful for related scientific fields such as communication science. For example, the effects
of ambiguity can be used to better understand how uncertainty about the causes of en-
vironmental problems and its possible solutions can be influenced by media campaigns.
Also, the importance of trust in governmental institutions is a crucial element in peo-
ple’s risk evaluation that can be influenced by risk communication. As described in the
Social Amplification of Risk Framework in Section 4.2.8, within their social context in-
dividuals as well as institutional actors function as social amplification stations to either
strengthen or weaken trust and uncertainty using communicative processes (Kasperson
et al., 1988; Kasperson, 2014). Political campaigns can lead to better informed people
who are able to evaluate a risk more accurately and build their environmental attitudes
based on the best available knowledge. On the other hand, citizens’ risk perception and
environmental attitudes are also influenced by political or lobby campaigns which aim
to spread incorrect information or only selective information focusing on the positive or
negative aspects of a technology or environmental problem.
My research could reveal systematic effects regarding how individual’s environmental
attitudes are related to socio-demographic factors. Nevertheless, the research has its
weak points which I want to mention in the hope of improving future research. I also
wish to add ideas for new research questions. The time effect has been estimated based on
short periods within nine countries. The results would have been more robust if there had
been more countries with survey periods of more than six months. To better control for
unobserved heterogeneity, it would be necessary to use a longitudinal panel design with
individual data before and after the Fukushima accident. Since this data are not available
any expressed causal relationship in my work is only an assumption. Furthermore, the
fixed effects model could be extended adding country specific explanatory variables in a
hierarchical-linear-regression design (e.g. for environmental concern: Franzen and Vogl,
2013c). For example, nuclear risk perception can be influenced by a country’s current
energy costs or if nuclear power is part of the national energy mix. I have not controlled
social or communicative context factors such as the intensity or degree of political debate
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in the public or media before and after the nuclear accident. Nor did I control the effect
of national or international non-governmental organizations dealing with environmental
or anti-nuclear topics, as well as economic lobby groups, which are important actors who
are able to influence citizens’ environmental and technological attitudes. I also did not
consider how the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident was reported in media. I assumed
a homogeneous spread of information across all countries in the sample. In this regard
a careful evaluation of media coverage after the Fukushima accident could be useful to
detect media-specific influential factors (see for example Arlt and Wolling, 2015).
Finally, I would like to consider how the results can be used to improve research on
environmental concern in the field of environmental sociology. One obvious aspect is
that the overall level of environmental concern, as measured in an additive index of nine
variables, did not change as a result of the accident. This leads to the conclusion that
environmental concern is a robust index which is not sensitive to unexpected events
such as a nuclear accident. This robust characteristic of environmental concern raises
the question of what environmental concern is measuring if even an extreme event, such
as the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, is not able to influence the index. I think
that environmental concern, as conducted in the ISSP and operationalized here, is a
quite general indicator, measuring individual’s intension to preserve the environment
and to avoid environmental problems. The indicator of environmental concern is not
a useful measure or indicator for drawing conclusions on individuals’ specific attitudes
such as attitudes towards nuclear power. And vice versa, a person who perceives nuclear
power a safe technology can express strong attitudes for protecting and improving the
environment. This chapter revealed that environmental attitudes are a multi-facetted
social element and research subject. It is a useful object for interdisciplinary research
and for more comprehensive survey research.
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8.6. Appendix
Table 14: Estimated coefficients of nuclear risk perception and environmental concern.
Nuclear risk perception Environmental concern
(Model 1) (Model 2)
Time dimension
Interview time since 3/11/2011 (in 10 days) -0.14 (-1.00) -0.044 (-0.61)
Socio-demographic variables
Sex (female=1) 8.99∗∗∗ (12.1) 0.98∗ (2.45)
Age (18-80) 0.43∗∗ (3.05) 0.15 (1.95)
Age (squared) -0.0050∗∗∗ (-3.42) -0.0016∗ (-2.04)
Highest educational degree (Ref: no degree)
Primary education 0.13 (0.096) 1.83∗∗ (2.59)
Intermediate education -1.12 (-0.85) 4.12∗∗∗ (5.81)
High school degree -4.31∗∗ (-3.04) 5.00∗∗∗ (6.59)
University degree -4.18∗∗ (-3.03) 8.32∗∗∗ (11.3)
Household’s income (z-standardized) -1.76∗∗∗ (-4.68) 0.58∗∗ (2.88)
Individual attitudes
General trust in people -0.40∗ (-2.05) 0.65∗∗∗ (6.18)
Trust in government -1.26∗∗∗ (-3.32) 0.28 (1.36)
Postmaterialistic value orientation 1.66∗ (2.57) 2.32∗∗∗ (6.72)
Ambiguity -0.16 (-0.74) -1.48∗∗∗ (-13.0)
Constant 71.8∗∗∗ (15.7) 44.6∗∗∗ (18.2)
R2 0.053 0.14
N 4480 4544
T-Value in parenthesis, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Fixed effects model in nine countries. R2 is the explained within country variance.
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Part III.
The art of change
9. Risk governance
9.1. Social science in risk governance
The “ultimate goal” of risk governance is to design risk communication processes to
“reconcile expertise, interests, and public preferences across the cultures within a society
and between societies” (Renn and Rohrmann, 2000b, 226). What Renn and Rohrmann
describe as the ‘ultimate goal’ for people doing risk governance is, from their point
of view, a complex social act of combining social and factual evidence, information
processing and judgement. Risk governance is an act of exchange of all involved interests
and voices that are included in the decision making process. As an underlying foundation
and basic assumption, it also means to mutually accept different views on risks, including
people’s risk perception and desire for a save environment to live in and to provide the
space for new social life in the future.
In the previous chapters, the empirical evidence and the theoretical approaches from
psychology, sociology, and anthropology to explain and evaluate people’s risk perception
and attitudes, reveal that there is no single approach in social sciences to entirely or
completely describe the nature of risk and its perception by humans. As described in
the dissertation, from my point of view, risk perception is an open concept to explain
how and what people across different cultures, societies, and time points perceive as
risks. Renn and Rohrmann (2000b, 224) suggest to understand different approaches
in social sciences rather as a single and intertwined entity than as “separate entities.”
The combination of empirically tested and theoretically derived knowledge, allows risk
managers to design risk assessment processes that are sensitive to the broad range of
public’s views and interests and adoptable by the given power structures.
I think the argument that public’s views on risk are biased and based on ignorance,
is a tautological argument and ends in an infinite regress: an argument that cannot be
rejected and not be proved. There is no best risk perception and no best approach, no
matter how ‘technical’ or ‘soft’, to assume a risk’s nature. What social-science research
allows is to assume that people associate different concerns with different risks. For risk
managers, it can be useful to know how individuals in social sub-groups, on average,
perceive a risk and how cognitive and affective components, combined with cultural em-
beddedness form and shape views on risks. A wise risk manager can learn to understand
perception forming processes in society. A wise risk manager can furthermore learn to
choose the right language and to address risk concerns without facing walls of socially
constructed ignorance; or as Renn and Rohrmann present in more technical jargon:
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“The core argument here is that risk communication, and indispensable component of
risk management, cannot be effective without a comprehensive understanding of how
people perceive and evaluate risks, and why risk perception varies so much within a
society” (Renn and Rohrmann, 2000b, 225).
The different scientific approaches cannot claim to be overarching and objective. What
is common in all of the approaches is the susceptibility to ignorance. The above men-
tioned integrative framework by Renn and Rohrmann (2000b, 221) reveals a multiplicity
of possible positions and perspectives by scientifically approaching the topic of risk (com-
pare e.g. Figure 10 on page 161). What is assumed, accepted, and ignored as a risk
differs also across individuals in society. If a risk manager decides to leave the clear cut
technical definition of risk, leaving the world of easily calculable and absolutely scaled
precise numbers, and enters the vague world of non ordered categories, it becomes clear
that what is perceived as a risk by one social sub-group can be without doubts accepted
by another social entity.
To come to a decision making process, in a world with “no impartial referee avail-
able”, social science can help, but is according to Renn and Rohrmann not the finite
solution (Renn and Rohrmann, 2000b, 225). Only a dialogical approach can help to find
the best available solutions in democratically organized societies (see e.g., Habermas,
1971; Fiorino, 1989; Renn et al., 1993). According to Renn and Rohrmann, science can
help design specific communication programs, more or less structured, such as formal
hearing, advisory committees, or citizen panels to create trust among people to perceive
themselves as an important actor to inform and control in the risk managing process.
Social-science research can also enter the arena of risk management and help to “artic-
ulate objectives of risk policies” (Renn and Rohrmann, 2000b, 225) that are based on a
society’s most important values, such as honesty, equity, and trust. By designing such
processes, the scientific goal to tell the (unknown) truth will transform in the goal to
mediate and monitor the risk communication process and the process of joint decision
making.
9.2. Adaptive management
Complex risks and high uncertainties challenge the traditional designs of risk manage-
ment processes and their ability to cope with risks. Scrutinizing the procedure of how
risk where confronted, controlled, and solved by social processes, is also a non-trivial
social process. Implementing new processes that are able to adapt to new information
bears the risk of loosing existing social trust in risk managing institutions, as Roger
Kasperson (2013) remarks when explaining the concept of ‘adaptive management’ of
risks. Adaptive management of risks is an approach that is more suitable for situa-
tions with high uncertainties, such as environmental risks, that cannot be managed by
the traditional logic or approach of “command-and-control” (Kasperson, 2013, 81). The
‘command-and-control’ approach follows a vertical way of thinking (or of language) with
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different steps to first identify a problem and finally to solve the problem. The basic
assumption is that risk and uncertainties are quantities that can be measured and un-
derstood sufficiently in order to develop exact models and accurately forecast potential
outcome and consequences. Based on this assessment, the decision making process, itself
based on quantitative standards, is designed to produce the best solution. This process
usually follows detailed guidelines.
It is not surprising that the linear and vertical command-and-control approach, de-
signed in the 20th century, using the language of the 20th century, is “drawing upon
military models of how decision objectives may be accomplished” (Kasperson, 2013,
81). Kasperson uses the example of global climate change or the case of radioactive
waste disposal facilities to exemplify that the world is an entity of coupled systems with
uncertainty as a predominant factor: “... [in] a kaleidoscope of social, economic, and
political institutions, high levels of uncertainty challenge existing assessment methods
and familiar decision and management procedures” (Kasperson, 2013, 73). Kasperson
questions the “well-honed strategy of “divide and conquer” of positive science” that seems
to haven been the standard approach in the scientific community, ignoring the need for
more “holistic and integrative assessments” that are able to cope better with the existing
ignorance structures in society to form and build a more resilient society (Kasperson,
2013, 74).
Adaptive management is an alternative concept, Kasperson puts forth. This approach
provides an alternative logic to irrevocable knowledge claims, control of uncertainty
based on logical assumptions, and risk regulation based on vertical thinking. In the case
of adaptive management the participants or parties involved in the process accept that
deep uncertainty still is a predominant factor.88
The acknowledgement of uncertainty and accepting that uncertain knowledge exists,
allows social knowledge-structure to grow with the risk in an co-evolutionary process.
Collaboration among all parties is an important factor for allowing for mid-term correc-
tions and adaptive management. Lateral thinking, in this case, is an important factor
to learn form experience in society with complex risks (compare an example of lateral
thinking in the comparison of climate change and terrorism Rosa et al., 2012). It is
assumed that the future cannot be accurately predicted and mutual learning is essential
to adapt to changes that are to be expected. The logic of learning (c.f., Henry, 2009)
is an essential factor. This process also follows the language of “humility” because as
Kasperson states: “When uncertainties abound, there is little reason to believe that we
will get things right on first try” (Kasperson, 2013, 83). The contrasting strategies for
88 Kasperson distinguishes between three types of uncertainty: a) aleatory uncertainty, b) model-
parameter uncertainty, and c) deep uncertainty, or ignorance or epistemic uncertainty (Kasperson,
2013, 74-75). The later case of deep uncertainties he defines as: “These are uncertainty situations in
which the phenomena posing potential threats to human societies are characterized by high levels
of ignorance, are still only poorly understood scientifically, and modeling and subjective judgements
must substitute extensively for estimates based upon experience with actual events and outcomes,
or ethical rules must be formulated to substitute for risk-based judgements” (Kasperson, 2013, 75).
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the command-and-control approach as well for the adaptive management approach are
displayed in Figure 25 (Kasperson, 2013, 82, Fig. 4).
(Source: Kasperson, 2013, 82, Fig. 4)
Figure 25: Adaptive management and command-and-control management.
The question arises ‘How should that be possible?’ given the existing institutional
structures in our developed societies. How to build a society equipped with institution-
alized communication structures that are open to evolutionary learning and collabora-
tion? Kaspersons suggestion is to work on a resilient society (compare Walker and Salt,
2006) that can adapt to changes. The aim is to couple nature, society, and technology
and form a system that is dynamic. This would involve a change of social capital, so-
cial institutions, and social structures of economy. Resilience, therefore, is not the easy
rout to glory: “[i]t is a new basic paradigm for guiding society and the economy, and
their relationship with nature, to goals of sustainability and resilience and away from
preoccupation with short-term profits and gains” (Kasperson, 2013, 84) – if glory is still
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a valid concept for society in an uncertain and resilient world.
The author criticizes the existing management institutions of both the private and
the public sector as not prepared enough to adapt to changes and not designed to learn
(Kasperson, 2013, 84). Therefore, Kasperson lists attributes of how institutions should
be, if they do not want to follow a traditional command-and-control logic. The attributes
emphasized the need for unobstructed communication and flexible power structures such
as: horizontal interaction and information flow, flexible management structures, open-
ness to stakeholder and inter-institutional exchange, learning centers within institutions
to learn from past errors, acknowledgement of uncertainties, and a socio-ecological and
socio-technical worldview (Kasperson, 2013, 84).
One major step to move from the military logic of regaining control by commanding
and controlling to the logic of resilience and adaptive learning, is to understand the
concept of change. The idea of learning and adaptation is not to move ‘back’ to an pre-
existing equilibrium state of the world, such as the idea of an absolute truth. In an socio-
technical and socio-ecological world the only existing equilibrium, the relevant dynamic
is change. The language of this dynamic allows for mistakes and uses them to improve
learning. In a world of constant change, experiential learning is not an automatic process
that leads to the right decisions. Uncertainty which allows for learning, does not mean
that the right conclusions will be drawn upon and right measures will be implemented
by all participants at the same time and in the same rhythm. Both, flexibility for
adjustments and the space for mistakes should be anticipated (Kasperson, 2013, 86).
Since learning is an art and a social process (Feyerabend, 1984), Kasperson encourages
all parties involved in a decision making process to keep vigilance and skepticism as
learning tools. This creates a permanent space for questioning long-held assumptions
that might hinder the understanding of new developments and not making space for
alternative views and lateral thinking. Knowledge in that sense and in line with Popper
(Popper, 1959) is a fragile and temporary object, and someone’s own view or perspective
of the world should always be the object of scrutiny and skepticism. Creating a dialogue
of vigilance and skepticism with the inner critical voice keeps the ability to learn alive
and vital. Kasperson suggests not trying for “debunking” critics if a “plural process to
assessment and decision making” wants to be maintained and encouraged (Kasperson,
2013, 87). The aim is not to control different views and neglect or ignore the views that
seem to be wrong. The aim is to keep a balance of views in order to learn from each
other’s experience.
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9.3. Risk governance
In the concept of risk governance, laid out by Rosa and colleagues89, the “willingness to
learn” (Rosa et al., 2014, 190) by all participants of a risk evaluation process, independent
of its openness or closeness, is a prerequisite for successful dialogue. Further important
buttresses are the “resolution of allegedly irrational responses” and the “non-moralization
of positions and parties” (Rosa et al., 2014, 191). The first pillar ‘willingness to learn’
implies that parties involved in the risk assessment process are willing to accept each
other’s views not feeling pressured to give up their views and not feeling to pressure
other parties to change their preferences and attitudes. Learning involves an ability
to recognize and to express in words that various forms of rationality exist (compare
Lynn, 1986). Learning furthermore involves recognizing that there are different forms
of knowledge existing in this world: very structured forms, such as systematic and
analytic knowledge (Rosa, 1998); various structured or unstructured forms of experiential
knowledge; and there is folklore wisdom90 in society, passed through generations (Renn,
2010).
The second pillar ‘resolution of allegedly irrational responses’ means to “discover the
hidden rationality in the argument of the other party” and to accept it (Rosa et al., 2014,
191). This part of a communicative process is independent of the actual issue to solve, it
is a process of building mutual trust to understand each other’s views and the underlying
rationale, as the authors point out. One example is the conflict between experts and
laypeople. Laypeople tend to provide anecdotal evidence and report emotional reactions
or affective experience. This information can be perceived as irrational by experts who
tend to rely on analytical thinking and pre-structured empirical evidence. These views
can be perceived as technocratic and simplistic. Accepting the rationale of each other’s
views helps to extract the relevant information – the elixir – of each view to derive to a
healthy decision (Rosa et al., 2014, 191).
The third pillar ‘non-moralization of positions and parties’ stands for the claim, that
all parties involved in a dialogical and deliberative process are committed to refrain
from moralizing. The above mentioned healthy decision is a compromise and moral
judgements jeopardizes that process. “Moral judgements on positions or persons impede
compromise. As soon as parties start to moralize, they cannot make tradeoffs between
their allegedly moral position and the other parties’ “immoral” position without losing
face” (Rosa et al., 2014, 191). Accepting the dignity of own’s own and other’s moral
values is the first principle of a successful dialogue. A second principle is to hold on to
the equality principle. The equality principle assures that no party is superior or inferior
in their position. Moralizing is also a strategy to pretend to have knowledge. Blaming
89 In the following part I refer to the chapter on ‘Risk Governance’ (Rosa et al., 2014, Chapter 10:
170-193)
90 As an example of how indigenous people in the U.S. and Canada passed their knowledge about
‘dangerous’ places that should be avoided and respected (now known as places containing high
levels of uranium) from generation to generation, see (Biergert and Stolhofer, 1993).
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or moralizing others serves to keep up appearances when arguments are weak and there
is a lack of available information (Rosa et al., 2014, 191).
The above mentioned process of adaptive management and learning from experience,
as well as deliberative participation of all involved stakeholders form the ground for an
integrative process to create social processes and strategies to solve today’s complex and
unknown risks. It could also be a practice to find answers for the expected problems
associated with risks. As mentioned, the process of scientific analysis and the process
of deliberative democratic participation are important elements, that together, create a
space where one can first identify a problem and then derive to a solution based on all
available and relevant knowledge.
In their part on ‘Risk Governance,’ Rosa and colleagues describe their idea of an
“Analytic-Deliberative Process”(Rosa et al., 2014, Chapter 10: 170-193). As the first
element of the analytic-deliberative process in risk management, the authors refer to
knowledge that is systematic and reproducible. This external source of analytic scien-
tific knowledge is an essential element, yet scientific knowledge cannot claim to be the
ultimate and only source of relevant knowledge in a risk decision process. Independent
of the discourse of what is real or objective scientific knowledge, following the method-
ological principles of relevance, reliability, and validity can produce knowledge of high
quality. Methodological rules are an “important yardstick” for measuring the quality of
scientific knowledge (Rosa et al., 2014, 180). The authors invite critical views, mention-
ing the constructivist’s skeptical view on scientific results (Jasanoff, 1999, 1996, 1989;
Latour, 1987; Wynne, 1992b). A skeptical view helps to keep vigilance and points to
the social construction of knowledge. In contrast to the positivistic or realist view: “[the
constructivists] see scientific results as products of specific processes or routines that an
elite group of knowledge producers has framed as “objective” and “real,” these products
are determined by the availability of research routines and instruments, prior knowledge
and judgements, and social interests” (Rosa et al., 2014, 180).
Rosa et al. point out that, independent of the debate of whether ‘real’ is realistic or
not, in risk assessment processes scientific knowledge is used as a knowledge base and as
an instrument to provide knowledge to reconcile conflicting perspectives. All analytical
processes follow almost identical rules and are independent of the “philosophical stance
of realism” (Rosa et al., 2014, 180). What can be accepted as valid knowledge depends
on the procedure of data collection and the cautious interpretation of the available data,
the inter-subjective reproducibility of results, and the compatibility of the theoretical
approaches. Even if the methodological and the theoretical approaches enable for the
acquisition of knowledge in its best quality, the nature of risk itself quite often evades
the possibility of being quantified and put into causal models with empirically proven
relationships: “often, only intermediary types of knowledge are available when it comes
to assessing and evaluating risks” the authors state (Rosa et al., 2014, 180).
In an analytic-deliberative process, scientific knowledge and competing knowledge
claims can be judged upon its validity. Systematically assessing the “relative validity”
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of each knowledge-building process, by revealing the underlying assumptions, and limits
of each claim scientific knowledge, can be useful for decision making processes that deal
with problems where almost no empirical evidence is available (Rosa et al., 2014, 181).
The authors emphasize that in an analytic-deliberative process all knowledge claims,
independent of its scientific nature, ranging from systematic knowledge to experiential
knowledge or folkloric wisdom, are a-priori equally important and legitimated to find
the best solution for each part of the problem in question (Rosa et al., 2014, 181).
Given different cultures of knowledge and within those cultures, considering the differ-
ent knowledge claims, a thoughtful process that combines and interacts with all different
knowledge claims is important: “The term deliberate refers to the style and procedure
of decision making without specifying the participants who are invited to deliberate”
(Rosa et al., 2014, 181). A deliberate process, the authors continue to summarize, is
a process in which each argument is judged independent of status of the participant
but by its relative weight according to the relevant pros and cons. Furthermore, the
process is not primarily designed or geared for decision making, but aims to exchange
arguments and invites all participants to reflect on competing knowledge claims (c.f.,
Webler, 1999; Renn et al., 1993). Because the decision making process is a process that
comes to an agreement, rather than to a decision, the deliberative process is a “style of
exchanging arguments” that focuses on the validity of each argument and the quality of
each statement and inferences (Rosa et al., 2014, 181).
Rosa and colleagues suggest an approach that combines the idea of integrating laypeo-
ple’s third-party knowledge into the mostly scientifically dominated risk assessment ap-
proach and keeping the spirit of a deliberative approach in the decision making pro-
cess. The combination of the two is what the authors term “deliberative democracy”
(Rosa et al., 2014, 182). Following a deliberate style helps to combine different forms of
knowledge and knowledge generating processes to form a knowledge base for uncertain,
complex, and ambiguous problems. Citizens do not step back when uncertainty enters
the risk communication arena and citizens cope with disagreement between various ex-
pert’s views. What citizens often miss is the “integrity” to be accepted with all views,
when invited into an expert arena (De Marchi and Ravetz, 1999, 756). Deliberative
democracy also integrates concerns of groups relying on the feedback of affected groups.
One important strength of deliberate democracy is to create a common understanding
through empathy. Once a common moral ground is created through empathy, the delib-
erative process is able to create new options and solutions through a creative process.
New approaches and ideas can be discovered and put in place: “It has the potential to
show and document the full scope of ambiguity associated with risk problems and helps
to make a society aware of the options, interpretations, and potential actions connected
with the issue under investigation” (Rosa et al., 2014, 182).
A deliberative discourse has the advantage of testing the internal consistency of a
problem – it “clarifies the problem” (Rosa et al., 2014, 182); it furthermore detects fram-
ing effects and assures that the arguments are still in line with the existing knowledge
claims; it is also a process that follows accepted norms and values present in the whole
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of society, not only in accordance with values and norms of a dominant sub-group in
society. The overall approach of combining different views is an advantage compared to
traditional approaches that happen within accepted norms and values of mutual exclud-
ing scientific disciplines, following strict standards of gathering and gaining structured
knowledge. The traditional approach ignores the knowledge that is within the public,
the feedback and creativity that exists, but cannot be measured with scientific methods
such as survey information or focus group analyses (Rosa et al., 2014, 182).
Maybe the greatest advantage is that deliberative processes create agreements among
all parties involved, independent of their initial views. This processes also helps empower
citizens to participate and to “play their role as active citizens in the various political
arenas” (Rosa et al., 2014, 183). Common agreements differ in their level of consensus91.
The crucial point is to combine the analytic part with the deliberative part in a
risk assessment process. The question is how to integrate analytic input, i.e. different
forms of information, into an existing deliberative process. One important element of
that integrative process is to make all underlying assumptions and scientific conventions
transparent, and to be open and vulnerable to skeptical critique. It also enables partici-
pants to learn to become experts and active citizens (Klein, 1997). The language and the
style of how scientific knowledge and results are presented to the broader public should
be considered carefully if experts want to be challenged by public’s vigilance: “the as-
sumptions and conditions that may constrain the validity and applicability of the modes
should not remain hidden behind the image of exact figures and algorithms” (Rosa et al.,
2014, 187). The style of presentation of knowledge is important for transmitting and
transforming experts’ knowledge to the public.
From my point of view, it is important to recognize that all participants of an analytic-
deliberative process are aware that they are in charge and take care of the existing
knowledge that exists in society. Their work should aim to improve the quality of
that knowledge. Vigilance and skepticism help to reflect and help to detect, through
a communicative process, the blind areas of a single perspective. Scientific approaches
are a simplified picture of reality, based on accepted procedures and limited knowl-
edge: “Experts need to acknowledge that they act on the basis of cultural expectations
(paradigms), professional conventions, sometimes doubtful assumptions, incomplete or
conflicting data, and simplified models” (Rosa et al., 2014, 188). I think that any so-
cial process which allows for critical reflection of the existing knowledge and knowledge
cultures is able to create new ideas and solutions for today’s and future’s risks.
Rosa et al. put forth five quality criteria to design a self-reflecting process that assures
that all knowledge has been reflected and carved out (Rosa et al., 2014, 187-188). The
first quality criteria for the available information is “methodological rigor.” This criteria
requires the use of all accepted standards to test all evidence claims for their validity.
The second criteria is the criteria of “comprehensiveness and representativeness.” This
91 A consensus can be unanimously, a win win situation, it can be a tolerated consensus, a morally
superior situation, or a compromise, a situation you can ‘live with’.
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criteria asks if all of the relevant evidence has been collected and analyzed. The third
criteria “incorporation of all relevant knowledge claims” asks if all forms of knowledge,
i.e. systematic, experiential, local knowledge and expertise, were considered adequately.
The fourth criteria questions if all conflicts regarding the provided evidence and modes
of validation and presentation were solved and all involved participants accept the given
knowledge. The fifth criteria asks whether all participants in the knowledge sharing
process perceived and understood the inherent normative judgements as part of the
provided evidence. It furthermore asks if that judgements are in line with the existing
accepted legal norms and conventions that exists in the society.
It has become clear that risk communication is one of the core elements of risk gov-
ernance. It can be the key to a successful way of govern risk or, from a skeptical per-
spective, can be the beginning of social distrust of governmental organizations designed
to govern complex risks (van Asselt and Renn, 2011, 439). According to Rosa et al. the
term governance refers to a political perspective aimed at providing a non-hierarchical
organization structure with no a-priori defined authorities. Collectively binding policy
solutions are generated in a deliberative process among all participants of a multi-actor
network. It is assumed that the power among all participants is equally distributed.
This multi-actor network includes actors from civil society, economy, and governmental
institutions. An important element is to draw the attention to the diversity of views,
logics, and roles, as Rosa and colleagues point out (Rosa et al., 2014, 153).
The concept of governance in contrast to the traditional idea of regulative and hier-
archically structured government authorities can be perceived as an answer to a grow-
ing complexity in an interdependent and globalized world, with constant technological
change and a growing number of uncertain, complex, and ambiguous risk problems. To
call for diverse views to find answers for new challenges seems to be an obvious social
tool. An institutionalized integrative risk governance structure can help to create a soci-
ety that is less vulnerable and more resilient. But risk governance is not a self-fulfilling
prophecy itself. It is a process that requires “social learning” to adequately include all
available information (van Asselt and Renn, 2011, 440). The non-hierarchical structures
also come with the disadvantages such as a fragmented risk governance process, cost in-
tensive evaluation and communication procedures, or a loss of trust and accountability
for governmental bodies. Beside the concerns of ‘bottling old wine in new bottles’, of
relabeling existing government procedures without changing the underlying processes,
the idea of risk governance bears the ability for adaptation and social learning to create
solutions for risk problems that are relevant for all members of society: “It is a dynamic,
adaptive learning, and decision-making process of continuous and gradual learning and
adjustments that permit prudent handling of complexity, scientific uncertainty, or so-
ciopolitical ambiguity” (Rosa et al., 2014, 156).
An adaptive and integrative risk governance process consists of different components
and depends on different resources and institutional means. Klinke and Renn (2012)
illustrate that risk governance depends on the institutional means, financial and technical
resources, as well as on human resources and social capital (see Figure 26). The authors
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structure the process of risk governance in several components that are all accompanied
by deliberative communicative processes. The components are on the one hand the pre-
estimation of a risk, combined with an interdisciplinary risk estimation procedure. The
other part comprises the evaluation of a risk and risk management strategies, followed
by monitoring and controlling to evaluate the chosen risk management strategies as
appropriate for the levels of a risk’s complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity. Once a
risk passes the interdisciplinary risk estimation process and is ranked according to its
complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity, strategies to manage a risk can be implemented.
Either standard linear risk management procedures, such as quantitative risk assessment
and risk-benefit analysis by regulation agencies, can be performed or more complex forms
of risk regulation, involving more discourse based management procedures with different
social actors to address a risk properly. I will not go into more detail to explain the
components of the risk governance process92. In the last part of this chapter I will focus
on the process of risk communication and participation the – from my point of view –
key component of successful risk governance.
expertise, epistemic communities, etc.). Hence the adequate involvement of experts,
stakeholders, and the public in the risk governance process is a crucial dimension
to produce and convey adaptive and integrative capacity in risk governance institu-
tions (cf. Pelling et al. 2008). Since the social acceptance of any response of risk
governance to risk problems associated with complexity, uncertainty and/or ambigu-
ity is critical, risk handling and response strategies need to be ﬂexible and the risk
management approaches need to be iterative and inclusionary.
Pre-estimation
Risks are not real phenomena but mental constructions resulting from how people
perceive uncertain phenomena and how their interpretations and responses are
determined by social, political, economic, and cultural contexts and judgments (cf.
Luhmann 1993; OECD 2003; IRGC 2005). The introduction of risk as a mental
construct is contingent on the presumption that human action can prevent harm in
advance. Risk as a mental construct has major implications on how risk is consid-
ered. Risks are created and selected by human actors. What counts as a risk to
someone may be a destiny explained by religion or even an opportunity for a third
party. Although societies have over time gained experience and collective knowl-
edge of the potential impacts of events and activities, one cannot anticipate all
potential scenarios and be worried about all the many potential consequences of a
proposed activity or an expected event. By the same token, it is impossible to
include all possible options for intervention. Therefore societies have been selective
in what they have chosen to be worth considering and what to ignore.
The insight that risks are not objective entities that need to be discovered but
mental constructs of how people select signals of the environment in order to be
Figure 1. Adaptive and integrative risk governance model.4
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Figure 26: Adaptive risk governance.
92 For a detailed description see Rosa et al. (2014, 156-166) or Klinke and Renn (2012).
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9.4. Effective communication
All risk governance processes rely on effective communication at all time and across all
levels. “Positively framed, risk communication is at the core of any successful risk gov-
ernance activity. Negatively framed, a lack of communication destroys risk governance”
as Rosa and colleagues (2014, 166) point out. It has become obvious that trying to
educate and persuade ‘less’ informed people to make them more knowledgeable – the
deficit model of communication – with the intension to make them to understand ex-
perts’s knowledge better is not a successful strategy to close the gap between experts’
and public’s opinions (Fischhoff, 1995; Pidgeon et al., 2005). The public is most often
well informed, knowledgeable, and not misunderstanding scientific approaches. Effective
risk communication even provides the ability to combine experts’ rather abstract exper-
tise and laypeople’s experiential knowledge to get a broader understanding of a complex
risk problem (Horlick-Jones et al., 2007). Especially in the case of complex technologi-
cal risks, such as nuclear power, risk communication is an important mean to build and
keep trust between the public and the risk managing agencies; but communication can
also destroy trust, if wrong communication strategies are chosen (Whitfield et al., 2009;
Figueroa, 2013).
According to Rosa et al., communication in the context of risk governance is under-
stood as an integrative process of policymakers, stakeholders, experts, and the public.
Communication, therefore, is defined as “meaningful interaction in which knowledge, ex-
periences, interpretations, concerns, and perspectives are exchanged” (Rosa et al., 2014,
166) and aiming to build trust among all parties involved. A successful communication
process, according to the authors, should lead to a shared basis of knowledge and to
better and more efficiently govern risk problems. To do that, communication in this
sense is not a mere social act, it is to be understood as a technique that allows in an
environment of complex, uncertain, and ambiguous information to interact meaningfully
and trustfully. Governing risk is a multi-actor approach and, hence, risk communication
a method addressed to bring together multiple actors to exchange information.
Communicating is an act of coordinating knowledge within and between different
social contexts and among different priorities. Rosa et al. clearly make the point that
in the context of risk governance participants share a common “normative position” to
include different interests and priorities as a necessary step of a collective decision making
process (Rosa et al., 2014, 167). The authors emphasize that inclusion of participants is a
problematic process and a challenge for the process of risk governance. Risk governance
implies a paradigmatic shift towards risk identification given a set of plural opinions,
multiple concerns, and contradicting public values: “[i]nclusion means that actors play
a key role in framing (or pre-assessing) the risk” (Rosa et al., 2014, 168).
The method of inclusion always addresses the questions of who should be included,
what should be included, and how should it be included. Various forms of involvement
can be used to include different knowledge claims, concerns, and public values into a risk
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assessment process: among others are round tables, open forums, mediation, or mixed
advisory committees (Rosa et al., 2014, 168). Successful communication depends on
the ability to learn to choose the appropriate methods and strategy of inclusion. The
principle of inclusion, as understood by Rosa and colleagues, is a “means to an end”
to combine all available information and concerns, to understand what is perceived as
a risk by whom and who knows what about that risk (Rosa et al., 2014, 168). The
nature of complex, uncertain, and ambiguous risks allows and is asking for a process
that incorporates and integrates various sources of knowledge and multiple perspectives.
It is also a means to designing and agreeing on a commonly shared decision making rule.
This process itself is an important part of a deliberative democratic decision making
process that itself is able to strengthen a social community and to make it more resilient
to risks that are able to affect the community. The principle of inclusion, the authors
conclude, is “intended to support the coproduction of risk knowledge, the coordination
of risk evaluation, and the design of risk management” (Rosa et al., 2014, 168).
Inclusion, as normative principle, is an openly designed process that itself follows
no strict rules about the degree of inclusion needed by the risk assessment or decision
making process. It requires constant learning, adaptation, and differentiation. Inclusion
can be a powerful tool for combining different opinions and identifying potential conflicts
from the very beginning of the decision-making process. The concept of risk governance
provides a platform that allows for such a process, it does not guarantee a successful
decision making process. And yet, as Belzer (2001) argues, people should learn to
manage their risks and are expected to make their own choices. An active citizen is
aware of the responsibility for the decisions needing to be made. Combining citizens’
awareness of high responsibility with experts’ knowledge is able to create trust within
a society, will close the gap among experts’ judgements and citizens’ – or shall I say
laypeople’s – perceptions, and at the end will guide all involved decision makers to an
commonly accepted decision.
I think, the ability of all actors to learn, grow and change through communicative
processes are the key challenges. In the end, in an uncertain environment, everyone will
be ruled-out by their own ignorance structures; the presence of risk is an invitation to
change and to create an open space, a place to exchange opinions, knowledge, values,
and emotions. Uncertainty is not the peril but rather the starting point and a finger-
post for constantly creating better communication structures in society. Communicative
processes designed to understand the uncertainty structure in society, support to find
sustainable solutions for a peaceful coexistence for all future generations.
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10. Final chapter: beyond nuclear risk
In my concluding chapter93 I want to ask: What is the question after the question:
‘How dangerous do you think nuclear power stations are?’? In short: ‘What is beyond
nuclear risk perception?’ To answer this question, I summarize four key findings of my
dissertation:
1. Evidence: the concept of nuclear risk perception is based on empirically observ-
able evidence. There are cognitive as well as social mechanisms for explaining
nuclear risks. People in the observed countries are aware of nuclear power’s dan-
gerous consequences for the environment.
2. Distribution: nuclear risk perception varies in all analyzed countries and is dis-
tributed within a society. The observed differences are not biased observations
from one correct way to assess and judge nuclear risk. Nuclear risk perception is
a process of intuitive and rational information processing. Within each country
there are citizens who express high levels of nuclear risk perception and there are
citizens who express low levels of nuclear risk perception, and citizens who perceive
nuclear power as somewhat dangerous. The tendency is that people proportion-
ally express higher levels of nuclear risk perception compared to lower levels of risk
perception.
3. Differences: within a society, nuclear risk perception varies systematically de-
pending on certain socio-demographic factors. The results show that women as
well as people with lower socio-economic status express, on average, higher levels
of nuclear risk perception. People who express higher levels of trust in the national
government, on average, evaluate nuclear power as less dangerous.
4. Sensitivity: nuclear risk perception is sensitive to an external shock of a nuclear
accident. An accident leads to an increase in nuclear risk perception and a more
uniform view on nuclear risk across the public. This changes are more pronounced
for subgroups of people who, on average, prior to the accident expressed lower
levels of nuclear risk perception.
What is the deeper meaning of the key findings? Risk perception is a social phe-
nomenon and the awareness of a problem is creating a social reality. This holds inde-
pendent whether the social space is understood as local resilient communities (Jasanoff,
2006) or as a world risk society, as Ulrich Beck claims (Beck, 1992, 1999). It is not
the case that all citizens perceive nuclear technology as dangerous. It seems to me that
the degree to what nuclear technology is accepted and opposed by citizens is still under
negotiation among all involved citizens. It is a local and a global discourse. There is
93 This chapter is not structured as a summary of my dissertation. For a summary of all chapters
please read the Introduction (Section 1). I dedicate that chapter to Ulrich Beck who passed away
in January 2015, the time I stated writing on my dissertation.
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no excluded other, everybody has its voice in this discourse. The process of evaluating
nuclear hazards is on the one hand forming attitudes towards a specific risk on the local
level while expressing shared concerns cross-nationally. I agree when Ulrich Beck speaks
of “global risk[s]” as the “human condition” (Beck, 2014, 80) of today’s world.
Where are citizens’ perceptions pointing to? The combined knowledge of all exam-
ined societies indicates that nuclear technology has an extremely dangerous potential
for the environment. Even though the data of the International Social Survey Pro-
gramme (ISSP) does not cover all countries, I assume that nuclear concern is a global
phenomenon. The patterns of how risk judgment are derived and distributed among the
population differ to some degree within countries and between countries. However, in
all countries there is a significant proportion of people who perceive nuclear power as
dangerous.
For me, the dynamics of nuclear risk perception point in two directions broadening the
scope of awareness: 1) nuclear risk perception creates an outreaching dynamic crossing
the boundaries of a national perception leading towards a global perception of risk; 2)
nuclear risk points inwardly crossing the boundaries of someone’s identity.
I think of the outreaching or embracing momentum of nuclear risk perception first. A
belief that this momentum is able to break the boundaries of narrow social spaces and
ignorance, creating a global other – a force that is encompassing the most distant social
spaces. Nobody is able to be ignored within the cosmopolitan community of awareness.
Maybe because the cosmopolitan communities activate at the same time high levels of
awareness and ignorance: nuclear risks are a Damocles Sword and a Pandora’s Box at
the same time (Renn, 1998). Cross-national empirical research on nuclear risk perception
(cf, for example Renn and Rohrmann, 2000a; Slovic, 2000a) indicates that nuclear risks
are anticipated in quite similar ways in different countries. From Beck’s point of view,
the shared awareness can have the potential to transform the world: “The sociological
point is: if destruction and disaster are anticipated this might produce a compulsion to
act. The social construction of a ‘real’ anticipation of catastrophes can become a social
and political force, which transforms the world” (Beck, 2014, 80). Beck in his vision
of a cosmopolitan society (compare for example Beck, 2014; Beck and Grande, 2010;
Beck, 2011; Aven, 2012b) is convinced that global risks are creating a space of a global
togetherness, challenging the concept of exclusive spaces and distant others: “Global
risks tear down national boundaries and jumble together the native with the foreign.
The distant other is becoming the inclusive other – not through mobility but through
risk” (Beck, 2014, 86).
Emotional perception of risk is a very important element of individual’s evaluation of
risk, as I have clearly argued. With the given data structure I cannot analyze in more
detail how emotions are shaping individual’s risk perception. However, research indicates
that rational analysis as well as emotional reasoning, is the basis for judging a risk (e.g.
Finucane et al., 2000a). Neither experts’ nor laypeople are free of ignorance. Emotions,
according to Beck, open the space to develop new procedures to deal with risks in the
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future and to include the distant ‘other’, not in the strict geographical sense, into the
discourse (Beck, 2014, 88). Emotions can also have the reverse effect of narrowing the
scope of citizen’s reflection, leading to new conflicts and new social discourses. Emotions
are important for social learning.
Globalized risks, create a global arena of discourses of change: the art of change is
an open social process. My argumentation points towards the potential for social trans-
formation that is emerging in the discourse of global awareness of nuclear risk. Ulrich
Beck speaks of a “cosmopolitan moment” (Beck, 2014, 88)94 in which the awareness of
a global problem creates a space of uncertainty among existing institutionalized actors.
This social conflicts in moments of globalized uncertainty have an “enlightenment func-
tion” in the eyes of Ulrich Beck (Beck, 2014, 89). The outreaching character of global
risks towards the global boundaries of our reflection are stretching our capacities of the
existing institutionalized mechanisms towards these boundaries, revealing spaces of ig-
norance, uncertainty, and irresponsibility. The existing order, the dominant mechanisms
of social stability, are destabilized and in this process, opening space to reflect processes
for governing global risks.
I think, the moments of global uncertainty, Beck’s “cosmopolitan moments”, are more
than enlightened moments. They simply mean work: work to build or rebuild social
institutions able to govern global uncertainties using the means we have today; a deeply
emotional process and at the same time opening space to reveal analytically what needs
to be done. Listening to all sounds, taken together the knowledge presented in my work,
I believe that everything we need to govern risks in the future is already present within
our society, within every human being. There is no need to wait for a better society or
a better human being. We have what we need to solve today’s problems, today.
The cosmopolitan moment can also be a cosmopolitan moment inside of human beings.
In his psychometric framework Paul Slovic and colleagues (1981; 1987) define a risk space
with two qualitative dimensions to evaluate risks: (a) dread dimension and (b) unknown
dimension. Nuclear risks are scoring high on both dimensions. I think, the unknown and
the dread spectrum of human risk awareness is constantly pointing towards a space of
inner reflection. What does not work in a context of nuclear technology, for example, is to
declare war on an enemy (Bauman, 2009, 2014). This reflection can lead to an increased
awareness of how to govern and communicate risks. Research on environmental values
points towards the ability of values able to shape collective action and deliberative
decision making (Dietz, 2015). Maybe the awareness of nuclear risks enables inner
voices to express their wish of a peaceful mutual coexistence of humans on earth. What
must start, as I think, is a moment of awe and reverence of life on earth. This change
94 The whole citation is: “All this is part of the reflexivity generated by risk, by the anticipation of
catastrophe. I cannot think of any power inducing, enforcing such a global learning process in such
a short period of time. Be careful: not catastrophe does this. The catastrophe is the moment of
(total) destruction. The anticipation of catastrophe does it. Manufactured uncertainties, global
risks are, highly ambivalent, paradoxically also a moment of hope, of unbelievable opportunities – a
cosmopolitan moment.” (Beck, 2014, 87–88).
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in human reasoning is in conflict with traditional norms and conflicting worldviews
(Eisenberg, 2001; Walters, 2003; Ekberg, 2007). McCright and Dunlap conclude that
the openness of the reflexive idea also leads to a countermovement of “anti-reflexivity”
in societies (McCright and Dunlap, 2010, 126). Since values are a fundamental element
in individual’s decision making process (Dietz, 2015; Stern et al., 1995; Stern and Dietz,
1994) a sudden change in the global risk structure can lead to unexpected changes in
society. To govern risks, from my perspective, the whole social spectrum, from the inner
core values to the social institutions and cultural fabrics, needs to work on communicative
processes to transform risks within a dynamic of accepted change. Each individual is
able to do that, “the historical power of global risk is beyond all the ‘saviours” ’ as Ulrich
Beck says (Beck, 2014, 86).
My research on nuclear risk perception aimed to understand different approaches
to explain how individuals evaluate risks, in my case nuclear risks. I then turned to
the ISSP 2010 data to test how individual’s nuclear risk perception is related with
socio-demographic factors and, if possible, individual values. The empirical focus aimed
to compare cross-national differences in nuclear risk perception before and after the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident in March 2011, as well as to show the immediate
effect of the Fukushima Daiichi accident on peoples perception on nuclear power. My
theoretical work and my empirical analyses have their limitations that hopefully point
to further theoretical reflections on that topic and future efforts to provide empirical
evidence.
The theoretical limitations of my dissertation are diverse. For instance, I have not
reflected the various theoretical approaches in probability theory (cf. for example Aven,
2012b, 2013), nor have I systematically recapitulate the history of nuclear technology
and anti-nuclear movements in Section 6. I also am not able to explain in more detail
how political power structures are influencing decision making processes (Perrow, 2011).
I also do not give much weight to theoretical frameworks in sociology, such as the rational
actor paradigm, approaches in critical theory, or Haberma’s theory of communicative
action (cf, for example Jaeger et al., 2001; Rosa et al., 2014).
The empirical part of this dissertation has its limitations. I use cross-sectional data
from the ISSP 2010, therefore cannot test for causal relationships. Research on nuclear
risk perception could be improved if surveys are designed as panel data, with individuals
being asked continuously about their perception of nuclear risk (Siegrist, 2014). The
ISSP only asks one question on nuclear risk perception, which allows only a very general
evaluation of individual’s nuclear risk perception. The questions asks how dangerous
people think nuclear power stations are for the environment. I have assumed that this
question, especially the term ‘environment’ comprises the danger for social life as well
as for nature. Since human beings and their communities depend on a healthy natural
environment, I think my assumption is justified and the question a valid indicator for
measuring individual’s nuclear risk perception. The lack of specificity of evaluating
nuclear risk perception is counterweighted by the advantages of the ISSP to provide
representative national samples from over 30 countries to generalize valid results of
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nuclear risk perception in a cross-national comparison. Many studies on nuclear risk
perception have the disadvantage of being non representative ad-hoc samples in selected
countries (Rohrmann and Renn, 2000).
Throughout this dissertation, I have tried to grasp the complexity of nuclear risk per-
ception to better understand why different views coexist. To do so, I followed different
theoretical approaches to develop a picture of complexity. In my dissertation I did not
contribute to work on the theoretical foundation of nuclear risk perception, by system-
atically comparing different approaches because excellent work already exists in this
field95 (cf, for example Rosa et al., 2014; Renn, 2008). My theoretical restlessness is also
caused by the question of how to govern nuclear risk in the future? I believe that nuclear
technology is too much of a risk for social beings. As outlined in the introduction, the
underlying aim of my work is to learn how to create a world free of nuclear risks. This
underlying and covibrating question made me also realize that deep theoretical, histori-
cal, technical, and political knowledge is necessary to understand the evaluation process
of nuclear risk perception, the evaluation and assessment of uncertainty as well as deci-
sion making processes under uncertainty. Risk is a sound, waves of awareness resonating
within the boundaries of a social life and changing through exchange of information.
Where does my work point to? Sociological theories (compare Rosa et al., 2014)
provide comprehensive knowledge of how individuals evaluate risks, make decisions and
act. From my perspective, the interplay of theories, not one single theoretical framework,
provides the knowledge not only to explain nuclear risk perception, but also to learn to
understand how to govern risks. I encourage inter-sociological as well as interdisciplinary
collaboration to share the existing knowledge within the scientific community. I encour-
age social scientists to share their knowledge with people responsible for governing risks.
Neither today’s best theory, nor the best empirical work, nor best intended political ac-
tion can prevent the next nuclear accident. Nuclear accidents have become an empirical
evidence in human life on earth in the 21st century. To change this social reality our
only option is to turn to wise social actions, based on pure thoughts, respectful words,
and honest emphatic action. While still respecting the work of the pioneers of nuclear
technology, this also means that banning nuclear technology is one possible step to gov-
ern nuclear risks today. I hope my work will serve as inspiration towards developing
social foundations for a global society able to govern nuclear risks.
Epilogue
What needs to be done to govern nuclear risk? We need to build social institutions
able to govern nuclear risks, as Alwin Weinberg already demanded in 1972 (Weinberg,
1972). The question ‘if’ society wants the “Faustian Bargain” between “nuclear people”
and “society” (Weinberg, 1972, 33) is not relevant. Nuclear technology is a reality of
our modern world. What if the society now wants to build social institutions to govern
95 I am not able to improve this outstanding knowledge, and I do not see a necessity to do so.
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this technology? What can society demand in return from ‘nuclear people’ to build
these institutions? Peace! Peace among all nuclear people. Utopia! This utopian wish
seems to be ad-hoc and not possible. It is not. History proofed that it is possible.
A joint effort between 1942 till 1945 of national states, Great Britain and the U.S.,
social institutions, the army, politics, industry, and finance, and individuals, such as
nuclear scientists, made the Manhattan project possible and created the first nuclear
bomb. Similar projects around the world followed that project after World War II. Is
it possible to start an Utopian Manhattan Project II to take nuclear technology a step
further? Is the next step to institutionalize to govern nuclear risks globally and for future
generations? We cannot change problems beyond human’s ability to change, but accept
and build resilient communities (Jasanoff, 1999). Nuclear technology is not beyond
human’s ability to change: we can change the need for nuclear technology and can learn
to overcome enmity. We can create Utopia. Maybe a moment to reflect upon. The art
of change starts within. It begins with a moment of silence – a sound of change. A first
step would be deliberative assessment processes which consider different perceptions and
views as equally valid (Aven and Zio, 2014).
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